Special Features

Ben B. Ferencz: Illegal Armed Force as a Crime Against Humanity

By Benjamin B. Ferencz

 

ABSTRACT:

 

At the Nuremberg Trials in 1946, the waging of aggressive war was indelibly branded as “the supreme international crime,” The United Nations affirmed the Nuremberg principles and UN committees began creating a new International Criminal Court (ICC) to help maintain future peace. Half a century later, in 1998, in Rome, an enabling statute for an ICC was overwhelmingly acclaimed by 120 nations. After speedy ratification, the Court became operational in 2002. It was authorized to deal only with genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. However, several major powers were not prepared to accept any international judicial review of their perceived sovereign right to wage war; the same hesitations still prevailed at an amendment conference in Kampala, Uganda in 2010. Although aggression was re-defined by consensus, jurisdiction by the ICC was again postponed for consideration at some later date after 2017. The crime of aggression still hangs in legal limbo. There is a dangerous gap in the law.

Deterrence is the primary goal. If no court is competent to try aggressors, the crime is more likely to be encouraged than deterred. This paper seeks to narrow the immunity gap by suggesting a practical legal solution to discourage aggressive wars. Legal quibbling encourages evasions. Illegal use of armed force should be punishable as “other inhumane acts” within the meaning of the ICC prohibition of crimes against humanity. After considering the views of respected military commanders, distinguished academicians and noted human rights advocates, this paper concludes that those leaders who, without lawful justification and with the requisite knowledge and intent, are responsible for foreseeable large scale civilian casualties, should be accused of crimes against humanity and held accountable by fair trial in a competent national or international court of law.

 

From Nuremberg to Kampala

 

The history of humankind has been the history of wars. The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, had called for humane conduct even in warfare “lest by imitating wild beasts too much we forget to be human.” [2] Following the devastating U.S. civil war, Francis Lieber’s code set forth humanitarian Rules for the Governance of Armies in the Field. [3] At The Hague in 1899, delegates adopted the famous Martens Declaration that “belligerents remain under the protection of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the law of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” [4] The Commission on Responsibilities for World War I concluded that those who violated “the laws of humanity” were “liable to criminal prosecution.” [5] Rules outlawing the inevitable atrocities of war almost invariably contained exceptions in case of “military necessity” or “national interests” but the “laws of humanity” became an accepted minimum standard of binding customary international law.

 

In 1945, following the horrors of World War II, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, together with the United Nations, sounded a wake-up call. New thinking and new institutions would be needed, as stated in the preamble to the U.N. Charter, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” [6] The Charter clearly prohibited the threat or use of armed force except in self-defense against an armed attack or after authorization by the Security Council. [7] U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, America’s most distinguished jurist, served as Prosecutor for the United States at the IMT. He reported to the President that the American legal position “would be based on the common sense of justice…. We must not permit it to be complicated by sterile legalisms developed in the age of imperialism to make war respectable.” [8] The IMT declared: “This law is not static but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.” [9]

 

IMT jurisdiction was based on existing customary international law and treaties which condemned Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, such as murder, extermination, and “other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population.” [10] General Telford Taylor (later a professor at Columbia University), who directed a dozen subsequent trials at Nuremberg, following the IMT, concluded, in a prescient speech in Paris in April, 1947: “If the trials in Nurnberg . . . can help to expand and refine the legal principles of crimes against humanity, and if the nations of the world can establish a permanent jurisdiction for their punishment based on practical, enforceable and enlightened principles, we will indeed have reached a turning point in the history of international law.” [11]

 

Expanding and refining legal principles of crimes against humanity was not something that could be accomplished quickly or easily. Universal declarations of human rights and humanitarian proclamations have multiplied over the years but enforcement of the noble goals has been very slow in coming. Perpetrators of crimes in armed conflicts insist that their deeds were all necessary and justifiable; victims claim just the opposite. If such disputes cannot be resolved by peaceful means, and there is no impartial court competent to render a binding judgment, violence is unavoidable. Yet, we may be approaching a turning point as we peruse recent milestones that mark the progress in protecting humanity through law.

 

The 1948 General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed the inalienable right of all members of the human family to “freedom, justice and peace in the world.” [12] “Life, liberty and security of persons” was fundamental. [13] Another Resolution, in 1984, proclaimed that “the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace.” [14] In the 1990’s the UN Security Council created temporary courts to punish genocide and “other inhumane acts” committed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Yet, some powerful governments that supported the human rights system when it applied to others were unwilling to subject their own conduct to legal scrutiny. Despite such vacillation, the gradual movement toward a more humane world order protected by law was unmistakable. There has been a slow awakening of the human conscience.

 

In 1998, nations meeting in Rome adopted a Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC) based on the Nuremberg precedents. The treaty establishing the Court received the required 60 ratifications and became operational for over 70 countries in July 2002. Ten years later the number of accepting State Parties had reached 121. With the creation of the ICC, for the first time in human history, a permanent international criminal court came into existence. Only four core crimes “of concern to the international community as a whole” came within the jurisdiction of the Court: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

 

Major powers were still opposed, as they had always been, to having any foreign court adjudicate the legality of their military actions. They balked at allowing the ICC to try aggressors. Small states insisted that without being able to punish aggression – “the mother of all crimes” – the ICC would be a farce. As a compromise, aggression was recognized as a crime, but the ICC was prohibited from dealing with it until certain additional restrictive conditions were met. What was demanded was an acceptable new definition of aggression and assurances that Security Council powers would not be diminished. No one seemed to notice, or wanted to notice, that in 1974, after years of negotiation, a consensus definition of aggression had already been reached and accepted by the UN General Assembly (GA Res. 3314). [15] In any event, the impasse in Rome regarding the crime of aggression was bridged by postponing further consideration pending a Review Conference intended to be convened seven years later.

 

In June 2010, the promised Review Conference was finally held in Kampala, Uganda. The participants seemed to acknowledge at the outset that decisions would be reached only by consensus. “Consensus,” of course, meant that everyone had a veto right about everything. Under such restraints it would be exceedingly difficult to reach clear meetings of the mind on any important matters of substance. Nevertheless, a revised consensus definition of aggression was finally reached that was largely based on the 1974 consensus. [16] Its most significant change was that the aggression had to be a “manifest” violation of the UN Charter. [17] What actually was meant by “manifest” remained uncertain. Still, no longer could the convenient but spurious argument be made that aggression could not be prosecuted because it had not been defined.

 

Yet, once again, as had been done in Rome, under pressure from powerful states, giving the ICC active jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was not accepted. As a compromise, it was agreed to postpone the issue for reconsideration at some unspecified future date after 2017. It was an echo of the lame historical excuse: “the time is not yet ripe.” Thus, malevolent leaders responsible for what the IMT called “the supreme international crime” still remained beyond the ICC’s reach. If illegal war-makers were to be deterred by the threat of punishment by a court applying “enlightened and enforceable principles”, new ways had to be found to end the existing immunities.

 

Protecting Human Rights Through Law

 

“Enlightenment” begins with the recognition of the need for change. One of the primary objections to accepting new international rules to govern national conduct was the misguided complaint: “Our sovereignty is at stake!” For thousands of years, war was the accepted path to conquests, riches, and glory. Centuries ago, Thucydides articulated the oft-quoted observation: “We know as practical men that the question of justice arises only between those equal in strength, and that the strong do what they can, and the weak submit.” [18]

 

Power was decisive. International law did not exist.

 

The treaties of Westphalia in 1648 ended 30 years of religious conflict in Europe by creating a regional system of sovereign States in which a monarch reigned supreme only within his realm. Conquest by combat remained legitimate. This condition persisted even up to the formation of the League of Nations, which recognized war-making as lawful – as long as the enemy was given three months’ notice. [19]

 

The Nuremberg principles sought to substitute a rule of enforceable humanitarian law to replace the horrors of armed conflict. Those who stubbornly refused to be bound by new international rules failed to recognize that, in today’s interdependent and increasingly democratic world, sovereignty belongs not to a monarch who is above the law but to the people. The notion of absolute sovereignty is absolutely obsolete.

 

Enlightened military leaders who experienced armed combat learned the hard way that law is always better than war. When Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been Supreme Commander of the victorious allied forces in World War II, became President of the United States, he made an important speech in which he said: “In a very real sense the world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose the rule of law.” [20] He was echoing General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in the Far East, who, in 1946, praised the new constitution of Japan, in which the Japanese people forever renounced war as a sovereign right.

 

MacArthur, a great war hero, called for universal renunciation of armed might. He pointed to modern science and warned that failure to unshackle ourselves from the past “may blast mankind to perdition.” [21] Recently retired Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has repeatedly declared that he would rather prevent or deter a war than fight one. [22] It should be noted that prohibiting the illegal use of armed force is designed to protect military as well as civilian victims.

 

Many of our most far-sighted international legal scholars, such as revered Professors Hersch Lauterpacht [23], Myres McDougal [24] and his protégé, Michael Reisman [25] recognized that the human rights of the individual can best be protected by an expansive and not restrictive characterization of prohibited behavior and that we should look to the future, and not to the past, in developing norms of acceptable conduct. With respect to crimes against humanity, the highly esteemed Prof. Cherif Bassiouni has observed that “the purpose of the prohibition is to protect against victimization irrespective of any legal characterization or the context in which it occurs.” [26] In his recent book “Unimaginable Atrocities,” Prof. William Schabas recognized that taking the Nuremberg principles forward is “the mission of international justice, as well as international human rights, as a civilizer not only of individuals but also of nations.” [27]

 

Countless non-governmental organizations and official UN agencies have recognized the need for improved protection of humanity through law. In the absence of competent courts and political will by world leaders, the right to peace proclaimed in a wide variety of resolutions remained little more than an articulated but unenforceable aspiration. Declaring the law is one thing; respecting or enforcing it is another. The evolution of international law had not yet reached the point where institutions or means were available for effective peaceful enforcement of the rule of rule of law. [28] The existence of the ICC, with its legally binding statute that required all parties to the treaty to honor their obligations, held forth the implied promise that the future would be better than the past. Hope, however, does not become reality without sustained efforts to persuade the sceptics.

 

As a first step, all States Parties to the Rome Statute who were present in Kampala should now ratify the amendments on aggression, including the negotiated understandings agreed to by consensus in 2010. [29] Failure to provide the necessary [30] ratifications would undermine the utility and integrity of the entire Kampala effort. Those States Parties that accepted and ratified the Rome Statute are already legally bound by that treaty to assume primary responsibility for supporting the ICC goals and mandates. If they fail to ratify their own Kampala consensus, they foul their own nest.

 

Professor Otto Triffterer of the University of Salzburg, one of the earliest champions of an international criminal court, in his latest comprehensive commentary drew attention to the Rome Statute’s preambular mandate stressing “the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” [30] The statute’s preamble similarly speaks of punishment “at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation” and emphasizes that the ICC is “complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” [31] This principle of “complementarity” meant that it was only when domestic courts were unwilling or unable to provide a fair trial that ICC intervention was appropriate. Of course, it made good sense to rely first on local courts where victims could see that justice was being done, evidence was more readily attainable, and costs would be limited. To be sure, the Security Council, as provided in the Charter and the Rome Statute, can always intervene in the interest of world peace. [32]

 

It is particularly notable that States can trump and bypass ICC powers by enacting their own local laws authorizing their own courts to try any of the ICC crimes. Leaders who violate international criminal should have to answer to their own courts and their own citizens. If that is not possible or feasible, those responsible for massive killings should not expect the world to turn a blind eye to their crimes, but should expect that in the final analysis justice will be done by the ICC.

 

The Primacy of National Courts

 

Addressing the Assembly of State Parties on 12 Dec. 2011, the highly respected United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called on nations to fulfill their obligations by enacting comprehensive legislation incorporating the Rome Statute into their domestic criminal codes. She called upon the Assembly to work “toward ending impunity for gross human rights violations that amount to the worst crimes.” [33] She was right to note that the primary objective “is not to bring as many perpetrators as possible before the ICC, but to get states to diligently implement their obligation to prosecute international crimes.” [34] In reviewing the work of the ICC on its tenth anniversary, the President of the Court, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, correctly observed that “the most important aspect of the fight against impunity takes place in each country, society and community around the globe. Domestic justice systems must be strong enough to be able to act as the primary deterrent worldwide…” [35]

 

The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the right of peoples to peace has recently similarly emphasized that there is a universal right for all peoples to be free from the use of force in international affairs, and that states should do their part in advancing such rights. [36] The net by which perpetrators of international crimes may be apprehended and brought to justice is still under construction. Yet, if enough states carry out their acknowledged primary responsibility to enforce the rule of law, those leaders responsible for massive human rights violations will eventually be left with no place to hide.

 

What is needed now is new national criminal legislation to put perpetrators of human rights violations on notice that their evil deeds will no longer be tolerated. As far as punishing the crime of aggression is concerned, the lock will unfortunately remain on the closed ICC door until some unpredictable date after 2017 – at the earliest. Still, it may be possible for the essence of the egregious offense to make its way into national criminal jurisdictions of peace-loving nations. It should be noted that national laws to protect the right to life and other peaceful humanitarian goals do not require Security Council approval.

 

It is, of course, inevitable that on such difficult problems as war and peace there will be differences of opinion. Those powerful states that prefer to rely on their own unrestrained military might remain free to go their own ways. As long as such differences are dealt with by peaceful means they deserve respect. But the use of armed force, particularly against innocent civilians, should not be tolerated. If the Security Council fails in its duty to maintain peace, other lawful means must be found to protect innocent victims and end the outrage that leaders responsible for the most atrocious crime of illegal war-making remain immune. Recent experience has shown that when illegal violence becomes unbearable, tyrants may be toppled by the awakened und unrestrained outrage in the court of public opinion; surely, a peaceful legal resolution of such conflicts would be more humane and in everyone’s interest.

 

Although uniformity is desirable, different countries have differing legal systems, and different terminology may be needed to enable national codes to curtail the illegal use of force. If the term “aggression” seems too politically sensitive, States should consider criminalizing the offense under a more general description. “The illegal use of force” should be recognized and condemned as a “crime against humanity.” Of course it would have to be more explicitly defined and explained, but it might induce militant extremist groups or states to pause or desist from causing great suffering to large numbers of blameless victims.

 

Even powerful countries may come to see the value of restraining their own military might. The post-war constitutions of Japan and Germany, for example, contain provisions recognizing that aggression is a crime and curtailing their own right to use armed force except in self-defense. [37]

 

Many other states condemn various human rights violations such as genocide, apartheid, torture and other crimes against humanity as punishable in their national courts because they are recognized as customary international law that should bind all countries. Other states do not recognize customary international law unless specifically adopted in their own legislation. [38] The humanization of man’s most inhumane activity must be an ongoing process in the interest of our common humanity.

 

To be sure, many smaller states may need help in adapting their local laws to meet contemporary needs or threats. The ICC should, as a form of “positive complementarity,” assist States to close the impunity gap that now exists for crimes that were universally outlawed at Nuremberg. They should let it be known that if nations fail in their duty to protect their own citizens from slaughter, the responsible leaders may be brought to The Hague to face trial for their inhumane acts. Similarly, NGO’s and other supporting institutions can play a valuable role with respect to informing and galvanizing support from the general public and sympathetic legislators. The goal should be to include in national criminal codes all of the crimes that were punishable in Nuremberg and are listed as crimes by the ICC and other new international courts. Humanitarian law enforcement begins at home.

 

Some Practical Suggestions

 

The Rome Statute that binds the ICC spells out the parameters of all of the crimes within its own current jurisdiction. Enumeration of certain actions as “crimes against humanity” in the ICC statute and similar codes was never intended to be exhaustive or exclusive. Crimes which were separately categorized as “genocide” and “aggression” were being dealt with by special UN committees, but such separate crimes could very well have fit within the broader categorization of “crimes against humanity”. The ICC statute includes, by way of example, acts which qualify as crimes against humanity: murder, enslavement, apartheid, rape, torture, and half a dozen similar outrages. The final enumeration of offending types of conduct also condemned a catch-all category: “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” [39] This provision is consistent with the IMT language and with the statutes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals which have been set up by the Security Council.

 

The precise character of “other inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity was left to interpretation by courts and judges. The door was deliberately left open to possible inclusion of other unforeseeable major inhumanities that might otherwise have escaped judicial scrutiny. Nuremberg correctly condemned aggression as “the supreme international crime” because it included all the other crimes. [40] Even if the appellation “aggression” is not used, the consequences of the illegal use of armed force may be equally reprehensible and should not be allowed to escape criminalization because of nomenclature.

 

It may be useful, therefore, to consider a draft of a model code or template to help define the conditions under which an illegal use of force may come within the purview of Crimes Against Humanity, possibly as a category of crime included within “other inhumane acts.” In essence, what is required is national legislation along the following lines:

 

“Any person responsible for the illegal use of armed force in violation of the United Nations Charter, which unavoidably and inevitably results in the death of large numbers of civilians, is subject to punishment for crimes against humanity.”

 

Limiting the crime to persons responsible implies a leadership position. What is illegal is made plain by the UN Charter itself: there is an inherent right to individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack (Art. 51), and, of course, the Security Council can authorize any measures to maintain peace (Art. 42). If those conditions do not exist, the use of armed force is illegal.

 

It should be noted that those who undertake legally authorized armed force fall into a different category altogether. The legitimate use of armed might is permissible so long as such force is applied in a manner proportional to the harm sought to be redressed and consistent with established rules of armed conflict. It is the illegality of the use of force that gives rise to a crime against humanity because it shocks the human conscience by violating fundamental norms of permissible human behavior.

 

Of course, all of the safeguards of due process and fair trial must apply to both national and international courts. The ICC, for example, can only consider “crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” It must be shown that the crime against humanity was part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. The Prosecutor must prove that the accused meant to cause the consequences “or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” (Art. 30). The judges and the Prosecutor must take into account the gravity of the crime and whether the prosecution would serve the interests of justice. (Art. 53). The law must be strictly construed and not extended by analogy. It will be up to the judges rather than the protagonists to decide whether the specific deeds are “other inhumane acts” as contemplated by the law.

 

With such a wide array of safeguards, leaders who do not plan to use armed force illegally need not fear their national courts or the ICC. They should welcome this extension of international law as a protective shield for themselves and their citizens. True, national courts are not likely to bring charges against their own tyrannical leaders. But changes in regime are not uncommon and an independent and transparent judiciary may offer justice instead of vengeance.

 

The international community, frustrated by political inability to use authorized armed force, has heralded a new justification under the guise of a “responsibility to protect.” But one should never forget that lawful goals should not be pursued by unlawful means. Humanitarian intervention must not be a cloak for concealed political objectives. The use of armed might can only be legitimate under circumstances permitted by the U.N. Charter. The determination of whether armed force is lawful or criminal cannot be left to the self-serving and biased protagonists or their allies. ICC prosecutors and judges are required by law to take account of all relevant circumstances, including mitigating factors, in order to serve the interests of justice. A fair and transparent judicial decision by judges of mixed gender and varied nationalities, applying humanitarian rules of law remains the safest path to peace.

 

ICC rules of procedure and decisions by the specialized tribunals created by the Security Council to penalize the horrors committed in this century are creating valuable jurisprudence by which the legality of human inhumanity can be judged. If even one murder can qualify as a crime against humanity, surely maiming and killing thousands of innocents should also be recognized as a punishable crime by competent national, regional or international tribunals.

 

No one can expect all crimes to be eliminated simply by making them punishable locally or internationally. As wisely stated by Professor Theodor Meron, an internationally esteemed legal scholar and currently the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “To genuinely humanize humanitarian law, it would be necessary to put an end to all kinds of armed conflict.” [41] Of course, he’s right. Furthermore, a vast matrix of social improvements is also required. The threat of punishment, however, certainly has some deterrent effect. A guarantee that the offender cannot or will not be tried can only encourage more criminality. If the illegal use of armed might can be deterred, even to a slight extent, the effort to save human lives and treasure is surely worthwhile.

 

Concluding Thoughts

 

Internal and external wars that brutalize human beings continue to deface the human landscape. New technologies enhance man’s capacity to kill his fellow humans. The threat to humanity posed by the illegal use of armed force by nations and militant groups increases daily. Having invented the means for destruction of all life, it is difficult to believe that we lack the intelligence and capacity to prevent it from happening. Of course, there are those who still believe, as Thucydides did, that wars are inevitable and people will act only to protect their own interests. Yet, in today’s inter-dependent and potentially life-ending world, is it not in the interest of all nations to do what they can to deter war? The notion that war is an immutable manifestation of some Divine providence simply cannot stand the light of intelligent, informed analysis. War is never Divine; in fact, war is hell. The willingness among some to accept violence as the final arbiter of disputes has given us the world of terror, genocide, mass killings of children, and similar atrocities that raise doubts about whether humans are really human.

 

In his farewell address in 1961, U.S. President Eisenhower warned about the power of a self-serving military-industrial complex that could only be controlled by “an alert and knowledgeable citizenry.” [42] An ideology cannot be killed by a gun. It requires a more acceptable ideology. The logic of armed might breeds crime. Every war makes murderers out of otherwise decent men. Whether they are nations or armed bands, militants must learn to resolve their differences without having to kill their adversaries and their neighbors. The rule of law, nationally and internationally, points the way toward a more humane world. Failure to enforce the law undermines law itself.

 

Skepticism is understandable, but if change is desired, inaction is intolerable. When the Statute for the International Criminal Court emerged from the negotiations at Rome, U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called it “The hope of future generations.” [43] Legislators, diplomats, students, teachers, religious leaders, non-governmental organizations and every segment of society must be alerted to the vital importance of developing national and international criminal law to help protect the basic human rights of people everywhere. There is nothing more important than the right to life. Putting Nuremberg defendants on trial, as Justice Jackson noted in his brilliant opening statement in 1945, was “one of the most

significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.” [44] Failure to recognize that illegal war-making is a punishable crime against humanity repudiates Nuremberg and would be a

tragic triumph of Power over Reason. “Law, not war” remains my slogan and my hope.

 

August 22, 2012

 

Endnotes

 

1 Editor’s Note: The author is the former Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor of the Einsatzgruppen Case, in which 22 high-ranking Nazis were convicted of slaughtering of over a million innocent men, women, and children. In his opening statement to the Court, he declared, “The case we present is a plea of humanity to law.” (Original video footage is available online at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_fi.php?ModuleId=10007080&MediaId=184). He has been an active advocate for the rule of law throughout his career and a comprehensive selection of his writings, essays, and lectures may be accessed online at www.benferencz.org. He was assisted editorially in the preparation of this essay by his son, Donald M. Ferencz, who is also an active proponent of international justice and the rule of law; he may be reached at donferencz@aol.com.

2 Hugo Grotius, On the Laws of War and Peace, Book III. Chap XXV, Section II, available online at http://books.google.com/books?id=j1esrnUC- YQC&pg=PA83&lpg=PA83&dq=lest+by+imitating+wild+beasts+we+forget+to+be+h uman&source=bl&ots=5Qu504gqq_&sig=msOgyF3vNMIcNv8VM3NcFPuLM5s&hl=e

3 Available on-line at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp .

4 See The Preamble to The Geneva Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, available online at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/195-200001?OpenDocument .

5 Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities Conference of Paris 1919, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No. 32, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1919, at p. 20, available online at http://archive.org/stream/violationoflawsc00pariuoft#page/n1/mode/2up .

6 Preamble to the United Nations Charter, available online at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.

7 U.N. Charter Articles 2(4), 42-51, available online at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

8 Letter from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the President of the United States, 6 June 1945, reporting on the Nuremberg Trials, available on-line at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack08.asp.

9 IMT Judgement, The Law of the Charter, available on-line at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp. See also Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court, A Step Towards World Peace, p. 479, Oceana Publications, Inc. 1980 available online at http://www.benferencz.org/books/FerenczAnInternationalCriminalCourtVol1.pdf.

10 Constitution of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(c), available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp .

11 Telford Taylor speech of April, 1947, translated copy on file with the author.

12 See preamble to General Assembly resolution 217 A (III), available online at http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdf?OpenElement.

13 Id. at Article 3.

14 G.A. Res. 39/11, 1984, available online at http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/459/88/IMG/NR045988.pdf?OpenElement

15 G.A. Res. 3314 (1974), available online at http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/739/16/IMG/NR073916.pdf?OpenElement; see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, Volume II, Oceana Publications, Inc. (1975), B. Ferencz, “The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Substance?”, Journal of International Law and Economics, National Law Center, George Washington University 10 (Aug.-Dec.,1975) 701-724.

