Papua New Guinea To Begin Re-Settling Refugees on Manus Island

By Samuel Miller
Impunity Watch Reporter, North America and Oceania

PORT MORESBY, Papua New Guinea — Australia, which has been criticized for its policy of sending asylum seekers to offshore detention centers, has said the Pacific nation of Papua New Guinea would begin resettling refugees who are now being held in camps there. The statement did not indicate how many refugees were expected to be resettled in Papua New Guinea, nor did an earlier statement from that country’s foreign minister.

Asylum Seekers at the Manus Island Detention Center in Papua New Guinea. (Photo Courtesy of The Guardian)

Australia made a 2013 deal to provide Papua New Guinea with aid if it agreed to house a detention center and resettle refugees.

Immigration Minister Peter Dutton welcomed the announcement, saying he would be meeting with the Papua New Guinea government next week to examine the details.

“Consistent with the Regional Resettlement Arrangement (RRA), persons transferred to Papua New Guinea who are found to be refugees will be resettled in Papua New Guinea. No-one will be resettled in Australia,” Mr. Dutton said in a statement. “The Papua New Guinea government has shown its commitment to permit those found to be refugees to get on with their lives and have a fresh start in this dynamic nation with a growing economy.”

Australia’s policies toward migrants who try to reach it by sea have come under increasing criticism from rights groups. The groups say the country’s two offshore detention centers — one on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, and the other in Nauru — expose asylum seekers to harsh and unsafe conditions.

Papua New Guinea, which Australia says suffers from a general atmosphere of lawlessness, has not resettled anyone in the three years it has hosted the center and it says those who are resettled will face waits of up to eight years before obtaining citizenship.

Refugees will be eligible to apply for citizenship after eight years, but they may be able to bring their families to Papua New Guinea before then, after they have a job and have established themselves.

No refugees will be settled on Manus, only in other parts of Papua New Guinea. It is understood the vast majority are likely to end up in the capital, and economic hub, Port Moresby.

Advocates have said that conditions could prove difficult for refugees in Papua New Guinea, which has one of the world’s highest crime rates. The capital, Port Moresby, has high unemployment and is often ranked in surveys as one of the world’s least livable cities.

Indeed, many of those held in detention have said they will not accede to resettlement elsewhere in Papua New Guinea. Several dozen have already refused to present their refugee claims to officials.

“I will stay inside the detention center for the rest of my life rather than go to Papua New Guinea,” one refugee told Guardian Australia. “I never ever dream I could have a future in this inferno. Hundreds here, they feel same way like me.”

No refugee transferred to Papua New Guinea by Australia has of yet been resettled in the country.

For more information, please see:

ABC Online — PNG to begin resettling Manus Island refugees – 23 October 2015

BBC News — PNG to resettle Manus Island refugees, Australia says – 23 October 2015

NY Times — Papua New Guinea to Resettle Refugees From Australian Detention Center – 23 October 2015

Reuters — ‘Lawless’ Papua New Guinea says to begin resettling asylum seekers from Australian camp – 23 October 2015

The Guardian — Hundreds of refugees are refusing to settle in PNG’s ‘land of opportunities’ – 23 October 2015

Foreign Policy: Kurdistan’s Democracy On The Brink

Iraqi Kurdistan — officially known as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) — is the country’s only autonomous region. Compared to the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan enjoys more stability, security, political pluralism, and freedom for civil society. From 2003 until 2013, the region witnessed an unprecedented economic boom. During the U.S.-led war to depose Saddam Hussein, the Kurds were some of the United States’ most reliable allies, and today they are playing a pivotal role in the fight against the Islamic State. These stark differences from the chaotic rest of the country have led many to describe the KRI as the “Other Iraq.”

But today, this nascent democracy faces its most severe and probably decisive crisis since the end of its civil war in 1998, which had pitted the region’s two main political camps against each other.

Today’s crisis touches upon two core democratic principles: the peaceful transfer of power and government accountability.

Today’s crisis touches upon two core democratic principles: the peaceful transfer of power and government accountability. It is the outcome of this crisis — and not just the fight against the Islamic State — that will determine the development of democracy in Kurdistan.

Iraqi Kurdistan’s president since 2005 has been Masoud Barzani, whose family has ruled the conservative Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) since its establishment in 1946. Barzani was originally supposed to serve for eight years, as stipulated by the draft constitution. But a 2013 deal between the KDP and its erstwhile rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), extended his term for an additional two years. This deal was pushed through the regional parliament despite fierce resistance from the opposition and civil society, who called the extension unconstitutional. But, as of August 19, even this two-year extension has nowpassed — and the KDP has refused to respect the agreement. Barzani still clings to the presidency. His recalcitrance has plunged Iraqi Kurdistan into a deep constitutional crisis.