16 For a comprehensive discussion of the Kampala amendments and process, see Stefan Barriga and Leena Grover, A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression, American Journal of International Law, July 2011 edition, Vol. 105:477, pp. 517-533, available online at http://www.regierung.li/uploads/media/105_AJIL_July_2011_-_Barriga-Grover_-

_Historic_Breakthrough_on_the_Crime_of_Aggression_01.pdf .

17 For a discussion of the development of the definition of the crime of aggression up to and including the Kampala review conference, see Prof. Claus Kress and Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, available online at http://intl- jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/5/1179.full.pdf+html.

18 Excerpted from a History of the Peloponnesian Wars, relevant portion available online at http://www.rooseveltlausd.org/ourpages/auto/2010/9/29/49133548/Thucydides% 20History%20of%20the%20Peloponnesian%20War.doc .

19 Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 12, available online at

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,LON,,,3dd8b9854,0.html .

20 Statement by President Dwight D. Eisenhower made on April 30, 1958, in recognition of Law Day, available online at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/pages.php?pid=504 .

21 Excerpted from an address to The Allied Control Council in Tokyo, April 1946, American Affairs, Vol. III, No. 3, at p. 150, Summer Edition (July, 1946), available online at http://mises.org/journals/aa/AA1946_VIII_3.pdf.

22 See, for example, Mullen’s address to The Washington Center for Internships and Academic Seminars, Washington, DC, 6 January 2010, where he said “I would much rather prevent a war than fight a war,” http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4119.

23 For a short biographical sketch and tribute to Hersch Lauterpacht, see Philippe Sands, My legal hero: Hersch Lauterpacht, The Guardian Online, 10 November 2010, available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/nov/10/my-legal-hero-hersch-lauterpacht.

24 See, for example, McDougal, Myres S., “International Law and the Future” (1979). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2662, available online at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3677&context=fss_pape rs .

25 As noted by Myres McDougal, supra, note 24, at p. 260, “Michael Reisman has appropriately emphasized that lawyers must continuously make judgments about the future. In Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to a Decision, 14 VA.

  1. OO’L L. 1,33 (1973), he writes: Lawyers too often overlook the painfully obvious fact that though the events which precipitate decisions come from the past, decisions themselves are future oriented; the test of their quality is not whether they conform to the past, but rather whether they structure processes and value allocations in the near and distant future in preferred ways.”

26 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, at p. 44, Kluwer Law International, 2d ed. 1999. For an excellent discussion of the movement toward an international convention for crimes against humanity, see also Leila N. Sadat, Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

27 William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities, Oxford University Press, 2012, at p. 221.

28 For a general discussion of the development of international law, see Benjamin Ferencz, New Legal Foundations for Global Survival, Oceana Publications, 1995 and Enforcing International Law, A Way to World Peace, Oceana Publications, 1983 (included among selected works of the author available online at http://heinonlinebackup.com/HOLtest/UNLAV ).

29 Ambassador of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, Christian Wenaweser, as the outgoing President of the Assembly of States Parties, declared, “It is now up to each one of us States Parties to do what is necessary to have this system become operational in 2017.” Remarks by Christian Wenaweser as ASP President (2009- 2011), p. 2, available online at http://www2.icc- cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ASP10-ST-PASP-CW-CLRemarks- ENG.pdf. The Principality of Liechtenstein became the first State to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Kampala amendments on 8 May 2012.

30 For his major work reviewing the Rome Statute, see Triffterer: Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Second Edition), Hart Publishing, 2008.

31 Preamble, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available online at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm. See also the remarks of Amb. Tiina Intelmann, the current President of the Assembly of States Parties who, upon her election stated, “States Parties should increase their focus in building capacities of national jurisdictions. This is also the only way to deter future crimes.” SECRETARIAT OF THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES, Tenth Session of the Assembly, New York, 12 – 21 December 2011, Remarks by Amb. Intelmann, the new President of the Assembly upon election, at p. 1, available online at http://www2.icc- cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ASP10-ST-NPASP-Remarks-ENG.pdf.

32 ICC Statute Article 16, available online at

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.

33 Statement of Navi Pillay to the Assembly of States Parties, 12 December 2011, available online at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ASP10- ST-UNHCHR-ENG.pdf.

34 Id. See also speech of Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Right, at Cinema for Peace Dinner, December 2011, New York, NY, available online at http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11724&L angID=E

35 International Criminal Court Turns Ten, Opinion piece by Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the International Criminal Court, 2 July 2012, available online at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2012/07/02/international-criminal-court-turns-ten- opinion-piece-by-judge-sang-hyun-song-president-of-the-international-criminal-court/.

36 See Progress Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the Right of Peoples to Peace, as reproduced 9 December 2011, A/HRC/AC/8/2, available online at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/Session8/A-HRC- AC-8-2_en.doc.

37 The Japanese Constitution at Article 9 reads “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. “(available online at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html). Art. 26(1) of the German Basic Law reads: “Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offense.” (available online at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#26); moreover, German Ambassador Hans-Peter Kaul, a respected judge at the ICC, has been an ardent and outspoken champion of criminalizing the crime of aggression and the illegal use of force on both the international and national level (See, for example, Is it Possible to Prevent or Punish Future Aggressive War‐making? Address by Judge Dr. jur. h. c. Hans‐Peter Kaul, Second Vice‐President of the International Criminal Court at the Li Haopei Lecture Series “Implications of the Criminalization of Aggression” , 8 February 2011, Forum for International Criminal and Humanitarian Law, Oslo, Norway, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6B2BA9C6-C5B5-417A-8EF4- DA3CA0902172/282974/07022011_ImplicationsoftheCriminalizationofAggress.pdf).

38 See, for example, R. v. Jones, where the U.K. Law Lords opined that the crime of aggression exists in customary international law, but must first be domesticated into national law by specific legislative action before it can be prosecuted in domestic courts, [2006] UKHL 16, available online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329/jones-1.htm.

39 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7, Paragraph 1.k, available online at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm. By way of example, courts have interpreted beatings and acts of violence, including forcing a woman to exercise naked in public to constitute “other inhumane acts”. See Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, the Experience of International and National Court,

Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Volume I, Kluwer Law International, 2000, at p. 244. Author’s note: If crimes such as these are within “other inhumane acts”, surely killing masses of civilians in an illegal war merits at least equal condemnation as a prosecutable crime.

40 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, under the heading The Common Plan or Conspiracy and Aggressive War, available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp.

41 94 American Journal of International Law (pp.240) (April 2000).

42 Eisenhower’s farewell addresses to the nation, 17 January 1961, text available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp. For a video of the speech, as delivered, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWiIYW_fBfY.

43 See Statement of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the opening of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court, New York, 16 February 1999, available online at http://www.ngos.net/un/icc.html.

44 Transcripts of the IMT proceedings and judgement may be found on-line at The Avalon Project, with the opening statement of Jackson at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap_05.asp. The trial transcript erroneously indicates that Jackson used the phrasing “Power ever has paid to Reason”; what Jackson actually said was “Power has ever paid to Reason,” as may be seen on live video footage of his opening statement available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L50OZSeDXeA.

 

 

War Crimes Prosecution Watch: Volume 10, Issue 12- August 24, 2012

Volume 10 – Issue 12
August 24, 2015

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Editor in Chief
Alexis Krivoshik

Managing Editors
Kate Mozynski
Aaron Kearny

Senior Technical Editor
R. Tadd Pinkston

War Crimes Prosecution Watch is a bi-weekly e-newsletter that compiles official documents and articles from major news sources detailing and analyzing salient issues pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes throughout the world. To subscribe, please email warcrimeswatch@pilpg.org and type “subscribe” in the subject line.

Opinions expressed in the articles herein represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily those of the War Crimes Prosecution Watch staff, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law or Public International Law & Policy Group.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Darfur, Sudan

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in Darfur, Sudan

Rwanda’s Intelligence Chief Won’t Be Extradited to Spain
Wall Street Journal
By Nadim Roberts
August 10, 2015

A U.K. court has rejected an extradition case against Rwanda’s spy chief to stand trial in Spain for his alleged role in reprisal killings following the country’s 1994 genocide, Britain’s prosecution service said on Monday.

Rwanda’s intelligence chief Karenzi Karake was arrested in June at Heathrow Airport while embarking a flight to Rwanda. The arrest was made at the request of authorities in Spain, where he is wanted in connection with war crimes against civilians.

But on Monday, Britain’s Crown Prosecution Service said it didn’t believe an extradition offense could be established under U.K. law. “The main reason is that the relevant laws on the conduct alleged in this case do not cover the acts of non-U.K. nationals or residents abroad,” the CPS said.

Acting on this information, Senior District Judge Howard Riddle decided to discharge the European Arrest Warrant seeking the extradition of Mr. Karake, the CPS added.

Mr. Karake’s arrest had placed a strain on relations between Rwanda and the U.K. Rwandan government officials had claimed the charges were politically motivated and insulting, with the country’s president calling the arrest a “continuation of slavery, of colonialism, of violence and bigotry.”

Mr. Karake is a member of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the current ruling party. He fought in the civil war that preceded the genocide. Previously, he was the deputy commander of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan. He left that post in 2009.

Human Rights Watch protested his appointment, accusing him of coordinating attacks against civilians when Rwandan forces were fighting Uganda in Congo in 2000.

The Spanish warrant stemmed from an indictment issued by a judge in 2008 that accused Mr. Karake, along with dozens of other Rwandans, of war crimes in the aftermath of the genocide. Mr. Karake was also accused of ordering the 1997 killing of three Spanish volunteers from a medical charity, Medicos del Mundo.

Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo said on Monday in a message on Twitter that she was delighted Mr. Karake would be coming home. “This was an unnecessary and abusive process,” she said.

A Spanish lawyer for plaintiffs seeking Mr. Karake’s extradition couldn’t immediately be reached for comment.

South Africa: Judgment Reserved in Bashir Appeal Bid
All Africa
August 14, 2015

Judgment was reserved in an application by the South African government for leave to appeal a ruling that it should have detained Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when he was in South Africa for an African Union (AU) summit.

A full bench of three judges of the High Court in Pretoria in June ruled that South Africa was compelled to arrest Al-Bashir and hand him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to stand trial on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur.

They also ruled that the government’s failure to take steps to arrest Bashir was unconstitutional.

In strongly-worded reasons for their ruling, the judges said the democratic edifice would crumble stone by stone until it collapsed and chaos would ensue if the state did not abide by court orders.

They said a democratic state based on the rule of law could not exist or function if the government ignored its constitutional obligations.

Judge President Dunstan Mlambo, Deputy Judge President Aubrey Ledwaba and Judge Hans Fabricius also invited the National Director of Public Prosecutions to consider if criminal proceedings were appropriate.

Judge Fabricius on June 14 granted an interim order to the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) to keep Bashir in the country.

The full bench granted an order on June 15 for his arrest, pending a formal request by the ICC, but he was allowed to leave while the matter was before court. The South African government maintained that as a sitting head of state, Bashir enjoyed absolute immunity and it would have been unlawful to arrest him.

It also maintained that the UN and not the government had invited Bashir.

On Friday, Jeremy Gauntlett, SC, representing the government, argued that the court had granted an order which potentially reached “to the death or retirement of President Bashir, which could be a very long time”.

He said it was not unlikely that Bashir would visit the country or pass through South Africa again.

“This involves the conduct of international relations and gives rise to serious constitutional debate… It would not in principle be right to say the last word has been spoken on the issue.

“These are issues of fundamental importance to the constitutional and the international obligations of the country,” he said. Gauntlett argued that the order could affect other heads of state who were in a similar situation and could affect every future event of international significance to be held in South Africa.

“Whether South Africa is in a position to host African events without arresting invitees is of pressing practical relevance to government,” he said.

He submitted that the court order imposed domestic legal obligations under a court order which was inconsistent with domestic legislation and international law and ventured into a sensitive area of foreign policy, which was within the heartland of the executive arm of government.

“The court’s inference that government was able to prevent President Bashir’s departure, but deliberately repudiated the order, is contrary to the evidence before court.

“In such circumstances there are good prospects that another court may come to a different conclusion on government’s compliance with the interim order.

“There is every reason to afford both parties an opportunity to ventilate the decision on appeal. If this is not permitted, the practical legal effect will be that the question will never realistically arise again before a South African court, because no head of State liable to arrest would ever again enter South Africa.

“The implications for South Africa’s conduct of its international relations are both clear and profound,” he submitted.

Wim Trengove, SC, for the SALC, argued that the issue became moot when Bashir left the country and that any order granted on appeal would have no practical effect.

He said if they had been told during the course of the hearing that Bashir had left the country, they would not have continued with the application.

“The issue was whether government had a duty to arrest him. That duty disappeared when Bashir left.

“The matter is moot and this court has no discretion to grant leave to appeal… Courts do not settle academic issues.

“The court ceased to have jurisdiction when the general left the country,” he said.

He submitted that it was entirely speculative to say Bashir might come back or that he or some other fugitive of justice might be invited to visit South Africa.

Trengove argued that there was in any event no prospect of success on appeal because the ICC Act placed a duty on the South African government to give effect to an ICC warrant and it made no difference if he was a sitting head of State.

Wanted War Criminal Plans New York Visit
Front Page Magazine
By Stephen Brown
August 18, 2015

The Obama administration is definitely no longer acting “with a sense of urgency and purpose” when it comes to Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, the world’s most prominent fugitive from International Criminal Court (ICC) justice.

The ICC indicted Bashir in 2009 on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur, an area in western Sudan, but has not been able to apprehend him. He is the only head of state on the ICC’s wanted list. But despite the international warrant for his arrest, the “Butcher of Darfur” is apparently planning, for the third time in three years, to visit the United Nations (UN) in New York.

“Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir belongs in only one place, the International Criminal Court…,” said Elise Keppler, a Human Rights Watch official. “A visit by al-Bashir to the U.N. would not only be an affront to Darfuri victims, but a brazen challenge to the U.N. Security Council, which was responsible for sending Darfur to the ICC for investigation in the first place in 2005.”

Sudan’s Deputy UN ambassador, Hassan Hamid, confirmed earlier this month that Bashir will attend a UN conference on sustainable development in September along with 150 other heads of state. One conference agenda has Bashir scheduled to address the General Assembly on September 26. But another agenda has Sudan represented only at the ministerial level.

Bashir is regarded as “the mastermind” of the Darfur genocide, which once figured so prominently in the media but is now largely forgotten. Before that, after coming to power in Sudan in 1989, he presided over a brutal civil war in southern Sudan, underway since 1983, that saw two million people perish and tens of thousands of black Africans enslaved. The war ended in 2005 and saw southern Sudan become an independent country.

Obama made Darfur an issue in his 2008 election campaign, possibly because the genocide’s victims were black Africans and this would resonate with African-American voters. A campaigning Obama stated correctly that “hundreds of thousands of men, women and children,” had perished at the hands of Sudan’s military and Arab militias, armed and directed by Bashir and his cronies, three of whom are also wanted by the ICC.

Darfuri black Africans, feeling neglected by a government that is dominated by Sudanese Arabs like Bashir himself, had launched an insurgency in 2002 against the Khartoum regime. As a result of the conflict, several million Darfuris have been racially cleansed with the greatest brutally, including enslavement of children. Several million Darfuris, all Muslims like the Sudanese Arabs attacking them, have lived now for years in refugee camps with return an unlikely possibility, their lands either laid waste or occupied by Arab settlers.

Bashir’s first attempted to visit America in 2013, applying for a visa to attend the UN General Assembly. He apparently was so confident of receiving one he “booked rooms at a hotel in midtown Manhattan.” The ICC fugitive even appeared to taunt the US authorities about his proposed trip.

“Those people (the American government), we put them in a corner…We can go to the US and no one can do anything to us because there is no law in America that affords US authorities the right to take any action against me because it is not a member of the Rome Statute (the accord that created the ICC),” Bashir said at the time. “Attending the General Assembly is our right.”

In the end, though, Bashir decided to stay home. A factor in his decision may have been that the Obama administration reportedly “dragged its feet” on the visa.

A proposed visit in 2014 was also aborted. A Sudanese UN diplomat said the US simply denied Bashir a visa “in violation of the U.N.-U.S Headquarters Agreement.” This accord obliges the United States, as the host country, not only to issue visiting national dignitaries visas, but also to grant them diplomatic immunity. But in 1988, the US refused to grant Yasser Arafat a visa to address the General Assembly, causing the UN to move its meeting to Geneva.

Bashir’s 2013 cancellation probably elicited a huge sigh of relief in the White House. His arrival in New York would have constituted a huge embarrassment for the Obama. Hosting a war criminal would definitely not fit the image of a Nobel Peace Prize recipient and Democratic president who claims to be a big human rights supporter. Especially one who personally had once spoken so loud and long against the genocide in Dafur.

There also existed an even greater potential for damage to Obama’s reputation. According to Fund For Peace, the ICC had asked the American government to arrest Sudan’s leader after his arrival on American soil, even though the United States is not a signatory to the Rome Statute. Again, failure to act on this request would have seriously undermined Obama’s credentials, especially in the eyes of his liberal and leftist supporters, as a defender of human rights.

The same ingredients for acute embarrassment still exist for Obama if Bashir appears in New York next month. But even if the proposed visit, like the others, does not occur, it still serves the purpose of highlighting Obama’s failed Sudan policies. The genocide that he once called “a stain on all of us,” saying he would not “turn a blind eye to slaughter” still continues, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).

HRW’s 2015 report on Sudan indicates the situation in Darfur may even be worse than when Obama was campaigning for president. Calling the UN-African Union military force in place to protect Darfuri refugees “largely ineffective,” the report outlines the Arab militias’ continued attacks on villages and civilians.

“They burned homes and shops, looted livestock, killed and robbed civilians, and forced tens of thousands of residents to flee towns and camps for displaced people,” the report reads. It adds that “450,000 people have fled violence in Darfur since the beginning of 2014.”

And the potential for genocide in Sudan, overall, is probably greater than in 2008. Government violence has spread to the Nuba Mountains in South Kordafon province where, again, a black African population has been under attack for years from government forces. Last month, Nicolas Kristof wrote in the New York Times that Bashir “blockades the area to keep out all food, medicine and supplies.”

“Sudan even bombs trucks carrying food, and its denial of food and medicine probably kills more civilians than bombings do directly,” Kristoff wrote.

Kristoff reports that Obama has “quietly provided food to the Nuba Mountains, thus avoiding starvation.” Medical shipments, however, are still desperately needed.

“But Obama overall has been weaker than the four previous presidents in standing up to Sudan,” Kristoff states.

The most glaring of Obama’s failed Sudan policies, however, is the fact that Bashir is still free and roaming the world six years after his ICC indictment. He has visited numerous countries, including China, since 2009, some repeatedly. Even more disgracefully, he now even dares to propose visiting America.

But why wouldn’t he? The White House’s response to Bashir’s still being at large has been one of inaction. The president who once deplored the genocide Bashir is still orchestrating has never launched a determined international crusade to bring him to justice. Obama, who often acts like he is answering a higher moral calling, appears in this case to have forgotten his moral obligation – and that black lives do matter.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Judge Fernández to Stay on Lubanga ICC Sentence Review Panel
International Justice Monitor
By Wairagala Wakabi
August 14, 2015

The Presidency of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has dismissed a defense application for the disqualification of Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi from presiding over the upcoming review of Thomas Lubanga’s the prison sentence. The majority of a 15-judge plenary found that the functions Judge Fernández earlier performed in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) were “irrelevant” to the proceedings to determine whether Mr. Lubanga’s 14-year jail sentence should be reduced.

In an August 3, 2015 decision, the judges determined that the functions performed by Judge Fernández when she was employed by the OTP appeared to have been strategic, high-level, and “relatively removed” from the details of the case against Mr. Lubanga. “There might be circumstances where Judge Fernández’s prior functions in the OTP could raise a reasonable doubt as to her impartiality, but the applicant failed to provide any concrete evidence pointing to such circumstances,” the judges ruled.

In March 2012, Mr. Lubanga became the first person to be convicted by the ICC. He was found guilty of conscripting and using child soldiers in active combat during an ethnic conflict in the Congo in 2002 and 2003. As of last month, the former president of the Union of Congolese Patriots and its armed wing, known as the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), had served two thirds of his sentence. A hearing to determine whether his sentence should be reduced pursuant to Article 110 of the Rome Statute is scheduled for August 21.

On June 15, Mr. Lubanga’s lawyers filed an application for the disqualification of Judge Fernández from the sentence review panel, citing her previous work with the OTP, which they claimed “manifestly cast doubt on her impartiality.” In particular, the defense highlighted Judge Fernández’s roles as Special Adviser and Chef de Cabinet to former Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo between 2003 and 2006, when she was involved in the application for a warrant of arrest against Mr. Lubanga and the confirmation of charges hearing.

However, according to the prosecution, “a reasonable and well informed observer” would not find the judge biased. Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, in a July 3, 2015 response, argued that the threshold to disqualify a judge should not be interpreted to encompass all proceedings before the court involving an accused or convicted person. “A judge who has participated in some aspect of the main criminal proceedings should not necessarily be conflicted to review the sentence of a convicted person,” argued the prosecutor.

She stated that the sentence review was of a “limited purpose and nature” not related to the merits of the case, which had already been adjudicated. The prosecutor also stated that Judge Fernández was never directly responsible for investigating and prosecuting Mr. Lubanga.

In written submissions to the plenary, Judge Fernández stated that since being appointed as a judge, she had “systematically” avoided being involved in judicial proceedings arising from any case whose investigations commenced or were conducted during the time she worked for the OTP. The judge considered that “the distinct nature” of the sentence review did not warrant a request for her excusal because it “deals with the reduction of a sentence already imposed and entails the consideration of circumstances that may have arisen after the culpability of the person and corresponding penalty have been already settled by a Trial Chamber and ruled upon by the Appeals Chamber.”

Since the sentence review considers the time that has elapsed since sentencing and any new circumstance that may have arisen since, Judge Fernández did not see how any decisions or determinations that she may have made at the OTP could “color” her evaluation of the specific factors she must consider during the review.

However, two judges on the plenary were in favor of granting the defense request for disqualification. These judges noted that it was a case of “apparent, not actual” bias and the prudent approach would be for Judge Fernández to step aside “so as to protect the judicial process from the charge of bias.” In particular, the two judges were concerned that Judge Fernández’s earlier role with the OTP “might bear some relevance” to one of the factors to be considered by the sentence review panel: Mr. Lubanga’s early and continuing willingness to cooperate with the Court in investigations and prosecutions.

Four judges abstained from the decision due to a lack of sufficient information which “prevented them from formulating a distinct position” on the defense application.

Kenya

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Republic of Kenya

The President of the Assembly of States Parties meets with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and with the Bureau of the Committee of Representatives
ICC-CPI
August 14, 2015

On 13 August 2015, H.E. Mr. Sidiki Kaba, President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (“the Assembly”) of the International Criminal Court (“the Court”), traveled to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) to meet with H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission. During their exchanges, the President of the Assembly introduced the main priorities of his term and reiterated the need to develop a new relationship between Africa and the Court. He also emphasized the need to strengthen the judicial capacities of States to prevent and prosecute the most serious crimes contained in the Rome Statute.

President Sidiki Kaba also met with the Bureau of the Committee of Representatives to the African Union (COREP) and with the Chairs of the African regional groups at a meeting held in the presence of Ms. Djenna Djarra, Executive Secretary of the Commission. At this meeting, President Kaba welcomed the efforts undertaken by the African Union to fight impunity.

Furthermore, President Kaba met with Mr. Haile Menkerios, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the African Union, with whom he had fruitful discussions on the peacebuilding efforts by the United Nations in Africa. In this regard, he reiterated that justice is an essential vehicle to ensure sustainable peace and break the cycles of violence that feed from impunity.

President Kaba also met with the Delegation of the European Union (“EU”) and with the representatives from EU member states in Addis, as well as with the representatives of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC) accredited in Ethiopia. At these meetings, he urged them to continue supporting the Court.

At the conclusion of this official visit, H.E. Mr. Kaba stated:

“I thank President Dlamini-Zuma for her warm welcoming as well as the constructive exchanges we had. I am convinced that there is an urgent need to restore trust between the Court and African States Parties to the Rome Statute. The dialogue that we started today must be continued as we aspire to initiate a new era in the relationship between the Assembly and African States.”

ICC Appeals Chamber reverses decision on Kenya’s cooperation and remands issue to Trial Chamber for new determination
ICC-CPI
August 19, 2015

Today, 19 August 2015, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) reversed Trial Chamber V(B)’s decision regarding the Kenyan Government’s alleged non-compliance with its obligations under the Rome Statute in the case The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, due to errors in the Trial Chamber’s assessment. The Appeals Chamber hence remanded this decision to the Trial Chamber V(B) to determine, in light of relevant factors, whether Kenya has failed to comply with a cooperation request that has prevented the Court from exercising its functions and powers and, if so, to make an assessment of whether it is appropriate to refer Kenya’s non-compliance to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).

On 29 November 2013, the Prosecution had filed an application for a finding of non-cooperation against the Kenyan Government, alleging that the Government had failed to comply with a request to produce records relating to Mr Kenyatta. On 3 December 2014, Trial Chamber V(B) rejected the application for referral of the matter to the ASP. The Prosecutor appealed this decision on 20 March 2015.

Today, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, Presiding Judge in this appeal, delivered a summary of the judgment in an open court session. She indicated that the Appeals Chamber considered that Trial Chamber V(B) erred by failing to address whether judicial measures had been exhausted to obtain the Kenyan Government’s cooperation, as well as by assessing in an inconsistent manner the sufficiency of evidence and the Prosecutor’s conduct. The Appeals Chamber found that these errors prevented the Trial Chamber from making a conclusive determination on the existence of a failure to comply with a cooperation request by the Court and affected the Trial Chamber’s decision not to refer the matter of Kenya’s non-compliance to the ASP. The Appeal Chamber hence reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision and remanded it for the Trial Chamber for a new determination.

The Appeals Chamber emphasized that in determining whether there was a failure from a State to cooperate, the Trial Chamber should take into account all relevant factors, including the evidence that was required in the cooperation request and the conduct of the parties to the proceedings. The Trial Chamber should determine whether judicial measures to obtain the cooperation had been exhausted and consultations had reached a deadlock. In addition, Trial Chamber V(B) should have avoided conflating the status of the criminal proceedings against Mr Kenyatta with the issues relating to the Kenyan Government’s cooperation.

Background: In accordance with the Rome Statute, the Court’s founding treaty, all States Parties are obliged to cooperate fully with the ICC in its investigations and prosecutions. Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate with the Court, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers, ICC Judges can make a finding of a failure to comply with a request for cooperation by a State, which prevents the Court from exercising its powers and functions under the Statute and decide to refer the matter to the ASP, or the United Nations Security Council if the latter had referred the situation to the Court, to seek external assistance to obtain cooperation with the request at issue or to otherwise address the lack of cooperation by the requested State. The ASP and the Council may then decide to take the measures they deem appropriate.

Mr Kenyatta was charged, as an indirect co-perpetrator, with five counts of crimes against humanity allegedly committed during the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-2008. Charges were confirmed on 23 January 2012, and the case was committed to trial before Trial Chamber V(B). On 13 March 2015, Trial Chamber V(B) decided to terminate the proceedings in this case and to vacate the summons to appear against him, noting the Prosecution’s withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta. The Chamber also stressed that, although the proceedings shall be terminated, the Court retains jurisdiction over any interference with a witness or with the collection of evidence, and that the protective measures ordered for witnesses and/or victims shall continue, subject to the review by the ICC.

Libya

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Lawyers to appeal sentences handed out to Libyan regime-era officials
International Bar Association
By Tom Westcott
August 10, 2015

Defense lawyers in Libya are preparing to appeal against sentences handed out last week, including nine death penalties, for war crimes allegedly committed by senior officials from the regime of Muammar Gaddafi during Libya’s 2011 uprising.

A week after the pronouncements had been made, lawyers complained that they had still not received copies of the documents from the court ruling.

‘Time is precious to us because we have only 60 days to appeal,’ said lawyer Ibrahim Aboisha.

He is representing two clients – Gaddafi’s former head of intelligence Abdullah Senussi and the man who served as his right-hand man, Abdulhamid Amar Oheida, both of whom were among the nine sentenced to death by firing squad.

‘We only heard the sentences in the court, like everyone else who was present, but we must see all the details and the reasons why the judge made the ruling and gave such sentences before we can prepare our appeal,’ Aboisha said.

The verdicts were passed by judge Naji Al-Amin on 28 July, in a purpose-built courtroom inside Tripoli’s Hadba prison facility, where most of the accused men have been held.

The death sentences were a dramatic finale to the mass trial of 36 regime-era senior officials and Gaddafi’s son Saif Al-Islam. The often slow-moving proceedings had drifted on for over a year with scant international attention, after Libya’s security situation deteriorated forcing most embassies and international organisations to relocate to neighbouring Tunisia.

Sentenced in absentia and having apparently had no meaningful legal representation throughout the trial, Saif was also handed the death penalty. His sentence is little more than a symbolic gesture, however. Under Libyan law, Saif would have to be retried in person and he continues to be held in the mountain town of Zintan, which is not under the control of the Tripoli government.

The verdict was also pronounced in spite of a long-standing demand from the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Libya to hand over Saif to the Hague, where he is wanted for crimes against humanity. The Libyan authorities – under successive and now rival post-revolutionary governments – have continued to appeal against the ICC’s demand, insisting that its judicial systems were competent to try Saif.

The Tripoli Justice Ministry said that, since the ICC had agreed that Libya’s court was deemed competent to try Senussi, the same rule should apply to Saif. However, his ongoing absence from the court proceedings (appearances via video-link stopped last summer) and a lack of independent verification of either his whereabouts or wellbeing, continues to cast a shadow over the proceedings against Saif.

At the Tripoli Appeals Court, 23 other defendants were given prison sentences, ranging from life imprisonment to five years, and large fines. Four men were acquitted and released immediately after the proceedings, and charges were dropped against a fifth who was deemed mentally unfit to stand trial.

‘I was shocked when I heard the verdicts,’ said another lawyer whose client received a prison sentence, and who spoke on condition of anonymity. ‘My client’s sentence is much too long, and it is for nothing.’ Calling both the accusations and the case presented by the General Prosecutor weak, he said he was certain his client was innocent. Like Aboisha, he was waiting to receive the court documents, to prepare an appeal.

The trial has been condemned by international human rights organisations as failing to meet international fair trial standards while having been plagued with human rights violations. Amnesty International called the proceedings ‘deeply flawed’ and said the Libyan authorities had failed to ensure the defendants’ due process rights had been met.

Richard Goldstone is Honorary President of the IBA’s Human Rights Institute. ‘There are serious allegations of a denial of fair trial rights of the defendants,’ he said, voicing concerns about the conditions in which defence counsel and witnesses could be protected and perform their duties. ‘This is especially of concern in cases such as the present one where some of the defendants have been sentenced to death. There should be a full reconsideration of the proceedings by the Supreme Court of Libya.’

The Head of Investigations for the General Prosecutor’s Office, Sadiq Al-Sour, has repeatedly said that defendants’ rights had been met, citing access to medical care, family visits, and investigations carried out in a ‘comfortable atmosphere’ and only by the General Prosecutor’s office. He also insisted that the court was completely impartial, despite it operating in Tripoli, which is controlled by a self-appointed, and not internationally-recognised, government.

However, such insistences seem to carry little weight amidst the powerful international backlash against the proceedings. They have also been undermined by the widespread circulation on social media sites across Libya of a video showing another of Gaddafi’s sons, Saadi, being tortured in Hadba prison, the same facility where most of the defendants have been incarcerated, and the location of the appeals court itself. The nine-minute video-clip shows Saadi being blindfolded, slapped, beaten on the soles of his feet and forced to listen to another man being tortured in an adjacent room.

Despite international concerns and regardless of a general amnesty for regime-era figures declared by Libya’s internationally-recognised government which is now based in the east of the country, lawyers believe the next two months are unlikely to see any meaningful reversal of, or change to, the sentences.

‘It is not looking promising. As long as the circumstances here remain the same, the result will be the same,’ Aboisha said. ‘But if the circumstances change and the appeals stage is fairer, then I am full of hope.’

Exile or death: violence and collapsed State leave human rights defenders with few options
FIDH-Worldwide Movement for Human Rights
August 12 2015

In Libya, human rights defenders have become prime targets for many armed groups involved in the ongoing civil war, reveals The Observatory in a report published today. Violence, harassment and intimidation are daily occurrences for these defenders, in a climate of impunity resulting from the breakdown of the State. The respect of human rights defenders as vital, non-partisan voices should be a baseline consensus for any successful agreement between parties to the conflict.

“No democratic society can exist without human rights defenders. They are the keystones in the construction of a State that protects and empowers the people. The situation they face is unbearable and puts at risk the entire process of building a sustainable democracy in Libya. Therefore, we call on the international community and all the parties to include them in the negotiations and to provide them with shelters for their protection”, stated Gerald Staberock, OMCT Secretary General.

The report illustrates this catastrophic situation through the stories of 24 human rights defenders, several of whom have been killed. Others have been kidnapped, received violent threats against them or their family. Their places of work have been broken into and subject to arson. Threatening phone calls, defamation, and exile in neighbouring countries are regular occurrences for Libyan defenders.

In this polarised context with no room for independent voices, no male or female citizen promoting the respect for human rights and democratic principles is out of danger. However, those most often targeted by acts of violence are lawyers, judges, representatives of government institutions and national or international human rights organisations, journalists and those who defend the rights of ethnic minority groups.

According to the testimonies of human rights defenders, the authors of these violations are mainly members of various non-State armed groups, particularly those belonging to the fundamentalist Islamist movement (in particular “Fajr Libya”). Sources have told the Observatory that Islamist armed groups keep “black lists” of targets containing the names of persons who promote democratic ideals and defend human rights and gender equality, values diametrically opposed to those promoted by Islamist armed groups.

The judicial institutions that do exist include in their founding statutes their allegiance to various tribes, warlords, and non-State actors, effectively legalising these entities. In some cases, these armed groups actually fund the judicial institutions themselves. These groups have gone on to replace State institutions by infiltrating them and rendering them dysfunctional.

With the support of the international community, Libya is currently participating in a process to reach an agreement to stabilise the country. The process will specifically address the protection of human rights and human rights defenders. However, some paramilitary groups and militias have deserted the negotiations. Their return to the negotiating table, upon which the success of the process depends, should be contingent upon their strict commitment to respect human rights. Human rights defenders must also be actively included in the process. Only under these conditions can a State respectful of basic human rights be established.

“Today in Libya, human rights defenders are forced to cease their activities or to go into exile in order to stay alive. However, even in exile, most Libyan human rights defenders face a very precarious situation. The host countries must examine the possibilities for supporting and facilitating the granting of refugee status to them”, declared Karim Lahidji, FIDH President.

Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire

Ivory Coast Court Convicts Top Pro-Gbagbo Security Officials
Voice of America
August 5, 2015

A military tribunal in Ivory Coast on Tuesday convicted two top officials in former president Laurent Gbagbo’s security forces of crimes related to the West African nation’s 2011 civil war.

Ivory Coast, the world’s biggest cocoa grower, has seen rapid economic revival under President Alassane Ouattara but is still struggling with issues of reconciliation and justice.

About 3,000 people died in the conflict, which was sparked by Gbagbo’s refusal to acknowledge his defeat by Ouattara in a late 2010 presidential run-off election.

Anselme Seka Yapo, the head of former first lady Simone Gbagbo’s security detail, was found guilty of wilful murder and assault and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The gendarme officer, known as Seka Seka, was accused of murdering the driver of Joel N’Guessan, a senior member of Ouattara’s RDR political party, and of beating his bodyguard.

In addition to his prison sentence, Yapo was also expelled from the gendarmes and will not be permitted to leave his home district for 10 years following his release.

Jean-Noel Abehi, who headed Gbagbo’s elite mobile gendarme squadron, was convicted of disobeying an order from superiors not to fight in support of the ex-president. He was sentenced to five years in jail.

Abehi, who was accused by a panel of U.N. experts of organizing a series of deadly raids from exile after the war, was arrested in Ghana in 2013 and handed over to Ivorian authorities.

Six other gendarmes on trial were acquitted of desertion.

Laurent Gbagbo is awaiting trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for alleged crimes against humanity.

Simone Gbagbo is wanted by the court on similar charges, though Ivorian authorities have so far refused to extradite her.

Rights groups have accused Ouattara’s government of prosecuting Gbagbo supporters while ignoring crimes committed by the president’s own backers.

All three ICC indictments relating to Ivory Coast target Gbagbo and his allies though the ICC prosecution have said it will expand its investigations by the end of the year to pursue all sides in the conflict.

In a report released on Tuesday, New York-based Human Rights Watch senior international justice counsel, Elizabeth Evenson, said: “Additional ICC investigations are necessary, but the focus so far on pro-Gbagbo forces has deeply polarised opinion within Ivory Coast about the ICC.”

The ICC: Too Important to Let Fail
The Globe and Mail
By Elizabeth Evenson
August 7, 2015

This month, the International Criminal Court will present its budget request for next year to the court’s 123 members, including Canada. The ICC is the only permanent global court with a mandate to prosecute the world’s worst abuses, whether in Darfur, Libya or Congo. But budget negotiations have become increasingly fraught.

Just as its workload began to increase (to eight countries from five between 2010 and 2013), some ICC members, with France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain in the lead, began to insist the court undertake reforms and cap its budget. They cited the global economic crisis and budget crunches at home.

The pressure to limit growth has eased in some corners but not in Canada, which has become the leading advocate for holding down ICC budget increases. In the past couple of years, Canada has not stood in the way of increases in the ICC’s budget agreed to by all other member countries, but it has made clear it intends to apply a non-growth stand to all international organizations, including the ICC. That will have disastrous effects if Canada wins the day on the ICC. Zero growth for the ICC is simply not tenable, even in times of austerity. The 13-year-old court is just hitting its stride, completing first trials, grappling with complex and important situations, and facing demands for justice in more places. It is at pains to keep up.

Consider Ivory Coast. A new Human Rights Watch report on the ICC’s work in the West African country paints a picture of a court struggling to make sure the justice it delivers actually counts.

The ICC prosecutor opened investigations in 2011 into horrific abuses during the country’s 2010-2011 post-election crisis. Attacks both by forces allied with former president Laurent Gbagbo and by those with current President Alassane Ouattara killed at least 3,000 civilians. But the prosecution focused initial investigations on crimes by pro-Gbagbo forces. It has signalled it will continue its investigations into all sides this year but, until now, the only cases opened, including the one against Mr. Gbagbo, relate to one side of the conflict.

The result is polarized opinion about the court and a lack of access to justice before the ICC for victims of pro-Ouattara forces. Resulting perceptions of bias in the ICC’s work in Ivory Coast have damaged its legitimacy in that country. And even the court’s outreach around these existing cases was too narrowly focused to engage more Ivory Coast citizens in the ICC’s work.

Lessons from the court’s work in Ivory Coast likely apply, to varying degrees, across all countries where the ICC has investigations.

The problems cannot be explained by a lack of resources alone, but they are a factor. The ICC lacked the money to put a full-time staff member in Ivory Coast to provide information to the public and journalists. Making do with missions conducted from the court’s headquarters in The Hague contributed to the narrow reach of these efforts. And while a budget crunch cannot explain away the prosecution’s initial decision to focus on only one side, it has been a factor in allowing the situation to persist; the ICC prosecution has cited its need to focus on other investigations – and a lack of resources to be everywhere at once – to explain the prolonged delay in getting to other cases in Ivory Coast.

Even if court officials could have made different decisions in Ivory Coast, to apply the lessons from its work there across the countries where the ICC is working – and where it may work in future – it will likely need more resources.

While Canada may have allowed some budget increases to go through, its insistence on zero growth, like the insistence of other ICC member countries before it, risks distorting budget discussions. It moves these discussions toward an arbitrary bottom line, rather than where they need to be: firmly focused on whether the ICC has what it needs to make a difference where it matters, for victims and for communities that have borne the brunt of mass atrocity.

Member countries do need to scrutinize the court’s requests for resources and demand accountability for its use of funds. But as human-rights crises continue to pile up, the ICC’s mandate to hold abusers to account is too big to let the court fail, and yet the Canadian position risks leaving the court too small to succeed.

Military Group Takes on New Mantle
IOL News
August 16, 2015

A militant youth group linked to Ivory Coast’s ICC-indicted former president Laurent Gbagbo took on a new mantle this weekend, turning itself into a political party and pledging to work for peace.

The Congress of Young Patriots (COJEP) was set up 14 years ago by hardline youth leader Charles Ble Goude, who along with Gbagbo is awaiting trial in The Hague by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity during unrest in 2010-2011.

Renaming itself the Panafrican Congress for Justice and Equality but keeping the same initials, the new COJEP said in a statement it aimed “to fight for peace” while steering clear of extremists, and that it would not contest upcoming presidential elections.

Goude’s “Young Patriots” militia have been accused of perpetrating some of the worst atrocities in the bloody unrest that broke out after a general election in December 2010, claiming more than 3 000 lives in the once prosperous country.

A statement from Goude, sent from his cell in The Hague and read out to supporters at the founding meeting, said: “I call on all my strength for inclusive discussions between the government and opposition, and for peaceful elections.”

The first round of the presidential elections are set for October 25, and are seen as crucial for stabilising the country after the post-election crisis of 2010-2011, which was the last chapter in a decade of political and military crisis in the Ivory Coast.

Nogbou Hyacinthe, an academic, was named as executive secretary of the new party in Goude’s absence.

AFRICA

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

Official Website of the ICTR

Chad

Growing Insecurity Leads to More Displacements in Lake Chad Region, Warns UN Officials
All Africa
August 6, 2015

The United Nations today reported further population displacement in the Lake Chad region owing to fear of attacks by Boko Haram and appeals by the Government of Chad for civilians to leave areas where ongoing military operations are being undertaken against the group.

“For a few weeks now, more than 40,000 people have been fleeing their villages for fear of attacks, without any belongings,” said the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Chad, Thomas Gurtner.

“The Lake Chad islands still face sporadic attacks and the Government is considering relocating some additional 20,000 people to the mainland, therefore increasing vulnerability among displaced population and host communities,” he added.

On 3 August, an estimated 10,000 people fled to the locality of Koulkimé, some 20 kilometres from the town of Baga Sola, in the Lake Chad basin, bringing the total of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region to around 40,000, according to the latest update by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Overall, some 79,000 civilians have been forced to flee their homes since the beginning of the year, including refugees, returnees and IDPs.

The UN system is working with partners to implement immediate life-saving assistance to this new displaced population, as the area is prone to cholera outbreaks, Mr. Gurtner said.

The volatile security situation and the rainy season are limiting physical access, slowing humanitarian assessments and response. Despite these challenges, three spontaneous IDP sites near Baga Sola have been provided with basic supplies, food and wash kits.

According to OCHA, the humanitarian community is concerned with the growing trend of forced displacement of civilians in the region.

“As elsewhere in the Lake Chad Basin, which straddles four countries, and where people have been affected by violence, the humanitarian community calls on authorities to ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with the Member States obligations under international law, particularly international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law,” it stated.

Chadian President Claims Boko Haram Leader Dead
All Africa
By Eugene Ndi
August 13, 2015

Chad’s president, Idriss Deby Itno, has claimed that Aboubakar Shekau is no longer the leader of the Boko Haram jihadist group.

At a press conference on the occasion of the 55th anniversary on Tuesday of Chad’s independence, President Deby said the Nigerian extremist group has a new leader.

He did not say what had happened to Abubakar Shekau, the declared leader of the group, but he said he had been replaced by a certain Mahamat Daoud who was ready to dialogue with the Nigerian government.

Speculation regarding Shekau’s ‘death’ is rife amongst countries involved in the war against the extremist group.

This speculation is further heightened by the fact that the ‘leader’ of the group has not appeared in Boko Haram’s videos of late.

NOT LAST LONG

“Boko Haram is decapitated. There are little groups (of Boko Haram members) scattered throughout east Nigeria, on the border with Cameroon. It is within our power to definitively overcome Boko Haram,” President Deby said.

The Chadian leader even declared that the Boko Haram war will not last long after the setting up of the regional force headquartered in N’Djamena. “It will be over by the end of the year,” he said.

Earlier, in March, President Deby had called on Shekau to surrender or be killed.

He claimed Chadian forces knew his hideout, and that if he refused to surrender, “he will suffer the same fate as his comrades.”

While claiming progress in the fight against the jihadists, who have repeatedly hit border areas of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and wrought havoc in northeast Nigeria, Deby admitted that suicide bombers still posed a threat.

In the past few week, suicide bombers, many of them women, have staged several attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.

The challenge, Mr Deby said, was to “avoid terrorist acts and that’s why we must organise at the regional level to prevent bomb-making materials and other explosives entering our countries”.

Where’s Shekau? Chad President messes with Boko Haram’s Mind
Reuters
By Alexis Akwagyiram and Julia Payne
August 14, 2015

If Chadian President Idriss Deby is to be believed, Abubakar Shekau, the bearded and bandoliered leader of Islamist militant group Boko Haram, is no more.

Given the many previous reports of Shekau’s demise, followed soon after by videos of him brandishing automatic weapons and spouting invective against the Nigerian state, analysts and diplomats are treating the claims with caution.

However, two factors are spicing up the normal guessing game that swirls around the leadership of the notoriously opaque group, which has killed thousands of people in its six-year campaign to establish an Islamic caliphate in northeast Nigeria.

First, Shekau – not known for being camera-shy – has not appeared on video for six months, raising the possibility that he has indeed been injured or killed by offensives during that time by Nigerian, Chadian and Cameroonian troops. And second, Deby has identified a successor.

Although little is known about the replacement, identified by Deby as Mahamat Daoud, it suggests that even if Shekau is not down and out, he may have a rival for control of an organization long suspected of being riven by factional divisions.

Besides the battlefield setbacks Boko Haram has suffered, disagreements over whether to entertain negotiations with Abuja or declare allegiance to jihadist groups such as Islamic State in Syria and Iraq are believed to have deepened those rifts.

“Boko Haram has always been something of a constellation of units, with its hardline leadership having only limited control or influence over some fighting units,” said Roddy Barclay, senior Africa consultant at Control Risks.

“Regional military pressure is likely to have fragmented militant command structures, though it remains uncertain whether a change in leadership has actually occurred.”

“HEAD CUT OFF”

The possibility remains that Deby, a wily regional operator who came to power in a 1990 military coup and who has survived several armed attempts to remove him, is trying to engineer internal blood-letting by promoting one faction over another.

“We have cut off Boko Haram’s head,” said Deby, who has turned Chad’s fight against Boko Haram into a personal duel with Shekau. “I think Boko Haram will be finished by the end of 2015.”

The new leader Daoud was open to the idea of talks with Abuja, Deby added.

What little is known about Daoud suggests he and Shekau do not see eye to eye, especially on the issue of the extreme violence that Boko Haram has meted out under Shekau’s leadership, diplomats and analysts said.

“It may be a tactic to sow disunity within Boko Haram,” one Abuja-based diplomat said. “This man, Daoud, has not been fighting or close to the Shekau group. He’s more of a learned cleric.”

Nigerian security analyst Fulan Nasrullah concurred, saying he understood Daoud to be around 38 years old and the son of an Arab man and Chadian mother renowned for his Islamic scholarship and loyalty to tenets laid down by sect founder Mohammed Yusuf.

Yusuf’s largely peaceful movement advocating sharia law and Islamic schooling — Boko Haram means “Western education is forbidden” in the local Hausa language — turned violent in 2009, and quickly morphed into a full-on insurgency after Yusuf’s death in police custody.

Since then, thousands have been killed and more than a million displaced by the militants who at the start of this year controlled an area the size of Belgium. Much of that territory has since been retaken by Chadian and Nigerian forces.

Nasrullah said Daoud had a significant support base and could bring hundreds of fighters with him if he jumped ship — as well as vital information about Boko Haram’s workings and the whereabouts of its top commanders.

“He could expose the money generation and transfer methods the group uses, reveal critical intelligence about the group’s inner structure, and maybe even offer up information as to how to kill Shekau,” he said.

“If Daoud is really seeking negotiations, the Nigerian government should hurry and take the offer

as having him on side could well be a game-changer.”

SCEPTICISM

Shekau’s last video appearance was in February, when a person claiming to be him — analysts believe he may have impersonators — threatened to disrupt presidential elections held the following month.