The region is now deeply divided. Four main parties – Gorran (the Movement for Change), the PUK, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group — are calling on Barzani to step down. These four parties, who might be described as the “constitutional camp,” are calling for a genuine parliamentary system in which the president is elected by parliament and is therefore accountable to it. In contrast, Barzani’s KDP and some of its smaller allies (locally known as “political shops” since they were either created or supported by KDP and PUK) want Barzani to get an additional two-year extension. They also argue for a presidential system that would give the president immense power. Only Barzani, they argue, can lead Iraqi Kurdistan in the fight against the Islamic State and thus win the Kurds an independent state — the latter being something that all Kurds, regardless of political persuasion, wholeheartedly favor.

Barzani appears determined to hang on.

Barzani appears determined to hang on. In a recentinterview, his nephew (and current prime minister), Nechirvan Barzani, said that even the president himself acknowledges that his term has expired, and that his staying in power is therefore illegal. But he wants to remain in power until 2017, when the new election is scheduled, to lead the fight against the Islamic State.

Meanwhile, due to the stark decline in oil prices (as well as endemic corruption, general mismanagement, discord with Baghdad, and the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State),

Kurdistan is facing a severe economic crisis after years of positive growth.

Kurdistan is facing a severe economic crisis after years of positive growth. The crisis has delayed payment of salaries to civil servants, led to shortages of fuel and electricity, and prompted growing social protests. The constitutional crisis compounds these problems and has fragmented Kurdish society to the core.

Instead of becoming the president of all Kurds, Barzani has remained the president of his own party only. He has been unwilling to take the serious steps necessary to address Kurdistan’s many challenges. He has failed to tackle high-level corruption. He has neglected to implement urgently needed reform of the military and the intelligence and security forces. He has balked at creating an independent judiciary — or, for that matter, any of the institutions required for a democratic statehood. And he has done nothing to bring perpetrators of human rights violations — from his party and others — to justice.

Rather than the unifying leader Kurds so desperately need, Barzani has become a source of division. Instead of relying on internal legitimacy, he has turned to regional and international sponsors to remain in power: the three most influential players in Kurdistan — the United States, Turkey, and Iran — support the unconstitutional extension of Barzani’s term. These countries claim that this bolsters the fight against the Islamic State and will provide stability in Kurdistan and Iraq. For them, it seems, “stability” is more important than democracy.

In its bid to keep Barzani in power, the KDP has resorted to intimidation,violence, threats to re-establish separate governments (which would essentially amount to partition of the region), the manipulation of judicial institutions, and the co-optation and coercion of intellectuals and journalists.

In an attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully, the four parties that oppose extending Barzani’s presidency have presented the KDP with two options they can accept. In the first, parliament will choose a new president, granting him extensive powers. In the second, the people will elect him directly, but as a largely symbolic leader with mostly ceremonial powers. But at an October 8 meeting, the opposing sides failed to reach an agreement. The “constitutional camp” is under immense pressure from its increasingly frustrated supporters to stick to its demand that Barzani should leave power peacefully. But the KDP seems in no mood to compromise, leaving everyone in a bind. The political stalemate has resulted in demonstrations by protesters calling for jobs, payment of back wages, and resignation of Barzani. Five people were killed, reportedly by the KDP security forces.

The KDP has accused Gorran of surreptitiously organizing attacks by protesters on his offices, and physically prevented the speaker of parliament (who is from Gorran) from entering Erbil. (The party has also withdrawn its recognition of his position as speaker.) In addition, Prime Minister Nechiravan Barzani sacked Gorran ministers and replaced them with KDP officials. Gorran says the government is no longer legitimate. The political polarization has reached a climax and no resolution to the stalemate is in sight.

Barzani had a unique opportunity to enter history as the first Kurdish president to abide by democratic rules and step down.

Barzani had a unique opportunity to enter history as the first Kurdish president to abide by democratic rules and step down. Sadly, he has chosen to do the opposite. By so doing, he is critically endangering Kurdistan’s fledgling democracy and the unity the Kurds so badly need to achieve independence.

As the Arab Spring has shown, however, sham internal stability supported by external powers provides neither security to a people nor legitimacy to their aspirations for statehood. Defeating the Islamic State and democratizing Kurdistan are the only ways to ensure long-term genuine stability and prosperity in a crucial region that is at the forefront of the fight against violent religious extremism.

 

Argentina to Hold Runoff Elections

By Kaitlyn Degnan
Impunity Watch Reporter, South America

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina — Despite polls and the media reporting to the contrary, the Presidential elections in Argentina have resulted in a tie. The top two candidates, current ruling party candidate Daniel Scioli and opposition candidate Mauricio Macri were neck in neck when votes were counted late Sunday evening.

Voters in Buenos Aires during Argentina’s elections on Sunday. (Photo courtesy of the New York Times)

Both candidates started fresh campaigns on Monday. They will face off against each other in a runoff election on November 22.

Results from 97 % of polling places reported that Scioli received 36.9 percent of the vote, and Macri received 34.3 percent. In Argentina, a candidate needs either 45 percent or 40 percent and a 10-point advantage in order to win. Anything less than that forces a second round, as in this case.