The group has released at least five videos since then, none purporting to show Shekau.

However, one source in the office of Nigeria’s National Security Adviser played down Shekau’s absence from the videos, and remained skeptical of Deby’s assertion that Shekau is dead, saying he “wouldn’t make too much of that statement”.

Femi Adesina, a spokesman for President Muhammadu Buhari, who came to power in March on promises of, among other things, tackling Boko Haram, said Abuja was open to talks if any faction with significant influence came forward.

“If genuine leadership of Boko Haram approaches the government for negotiation, the government will negotiate with them,” Adesina said.

Mali

Mali: UN Alarmed at Release of Human Rights Abusers; Warns De Facto Amnesty Contrary to International Law
UN News Centre
August 11, 2015

The United Nations human rights office expressed deep concern over the reported release of detainees in Mali suspected of involvement in, or formally charged with, serious abuses, including war crimes, terrorist acts and gross human rights violations.

Ravina Shamdasani, spokesperson for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), said: “We understand that a number of those released on 16 July 2015 were implicated in such crimes and are concerned that further releases may be imminent.”

Any measure that would, de facto, amount to amnesty would be contrary to international law, and in violation of the commitment by the parties to the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.

“We emphasize the critical importance of the fight against impunity and the need to investigate and prosecute all gross violations of human rights, to ensure accountability,” she underscored.

Amnesties that prevent the prosecution of individuals who may be legally responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights are inconsistent with States’ obligations under various sources of international law.

“We urge the Government to ensure that any releases made in the context of confidence-building measures are in full conformity with international law, and to take all measures to ensure the investigation and prosecution of all serious crimes under international law,” the spokesperson continued.

“The judicial authorities in Mali should pursue the investigation and prosecution of all alleged perpetrators of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other gross violations of human rights, and ensure that the rights of victims to an effective remedy are promoted and protected.”

OHCHR also condemned the atrocious attacks on civilians in the Byblos hotel in Sevaré in Central Mali between Friday and Saturday last week.

“Such attacks, which appear designed to provoke a state of terror and intimidate, are in violation of national and international law. We call on the international community and neighbouring states to give all possible assistance to Mali in its ongoing efforts to restore peace, security and the full respect for human rights,” Ms. Shamdasani concluded.

Mali: The Deadliest Peacekeeping Mission In The World
International Business Times
By Erin Banco
August 15, 2015

Gunmen dressed in plain clothing ran up to the Byblos Hotel in the central Malian town of Sevare last week, opening fire at the few government soldiers who were protecting its entrances. The gunmen barged through the doors of the hotel with one mission in mind: to take as many people hostage as possible. Some hotel employees and visitors hid in cupboards, while others were detained by the militants. The siege lasted more than 24 hours and ended when the military stormed the hotel. In all, 12 people were killed, including civilians and members of the United Nations peacekeeping mission.

The attack on the hotel in Sevare was just one of many this year that have focused not only on civilians and government soldiers but also on members of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the country. Last month, six U.N. peacekeepers were killed in an attack by Ansar Dine rebels in Timbuktu, an area that the rebel group moved into in 2012 during the political unrest in the country. Ansar Dine, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 2013, formed during the Malian political turmoil of 2012. All the peacekeepers attacked were from neighboring Burkina Faso.

The U.N. has reported 54 of its peacekeepers have been killed in Mali this year, making it the world’s deadliest peacekeeping mission at present. The mission in Mali has the highest average yearly fatality rate for all peacekeeping missions, according to U.N. figures. The organization just approved funding for one more year of the mission, and things are already off to a rocky start under the new accord. The force is now dealing with new, unprecedented threats in the southern part of the country, which until recently had remained largely muted.

Mali’s deteriorating security situation and tough terrain constitute conditions similar to those peacekeepers have faced in other countries, including Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Between 2001 and 2015 to date, there have been 255 peacekeeper deaths in Congo alone. From 1960 to 1964, there were 249 peacekeeper deaths in that country. Meanwhile, 220 peacekeepers have died during the ongoing African Union/U.N. hybrid operation in Darfur, Sudan.

“We are working in a very difficult environment, an environment with asymmetric threats such as those posed by terrorists and those posed by rebels that engage in drug trafficking,” said Radhia Achouri, a representative of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali.

As of last month, the U.N. mission in Mali consisted largely of about 9,100 military personnel deployed at 12 different locations throughout the country. About another 1,000 people are deployed as police. The members of the mission come from 68 different countries. The goal of the mission is to support, monitor and supervise the implementation of ceasefire agreements and to protect civilians.

Mali has been mired in violence since 2012 when ethnic Tuareg rebels overthrew the government. The ousting of President Amadou Toumani Toure created a vacuum that allowed for the rise of extremist rebel groups connected to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a branch of the broader al Qaeda network. The government of Mali requested international help, and French forces intervened, followed by the U.N. peacekeeping mission. Since then, the government and rebels have attempted to sign peace agreements, but talks have broken down each time. The Malian government and a semimoderate ethnic Tuareg rebel umbrella group signed a peace deal in Bamako in June, but it is unclear whether that pact will hold given the recent violence in the country.

There are dozens of rebel groups in Mali, some connected to the Tuareg rebel movement, others connected to AQIM. Several of the Tuareg rebel groups dominant in the north signed the recent peace deal with the government, with both sides promising to put down their weapons. But other groups, specifically those connected to AQIM, made no such promise and are now — more than at any time since the beginning of the year — attacking convoys and outposts of the Malian military and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the country.

“Mali’s governmental presence is not particularly robust in the north,” said Hilary Matfess, a researcher with the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. “AQIM might be focusing its efforts on the most robust military security presence there, which is the U.N. mission.”

The northern part of Mali is still an area of concern for Malian officials, but the southern part is also becoming more violent, especially within the past two weeks as Ansar Dine has ramped up its attacks near the capital. The group is associated with the Saudi-inspired Salafist/Wahhabist brand of Muslim ideology, even though most people in Mali identify with the Sufi sect — often defined as a faction of Islam that follows the inner, mystical aspects of the religion.

Ansar Dine attacked towns on Mali’s borders with Ivory Coast and Mauritania last week, and leaders of the group say they are planning more raids. The group’s new threat prompted Ivory Coast forces to carry out a mission inside Mali Wednesday in an attempt to track down rebels who are believed to be hiding in the Sama forest.

Statements by the group’s leaders and the attacks carried out by rebels within the past week mimic those of groups such as Boko Haram, the Nigerian militant group that is trying to expand from its land in the country’s Borno state to Chad and Cameroon.

Ansar Dine and other extremist groups are only growing stronger, especially with the growing drug- and human-trafficking networks in the region. Each year, thousands of migrants from places such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Sierra Leone, as well as Mali, pay as much as $500 apiece for smugglers to take them north to Libya, where they get on a boat and head to Europe. This year, a record number of migrants have attempted to make the journey to Europe, the U.N. said last month.

Given the security difficulties in the country, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali has frequently asked Geneva for better equipment. In a recent U.N. report, the head of the Mali mission said his forces are frequently targeted by armed groups and his troops do not have the necessary weapons to ward off attacks.

“We need to be fully capable of facing this environment in all aspects,” Maj. Gen. Michael Lollesgaard, the commander of the peacekeeping mission in Mali, said in the report. “That means capability to face hostile armed groups hiding amongst the population and to face challenging climates, geography and infrastructure.”

Mali: UN Condemns Violations of Ceasefire in Kidal Region
UN News Centre
August 17, 2015

Fighting erupted over the weekend in northern Mali’s Kidal region between armed groups, breaking the ceasefire and prompting the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the country, known as MINUSMA, to issue a firm condemnation.

“Pending the conclusions of the investigation team today dispatched to Anefis, MINUSMA condemns in the strongest terms these acts, perpetrated in blatant violation of ceasefire agreements and of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali”, to which both rival groups – the National Movement for Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and the Plateform Coalition – are signatories.

Fighting resumed on August 15 in the town of Touzek Oued, located at the south-east of Kidal and between Tabankort and Anefis, also in the North Mali, points out a press release.

“The international community, as well as the population, is concerned by the increasing number of these violations, which could hinder the progress made towards a stable and lasting peace in Mali.

MINUSMA reminded the parties that they will have to answer for their actions before the Security Council, which, on 29 June, said that it would consider targeted sanctions against those who obstruct or threaten the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Urging the armed groups to immediately cease fighting, the Mission, adds the statement, stresses that it will not hesitate to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, in accordance to its mandate and rules of engagement.

U.N. Deploys Troops Around Northern Mali Town After Clashes
Reuters
By Tiemoko Diallo and Adama Diarra
August 18, 2015

Mali’s U.N. peacekeeping mission deployed troops around a northern separatist stronghold on Tuesday, seeking to prevent an escalation of clashes between rebels and pro-government militias that threaten to torpedo a peace deal.

The separatists, led by Tuareg tribesmen, and the pro-government Platform militias signed the U.N. sponsored peace accord in June. Its aim was to pacify the north and allow the Malian army to focus on tackling Islamist militants in the west African country.

The two sides have traded blame for the clashes, which began on Saturday. On Monday, Platform fighters seized the town of Anefis from the separatist Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), raising the prospect they could advance on the town of Kidal, the group’s main stronghold.

“These acts constitute a flagrant violation of the ceasefire and the peace accord,” the U.N. mission, MINUSMA, said in a statement.

MINUSMA called on both sides to immediately return to the positions they occupied on Aug. 15, and said it was putting in place a security zone extending 20 km (12 miles) around Kidal to prevent a spread of the violence and to protect civilians.

“In the case of a violation of this security zone by Platform elements or those affiliated with the Platform, MINUSMA will react in accordance with its mandate,” the mission said.

There are over 9,000 U.N. peacekeepers in Mali, 90 percent of them in the north. The U.N. force did not specify how many troops were deployed around Kidal.

The move was criticized by the separatists and the pro-government militia, while the Malian government called on the U.N. mission to remain within its mandate of protecting the civilian population in all parts of the country.

“Any unequal treatment will produce perverse effects that would harm the search for peace,” government spokesman Choguel Kokala Maiga said on state television.

No clashes were reported on Tuesday. A Reuters witness said CMA fighters were reinforcing positions around Kidal and deploying heavy weapons.

Fahad Ag Almahamoud, the secretary general of the GATIA pro-government militia, slammed the U.N. mission for handing part of Mali’s territory to a rebel group.

“We do not understand this decision by MINUSMA,” he said.

Mohamoud Ag Ghaly, secretary to the president of the CMA, said the group had no need of U.N. protection and had already repulsed an effort to take Kidal.

He said the U.N. mission was failing to protect civilians in northern towns occupied by the militia and the Malian army, including Menaka and Anefis.

Neighboring Niger had been due to host talks from Wednesday to ease tensions but government sources in Niamey said the discussions were canceled after representatives of the armed groups failed to show up, citing the latest violence.

Mali says it has asked the African Union and the United Nations to investigate the ceasefire violations. MINUSMA on Monday threatened to apply targeted sanctions against those found to be behind the violence.

The West African nation is seeking to break a decades-long cycle of Tuareg uprisings, the most recent of which allowed Islamist groups, some linked to al Qaeda, to seize the desert north in 2012.

A French-led intervention a year later scattered the Islamists but failed to eradicate them, and Islamist violence is once more on the rise, spreading further south.

Mali Expresses Reservation Over MINUSMA’s Safe Zone Around Kidal
Star Africa
August 19, 2015

The Malian government expressed hesitation about the decision by the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to create a safe zone around Kidal, noting that it rather preferred MINUSMA “remains in its role of protection of the population and of all people, in all exposed areas, like Kidal, at the same security threats”.

Choguel Maiga, government spokesman is quoted by statement read on Tuesday evening on national television, as saying that “any unfair treatment will produce negative risk to the search for peace and harmony”.

MINUSMA has since Monday decided to set up a safety zone around Kidal city “to protect the civilian population”.

Since Saturday, the Kidal region has been experiencing renewed violence marked in particular by deadly clashes between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and Gatia, a pro-government militia.

EUROPE

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, War Crimes Chamber

Official Website [English translation]

Second-Instance Verdict Sent Out in the Case of Predrag Milisavljević et al.
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
August 7, 2015

On July 23, 2015, the Appellate Division Panel of Section I for War Crimes of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent out the second-instance verdict of June 2, 2015 in the case of Predrag Milisavljević et al., which, in their entirety, refused as ill-founded the appeals filed by the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by defense counsel for the accused Predrag Milisavljević, from the verdict issued by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina No. S1 1 K 011128 12 Krl of October 28, 2014, whereas the appeal filed by defense counsel for the accused Miloš Pantelić was partly granted, so the verdict issued by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina No. S1 1 K 011128 12 Krl was modified in the decision on punishment in the manner that the accused Miloš Pantelić, concerning the criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity, is now sentenced to 15 (fifteen) years of imprisonment. The first-instance verdict was upheld in the remaining part.

The first-instance verdict of the Court of BiH found the accused Predrag Milisavljević and Miloš Pantelić guilty that by the actions described in Section 1 of the Operative Part of the Verdict they committed the criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1)h) as read with Subparagraph a) of the CC BiH, all in conjunction with Article 29 of the CC BiH, for which they were sentenced to 20 (twenty) years of imprisonment each. Pursuant to Article 56 of the CC BiH, the time the accused spent in custody was credited towards the sentence of imprisonment.

The verdict acquitted the accused Predrag Milisavljević, Miloš Pantelić and Ljubomir Tasić of the charges that, under Article 284, Subparagraph c), of the CPC BiH, by their actions under individual counts of the indictment they committed the criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity.

The Prosecutor filed an appeal because of the erroneously established state of facts in relation to the acquittal, specifically in relation to the accused Miloš Pantelić for the actions described in Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Operative Part of the Verdict, and in relation to the accused Predrag Milisavljević and Ljubomir Tasić for the actions described in Section 8 of the Operative Part of the Verdict. The Prosecutor’s Office filed its appeal because of the sentencing decision in relation to the accused Predrag Milisavljević and Miloš Pantelić, proposing that the appellate panel grant the appeal, revoke the challenged verdict in the foregoing section and order a retrial, or modify the challenged verdict concerning the conviction, by imposing on the accused Predrag Milisavljević and Miloš Pantelić a heavier sentence.

Defense counsel for the accused Predrag Milisavljević filed his appeal because of the essential violation of criminal procedure provisions, violations of criminal code, erroneously and incompletely established facts and the sentencing decision, as well as property claim, moving the appellate panel to grant the appeal and modify the first-instance verdict in terms of conviction, and acquit the accused Milisavljević of the charges concerning the criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1)h) as read with Subparagraph a) of the CC BiH, all in conjunction with Article 29 of the CC BiH, or to revoke the first-instance verdict and order a retrial, and issue a decision to terminate custody of the accused Milisavljević.

Defense counsel for the Miloš Pantelić filed his appeal because of the essential violation of criminal procedure provisions and the erroneously and incompletely established state of facts, moving the appellate panel to revoke the challenged verdict and hold a retrial, with a reproduction of the already adduced evidence by re-examining certain witnesses, and after that render an acquittal.

On June 2, 2015, the Appellate Panel held a public session at which the parties orally presented the grounds for appeal, while maintaining their written submissions and arguments.

Having reviewed the challenged verdict within the bounds set in the appeal, the Appellate Panel issued the foregoing decision.

Milun Kornjača Sentenced to 7 Years of Imprisonment
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
August 7, 2015

Following a public trial held before the Appellate Division Panel of Section I for War Crimes of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on August 6, 2015 the Appellate Panel publicly pronounced the second-instance verdict, finding the accused Milun Kornjača guilty of the criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1)(h) (Persecution), as read with Subparagraph (e) of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all in conjunction with Article 180(1) of the CC BiH and Article 29 of the same Code.

In that regard, the Court sentenced the accused Milun Kornjača to 5 (five) years of imprisonment. Taking into account the previously imposed sentence of imprisonment of 5 (five) years for the committed criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity by Persecution under Article 172(1)h) of the CC BiH as read with Article 180(1) of the CC BiH and Article 29 of the CC BiH, under the verdict of the Court of BiH No. S 1 1 K 003541 10 Kri of May 21, 2014, upheld in its convicting part by the Appellate Panel’s verdict No. S1 1 K 003541 14 Krž 12 of March 10, 2015, the Court ultimately imposed on the accused Milun Kornjača a single sentence of 7 (seven) years of imprisonment.

Pursuant to Article 56 of the CC BiH, the time the accused Milun Kornjača spent in custody shall be credited towards his sentence of imprisonment.

Pursuant to Article 188(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the accused Milun Kornjača is relieved of the obligation to reimburse the costs of the criminal proceedings, which will be covered from within the Court’s budget appropriations.

The accused Milun Kornjača was found guilty because during the period from mid-April 1992 to late May 1992, in the Čajniče municipality, within a widespread and systematic attack of the Serb Municipality of Čajniče TO, members of the Plavi orlovi (Blue Eagles) unit and the Čajniče police station officers, helped by paramilitary formations coming from Serbia and Montenegro, directed against the non-Serb civilians in the Čajniče municipality, knowing of such an attack, as Commander of the Plavi orlovi unit he ordered and himself perpetrated the persecution of non-Serb civilians in the Čajniče municipality on ethnic and religious grounds, by detention committed with the intention to inflict immense suffering or serious physical or mental injury or health violation. The accused Milun Kornjača is acquitted of the charges that, even though after the murder of detained persons he learned from those present on the premises of the Čajniče TO Headquarters that a certain member of the Plavi orlovi unit had committed the killing of detained persons at the Lovački dom na Mostini (Hunting Lodge), he took no action that might have been expected from him in line with his rights and duties as Commander of the Plavi orlovi unit to punish the person who killed the detained persons.

The Court also issued a decision that the prohibitive measures, previously imposed on the accused Milun Kornjača, and extended by Court’s Decision No. S1 1 K 003541 10 Kr1 of May 21, 2014, shall remain in force until the accused is committed to serve his sentence of imprisonment.

The Suspect Mato Baotić ordered into Custody
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
August 13, 2015

Deciding upon a Motion filed by the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued, on August 12, 2015, a decision granting the Prosecution’s Motion and ordering the suspect Mato Baotić into one-month custody. Pursuant to the referenced decision, custody may last up until September 10, 2015, or until a new decision of the Court.

Having reviewed the presented evidentiary materials, the Court concluded there is a grounded suspicion that the Suspect committed the criminal offense as charged, and ordered the Suspect into custody as there are circumstances pointing to a risk of flight, and a justified fear indicating that, if released, the Suspect will hinder the criminal proceedings by influencing the witnesses.

Mato Baotić is suspected of having committed the criminal offense of War Crimes against Civilians in violation of Article 173(1)(e) of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Indictment Confirmed in Ivan Kraljević et al. Case
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
August 14, 2015

On August 6, 2015, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed the Indictment charging the Accused Ivan Kraljević, Mate Jelčić, Slavko Skender, Stojan Odak, Nedjeljko Matić and Vice Bebek with the criminal offense of Crimes against Humanity and the criminal offense of War Crimes against Prisoners of War, and charging the Accused Vinko Radišić and Dragan Miloš with the criminal offense of War Crimes against Prisoners of War.

The Indictment alleges that, in the period from late April 1993 to late March 1994, in the Military Investigation Prison in Ljubuški, as part of a widespread and systematic attack of the HVO and the Military Police of the HVO against the Bosniak civilian population and prisoners of war from the Municipalities of Stolac, Čapljina, Mostar, Prozor, Livno and Jablanica, and Municipalities of Maglaj and Žepče in Bosnia, knowing of the attack and that with their act or omission they participated in it, Ivan Kraljević, Mate Jelčić and Slavko Skender, who each carried out the duty of the warden of Ljubuški Military Investigation Prison in different periods, and Stojan Odak, Nedjeljko Matić, Vice Bebek, Vinko Radišić and Dragan Miloš, as members of the HVO Military Police and guards of the Ljubuški Military Investigation Prison, knowingly participated in a Joint Criminal Enterprise with the common plan of enhancing and implementing the system of detention and abuse.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Official Website of the ICTY

Karamarko says Serbian Policy Based on Myths and Half-Truths
dalje
August 5, 2015

The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) leader Tomislav Karamarko said on Wednesday in Knin that August 5 1995 was one of the greatest days in Croatia’s history and dismissed Serbia’s criticism which he said was based on the policy fostered by myths, half-truths and untruths.

As for Serbian comments on the exodus of the Serbs from Croatia, there are relevant documents, proving that the departure of the Serbs from Croatia was planned by the team led by (Serbian leader Slobodan) Milosevic while Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman called on the Serbs to remain in Croatia, Karamarko said.

“Their criticism is their business and also a regretful thing. It’s high time they addressed their own past and I would like see them say something about a Greater Serbia idea which Milosevic intended to implement,” the Croatian Opposition leader said.

Karamarko recalled that Operation Storm put an end to the implementation of that idea.

The implementation began exactly in Knin in 1990 with the establishment of a quasi-state “Serb Krajina” that had terrorised the Croatian people for five years, the HDZ leader added.

Thousands flocked in Knin for central celebrations of Croatia’s Victory Day observed on August 5, in memory of Operation Storm and the liberation of that southern Croatian town on August 5 1995.

Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said on Tuesday that Croatia should be ashamed of “Storm” and that Serbia would no longer be silent about that offensive which it perceived as “a horrible crime”.

Addressing a commemoration held in the northern town of Sremska Raca in memory of Serbs killed and expelled from Croatia, Vucic said that August 5, 1995 was one of the saddest days in the recent Serbian history.

Operation Storm was launched at 5am on August 4, 1995, and within the following 84 hours 10,400 square kilometres or 18.4 per cent of Croatia’s territory was liberated. A 20-metre-long Croatian flag was displayed on the fortress in Knin, the heart of the Serb rebellion, at noon on August 5.

About 200,000 soldiers and police took part in the biggest operation of the Homeland War, of whom nearly 200 were killed and over 1,400 wounded.

Operation Storm marked the end of the war in Croatia, created conditions for the peaceful reintegration of the eastern Danube River region, spared the northwestern Bosnian town of Bihac from the fate of Srebrenica, and enabled the return of refugees and displaced persons.

The legitimacy of Operation Storm has been proved before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. On November 16, 2012, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s convictions of General Ante Gotovina, commander of the Split Military District, and General Mladen Markac, special police commander, and ordered their immediate release. The generals were in the ICTY’s custody on charges of involvement in a joint criminal enterprise and excessive shelling of Knin, Gracac, Obrovac and Benkovac.

Bosnian Serb Forces Not Behind Wartime Mosque Destruction – Witness
Institute for War & Peace Reporting
By Daniella Peled
August 14, 2015

Engineer tells court that demolitions were carried out in a haphazard rather than systematic way.

A defence witness for former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic told Hague judges this week that the wartime destruction of mosques was due to collateral damage or plain vandalism, and was not part of a deliberate policy.

Dragic Gojkovic, a former engineer with the Bosnian Serb army (VRS), authored a report in which he concluded that army units under Mladic’s command were not involved in the destruction of buildings outside active combat zones.

The defence had enlisted Gojkovic to contest the findings of prosecution witness Andras Riedlmayer, an expert on Islamic architecture, who testified two years ago about the numerous mosques and Catholic churches destroyed during the conflict.

Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb army from 1992 to 1996, is charged with the “destruction of cultural monuments and sacred sites” in relation to 11 Bosnian municipalities.

Prosecutors allege that Mladic is responsible for crimes of genocide, persecution, extermination, murder and forcible transfer which “contributed to achieving the objective of the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory”. He is accused of planning and overseeing the 44-month siege of Sarajevo that left nearly 12,000 people dead, as well as the massacre of more than 7,000 men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.

At the start of his testimony, Gojkovic made clear that his own expert report was based on the one that Riedlmayer submitted to the tribunal.

He complained that he had only been given seven hours to complete the “huge task” of writing his report, but that he had studied Riedlmayer’s data “very carefully”.

However, Gojkovic said that after he examined the most “characteristic” examples of the 94 buildings cited in Riedlmayer’s report, it was clear that their destruction had not been carried out by experts.

“I looked at their demolition, which was done in what I would describe as a criminal way without any particular model, system or method,” he said.

The commonest demolition method was to target the minaret, he said, which did not make structural sense.

“In most cases when mosques in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] were demolished, it was minarets that were attacked first and foremost, and too much explosive was being used – enough to destroy the entire building,” he said. “Now it depended on where the explosives were placed. A minaret would fall either on the building itself or to the side. Secondly, in most cases when minarets were destroyed, the roofs were damaged too. Also in many cases, after the building was destroyed, it was also torched; or rather it is very difficult to ascertain whether buildings were burned before or after the demolition.

“At any rate, explosives were placed inside the minaret and at the level of the roof – if I can put it that way – so that the explosives would usually damage the roof or blow it away, and then due to the weather conditions, rain, snow etc, you don’t know what was destroyed by explosions and what was due to the passage of time and the weather conditions. On the basis of photographs only, it is hard to establish that.”

Prosecuting lawyer Arthur Traldi focused his cross-examination on undermining the witness’s entire report. He noted that although Gojkovic testified that there was a great deal of information missing from Riedlmayer’s report, he had not included any additional information in his own study.

“I only dealt with the way in which buildings were demolished. Riedlmayer dealt with spirituality, history and whatever else,” Gojkovic replied.

Traldi asked him to point out one new piece of information in his report that had not been in Riedlmayer’s document. The witness was unable to do so.

Traldi then turned to the witness’s contention that ten mosques were destroyed during combat, while 84 were destroyed after the Bosnian Serb army withdrew from the area in queston.

He accused Gojkovic of presenting the trial chamber with a “false dichotomy” by excluding information showing that some buildings were destroyed after the fighting was over but at a time when “the VRS maintained clear control of the area”.

The witness repeated that he had only used the information contained in Riedlmayer’s report.

The prosecution said it was unacceptable that he had no other supporting evidence.

“You have offered the trial chamber, in the body of your report, unsupported conclusions which you do not explain and which, you now testify, you do not know whether they are true or not,” Traldi said.

The witness acknowledged that he may have “made some errors” but maintained that his data was “90 per cent correct”.

Traldi turned to specific examples of destroyed mosques, including in Novoseoci in the Sokolac municipality and Sanica in Kljuc.

He noted that in Novoseoci, the trial had heard evidence that the village had been “cleansed” and that “the male residents were massacred”.

“Did you consider evidence like that in determining whether to list something as during combat operations or after ‘withdrawal’?” he asked.

Gojkovic repeated that he had only drawn on the evidence set out in the prosecution report and had “looked at the techniques, the manner and proportions of the building, the manner in which the building was demolished”.

He added that throughout the war, the Bosnian Serb army would have remained in liberated areas for between five and ten days before handing over to the civilian authorities.

Once again, Traldi asked how the witness had been able to judge whether the army had withdrawn or not.

Turning to the example of the Sanica mosque, destroyed on June 26, 1992, Traldi asked, “Did you consider the Sanica mosque as having been destroyed during combat operations or after VRS withdrawal?”

The witness was unable to answer.

“What I’m putting to you, sir, is that [in] coming to this conclusion you have essentially made numbers up,” the prosecutor said. “You have no basis for it, and you are providing the trial chamber information that you have no basis for providing. That’s the truth right?”

The witness denied this.

Traldi now turned to the conclusion which Gojkovic drew in his report that “the destruction of these cultural sites was an uncontrolled spate, not part of the chain of command”.

“So just to make sure I understand your evidence, it’s your evidence that violence committed against every Muslim and Croat cultural site that either you or Mr. Riedlmayer looked at in these 12 different municipalities – different areas of Bosnia at different times – was either some sort of grassroots movement of people desecrating mosques and churches or a coincidence,” Traldi said. “Is that right?”

“Precisely,” the witness responded.

The prosecutor asked whether Gojkovic had studied any of the comments that wartime Serb leaders had made regarding mosques and churches.

The witness said he personally believed there was no need to do so, but that he had spoken to Dragan Davidovic, the Republika Srpska (RS) minister for religious affairs, at the end of the war.

“He claimed to me that the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs did not take part in this [destruction]”, Gojkovic said, adding that Davidovic had also publicly condemned the “criminal” 1993 demolition of the Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka.

Traldi then read from an article which appeared in the New York Times on August 21, 1992 and which included a quote from Simo Drljaca, the then chief of police in Prijedor.

Drljaca was shot dead in 1997 during an attempt to arrest him for war crimes.

“‘With their mosques, you must not just break the minarets, you’ve got to shake up the foundations because that means they cannot build another. Do that and they’ll want to go, they’ll just leave themselves,'” Tradli quoted Drljaca as saying. “This is not the sort of statement that you would have considered in coming to your conclusion that the Bosnian Serb authorities were disconnected from the destruction of mosques, is it?” he asked.

The witness said that Drljaca “was certainly an extremist” but that his comments did not represent the views of all RS leaders.

Traldi put it to the witness that he had in fact “failed to consider statements by actual authorities, and relied on one conversation you had with a gentleman named Davidovic in coming to this conclusion”.

The witness denied this, going on to emphasise that Bosnian Muslims and Croats had also served under him in the VRS, and that he and his commanders had “never dreamed” of demolishing cultural or religious sites.

“Do you think that I as commander would be destroying the buildings of soldiers who are waging war together with me? Does that seem logical to you?” he asked.

The trial will continue with the testimony of Mladic’s wife, Bosiljka Mladic.

Mile Mrksic Dies in Detention
inSerbia
August 17, 2015

Former commander of the Republic of Serb Krajina Army general major Mile Mrksic died in the detention facilities in Portugal where he was serving the sentence pursuant to the ICTY ruling, Radio Television of Serbia reported.

Mrksic’s daughter Marija said in the letter for the media that her father was transferred to the prison hospital ward on July 22 due to poor health and that the doctors diagnosed him with lung cancer.

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Rasim Ljajic announced on Saturday that he will ask for immediate release for treatment in Serbia in case of Mile Mrksic, who was transferred to the Lisbon prison in 2012.

ICTY sentenced Mrksic and several more Serbs in 1995 for mass murder of over 260 people at Ovcara in the vicinity of Vukovar. Mrksic willingly surrendered to the court on May 15, 2002.

The trial began in October 2005 and the ICTY Trial Chamber pronounced the verdict against Mrksic on September 27, 2007, sentencing him to 20 years of imprisonment for aiding and abetting torture, brutal treatment and murder of 194 Croatian inmates at a farm in Ovcara on November 20, 1991.

Domestic Prosecutions In The Former Yugoslavia

David Schwendiman chief prosecutor of special court for KLA war crimes
InSerbia News
By TANJUG, Kosovapres
August 10, 2015

US lawyer David Schwendiman will be the chief prosecutor of the new special war crimes court for members of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Pristina-based news agency Kosovapres reported.

As of August 2014, Schwendiman has been the lead prosecutor of the European Union’s Special Investigative Task Force on Kosovo, whose mandate is to conduct an independent criminal investigation into the war crime and organized crime allegations contained in the CoE report of January 2011 by Senator Dick Marty, he has excellent knowledge of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, and he has also participated in war crimes investigations in many world areas, the agency said.

From 2006 to 2009, Prosecutor Schwendiman served as an international prosecutor in the Special Department for War Crimes of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). In this role, he investigated and prosecuted war crimes committed during the 1992-95 conflict. From late 2007 until the end of 2009, he was one of four Deputy Chief Prosecutors of BiH and oversaw the Special Department for War Crimes.

Kosovo Serb Leader Hospitalized Due to Hunger Strike
Yahoo News
August 15, 2015

A top Kosovo Serb politician detained over suspected war crimes against ethnic Albanians has been hospitalized after his health deteriorated from a hunger strike, a medical official said Saturday.

Oliver Ivanovic, who is being tried by an EU tribunal in northern Kosovo for war crimes allegedly committed in 1999-2000, began a hunger strike on August 7 to protest against the court’s decision to extend his detention. He has been held since his arrest in January 2014, and the court has rejected his request for release several times.

“His life is not endangered at this moment, but his health has deteriorated over the hunger strike and he is refusing to receive” treatment, Milan Jakovljevic, head of the medical team that admitted Ivanovic to hospital, told reporters.

“It is necessary to keep him in the hospital” for the time being, he said.

Last week the EU court rejected Ivanovic’s latest request for a provisional release, despite the Serbian government’s guarantees that Ivanovic would be reachable and stand trial.

Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic called the court’s decision “senseless” and it was “aimed at further humiliation of Kosovo Serbs”.

The 62-year-old Ivanovic, who is considered a political moderate, is the first senior Kosovo Serb official to be charged and tried by the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) on suspicion of war crimes against ethnic Albanians.

Ivanovic, a former Serbian secretary for Kosovo, pleaded not guilty in August 2014 at the start of his trial, which is due to resume on September 10.

After the 1998-1999 Kosovo war, Ivanovic became a key interlocutor with NATO, the UN and later the EU and was seen as backing dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian community.

However, he was also among the organisers of a now-disbanded Kosovo Serb group of vigilantes known as “Bridgewatchers”, whose members were suspected of taking part in violence against ethnic Albanians.

Some 120,000 ethnic Serbs live in Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and has about 1.8 million inhabitants, most of them ethnic Albanians.

Kosovo has been recognised by more than 100 countries, including the United States and a majority of the EU states.

NGO in Serbia Files War Crimes Charges Against Policemen Over Slaughter of Albanian Women and Children
dtt-net
August 17, 2015

An Belgrade NGO has raised war crimes charges against two members of two wartime Serb policemen over slaughter of 53 Albanian civilians (24 women and 23 children) during the 1998-1999 war in central Kosovo.

The Humanitarian Law Center (FHP) said it filed charges on Monday against two unidentified former policemen for the crime in the village of Old Poklek (alb. Pokleku i Vjetër), Gllogovc municipality on 17th of April 1999.

The NGO said the suspects were members of the 86th Detachment of the Special Police Unit of Serbia’s Interior Ministry. Two of its commander are also charged but “of not preventing the crime and not punishing the perpetrators.”

“…one of the police officers smashed the window of the room where the women, children and the elderly were, opened the door violently and threw a bomb into the room, which exploded immediately. After several minutes, the same police officer came into the room to check whether there were any survivors. He instantly killed the ones who were still alive, using an automatic rifle,” the NGO wrote in a statement.

“After having killed almost all the civilians in the house, the police officers took two cans of petrol and burned the room where the bodies of the killed civilians were. Four persons, among them a child of two, who had survived the bombs and shooting but had not left the room on time, were burned alive,” it wrote, explaining that most of the children were less then seven years old.

The youngest baby killed was 10 month-old. Three persons survived and the remains of three others are still missing.

Convicted Serb War Criminal Mrksic Dies
Yahoo News
By AFP
August 18, 2015

A former Serb army commander serving a 20-year sentence for his role in the massacre of Croats during the Balkans wars has died in Lisbon at the age of 68, the Portuguese government said Tuesday.

Mile Mrksic, a former officer in the Yugoslav army (JNA), was convicted in 2007 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for aiding and abetting the torture and murder of nearly 200 civilians in Vukovar in eastern Croatia in 1991.

His sentence by The Hague-based UN court was upheld on appeal in 2009, and he was transferred in 2012 to a high security prison in Lisbon.

Mrksic died on Sunday of a terminal illness in a hospital in the Portuguese capital, a justice ministry spokesman told AFP, without elaborating.

The capture of Vukovar by the Yugoslav army and Serb rebels in 1991 is considered a pivotal event at the outbreak of Croatia’s 1991-95 war of independence.

The town was razed and more than 1,000 civilians were killed during the three-month siege and its aftermath, while some 22,000 non-Serbs were expelled.

Mrksic was convicted over the killing of 194 people who had been forcibly taken from a hsopital where thousands of Croats and other non-Serbs had taken refuge.

Mrksic’s subordinate Veselin Slijivancanin, was sentenced by the ICTY to 10 years in prison for his role in the massacre, while a third defendant was acquitted.

About 20,000 people were killed in the war sparked by Croatia’s proclamation of independence from the former Yugoslavia.

Vt. Man Faces War Crimes Retrial
The Rutland Herald
August 19, 2015

A Vermont man is expected to face a second trial early next year on charges he lied about his role in Bosnian war crimes during the early 1990s.

Earlier this summer, the conviction of Edin Sakoc was overturned after a judge ruled prosecutors made comments during his January trial that had not been included in the original indictment.

The Burlington Free Press reported that during a Monday hearing in federal court in Burlington attorneys said they would like to hold the retrial in February or March.

Sakoc is a Bosnian Muslim who arrived in the United States in 2001. Prosecutors charged he lied on his 2007 citizenship application about his role in war crimes in 1992, which his attorneys argued were committed by a Bosnian army commander.

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
Official Website of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT)

One-time supervisor tells of work on dam
Phnom Penh Post
By Rebecca Moss
August 11, 2015

During the final stretch of construction on the Trapeang Thma Dam in 1977, on sweltering April days just before Khmer New Year, workers carried earth in shifts for 120 hours straight with only brief breaks, witness Kan Thorl told the Khmer Rouge tribunal yesterday.

Thorl, now 57, worked as deputy platoon chief at the worksite, supervising 30 workers, though he recalled 15,000 people labouring at the dam, which he said was completed in under three months – although other witness testimonies dispute this timeframe. “At night, there were militiamen, they would monitor our movement,” he said.

To encourage the dam’s rapid progress, Thorl added that near-daily sessions for “self-criticism” and “re-education” were held, with the inefficient or those who feigned illness deprived a portion of their food rations – three cans of rice a day for a good worker.

According to the witness, between two and five members of his unit fell sick each day and less than 30 per cent were able to make their daily work quota.

“They became weaker and weaker after the food ration had been reduced,” he said. “This was one kind of punishment imposed on us.”

The witness confirmed that these instructions were handed down by Ta Val, who oversaw the worksite; he also placed several other senior cadre members at the dam, including sector secretary Heng Rin, and Ta Cheal, a member of the sector committee.

Thorl confirmed that the control of the dam switched into the hands of Southwest Zone cadres in 1977 – “Those from the Northwest Zone were no longer there,” he said simply – but could not say how he knew this, and denied arrests occurred at the site.

In an attempt to jog his memory, however, the prosecution read a passage from Thorl’s witness statement to the investigating judges.

“One day, I saw that they had arrested people and tied them up and were walking them nearby my building during the night.

I did not know their names.

The people walking them were dressed in black and had guns slung over their shoulders so I assumed they were soldiers,” the statement read.

The proceedings concluded with the discussion of marriage at the dam worksite, an arrangement of 30 couples wed at once with minimal ceremony.

Thorl said couples chose their partners willingly, contradicting previous testimony from civil parties, and said the regime believed traditional ceremonies were excessive and that marriages only required a “resolution” between partners as they held each other’s arms.

Ex-cadre tells of dam purges
The Phnom Penh Post
By Alessandro Sassoon
August 12, 2015

A former Khmer Rouge soldier and Trapeang Thma Dam guard between 1976 to 1977, Lat Suoy began his testimony by recounting the day the Khmer Rouge entered his village near the dam, on April 17, 1975.

“They came and screamed for all the relatives of Lon Nol soldiers, to take them away and execute them,” he said.

“They arrested my village chief Nea Rim and his wife and they were executed”, he added.

The recollection prompted an objection from the defence, who maintained that the alleged purges did not figure into the scope of the current Case 002/02.

However, the objection was ultimately overruled on the grounds that the purges established the existence of Khmer Rouge policy implemented nationally.

Suoy himself feared his relatives might be targeted as intellectuals by initial purges as “they had studied to grade one or two”.

Drafted into the ranks of the regime at age 15, Suoy said he did not know what the army was.

Taken into the jungle and separated from his parents, he “cried often”.

Speaking of his time at the Trapeang Thma Dam, Suoy testified that Ta Val commanded all mobile work units in sector five.

The witness claimed he knew Ta Val well, saying, “Ta Val was a very firm person”, and that “every time Ta Val came by, everyone feared him and tried to work harder”.

According to Suoy, subordinates carried out arrests at the worksite but the orders for executions came from Ta Val.

Suoy then described sanitary conditions, how workers had swollen bodies and would be poisoned from resorting to eating plants and mushrooms. “Some had knees bigger than their heads.”

At the end of the session, Suoy confirmed the purge of Northwest Zone cadres by Southwest Zone cadres in 1977, in which he himself eventually became a target. “Southwest Zone cadres came to arrest Northwest Zone cadres,” Suoy continued, naming Ta Val among the victims of the purge.

Once his superior was arrested, Suoy was next, but he evaded capture.

“I fled to my house and the Southwest cadres arrested me . . . I used Khmer traditional martial arts to knock down the security guard and fled”.

The day’s session ended with Suoy explaining how the purge continued, “They accused my village of being traitors. They intended to arrest all of us.

We had to take refuge in the jungle”.

In the morning, witness Kan Thorl concluded his testimony, saying he had heard secondhand accounts that any Vietnamese people found were to be executed, an element of the genocide charges in Case 002/02.

KR Leaders had authority over killings : Witness
Cambodian Daily
By George Wright
August 14, 2015

A former assistant to the head of the Trapeang Thma Dam worksite during the Pol Pot regime told the Khmer Rouge tribunal Thursday of an order stipulating that the decision to kill could only be made by the party’s leadership.

Chhit Yoeuk, who served under Ta Val—a ruthless commander witnesses say was responsible for ordering executions at the Banteay Meanchey worksite—told the court of a 1978 meeting in which mobile unit chiefs informed their subordinates they could not carry out purges.

“On the issues of arrests or killings, only in 1978 I heard of the meeting by the chiefs of the mobile unit who said that lower cadre did not have the authority to kill anyone, and only the decision to kill someone could be made by the center,” he said.

When asked by Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne if lower-level cadre held autonomy over purges prior to 1978, Mr. Yoeuk said he believed the directive could have come as a result of such a practice.

“It might be possible that those cadre made their own decisions to kill people and that’s why later on there was a directive from the center prohibiting them to kill in 1978,” he said.

Mr. Yoeuk was also questioned on his demotion from Ta Val’s assistant to collecting fertilizer at the site, and why he did not refuse to accept his new role.

“I didn’t know what mistake I made and I was reassigned to carry fertilizer…. I thought maybe someone made an accusation against me that’s why I was reassigned,” he said.

Despite regularly deflecting questions related to deaths at the site, claiming he was unaware of killings due to his low rank, Mr. Yoeuk admitted that he was afraid of losing his life.

“The fear was that I was wondering if someone made an accusation against me, if that was the case I would be in a big, risky situation that I might be arrested and sent to be killed,” he said.

“People disappeared without any reason and in fact during the regime, nobody dared ask any questions about this issue. For example if I was to be taken away, that’s the end of the story, nobody would dare to ask why I was being taken away,” he said.

More EU Financial Assistance to ECCC and Genocide Education
Khmer Times
August 15, 2015

The European Union has decided to make an extra contribution amounting to 10 million euro to support the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as well as to support genocide education in Cambodia.

According to a press release of the European Union Delegation to Cambodia made public Friday afternoon, 8.9 million euro of the total fund will be used to support the international and national components of the ECCC in order to ensure the necessary international standards of justice for the hybrid tribunal.

The rest (1.1 million euro) will be used to provide genocide education as a means encouraging and reinforcing collective and individual historical memory as well as understanding the importance of respecting human rights and cultural diversity, it pointed out.

“This new contribution to the ECCC is a renewed proof of the commitment of the European Union to improve good governance and the rule of law in Cambodia as well as to raise standards in the administration of justice and in combating impunity in this country,” said Mrs. Fiona Ramsey, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to Cambodia.

The EU contribution will be managed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in close partnership with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), said the press release.

With this new contribution, it added, the EU support to the ECCC now totals more than 17.3 million euro over the past 9 years (since 2007). To date, the EU and the EU Member States have contributed to the Court approximately US$55 million, corresponding to 26 percent of the total contributions. This makes the EU and the EU Member States combined the second largest contributor to the Court.

Iraq

Grotian Moment: The International War Crimes Trial Blog

Iraqi panel wants Maliki to ‘face court over fall of Mosul’ to IS group
France24
August 16, 2015

An Iraqi parliamentary panel called Sunday for dozens of security and political officials, including former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, to be indicted in connection with the fall of the northern city of Mosul to Islamic State (IS) group.

The indictment of Maliki, who remains a powerful figure in Iraq’s complex political landscape, and other senior officials comes a week after Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi launched a sweeping campaign to combat corruption and mismanagement that he argued had made the country nearly impossible to govern.

In the panel’s report, seen by Reuters and confirmed as accurate by three of its members, the committee also placed responsibility for the June 2014 defeat with former Mosul Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, former acting defence minister Sadoun al-Dulaimi, former army chief General Babakir Zebari and Lieutenant General Mahdi al-Gharrawi, former operational commander of Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital.

Others accused include Nineveh police commander Major General Khalid Hamdani and former Deputy Interior Minister Adnan al-Assadi. “No one is above the law”

There has been no official accounting of how Mosul was lost, and who gave the order to abandon the fight. The fall of the city – Iraq’s second-largest – was a turning point in Islamic State’s seizure of large swathes of the country’s north and west in a sweep across the Syrian border last year.

An investigation by Reuters in October showed how troop shortages in Mosul and infighting among top officers and Iraqi political leaders played into Islamic State’s hands and fuelled panic that led to the city’s abandonment. Maliki has accused unnamed countries, commanders and rival politicians of plotting the fall of Mosul.

The parliamentary report was approved by 16 of the panel’s 24 members, lawmaker Muhsin Sadoun said. Panel member Mohammed al-Karabouli said parliament would vote on the report’s findings on Monday and then refer it to Abadi, the prosecutor general and the integrity commission.

“No one is above the law and accountability to the people,” said Parliament Speaker Saleem al-Jabouri in a statement upon receiving the report. “The judiciary will punish perpetrators and delinquents.”

[back to contents]

Syria

Syria: War Crimes Amplify Suffering of Eastern Ghouta’s Bombed and Besieged Civilians
Amnesty International
August 12, 2015

Relentless aerial bombardment and shelling by Syrian government forces is magnifying the suffering of civilians trapped under siege and facing an escalating humanitarian crisis in Eastern Ghouta, said Amnesty International in a new report published today.

‘Left to die under siege’: War crimes and human rights abuses in Eastern Ghouta, Syria reveals damning evidence of war crimes and describes the Syrian government’s siege on Eastern Ghouta and unlawful killing of its besieged civilians, occurring as part of a widespread as well as systematic attack on the civilian population, as amounting to crimes against humanity. The report also highlights the agonizing struggle to survive of more than 163,000 people living under siege in Eastern Ghouta, as well as exposing abuses by non-state armed groups in the area.

“For nearly three years the lives of civilians in Eastern Ghouta have been devastated by bloodshed and tragedy. They are trapped and surrounded by fighting on all fronts with no means to escape the unlawful aerial and shelling attacks waged by government forces. Their anguish is compounded by dwindling supplies of food, clean water and other crucial necessities which mean that daily life for many has become a prolonged experience of hardship and suffering,” said Said Boumedouha, Acting Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.

War crimes by government forces

Between January and June 2015 Syrian government forces carried out at least 60 aerial attacks on Eastern Ghouta killing around 500 civilians. The report documents 13 air strikes and other attacks amounting to war crimes, which killed 231 civilians and only three fighters. In 10 cases no military target could be identified in the vicinity suggesting the strikes were direct attacks on civilians or at best indiscriminate. In the remaining three cases the attacks appeared grossly disproportionate or otherwise indiscriminate. Many public places that were struck were crammed full of civilians including a crowded public market, a school while students were nearby and the vicinity of a mosque soon after Friday prayers.

Satellite imagery analysis shows that aerial attacks carried out between 28 December and 10 February have completely destroyed multiple residential buildings in the vicinity of Taha mosque in Douma. One eyewitness said that he saw nine bodies scattered on the streets near the mosque killed by an airstrike on 9 February. He added that residential buildings, an underground field hospital and a school were also destroyed.

On the same day, Amir witnessed another strike on another mosque in Douma. He described to Amnesty International how displaced families including children were killed in the attack that struck al-Ansar mosque in Douma where they had sought refuge. “Nowhere is safe,” he said.

Public markets are also on the list of Syrian government’s targets. “It was a disaster,” one eyewitness said describing the aftermath of the attack on the market in Kafr Batna on 5 February. Residents said the attack took place at 1pm– the “busiest hour of the day” – and also destroyed two nearby residential buildings. There was no trace of a military target nearby.