The tie came as a surprise – in the week leading up to the election, polls and the media were reporting that Scioli had at least a 10 percent lead over Macri. Scioli’s headquarters even declared victory late Sunday night, after the polls closed but before the final count came in.

Scioli is the handpicked Kirchnerismo successor to outgoing president Cristina Kirchner and currently the governor of the Buenos Aires province. A former vice president, he was originally seen as an easy win. Kirchnerismo is a leftist faction of Peronism (the political ideology started during the rule of Juan Domingo Peron) dominated by President Kirchner and her late husband Nestor Kirchner, who was elected as president for one term in 2003. The Kirchners, popular among the poor and working class but frequently at odds with the business community, have been in power ever since.

Macri, although a member of the opposition, has appealed during his run to Peronist ideals, a popular political movement in Argentina that crosses multiple parties. An engineer by trade, he is considered much more business friendly than the Kirchners. He is also the former president of one of Argentina’s most popular football clubs.

The third runner up in the race was Sergio Massa, a former Kirchnerismo who broke with the faction and ran as an independent candidate. Massa has the opportunity to step into a “kingmaker” role – his endorsement (and his 21 percent of the vote) could make or break either candidate. Although he was in negotiations with Macri prior to the election, as a former Kirchnerismo, he may decide to return and back Scioli.

Despite the lack of decision in the Presidential race, Sunday’s elections did prove historical for Argentina. Maria Eugenia Vidal was elected governor of the Buenos Aires province. Her election ended 30 years of control by Peronists, as she defeated Kirchnerismo former chief of staff Anibal Fernandez. Vidal is also the first ever female governor of the province. Macri appeared beside Vidal on stage following the vote count.

Macri and Scioli are set to participate in a debate on November 15.

 

New York Times – In Argentina Elections, Tight Vote Yields Presidential Runoff – 25 October 2015

BBC – Argentina election: ‘Two country’ poll highlights divisions – 26 October 2015

Buenos Aires Herald – ‘Argentina needs a change and we are ready to carry it out’ – 26 October 2015

Telegraph – Cristina Kirchner’s political project thrown into crisis by shock Argentina election result – 26 October 2015

Washington Post – After surprising election, top 2 Argentine candidates reset – 26 October 2015

 

 

NGO: Brazil’s Prisons a ‘Human Rights Disaster’

By Kaitlyn Degnan
Impunity Watch Reporter, South America 

BRASILIA, Brazil — Brazil’s correctional system has often been criticized for its overcrowding, but a new report released last week by Human Rights Watch sheds light on the wide scope of the problem. The report illustrates an environment of overcrowding and corruption.

Makeshift “barracos,” or cubicles, inside Pavilion 7 at Presídio Juiz Antônio Luiz L. de Barros (PJALLB), in Recife. (Photo courtesy of Human Rights Watch)

The problem is most pronounced in Pernambuco, a small northeastern state. Prisons there are meant to hold a maximum of 10,500 inmates at a time. They currently hold about 32,000 inmates, which is about three times its intended capacity. Currently, there is a thirty prisoner to one guard ratio.

Due to severe understaffing, many of Brazil’s prisons, including Pernambuco, are not controlled by guards, but by inmates. In their report, Human Rights Watch described the use of “keyholders” to maintain order in Brazil’s severely overcrowded prisons.

These keyholders, designated by penitentiary staff, maintain control over almost all aspects of life in the prisons, including the sale of drugs. Keyholders are usually backed by “militias” – strongmen who beat, threaten, and extort other prisoners.

Keyholders themselves usually have private cells, with amenities such as televisions and bathrooms. They often charge inmates about 2,000 reais (the equivalent of USD 530) for a portion of a cell and often require payment of weekly “taxes” to avoid beatings.

Prison staff maintain control over outside pavilions, the areas surrounding multiple cell blocks. Officials have been accused of turning a blind eye to the corruption, or receiving kickbacks.

Sixty percent of inmates have not been convicted and are still awaiting trial. A large number of prisoners in Pernambuco are awaiting custody hearings, wherein a judge makes a determination whether to hold or release the arrestee pending trial. Pernambuco only began providing these hearings in August 2015.  Arrestees are entitled to these hearings under international law.

Additionally, there is no separation of those awaiting trial and those convicted of lesser crimes and convicted violent criminals. Packed, unsanitary conditions have led to outbreaks of tuberculosis, HIV and sexual violence amongst prisoners.

For more information, please see:

Human Rights Watch – Brazil: Where Inmates Run the Show – 19 October 2015

Human Rights Watch – The State Let Evil Take Over – 19 October 2015

Human Rights Watch – Pernambuco’s Privatized Prisons – 20 October 2015

Vice News – This Report on Brazil’s Prisons Exposes a ‘Human Rights Disaster’ – 20 October 2015

Newsweek – Brazil’s Prisons are a ‘Human-Rights Disaster’” HRW – 21 October 2015

New Zealand Herald – Watchdog group blasts Brazil’s violent, crowded prisons – 21 October 2015