In a similarly shocking attack on 25 January Syrian air force jets bombed a market in Hamouria shortly after Friday prayers as crowds of people poured out of a nearby mosque to buy sugar sold that day at a discounted price, killing more than 40 civilians. “I could only see blood. It was horrific, like nothing I have seen before,” an eyewitness said. “The timing and location of these attacks appear deliberately orchestrated to maximize damage or civilian casualties in a gruesome attempt by the Syrian government forces to terrorize the population. All attacks on civilians and civilian buildings or infrastructure must end,” said Said Boumedouha.

Syrian government forces also repeatedly fired imprecise rockets and mortars or unguided bombs into populated areas in a series of direct and indiscriminate attacks on civilians amounting to war crimes.

“By repeatedly bombing heavily populated areas in a series of direct, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks as well as by unlawfully besieging civilians, Syrian government forces have committed war crimes and displayed a sinister callousness towards Eastern Ghouta’s civilians,” said Said Boumedouha.

Life under siege – a struggle to survive

In addition to daily bombardments, living conditions for civilians of Eastern Ghouta have continued to deteriorate. Residents have limited access to food, clean water or medical care and essential supplies including electricity and fuel. Checkpoints controlled either by government forces or armed groups restrict their movements into and out of Eastern Ghouta. Government forces have also denied UN agencies and other humanitarian actors free access to the area.

More than 200 people have died from starvation or lack of access to adequate medical care in Eastern Ghouta between 21 October 2012 and 31 January 2015 according to the Syrian American Medical Society.

An emerging black market “war economy” has seen smugglers and members of armed groups or government officials profit at the expense of civilians. Syrian government forces routinely confiscate food at checkpoints forcing residents to buy goods on the black market often for up to 10 times the price of goods in central Damascus.

Marwan, a local resident from Jesrine, said he had lost more than 15kg in weight because of the siege. He spent days without eating in order to ensure his four children and wife could eat once a day. “What will it take for the United Nations to do something about it? Is starvation the only answer?” he said.

“Government forces are using starvation as a weapon of war in flagrant violation of international law. Withholding food and basic supplies required to survive is a vicious act of cruelty amounting to collective punishment of the civilian population,” said Said Boumedouha.

Residents also said Army of Islam (Jaysh al Islam) fighters and their families had abundant food while civilians were forced to pay hugely inflated prices.

The report discloses that non-state armed groups, particularly the Army of Islam, are guilty of an array of abuses including abductions, arbitrary detentions and indiscriminate shelling. Their use of imprecise weapons such as mortars and Grad rockets in populated areas amounts to war crimes.

“Widespread violations by the Syrian government do not excuse the appalling behaviour of the Army of Islam who have also waged indiscriminate attacks, failed to protect civilians and deprived them of access to food or medical care. Civilians of Eastern Ghouta are essentially caught in between two hostile sides vying for their own gain,” said Said Boumedouha.

International action desperately needed

More than a year ago the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions intended to alleviate the suffering of Syria’s civilians, calling on all parties to the conflict to end attacks on civilians, lift all sieges, grant unfettered humanitarian access and release anyone arbitrarily detained. So far however, they have failed to assuage the suffering of most civilians.

“The aim of these resolutions was precisely to protect civilians and prevent a full scale humanitarian disaster. Yet so far the UN Security Council has looked on as the resolutions continue to be openly flouted and the crisis grows steadily worse, despite commitments to take further steps to ensure they are enforced. Such steps are desperately overdue,” said Said Boumedouha.

“Perpetrators of the crimes under international law that we are witnessing in Syria must no longer be allowed to escape justice. As long as Russia blocks the Security Council from referring the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, justice remains a distant prospect.”

So far the UN Security Council has looked on as the resolutions continue to be openly flouted and the crisis grows steadily worse, despite commitments to take further steps to ensure they are enforced. Such steps are desperately overdue

The Security Council must urgently impose targeted sanctions against all parties to the conflict in Syria responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as an arms embargo on the Syrian government. The Syrian government should ensure unfettered access for the Independent International Commission of Inquiry to the country as well as other human rights monitors including Amnesty International.

UN Humanitarian Chief Says He is ‘Horrified’ by Attacks on Civilians in Syria
Associated Press
By Albert Aji and Bassem Mroue
August 17, 2015

The United Nations humanitarian chief said on Monday he is “horrified” by the attacks on civilians taking place in Syria, singling out in particular government airstrikes the previous day that killed nearly 100 people in a Damascus suburb.

The protracted conflict not only “severely affects” the lives of millions of people in Syria but also threatens the stability of the entire region, Stephen O’Brien said at a press conference in Damascus.

The stark warning comes amid a surge in violence as Syrian government troops, Islamic militants and rebels carried out attacks that killed and wounded dozens Monday, including in President Bashar Assad’s coastal stronghold of Latakia.

“Attacks on civilians are unlawful, unacceptable and must stop,” O’Brien said, speaking at the end of a three-day visit to Syria, during which he met senior officials and visited the central province of Homs.

Government air raids on Sunday killed at least 96 people in the eastern Damascus suburb of Douma, making it one of the deadliest single incidents since the crisis began in March 2011. The airstrikes hit a vegetable market in the suburb, which is a stronghold of the Islam Army rebel group.

Syria’s conflict has killed more than 250,000 people, according to United Nations.

“I am particularly appalled by reports of airstrikes yesterday, causing scores of civilian deaths and hundreds injured, right in the center of Douma,” O’Brien said. “I am horrified by the total disrespect for civilian life in this conflict.” He

appealed to all parties to protect civilians and respect international humanitarian law, and also expressed concerns for 4.6 million Syrian “stuck in hard-to-reach and besieged areas.”

O’Brien also lambasted armed groups for cutting off water in Damascus, saying it was unacceptable to “use access to water and other services as a weapon of war.”

Water cuts have been used before in the Syrian civil war, with Damascus and the northern city of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and former commercial center, most affected.

In Washington, State Department spokesman John Kirby said the United States “condemns in the strongest possible terms the Assad regime’s deadly airstrikes” on the Douma market.

“The Assad regime’s brutal attacks on Syria’s cities have killed thousands of people and destroyed schools, mosques, markets, and hospitals,” Kirby said, adding that they “demonstrate the regime’s disregard for human life.”

U.N. special envoy Staffan de Mistura also condemned the Douma airstrikes.

“Hitting crowded civilian markets (and) killing almost one hundred of its own citizens by a government is unacceptable in any circumstances,” de Mistura said, repeating calls for the warring sides to urgently start a dialogue toward a political solution.

Also Monday, the rebels in Damascus’ wider eastern suburbs — an area known as Eastern Ghouta — imposed a curfew, fearing more government airstrikes and saying the curfew was imposed out of concern for civilian lives. The rebel statement said the curfew would go on until further notice. Douma is part of Eastern Ghouta.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported 22 air raids on Eastern Ghouta on Monday, including seven in Douma. The Local Coordination Committees said Douma was hit with mortar shells.

Douma-based activist Baraa Abdul-Rahman said the streets there were empty and most people were staying indoors. “There is a situation of terror and fear in the town,” he said via Skype.

In Turkey, the head of the main Western-backed opposition group, the Syrian National Coalition, blasted the government over Douma’s air raids and urged the international community to help bring officials behind the “massacres and war crimes” to the International Criminal Court.

Sweden grants temporary asylum to 40 war crimes suspects
Middle East Monitor
August 14, 2015

A report by the Swedish Migration Agency has revealed that the government in the Scandinavian country has granted temporary residence to 40 asylum seekers who are suspected of having committed war crimes in Syria and Iraq. The suspects do not want to return home as they fear that they will be killed if they do.

Asylum expert Magnus Bengtsson noted that although war crimes suspects who seek asylum come to Sweden using false identities, the Swedish authorities have uncovered their real identities after thorough investigations. He pointed out that the people in question have not been sent back to their country because they risk getting killed or tortured, and “some” have been given temporary residence permits.

In a related matter, Swedish state television has claimed that hospitals in Sweden have treated 301 citizens who were injured in Syria and Iraq after joining the ranks of Al-Nusra Front and Daesh.

ISIS Beheads 82-Year-Old Archaeologist in Palmyra, Syrian Official Says
Fox News
August 19, 2015

ISIS militants have beheaded an 82-year-old archaeologist who had been in charge of overseeing the ancient site at Palmyra in Syria, a government official said Tuesday.

Syrian state antiquities chief Maamoun Abdulkarim told Reuters that the family of Khaled Asaad had informed Abdulkarim that Asaad had been beheaded earlier in the day and his body hanged from a column in the town’s main square.

Asaad’s death was also reported by the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The Observatory, which has a network of activists on the ground in Syria, said dozens of people gathered to witness the killing.

Abdulkarim said that Asaad had been held and interrogated by members of the terror group for over a month before his death. The official said that Asaad’s captors had been looking for information about where the town’s treasures had been hidden to save them from ISIS, but they had no success getting the information from the scholar.

ISIS seized Palmyra, whose Roman-era ruins attracted thousands of tourists prior to Syria’s civil war, from government forces in May. In the days and weeks before the city fell, Syrian officials said they had moved hundreds of statues out of concern that they would be destroyed by ISIS fighters.

“Just imagine that such a scholar who gave such memorable services to the place and to history would be beheaded … and his corpse still hanging from one of the ancient columns in the center of a square in Palmyra,” Abdulkarim said. “The continued presence of these criminals in this city is a curse and bad omen on (Palmyra) and every column and every archaeological piece in it.”

Asaad spent over 50 years working at the UNESCO World Heritage site, including alongside U.S., French, German, and Swiss archaeological missions. He also wrote many books and scientific texts either individually or in cooperation with other Syrian or foreign archeologists, SANA said. Among his titles are “The Palmyra Sculptures,” and “Zenobia, the Queen of Palmyra and the Orient.”

Abdulkarim described Asaad as “one of the most important pioneers in Syrian archaeology in the 20th century.” The country’s official news agency SANA reported that Asaad had been in charge of Palmyra’s archaeological site for four decades until 2003, when he retired. After retiring, al-Asaad worked as an expert with the Antiquities and Museums Department.

Asaad, who held a diploma in history and education from the University of Damascus, also discovered several ancient cemeteries, caves and the Byzantine cemetery in the garden of the Museum of Palmyra, the agency reported.

“Al-Asaad was a treasure for Syria and the world,” Khalil Hariri from Palmyra’s archaeological department told The Associated Press, speaking over the phone from the central Syrian city of Homs.

“Why did they kill him?”

“Their systematic campaign seeks to take us back into pre-history,” he added. “But they will not succeed.”

ISIS drew international condemnation after it released videos showing members destroying artifacts with hammers and drills in a museum in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul and using explosives to wreck other sites.

In March, ISIS members in Iraq razed 3,000-year old Nimrod and bulldozed 2,000-year old Hatra — both UNESCO world heritage sites. At the time, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon described the action as a “war crime.”

However, it is not completely clear what ISIS has done with Palmyra’s Roman-era ruins. In June, ISIS blew up two shrines that did not date from Roman times, but were regarded by the militants as pagan and sacrilegious under their strict interpretation of Islam. One of the destroyed tombs belonged to a descendant of the Muslim prophet Muhammad’s cousin. ISIS also destroyed a lion statue in the town dating back to the 2nd century. The statue, discovered in 1975, had stood at the gates of the town museum, and had been placed inside a metal box to protect it from damage.

In early July, ISIS released a video showing the killing of some 20 captured government soldiers in Palmyra’s amphitheater. They were shot dead by young IS members, armed with pistols. Hundreds of people were seen watching the killings.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

New Jersey Man Charged With Plotting to Support ISIS
The New York Times
By Stephanie Clifford
August 10, 2015

A New Jersey man who prosecutors said tried to organize support for the Islamic State was arrested on Monday.

The man, Nader Saadeh, 20, wanted to “form a small army” that would include his friends, according to the United States attorney for New Jersey. Mr. Saadeh lived in Rutherford, N.J., until he left the United States in May but was detained in Jordan.

Mr. Saadeh was charged with conspiracy and seeking to provide material support to a terrorist group.

A person who knew Mr. Saadeh alerted the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the criminal complaint says, telling federal agents in April that the men were headed overseas to join the Islamic State, which is also known as ISIS or ISIL.

That person lived with Mr. Saadeh and his brother, Alaa, 23, for several years after their parents were deported. The brothers lived together in Fort Lee, N.J., from 2012 to 2014, and this year moved back in with the same person in Rutherford.

The person said Nader Saadeh began to change after he moved in, “praying five times a day” and wearing “traditional Muslim attire in place of the Western clothing he had previously worn,” the criminal complaint says. He also became agitated when the conversation was not about Islam, the complaint says. When the Islamic State burned alive a Jordanian pilot, Mr. Saadeh said it was justified, according to the person, and he also said the attack on the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo was justified.

By April, the person said, Mr. Saadeh changed his phone number and began speaking in Arabic, which was not his first language, rather than English, when they were together.

Federal authorities then searched Mr. Saadeh’s email and social media accounts and found messages supporting the Islamic State.

In messages from 2013, Mr. Saadeh and a friend discussed building a “small army” of their friends. “Think of it, it will probably be like 2-4 yrs from now, we will be in the prime of our lives,” he wrote.

By April, Mr. Saadeh’s mother expressed worry. He received two messages through his mother’s friends dissuading him from joining the Islamic State. His mother wrote him, “Do not go anywhere if u love me dont kill your mom.”

In May, after Mr. Saadeh discussed joining the Islamic State with his brother and two friends, he flew from Kennedy International Airport to Amman, Jordan. About 10 days after he arrived, his father alerted Alaa Saadeh that his brother had been detained there, according to the person who lived with the brothers.

Nader Saadeh appeared in Federal District Court in Newark on Monday afternoon. His lawyer declined to comment.

His brother was arrested in June. The two friends who discussed joining the Islamic State — Samuel Rahamin Topaz, 21, of Fort Lee and a 20-year-old Queens resident who was not named — were also arrested that month.

Alaa Saadeh consented to being jailed without trying for bail, court records show, and is in plea negotiations. No bail package was presented for Mr. Topaz, who is also in plea negotiations.

California Man Guilty of Trying to Support Islamic State
The New York Times
By The Associated Press
August 10, 2015

A California college student who lied on a passport application so he could travel to Syria and join the Islamic State pleaded guilty Monday to a terrorism-related charge.

Adam Dandach, 21, of Orange pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State and to lying on a passport application.

He acknowledged in a plea agreement filed in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana that he supported violent jihad against the “occupiers” of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and planned to offer his services to the terrorism cause.

On July 2, 2014, the day he attempted to fly to Istanbul, he emailed a friend and complained that more people weren’t helping the cause and that it was a “golden opportunity,” according to court documents.

FBI agents found his smartphone loaded with jihadi songs supporting Islamic State fighting, maps of areas the group controlled, and Twitter updates of fighting by the terrorist group.

He told FBI agents who questioned him at John Wayne Airport that he was heading to Syria and planned to pledge allegiance and offer assistance to the Islamic State. He said he believed the killings of American soldiers were justified.

Dandach was initially snared on a charge of lying to get a replacement passport when he claimed on an application that he accidentally tossed out his old passport. He knew his mother confiscated his passport when she learned of his travel plans, prosecutors said.

His mother, Sawsan Ghannoum, told The Associated Press in March that she hid the passport when her son said he wanted to visit his father in Lebanon and volunteer for charity work.

She said he had psychological problems and was naive and misled by people on the Internet while trying to learn about Islam.

“He’s not a kind of violent person, a terrorist,” Ghannoum said. “He’s afraid of a bee.”

Dandach could face up to 25 years in federal prison when sentenced Jan. 11.

His lawyer did not immediately reply to a message seeking comment.

2 NYC students charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS
PIX11 News
By Alyssa Zauderer
August 11, 2015

A federal grand jury has indicted two New York City college students on terror charges accusing them of attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State and carry out a terror attack.

Munther Omar Saleh, 20, and Fareed Mumuni, 21, have been in custody since June.

Prosecutors say the 21-year-old Saleh had researched recipes for homemade explosives and looked up city landmarks on the Internet. They also say he and the 20-year-old Mumuni discussed how to build a pressure cooker bomb.

On June 13, Saleh and another man were arrested in Queens after they approached a police officer while armed with knives.

Just a few days later, the FBI executed a search warrant on Mumuni’s home on Staten Island. During the search, Mumuni allegedly tried to stab an FBI special agent with a large kitchen knife. Officials said the attack was premeditated.

“He kept the knife he used to attack the FBI Special Agent wrapped in a T-shirt in his bed for such an occasion,” the court document said. “Mumuni also stated that he kept the knife that was recovered from his mother’s vehicle for use in an encounter with law enforcement.”

Police Commissioner Bill Bratton commended the agents and detectives from the Manhattan-based Joint Terrorism Task Force and prosecutors on the case.

“Stabbing an FBI agent and providing ‎material support to a designated terrorist organization are a recipe for indictment, as alleged,” said Bratton.

Their defense attorneys haven’t responded to messages seeking comment on the indictment. An attorney previously denied Mumuni is an Islamic State convert and said he has a clean record.

An arraignment is set for Aug. 20.

Mumuni faces up to 85 years in prison while Saleh faces a maximum sentence of 65 years.

Man Pleads Not Guilty to Backpack Bomb Plot on Florida Beach
The New York Times
By The Associated Press
August 11, 2015

A Florida Keys man pleaded not guilty Tuesday to federal charges of plotting to set off a backpack bomb on a beach to show solidarity with the Islamic State militant group.

Attorney Richard Della Fera entered the plea Tuesday in federal court in Miami for 23-year-old Harlem Suarez of Key West, who did not speak during the brief hearing. Suarez faces life in prison if convicted of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and up to 20 years behind bars if found guilty of seeking to provide material support to terrorists.

Della Fera says Suarez, who emigrated from Cuba with his family in 2004, is no terrorist and has portrayed him as “troubled and confused.” The case, which involved FBI use of undercover operatives, evolved from a series of pro-Islamic State postings on Suarez’s Facebook pages earlier this year.

Suarez sometimes used a Facebook account with the name “Almlak Benitez” in which he appeared to be trying to recruit fighters for the terror group, the FBI says.

“We are the islamic state. We are isis Muslims,” one posting says.

According to the FBI, Suarez told an informant he wanted to detonate a homemade bomb using a backpack filled with nails on a Key West beach after previously discussing plans to set off a bomb in Miami Beach or another Keys town. He was arrested in July after officials say he took possession of an inert explosive device from an undercover FBI employee posing as an Islamic State member.

The material support charge stems from an Islamic State recruitment video Suarez is accused of making — using a script he wrote — with the assistance of the FBI informant, Della Fera said.

“Destroy our enemies against us. Let live only who are our brothers and sisters,” Suarez says on the video, according to an FBI complaint. “American soil is the past, we will destroy America and divide it in two, we will raise our black flag on top of your White House and any president on duty (cut head).”

Suarez is being held without bail in an isolation section of Miami’s downtown detention center reserved for terrorist suspects, alleged senior-level drug traffickers and similar high-profile defendants. Della Fera said he will decide whether to seek Suarez’s release on bail after reviewing the government’s evidence.

“Without any evidence, you’re just fishing around in the dark,” he said. “I haven’t received anything of substance in this case yet.”

A trial date has not yet been set.

Brooklyn Man Accused of Supporting ISIS Pleads Guilty
The New York Times
By Stephanie Clifford
August 14, 2015

A Brooklyn man accused this year of trying to join the Islamic State pleaded guilty on Friday to conspiring to provide material support to the terrorist organization.

Abdurasul Hasanovich Juraboev, 25, who appeared in Federal District Court in Brooklyn, will face a maximum possible term of 15 years in prison when he is sentenced. The date for the sentencing has not been set.

Mr. Juraboev is the first of a group of five co-defendants to plead guilty. In February, federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York said that Mr. Juraboev, an Uzbek citizen who worked in a Brooklyn gyro shop, had planned to fly to Istanbul, then travel to Syria, to fight for the Islamic State. Mr. Juraboev had a ticket to fly out of Kennedy International Airport to Istanbul departing in March, but was arrested before he could use it.

A co-defendant, Akhror Saidakhmetov, 19 at the time of his arrest and a citizen of Kazakhstan, was arrested in February on a jetway at Kennedy as he boarded a flight to Istanbul. The authorities said he had planned to slip into Syria from there and join the Islamic State, which is also known as ISIS or ISIL.

Mr. Juraboev and Mr. Saidakhmetov had talked of violence on behalf of the Islamic State, like planting a bomb in Coney Island and attacking President Obama, the authorities said. The authorities presented no evidence that the men had taken steps beyond just talk on those fronts. Mr. Saidakhmetov and three other remaining co-defendants have pleaded not guilty.

Prosecutors said three other men, Abror Habibov, Dilkhayot Kasimov and Akmal Zakirov, helped raise money to send fighters, including Mr. Saidakhmetov, to join the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

The criminal complaint against the men suggests investigators began monitoring Mr. Juraboev after he posted an online message asking how to martyr himself while staying in the United States. Federal agents interviewed him soon afterward, and he told them that he supported the Islamic State and that his friend, Mr. Saidakhmetov, shared similar views, according to the complaint. A paid informer soon began interacting with the two men and talking to them about traveling to Syria.

A lawyer for Mr. Juraboev did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

“This case is another example of the reach that ISIL has within the United States through social media, and the fact that some are willing to follow that call,” William J. Bratton, the New York City police commissioner, said in a statement.

Young Mississippi Couple Linked to ISIS, Perplexing All
The New York Times
By Richard Fausset
August 14, 2014

She was a cheerleader, an honor student, the daughter of a police officer and a member of the high school homecoming court who wanted to be a doctor.

He was a quiet but easygoing psychology student. His father is a well-known Muslim patriarch here, whose personable air and habit of sharing food with friends and strangers made him seem like a walking advertisement for Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace.

Today, the young woman, Jaelyn Young, 19, and the young man, her fiancé, Muhammad Dakhlalla, 22, are in federal custody, arrested on suspicion of trying to travel from Mississippi to Syria to join the Islamic State.

Friends and strangers alike said it was difficult to imagine two less likely candidates for the growing roster of young, aspiring American jihadists.

“Something must have happened to her,” Elizabeth Treloar, 18, said of Ms. Young, her friend. “She’s too levelheaded, too smart to do this.”

Mr. Dakhlalla’s relatives were as shocked as anyone when he and Ms. Young were arrested last weekend on their way to a small regional airport, where they had intended to catch the first in a series of flights that would eventually put them in Istanbul. The only plans the family knew of, said Dennis Harmon, a lawyer and friend of Mr. Dakhlalla’s parents, were that he would attend graduate school in the fall here at Mississippi State University.

Ms. Young, who three years ago was broadcasting silly jokes on Twitter and singing the praises of the R&B singer Miguel, had more recently professed a desire to join the Islamic State, according to an F.B.I. agent’s affidavit in support of a criminal complaint. On July 17, the day after a young Muslim man in Chattanooga, Tenn., fatally shot five United States servicemen, Ms. Young rejoiced, the affidavit alleges, in an online message to an F.B.I. agent posing as a supporter of the Islamic State.

“Alhamdulillah,” she wrote, using the Arabic word of praise to God, “the numbers of supporters are growing.”

Though a number of young Muslims in the United States have been seduced in recent months by the Islamic State, the fact that it has resonated as far as Starkville has set off an understandable wave of distress here — a feeling that the struggle and terror in foreign deserts are not as far from the American heartland as they might have seemed.

Starkville, which calls itself “Mississippi’s college town,” tends to dent the national consciousness only when Mississippi State’s football team is winning. Both of the suspects attended Mississippi State: Mr. Dakhlalla graduated in May with a psychology degree and had been accepted to graduate school for the fall; Ms. Young hoped to become a doctor and held a research job in a chemistry lab on campus.

Theirs were rather emblematic Mississippi State stories: Though the sprawling land-grant college lacks the Old South mystique of its rival, the University of Mississippi, it has a multicultural campus thick with research scientists and engineers, and locals tend to be proud of Starkville’s relative tolerance. In Mississippi, said Nick Crews, 34, a musician and neighbor of the Dakhlallas, Starkville “is like this little bastion unto itself.”

And so, in addition to expressing fear and anger, many here were simply baffled by what had gone wrong with this handsome young couple who seemed to be on their way to sharing a 21st-century Mississippi success story.

Mr. Dakhlalla’s father, Oda Dakhlalla, arrived in Mississippi decades ago and studied civil engineering at the University of Mississippi, said Mr. Harmon, the lawyer and family friend. Mr. Dakhlalla’s wife, Lisa, is from New Jersey and is a Muslim convert, Mr. Harmon said. They raised three sons in Starkville, were deeply ingrained in the life of the town and were hard to miss. Oda Dakhlalla dresses in a traditional gown, and his reputation as a miracle-working math tutor earned him, among students, the nickname “Yoda.” Ms. Dakhlalla was known as “the hummus lady” for the Mediterranean specialties she sold at the local farmers’ market.

From 2005 to 2009, the family operated Shaherazad’s, a Middle Eastern cafe. Ms. Dakhlalla has said they got out of the business because she was having health problems. Mr. Harmon said that their generosity may have gotten the better of them.

“They were great cooks, but they weren’t good business people,” he said. “Oda wants to feed everybody, but you’re supposed to sell it, not give it away.”

There was no question that the family had embraced the strategy, common in both the Middle East and the American South, of fellowship through food. Mayor Parker Wiseman said the elder Mr. Dakhlalla often came around City Hall with lunches for workers. Mr. Crews, the neighbor, said he had a leg of lamb that Mr. Dakhlalla had given him in his freezer. Though he was not the imam of the local mosque, the Islamic Center of Mississippi, Oda Dakhlalla lived across the street from it, sometimes delivered the Friday sermon and often invited neighbors like Mr. Crews to services.

Muhammad Dakhlalla, the youngest of the couple’s three sons, goes by “Mo.” He worked at the restaurant, earned black belts in taekwondo and judo at a martial arts school, and attended Starkville High School.

R. J. Morgan, a former teacher, said Mr. Dakhlalla was bright, courteous and popular, and mixed easily with non-Muslim students.

When his world history class took a month to explore the Israeli-Palestinian crisis in depth, Mr. Morgan said, Mr. Dakhlalla, then a 10th grader, spoke in favor of Palestinian rights. “But in no way, in no way, did Muhammad have extreme views on the plight of the Palestinian people,” he said.

Mr. Dakhlalla met Ms. Young about a year ago, Mr. Harmon said. She had graduated near the top of her class at Warren Central High School, where she had been a member of the homecoming court. Marneicha Wilson, 19, an old friend, said Ms. Young had been raised in a Christian household and attended church, but had not been particularly zealous.

Ms. Treloar said Ms. Young had converted to Islam in April after being introduced to the religion by college friends. She recalled that Ms. Young was drawn to the Quran’s teachings because she believed it had been unchanged since it was first written. She thought the Bible, by contrast, had been translated so much that its original meaning was lost, Ms. Treloar said.

Ms. Young believed that Muslims and groups like the Islamic State had been unfairly caricatured in the West, Ms. Treloar said. But she saw no signs that Ms. Young would try to join the extremists.

Ms. Young’s last Facebook post, on March 17, was a jokey altered photo, a pop-culture riff involving Whoopi Goldberg, the Star Wars character Jar Jar Binks, and the rapper 2 Chainz. Two months later, the affidavit says, an F.B.I. employee identified her “through social media platforms” as a supporter of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

The court document describes how two F.B.I. employees, posing as supporters of the terrorist group, engaged the couple in a long online courtship in which they repeatedly stated their desire to join the militants. Ms. Young wrote that she might be able to offer “medical aid” to the cause. Mr. Dakhlalla wrote that he was “willing to fight.”

But their messages were full of concerns. Mr. Dakhlalla wondered if he would be placed with other English-speaking recruits. Ms. Young was frustrated that family and community members in Starkville did not support the Islamic State. She also confessed that she had never traveled outside the United States. “I need help crossing from Turkey to Syria with my hijjrah partner,” Ms. Young wrote in early June, using the Arabic word for “emigration” or “journey.”

Ms. Young said they would leave under the pretense of being “newlyweds on our honeymoon.” On June 6, the couple performed an Islamic marriage ceremony. Mr. Harmon said that for the marriage to be valid under Islamic law, Ms. Young’s father was required to sign a contract. But the father, a police officer who friends say served in the United States military in Afghanistan, refused to do so.

After their arrest, the affidavit states, the couple confessed that they were on their way to join the Islamic State. On Tuesday, a federal magistrate in Oxford, Miss., ordered them held without bail, citing their methodical planning. They each face up to 20 years in prison on the charge of attempting and conspiring to knowingly provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization.

When Mr. Crews, the Dakhlallas’ neighbor, noticed unmarked police cars choking the block last weekend, he immediately guessed that “some idiot redneck did something to the mosque.”

“I certainly didn’t think somebody got arrested for wanting to join ISIS,” he said. “That just wasn’t on my radar.”

Competency of Man Accused of Supporting Terrorism Questioned
The New York Times
By The Associated Press
August 17, 2015

The lawyer representing a New York man accused of making plans to join the Islamic State group in Syria said Monday he is concerned about the man’s mental competency and received a federal judge’s permission for an evaluation.

Attorney Jeremy Schwartz made the request as Arafat Nagi, 44, pleaded not guilty to a two-count indictment charging him with attempting to provide material support, resources and personnel — himself — to a terrorist organization.

The United States-born Nagi was planning his third trip to Turkey, with plans to continue to Syria to join the fighters, at the time of his arrest last month, federal prosecutors said. Investigators learned of Nagi’s activities after being tipped off by residents alarmed by his jihadi beliefs, which he espoused in person and on social media, according to a criminal complaint.

Schwartz, asked after the hearing about his request for a competency hearing, said: “There are certain communications that I have had that gave me those concerns, but I can’t specifically talk about the details.”

During the hearing, assistant U.S. Attorney Timothy Lynch said the government was “not aware of any issues” but did not oppose the request.

Nagi’s brother and adult son were in court but declined to comment afterward.

Between 2012 and the time of his arrest, Nagi, an unemployed and divorced father of two, bought combat gear, including a machete, night goggles and body armor, and pledged allegiance online to the Islamic State group, prosecutors said. He also posted photos of beheadings and severed heads in 2014 before flying to Turkey, where he stayed for 10 days before continuing on to Yemen for a month, the criminal complaint said.

He was planning another trip this month, authorities said.

“The anticipated August 2015 trip was, I think, the last decisive action by this defendant and once he made that decision, we decided it was appropriate to effectuate an arrest,” Lynch told reporters after the hearing.

He said the pre-trial discovery phase of the case would be complicated because it will likely involve classified information. The government also plans to pursue 14 warrants to search electronic devices seized from Nagi’s home in Lackawanna during a July 29 search, he said.

Nagi has been held without bail since his arrest.

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Official Website of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
In Focus: Special Tribunal for Lebanon (UN)

Expert Testifies at STL on Mobile Phone Network Data
The Daily Star
August 20, 2015

Expert witness John Edward Philips gave testimony to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Wednesday detailing the technical aspects of mobile communications networks, expected to be the basis of the prosecution’s case.

His testimony is set to span the next two weeks, with a defense cross-examination expected to start next Monday.

Philips is an expert in the area of cell-site analysis specialized in analyzing data generated by 2G GSM systems in the U.K. His testimony builds on that provided by other expert witnesses last month about how the prosecution assembled call sequence records.

The call sequence tables and data records show who the alleged suspects in the trial were calling and from where, at given times. This data is an integral part of the prosecution’s case, as is Philip’s testimony about the inner workings of the system.

Philip’s used simulation cell-site data to explain the underlying features of the mobile network, drawing on existing systems in the U.K. as an example. At one point, Judge Walid Akoum asked Philip why he had not conducted a field study in Beirut at the site of the 2005 suicide bombing that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Philips replied that it was up to the prosecution to determine whether he was required to do a field survey. “I think it was decided it wasn’t appropriate for me to,” he told the judge.

Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal

Verdict Against Bagerhat Razakar Duo Tuesday
Dhaka Tribune
August 6, 2015

The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) 1 has set Tuesday to pronounce judgement in the case against Bagerhat Razakar duo Sheikh Sirajul Haque alias Siraj Master and Khan Akram Hossain.

Justice M Enayetur Rahim, chairman of the three-member panel of ICT 1, passed the order ton Wednesday morning, reports BSS.

Abdul Latif Talukder, accomplice of Siraj and Akram and another accused in the case, died of old age complications on July 28 at Dhaka Medical College Hospital.

The first tribunal on June 23 kept the verdict waiting for any day as the prosecution and defence concluded their respective arguments on that day.

A total of 32 prosecution witnesses, including the investigation officer, testified against the trio, whereas five defence witnesses submitted their depositions in support of the accused.

The ICT 1 issued warrant to arrest them on June 10, 2014, and Latif was nabbed by police on that very day. Akram was arrested on June 20 and Siraj on July 21.

The ICT 1 on November 5, 2014, indicted the trio in seven specific charges of crimes against humanity.

Bangladesh Court Sentences 1 Man to Death, Another to Life in Prison for 1971 War Crimes
Minneapolis Star Tribune
August 11, 2015

A war crimes tribunal in Bangladesh sentenced one man to death and another to life in prison Tuesday for collaborating with Pakistan to commit mass killings and other crimes during the 1971 war for independence.

The head judge of a three-member panel, M. Enayetur Rahim, handed down the sentences to Sheikh Sirajul Islam and Khan Akram Hossain in a packed courtroom in Dhaka.

The men faced charges including killing up to 700 civilians in the southwestern district of Bagerhat during the war. They were also found guilty of killing up to 50 minority Hindus in one village in a separate incident.

Bangladesh says Pakistani soldiers, aided by local collaborators, killed 3 million people and raped 200,000 women during the nine-month war, which ended in December 1971.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina set up the tribunal in 2010 to punish the collaborators. At least 17 people, mostly from the opposition Jamaat-e-Islami party, have been sentenced to death or life in prison. Two senior party leaders have been executed.

Jamaat-e-Islami is the main partner of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which boycotted 2014 general elections and is headed by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia — Hasina’s archrival.

Jamaat-e-Islami had openly campaigned against Bangladesh’s independence and formed militias to prevent it from breaking away from Pakistan.

War Crimes Investigation in Burma

United Nations Rights Envoy Says Meeting with Myanmar’s Rohingya Blocked
Daily News and Analysis
August 8, 2015

A UN human rights envoy says her whirlwind visit to Myanmar was marred by disappointments: She was barred from meeting long-persecuted Rohingya Muslims.

Talks with several high-ranking officials were denied or cancelled at the last minute. And when she met with government critics, security officials were there, quietly snapping pictures.

Yanghee Lee was in the Southeast Asian nation to assess the human rights situation ahead of general elections, the second vote since the former dictatorship began its bumpy transition to democracy just a few years ago.

But she said today the lack of access and serious disruptions to her program made it impossible to fulfill her mandate.

It was Lee’s third trip to Myanmar since being appointed the country’s UN special rapporteur on human rights just over a year ago. The challenges have increased with each visit. She has waded into sensitive subjects, most notably the treatment of the country’s 1.3 million Rohingya.

Though she asked to visit for 10 days, as she has in the past, she was only given five this time. “I am also disappointed that requested meetings and visits were not granted or suddenly changed or cancelled at the last minute without prior notice,” she said. Lee said she had received credible information that some of her interlocutors had been photographed by security officials. “I also heard that some individuals I met with in previous visits were monitored, photographed and later questioned,” she said.

During Lee’s last visit in January, comments about the persecution of Rohingya drew a stinging response from the government, which accused her of bias and infringing on state sovereignty. Though many members of the religious minority arrived generations ago, most people in this predominantly Buddhist nation of 50 million say all Rohingya are migrants from neighbouring Bangladesh.

Attacks by machete-wielding mobs in 2012 sent more than a quarter-million Rohingya either fleeing by boat or to camps in Rakhine state, where they have limited access to adequate health care or education and are denied freedom of movement.

Lee noted that Rohingya have been told they cannot vote in the November 8 polls, though many could in 2010. “This is an issue that must be seen against the backdrop of institutionalised discrimination against the Muslim population in Rakhine,” she told a press conference at the end of her visit.

The opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, is expected to make substantial gains in upcoming polls at the expense of the military-backed ruling party.

Lee had many concerns ahead of the vote, including the disenfranchisement of large swathes of the population, the harassment and arrest of civil society activists, journalists and those exercising freedom of speech, and the risk that elections in conflict-riddled areas will be called off. “While I am fully aware of the complexities of the situation in Myanmar and the reform process. I cannot hold Myanmar to a lower standard,” she added.

Terrorism

Illinois Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge
ABC News
Michael Tarm
August 11, 2015

A man from suburban Chicago changed his plea to guilty Tuesday on a terrorism charge that he tried to join an al-Qaida-affiliated group fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime.

Abdella Ahmad Tounisi, 21, of Aurora, stood in orange jail garb and spoke softly as he answered a federal judge’s questions. Several times he turned to smile at nearly 30 friends and relatives on spectator benches, including his mother and father.

 

Under a 14-page plea deal, Tounisi agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. In return, prosecutors will drop a second count of making false statements in a matter involving international terrorism.

 

At one point, U.S. Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan said he wanted Tounisi to explain his crime in a sentence or two in his own words.

 

“I wanted to go to Syria to fight with Jabhat al-Nusra,” Tounisi said, adding the group was also once known as “Al-Qaida in Iraq.”

 

The FBI arrested Tounisi, then 18, as he tried to board a plane in 2013 in Chicago on the first leg of a trip to Syria. That followed a four-month sting during which he engaged with agents through a sham FBI website that purported to link would-be fighters with terrorist groups, court filings say.

 

Just before adjourning Tuesday, Judge Der-Yeghiayan reminded Tounisi he had just pleaded guilty “to a very serious charge of terrorism.”

 

“You are a young man,” he said. “Did you understand everything (today) clearly?”

 

“Yes, your honor,” Tounisi answered.

 

He faces a maximum 15-year prison sentence on the one count. Der-Yeghiayan set sentencing for Dec. 9.

Uzbek Refugee Convicted of Terrorism Conspiracy Charge in US
ABC News
August 12, 2015

A federal jury in Idaho has convicted an Uzbek refugee of three terrorism-related charges after prosecutors said he worked to support a terrorist organization and gathered explosive materials in his Boise apartment.

Fazliddin Kurbanov, a Russian-speaking truck driver who fled Uzbekistan in 2009, was arrested two years ago by federal authorities who said he was determined to carry out an attack on U.S. soil. Prosecutors also said he tried to provide computer support and money to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which the U.S. government has identified as a terrorist organization.

 

Kurbanov’s attorney countered that Kurbanov was just making empty boasts when he talked about planning an attack, and that the explosive materials in his apartment were for building fireworks and legally available for purchase at hunting and sporting stores.

 

The jury found 33-year-old Kurbanov guilty of three counts that included conspiracy and attempting to support a terrorist organization, but acquitted him of two additional counts. Kurbanov faces up to 10 years in prison for the explosive device charge and up to 15 years for the other two charges when he is sentenced on Nov. 10.

 

He still faces a charge in Utah of distributing information relating to explosives, destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction. Prosecutors in Utah say he taught others how to build bombs so they could target public transportation systems or other facilities. That case is expected to move forward after Kurbanov is sentenced in Idaho’s U.S. District Court.

 

The Idaho trial lasted 20 days, and the jury deliberated for two days before reaching the verdict.

 

“Today’s verdict sends the clear message that where individuals intend to pursue acts of terrorism against the United States — whether in Boise, Idaho or any other community — they will be brought to justice,” said U.S. Attorney Wendy Olson in a prepared statement.

 

Kurbanov’s attorney, Charles Peterson, told jurors during the trial that the case was about fear, not actions. Peterson compared Kurbanov to someone who pretends to be a cowboy, describing his client as “all hat, no cattle.”

 

Peterson said he plans to appeal the verdict to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

Egypt Passes Tough – and Controversial – Counter Terrorism Law
CNN
Anas Hamdan
August 17, 2015

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has signed a tough counter terrorism law that rights groups say has ominous implications for journalists, critics and those who simply want to exercise their freedom of expression.

The law gives Egyptian authorities powers usually reserved for states of emergencies, Amnesty International said.

 

It “effectively bans the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association,” the group said.

 

The law imposes hefty fines for journalists if their accounts of terrorism-related cases contradict the official version.

 

The government insists the law is necessary at a time when militants are increasingly launching brazen and deadly attacks. The frequency of the attacks picked up after Egypt’s army overthrew President Mohamed Morsy — a former Muslim Brotherhood leader — following a popular uprising in July 2013.

 

Hundreds of Egyptian troops have since been slaughtered.

 

‘Decrees that aim to stifle dissent’

For rights groups, the measures would be counterproductive.

 

“More attacks on civil and political rights and freedoms by security institutions won’t be a successful solution in the face of all these [terrorist] threats,” 14 Egyptian rights groups said in a joint statement in July when the legislation was drafted by the Cabinet.

 

The law gives officials broad immunity from prosecution if they use lethal force, even when it’s not to protect lives, said the Geneva-based United Nations’ International Commission of Jurists. In addition, it grants prosecutors sweeping surveillance and detention powers, the group said.

 

“The promulgation of the Counter-Terrorism Law by President el-Sisi expands the list of repressive laws and decrees that aim to stifle dissent and the exercise of fundamental freedoms,” said Said Benarbia, director of the ICJ’s Middle East and North Africa Program.

Human Rights Group Slams Egypt’s New Anti-Terrorism Law
Business Insider
August 19, 2015

Egypt’s sweeping new counterterrorism law erodes basic rights and defines terrorism so broadly that it could encompass civil disobedience, Human Rights Watch said Wednesday.

The New York-based group says in a report that the law, passed by President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi last weekend, gives prosecutors greater power to detain suspects without judicial review and order wide-ranging and potentially indefinite surveillance of terror suspects without a court order.

 

“Egypt’s president has taken a big step toward enshrining a permanent state of emergency as the law of the land,” said Nadim Houry, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The government has equipped itself with even greater powers to continue stamping out its critics and opponents under its vague and ever-expanding war on terrorism.”

 

El-Sissi, who passed the law, just like dozens of others, in the absence of parliament, has led a harsh crackdown on Islamists and other opponents since 2013, when he led the military overthrow of the Islamist Mohammed Morsi, the country’s divisive first freely elected president.

 

Following Morsi’s ouster, a long-running insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula surged, with stepped-up attacks targeting the military there and on the mainland. The most potent armed group in Sinai pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group last year.

 

The ant-terrorism law was finalized amid a wave of attacks and killings this summer, including the assassination of Egypt’s attorney general by a car bomb in Cairo.

 

Egyptians lived under so-called “emergency laws” for decades that gave police extensive powers, encouraging a culture of excess and brutality among security forces, something that partially inspired the 2011 uprising against longtime autocrat Hosni Mubarak. The law was suspended after his overthrow.

 

“The Egyptian government faces a serious and deadly insurgency,” Houry said. “But eroding basic rights, curtailing dissent, and using ‘terrorism’ as a cudgel against opponents is no way to win the battle for hearts and minds.”

Piracy

Fuel Piracy Incidents Drop in July
IHS Maritime 360
Titus Zheng
August 18, 2015

ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), the Singapore-headquartered anti-piracy watchdog, posted no fuel siphoning incidents for the month of July 2015.

“The recent arrest of eight perpetrators involved in the hijacking and siphoning of fuel from Orkim Harmony in the South China Sea on 11 June 2015 could be the reason for no such incident reported in July 2015,” said ReCAAP ISC in its monthly report.

 

The anti-piracy watchdog stated that the perpetrators/syndicate may have chosen to suspend its activities amid heightened precautionary measures taken by shipowners/masters, and other counter-piracy measures deployed by the relevant authorities.

 

None of the 10 incidents reported in July was a Category 1 or fuel-siphoning event. The monthly record stands for the first time since January, when no siphoning of ship fuel/oil was known to have had occurred. This is in stark contrast to the incidents recorded in January-June 2015, when a total of 11 fuel-siphoning incidents took place.

 

Of the 10 reported incidents in July, one was classed as a moderately severe or Category 2 incident. This was followed by one case of low severity or a Category 3 incident, then six cases of petty theft incidents, and two attempted incidents.

 

These 10 incidents represented a 37.5% year-on-year drop in the overall number of 16 incidents in July 2014. Meanwhile, five out of the 10 reported incidents occurred on board ships while under way in the straits of Malacca and Singapore, two on board ships while anchored at ports/anchorages in Ho Chi Minh and Vung Tau, Vietnam.

 

There was one incident on board a ship anchored at Kandla anchorage, India; followed by one incident on board a barge towed by a supply vessel off the coast of Tanjung Kelasa, Malaysia; and finally one incident that happened on a ship anchored off Pulau Batam, Indonesia.

 

“The improvement in the situation in the straits of Malacca and Singapore could be attributed to the increase in the presence of enforcement agencies and better situational awareness of ship masters and crew transiting the area,” added ReCAAP ISC, commending the efforts of the joint co-ordinated Malacca Strait Patrols in safeguarding the sea lanes as well as the enhanced vigilance exercised by the ship masters and crew transiting in the area.

Hijackings of Ships in South East Asia Can Be Mitigated, Says UK-Based Dryad
Astro Awani
August 15, 2015

The recent hijacking of a Singapore-registered tanker, MT Joaquim last Saturday (Aug 8) in the Straits of Malacca has provided yet another timely reminder of the current risks facing seafarers in Southeast Asia, particularly in and around the Malaysian Peninsula, said a UK-based maritime intelligence agency, Dryad Maritime.

On Sunday, the world saw the recovery of the tanker by the Malaysian Enforcement Agency, approximately 14 NM off Tanjung Kling.

 

In its analysis, Dryad said the initial reports of the discovery suggest that 3,000 tonnes of fuel had been siphoned from the vessel before the power to the generator was cut.

 

This incident is the fourth successful hijacking for the purpose of fuel theft in the last 18 months within the Malacca Strait, a trend that is congruent with the overall increase in incidents off the Malaysian Peninsula which has seen a total of 11 hijackings, two unsuccessful, so far in 2015.

 

Dryad provided an immediate incident alert for the hijacking and, in their analysis, highlighted potential contributing reasons behind the increase of fuel thefts in the area.

 

Speaking of the trend, its senior analyst Steve McKenzie explained: “The nature of these incidents within the Malacca Strait is very similar and mirrors those in the South China Sea which have been occurring at regular intervals during the same time frame.

 

The last hijacking took place on June 11, when MT Orkim Harmony was taken 17 NM southwest of Pulau Aur in the South China Sea.

 

Orikim Harmony was subsequently discovered off the coast of Cambodia by the combined efforts of several national security forces who arrested eight Indonesians suspected as the hijackers.

 

Unfortunately five more had escaped after leaving the vessel earlier in an attempt to find a buyer for the vessel’s cargo.

 

This failure to capture all of the gang responsible for the hijacking shows that, despite a high level of commitment to the search by the authorities, bringing all of those involved to justice remains extremely challenging.

 

Because of this and other previous arrests, Dryad indicated that it was likely there would be a slowdown in the number of fuel theft incidents as the syndicates responsible for the crimes recruited new members and gave an original assessment of late July for the resumption of attacks.”

 

Dryad said this analysis focuses not only the on-going risk in Southeast Asia of maritime crime but also highlights the opportunity available to mitigate against the threat of hijackings and similar attacks.

 

The organisation of the groups responsible can be tracked in much the same way as other, legitimate enterprises.

By monitoring the events surrounding incidents of hijacking, not just the theft and recovery of vessels themselves, the future activities of the criminal groups perpetrating these attacks can be better predicted.

 

With this understanding, the continued monitoring and expert analysis of events in and around the Southeast Asia region can provide seafarers with an effective defence against the threat of maritime crime.

 

Dryad continues to assist in such an approach to tackling maritime crime that ensures capable and effective risk mitigation can be implemented to protect against threats at sea.

Life Sentences for Somalis in USS Ashland Piracy Case
13News Now
August 14, 2015

Five Somali pirates must spend life in prison for waging a mistaken and dramatically unsuccessful 2010 attack on Navy ship that was based at Little Creek, a federal appeals court ruled Thursday.

A three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously ruled that a judge erred when he sentenced the defendants to terms ranging from 30 to 42½ years. The court returned the case to U.S. District Judge Raymond Jackson in Norfolk and ordered him to impose the life sentences, which are mandatory for piracy under federal law.

 

Jackson had ruled that because nobody aboard the Navy ship was hurt, life terms were disproportionate to the crime and amounted to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.

 

“It is of no moment that no one aboard the USS Ashland was harmed before the defendants’ attack was thwarted,” Judge Robert King wrote for the appeals court. The mandatory life sentence reflects a rational legislative judgment that piracy in international waters “is a crime deserving of one of the harshest of penalties,” he wrote.

 

13News Now coverage: USS Ashland piracy case

 

The appeals court noted that piracy carried a mandatory death sentence from 1819 until 1909, when Congress reduced the penalty to a mandatory life term.

 

The defendants could appeal either to the full appeals court or the U.S. Supreme Court. Their attorney, Geremy C. Kamens, said he was reviewing the opinion and had no further comment.

 

U.S. Attorney Dana J. Boente said in a written statement that he was pleased with the court’s decision.

 

According to court papers, seven men boarded a small skiff in April 2010 and set out to capture a merchant ship that they could bring to Somalia and hold for ransom. In the dim early-morning light, they mistook the USS Ashland for a cargo vessel. Armed with AK-47 assault rifles and a rocket propelled grenade launcher, the men opened fire on the amphibious landing ship.

 

Sailors fired back with armor-piercing incendiary shells. The first shot killed one pirate, and the second caused the skiff to explode in flames, sending the rest of the men into the Gulf of Aden waters where they were rescued by the sailors.

 

One of the surviving pirates cooperated with federal prosecutors and received a lighter sentence. The other five went to trial and were convicted.

Gender-Based Violence

Amnesty International Row: Should Prostitution Be Decriminalised?
BBC News
Naomi Grimley
August 11, 2015

It’s not often that a liberal newspaper like The Guardian rails against an organisation like Amnesty International.

But last week the paper ran a stinging editorial questioning the wisdom of the human rights group.

 

It said Amnesty would make a “serious mistake” if it advocated the decriminalisation of prostitution – a decision the group’s international council will vote on later on Tuesday.

 

It’s not just The Guardian that is upset. Several women’s groups have got together with a host of big-name actresses – including Meryl Streep, Emma Thompson and Kate Winslet – to criticise Amnesty after a draft of its policy proposal was leaked.

 

Former US President Jimmy Carter has also urged Amnesty to be very careful before it changes its stance.

 

The arguments for decriminalization

 

Amnesty’s leaked proposal says decriminalisation would be “based on the human rights principle that consensual sexual conduct between adults is entitled to protection from state interference” so long as violence or child abuse or other illegal behaviour isn’t involved.

 

Those who favour decriminalisation say it removes the stigma of prostitution and makes it easier for sex workers to go to the police if they need protection from violence.

 

It’s also argued that it empowers prostitutes to strike open deals with their clients about safe sex. There are various groups across the world that support decriminalisation, such as Durbar in India.

 

Germany is one of the countries which liberalised its prostitution laws, together with New Zealand and the Netherlands.

 

One of the main reasons the Germans opted for legalisation in 2002 was the hope that it would professionalise the industry, giving prostitutes more access to benefits such as health insurance and pensions – just like in any other job.

 

Felcitas Schirow, a German brothel owner and sex worker, says the 2002 law has helped give prostitutes self-confidence.

 

“The owners of brothels could invest money,” she says, “and the women could pick a good employer where they felt at home and who met their requirements.”

 

Criticisms

 

But there are many who argue that the German experiment has gone badly wrong with very few prostitutes registering and being able to claim benefits. Above all, the number one criticism is that it’s boosted sex tourism and fuelled human trafficking to meet the demand of an expanded market.

 

Figures on human trafficking and its relationship to prostitution are hard to establish. But one academic study looking at 150 countries argued there was a link between relaxed prostitution laws and increased trafficking rates.

 

Other critics of the German model point to anecdotal evidence of growing numbers of young Romanian and Bulgarian women travelling to Germany to work on the streets or even in mega-brothels.

 

An investigation in 2013 by Der Spiegel described how many of these women head to cities such as Cologne voluntarily but soon end up caught in a dangerous web they can’t easily escape.

 

The Coalition Against Trafficking In Women argues that pimps would be the only ones to benefit from decriminalising prostitution.

 

The Nordic model

 

The women’s groups and anti-trafficking campaigners opposing the Amnesty motion start from the premise that most prostitutes are victims who sell sex simply to survive.

 

They argue that human trafficking and prostitution are inextricably linked.

 

They think the best approach to prostitution is the “Nordic model”. This is where the police go after the purchasers of sex by handing out tough fines or prison sentences to punters, and leave the sex workers in peace. In other words, the aim is to stifle demand.

 

It was a policy adopted by Sweden in 1999 and it’s since been copied by a host of other countries including Iceland, Canada, Norway and most recently Northern Ireland.

 

The European Parliament wants more member countries to adopt the model.

 

Some MPs at Westminster also believe it should replace the confusing patchwork of laws in England and Wales (in summary: buying and selling sex isn’t illegal but brothel-keeping, kerb-crawling and soliciting sex in a public place are).

 

But there are critics of the Nordic model too. Dr Jay Levy has studied the Swedish example and he’s not convinced by police figures suggesting prostitution is in decline there.

 

Instead, he thinks the Swedes have just succeeded in pushing prostitution into more clandestine spaces, making it even more risky.

 

“It basically reduces safety,” he says. “It reduces the amount of time that sex workers have to suss out a situation. And because clients are criminalised, they are reluctant to leave any information by which they can be traced.”

 

Those pushing for decriminalisation inside Amnesty International and their newfound opponents both say they want to protect the human rights of prostitutes.

 

But there’s no getting around it – they each have very different approaches about how that’s best achieved.

 

And they can’t both be right.

ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape
The New York Times
Rukmini Callimachi
August 13, 2015

In the moments before he raped the 12-year-old girl, the Islamic State fighter took the time to explain that what he was about to do was not a sin. Because the preteen girl practiced a religion other than Islam, the Quran not only gave him the right to rape her — it condoned and encouraged it, he insisted.

He bound her hands and gagged her. Then he knelt beside the bed and prostrated himself in prayer before getting on top of her.

 

When it was over, he knelt to pray again, bookending the rape with acts of religious devotion.

“I kept telling him it hurts — please stop,” said the girl, whose body is so small an adult could circle her waist with two hands. “He told me that according to Islam he is allowed to rape an unbeliever. He said that by raping me, he is drawing closer to God,” she said in an interview alongside her family in a refugee camp here, to which she escaped after 11 months of captivity.

 

The systematic rape of women and girls from the Yazidi religious minority has become deeply enmeshed in the organization and the radical theology of the Islamic State in the year since the group announced it was reviving slavery as an institution. Interviews with 21 women and girls who recently escaped the Islamic State, as well as an examination of the group’s official communications, illuminate how the practice has been enshrined in the group’s core tenets.

 

The trade in Yazidi women and girls has created a persistent infrastructure, with a network of warehouses where the victims are held, viewing rooms where they are inspected and marketed, and a dedicated fleet of buses used to transport them.

 

A total of 5,270 Yazidis were abducted last year, and at least 3,144 are still being held, according to community leaders. To handle them, the Islamic State has developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery, including sales contracts notarized by the ISIS-run Islamic courts. And the practice has become an established recruiting tool to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.

 

A growing body of internal policy memos and theological discussions has established guidelines for slavery, including a lengthy how-to manual issued by the Islamic State Research and Fatwa Department just last month. Repeatedly, the ISIS leadership has emphasized a narrow and selective reading of the Quran and other religious rulings to not only justify violence, but also to elevate and celebrate each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous.

 

“Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray,” said F, a 15-year-old girl who was captured on the shoulder of Mount Sinjar one year ago and was sold to an Iraqi fighter in his 20s. Like some others interviewed by The New York Times, she wanted to be identified only by her first initial because of the shame associated with rape.

 

“He kept telling me this is ibadah,” she said, using a term from Islamic scripture meaning worship.

 

“He said that raping me is his prayer to God. I said to him, ‘What you’re doing to me is wrong, and it will not bring you closer to God.’ And he said, ‘No, it’s allowed. It’s halal,’ ” said the teenager, who escaped in April with the help of smugglers after being enslaved for nearly nine months.

 

Calculated Conquest

 

The Islamic State’s formal introduction of systematic sexual slavery dates to Aug. 3, 2014, when its fighters invaded the villages on the southern flank of Mount Sinjar, a craggy massif of dun-colored rock in northern Iraq.

 

Its valleys and ravines are home to the Yazidis, a tiny religious minority who represent less than 1.5 percent of Iraq’s estimated population of 34 million.

 

The offensive on the mountain came just two months after the fall of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq. At first, it appeared that the subsequent advance on the mountain was just another attempt to extend the territory controlled by Islamic State fighters.

 

Almost immediately, there were signs that their aim this time was different.

 

Survivors say that men and women were separated within the first hour of their capture.

 

Adolescent boys were told to lift up their shirts, and if they had armpit hair, they were directed to join their older brothers and fathers. In village after village, the men and older boys were driven or marched to nearby fields, where they were forced to lie down in the dirt and sprayed with automatic fire.

 

The women, girls and children, however, were hauled off in open-bed trucks.

 

“The offensive on the mountain was as much a sexual conquest as it was for territorial gain,” said Matthew Barber, a University of Chicago expert on the Yazidi minority. He was in Dohuk, near Mount Sinjar, when the onslaught began last summer and helped create a foundation that provides psychological support for the escapees, who number more than 2,000, according to community activists.

 

Fifteen-year-old F says her family of nine was trying to escape, speeding up mountain switchbacks, when their aging Opel overheated. She, her mother, and her sisters — 14, 7, and 4 years old — were helplessly standing by their stalled car when a convoy of heavily armed Islamic State fighters encircled them.

 

“Right away, the fighters separated the men from the women,” she said. She, her mother and sisters were first taken in trucks to the nearest town on Mount Sinjar. “There, they separated me from my mom. The young, unmarried girls were forced to get into buses.”

 

The buses were white, with a painted stripe next to the word “Hajj,” suggesting that the Islamic State had commandeered Iraqi government buses used to transport pilgrims for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. So many Yazidi women and girls were loaded inside F’s bus that they were forced to sit on each other’s laps, she said.

 

Once the bus headed out, they noticed that the windows were blocked with curtains, an accouterment that appeared to have been added because the fighters planned to transport large numbers of women who were not covered in burqas or head scarves.

 

F’s account, including the physical description of the bus, the placement of the curtains and the manner in which the women were transported, is echoed by a dozen other female victims interviewed for this article. They described a similar set of circumstances even though they were kidnapped on different days and in locations miles apart.

 

F says she was driven to the Iraqi city of Mosul some six hours away, where they herded them into the Galaxy Wedding Hall. Other groups of women and girls were taken to a palace from the Saddam Hussein era, the Badoosh prison compound and the Directory of Youth building in Mosul, recent escapees said. And in addition to Mosul, women were herded into elementary schools and municipal buildings in the Iraqi towns of Tal Afar, Solah, Ba’aj and Sinjar City.

 

They would be held in confinement, some for days, some for months. Then, inevitably, they were loaded into the same fleet of buses again before being sent in smaller groups to Syria or to other locations inside Iraq, where they were bought and sold for sex.

 

“It was 100 percent preplanned,” said Khider Domle, a Yazidi community activist who maintains a detailed database of the victims. “I spoke by telephone to the first family who arrived at the Directory of Youth in Mosul, and the hall was already prepared for them. They had mattresses, plates and utensils, food and water for hundreds of people.”

 

Detailed reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reach the same conclusion about the organized nature of the sex trade.

 

In each location, survivors say Islamic State fighters first conducted a census of their female captives.

 

Inside the voluminous Galaxy banquet hall, F sat on the marble floor, squeezed between other adolescent girls. In all she estimates there were over 1,300 Yazidi girls sitting, crouching, splayed out and leaning against the walls of the ballroom, a number that is confirmed by several other women held in the same location.

 

They each described how three Islamic State fighters walked in, holding a register. They told the girls to stand. Each one was instructed to state her first, middle and last name, her age, her hometown, whether she was married, and if she had children.

 

For two months, F was held inside the Galaxy hall. Then one day, they came and began removing young women. Those who refused were dragged out by their hair, she said.

 

In the parking lot the same fleet of Hajj buses was waiting to take them to their next destination, said F. Along with 24 other girls and young women, the 15-year-old was driven to an army base in Iraq. It was there in the parking lot that she heard the word “sabaya” for the first time.

 

“They laughed and jeered at us, saying ‘You are our sabaya.’ I didn’t know what that word meant,” she said. Later on, the local Islamic State leader explained it meant slave.

 

“He told us that Taus Malik” — one of seven angels to whom the Yazidis pray — “is not God. He said that Taus Malik is the devil and that because you worship the devil, you belong to us. We can sell you and use you as we see fit.”

 

The Islamic State’s sex trade appears to be based solely on enslaving women and girls from the Yazidi minority. As yet, there has been no widespread campaign aimed at enslaving women from other religious minorities, said Samer Muscati, the author of the recent Human Rights Watch report. That assertion was echoed by community leaders, government officials and other human rights workers.

 

Mr. Barber, of the University of Chicago, said that the focus on Yazidis was likely because they are seen as polytheists, with an oral tradition rather than a written scripture. In the Islamic State’s eyes that puts them on the fringe of despised unbelievers, even more than Christians and Jews, who are considered to have some limited protections under the Quran as “People of the Book.”

 

In Kojo, one of the southernmost villages on Mount Sinjar and among the farthest away from escape, residents decided to stay, believing they would be treated as the Christians of Mosul had months earlier. On Aug. 15, 2014, the Islamic State ordered the residents to report to a school in the center of town.

 

When she got there, 40-year-old Aishan Ali Saleh found a community elder negotiating with the Islamic State, asking if they could be allowed to hand over their money and gold in return for safe passage.

 

The fighters initially agreed and laid out a blanket, where Ms. Saleh placed her heart-shaped pendant and her gold rings, while the men left crumpled bills.

 

Instead of letting them go, the fighters began shoving the men outside, bound for death.

Sometime later, a fleet of cars arrived and the women, girls and children were driven away.

 

The Market

 

Months later, the Islamic State made clear in their online magazine that their campaign of enslaving Yazidi women and girls had been extensively preplanned.

 

“Prior to the taking of Sinjar, Shariah students in the Islamic State were tasked to research the Yazidis,” said the English-language article, headlined “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” which appeared in the October issue of Dabiq.

 

The article made clear that for the Yazidis, there was no chance to pay a tax known as jizya to be set free, “unlike the Jews and Christians.”

 

“After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State’s authority to be divided” as spoils, the article said.

 

In much the same way as specific Bible passages were used centuries later to support the slave trade in the United States, the Islamic State cites specific verses or stories in the Quran or else in the Sunna, the traditions based on the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, to justify their human trafficking, experts say.

 

Scholars of Islamic theology disagree, however, on the proper interpretation of these verses, and on the divisive question of whether Islam actually sanctions slavery.

 

Many argue that slavery figures in Islamic scripture in much the same way that it figures in the Bible — as a reflection of the period in antiquity in which the religion was born.

 

“In the milieu in which the Quran arose, there was a widespread practice of men having sexual relationships with unfree women,” said Kecia Ali, an associate professor of religion at Boston University and the author of a book on slavery in early Islam. “It wasn’t a particular religious institution. It was just how people did things.”

 

Cole Bunzel, a scholar of Islamic theology at Princeton University, disagrees, pointing to the numerous references to the phrase “Those your right hand possesses” in the Quran, which for centuries has been interpreted to mean female slaves. He also points to the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, which continues into the modern era and which he says includes detailed rules for the treatment of slaves.

 

“There is a great deal of scripture that sanctions slavery,” said Mr. Bunzel, the author of a research paper published by the Brookings Institution on the ideology of the Islamic State. “You can argue that it is no longer relevant and has fallen into abeyance. ISIS would argue that these institutions need to be revived, because that is what the Prophet and his companions did.”

 

The youngest, prettiest women and girls were bought in the first weeks after their capture. Others — especially older, married women — described how they were transported from location to location, spending months in the equivalent of human holding pens, until a prospective buyer bid on them.

 

Their captors appeared to have a system in place, replete with its own methodology of inventorying the women, as well as their own lexicon. Women and girls were referred to as “Sabaya,” followed by their name. Some were bought by wholesalers, who photographed and gave them numbers, to advertise them to potential buyers.

 

Osman Hassan Ali, a Yazidi businessman who has successfully smuggled out numerous Yazidi women, said he posed as a buyer in order to be sent the photographs. He shared a dozen images, each one showing a Yazidi woman sitting in a bare room on a couch, facing the camera with a blank, unsmiling expression. On the edge of the photograph is written in Arabic, “Sabaya No. 1,” “Sabaya No. 2,” and so on.

 

Buildings where the women were collected and held sometimes included a viewing room.

“When they put us in the building, they said we had arrived at the ‘Sabaya Market,’” said one 19-year-old victim, whose first initial is I. “I understood we were now in a slave market.”

 

She estimated there were at least 500 other unmarried women and girls in the multistory building, with the youngest among them being 11. When the buyers arrived, the girls were taken one by one into a separate room.

 

“The emirs sat against the wall and called us by name. We had to sit in a chair facing them. You had to look at them, and before you went in, they took away our scarves and anything we could have used to cover ourselves,” she said.

 

“When it was my turn, they made me stand four times. They made me turn around.”

 

The captives were also forced to answer intimate questions, including reporting the exact date of their last menstrual cycle. They realized that the fighters were trying to determine whether they were pregnant, in keeping with a Shariah rule stating that a man cannot have intercourse with his slave if she is pregnant.

 

Property of ISIS

 

The use of sex slavery by the Islamic State initially surprised even the group’s most ardent supporters, many of whom sparred with journalists online after the first reports of systematic rape.

 

“What really alarmed me was that some of the Islamic State’s supporters started denying the matter as if the soldiers of the Khilafah had committed a mistake or evil,” the author wrote. “I write this while the letters drip of pride,’’ she said. “We have indeed raided and captured the kafirahwomen and drove them like sheep by the edge of the sword.” Kafirah refers to infidels.

 

In a pamphlet published online in December, the Research and Fatwa Department of the Islamic State detailed best practices, including explaining that slaves belong to the estate of the fighter who bought them and therefore can be willed to another man and disposed of just like any other property after his death.

 

Recent escapees describe an intricate bureaucracy surrounding their captivity, with their status as a slave registered in a contract. When their owner would sell them to another buyer, a new contract would be drafted, like transferring a property deed. At the same time, slaves can also be set free, and fighters are promised a heavenly reward for doing so.

 

Though rare, this has created one avenue of escape for victims.

 

A 25-year-old victim who escaped last month, identified by her first initial, A, described how one day her Libyan master handed her a laminated piece of paper. He explained that he had finished his training as a suicide bomber and was planning to blow himself up, and was therefore setting her free.

 

Labeled a “Certificate of Emancipation,” the document was signed by the judge of the western province of the Islamic State. The Yazidi woman presented it at security checkpoints as she left Syria to return to Iraq, where she rejoined her family in July.

 

The Islamic State recently made it clear that sex with Christian and Jewish women captured in battle is also permissible, according to a new 34-page manual issued this summer by the terror group’s Research and Fatwa Department.

 

Just about the only prohibition is having sex with a pregnant slave, and the manual describes how an owner must wait for a female captive to have her menstruating cycle, in order to “make sure there is nothing in her womb,” before having intercourse with her. Of the 21 women and girls interviewed for this article, among the only ones who had not been raped were the women who were already pregnant at the moment of their capture, as well as those who were past menopause.

 

Beyond that, there appears to be no bounds to what is sexually permissible. Child rape is explicitly condoned: “It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn’t reached puberty, if she is fit for intercourse,” according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute of a pamphlet published on Twitter last December.

 

One 34-year-old Yazidi woman, who was bought and repeatedly raped by a Saudi fighter in the Syrian city of Shadadi, described how she fared better than the second slave in the household — a 12-year-old girl who was raped for days on end despite heavy bleeding.

 

“He destroyed her body. She was badly infected. The fighter kept coming and asking me, ‘Why does she smell so bad?’ And I said, she has an infection on the inside, you need to take care of her,” the woman said.

 

Unmoved, he ignored the girl’s agony, continuing the ritual of praying before and after raping the child.

 

“I said to him, ‘She’s just a little girl,’ ” the older woman recalled. “And he answered: ‘No. She’s not a little girl. She’s a slave. And she knows exactly how to have sex.’ ’’

 

“And having sex with her pleases God,” he said.

War Criminal ‘Confesses to Rapes’
IOL News
Li Zhihui
August 17, 2015

A Japanese war criminal confessed that he raped dozens of Chinese women during Japan’s war of aggression in China, according to archives released on Monday.

The State Archives Administration (SAA) published the seventh of a series of 31 handwritten confessions from Japanese war criminals online.

 

Ikuma Yamamura, born in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan in 1919 confessed how he raped Chinese women and killed Chinese civilians from 1940 to 1945.

 

He raped at least 21 women aged between 13 and 50 while invading Hubei and Hunan province and Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region.

 

He also raped another 27 women 43 times in so-called “comfort stations,” according to a confession he made in 1954.

 

He recounted that in August 1944, he saw four Chinese women taking refuge in a tea grove in Leiyang County, Hunan Province.

 

He chased one of them towards the valley and she fell from a 30-meter cliff and died.

 

He caught another woman aged around 23, threatened her with handgun and raped her, according to his confession.

 

He took part in killing four Chinese peasants in Jingmen County, Hubei Province in June 1940 and shot dead another four peasants with a rifle in Hengyang County, Hunan Province in late August 1944, according to the confession.

 

A total of 31 confessions, one each day, from Japanese war criminals are being published online in the run up to commemorations of the end of the war on September 3.

 

The handwritten confessions, translations and abstracts in both Chinese and English, are published on the website of the SAA.

 

The confessions detail crimes perpetrated by the Japanese, including killing, enslavement and poisoning of Chinese people, as well as the use of biological and chemical weapons on live human subjects.

UN Reports

Rape and Sexual Servitude is virtuous to ISIS – The Real War on Women
San Diego 6
Kimberly Dvorak
August 17, 2015

War is hell. And it’s women and children that have bore the brunt of ISIS’ wrath in the worst imaginable way– repeated sexual assault.

“ISIS forces have committed organized rape, sexual assault, and other horrific crimes against Yazidi women and girls,” Liesl Gerntholtz, women’s rights director at Human Rights Watch explained. “Those fortunate enough to have escaped need to be treated for the unimaginable trauma they endured.”

 

For those who denied their captures, a different fate was imposed.

 

“ISIS executed 19 women in the city of Mosul during the past two days,” Iraqi News reported. “The penalty decision came on the background of the refusal to participate in the practice of sexual jihad.” A spokesperson for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), said that ISIS mistreatment of women and girls was quietly creating dissention in the ranks.

 

So how many girls have the radical terrorists taken into custody? The Yazidi elders say that 5, 270 females were taken a year ago, roughly 2,126 have escaped, but the terrorists have managed to keep approximately 3,144 girls. Of those girls, they’re subjected to theological arguments that pervert a narrow reading of the Koran and allows radical Islamic fighters to not only rape girls, but interpret the gross act to be something to virtuous that needs to be celebrated. “Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray,” said one 15-year-old girl captured on Mount Sinjar, Iraq.

 

 

According to the UN, the girl was sold to an Iraqi fighter in his 20s. “He kept telling me this is ibadah (Islamic scripture meaning worship). He said that raping me is his prayer to God. I said to him, ‘What you’re doing to me is wrong, and it will not bring you closer to God.’ And he said, ‘No, it’s allowed. It’s halal.’” She was eventually rescued nine months after her nightmare began, but others weren’t as lucky.

 

One year ago American’s were introduced to the Yazidi people in northern Iraq. Dubbed one of the oldest religions,’ the world watched as the brutal Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began to massacre defenseless people that lived on Mount Sinjar region of Iraq for centuries. Once the Yazidis were surrounded, the Jihadists systematically divided families into groups of men or women, something Adolf Hitler did in WWII. The men and boys with armpit hair were separated from their families and ruthlessly murdered. However, ISIS fighters had something else in mind for the women and girls – sexual servitude.

 

A story from the New York Times exposed ISIS’s evil tactics of raping young girls that justified the sexual assault with passages from the Koran. For those girls who were fortunate enough to escape and make it to a refugee camp, they retold the horrors of beatings and rape to the media and UN. The pre-teen girls said the radical Islamic fighters would pray to Allah before the rape and tell them the Koran allows them to sexually assault them because they are nonbelievers. When the jihadist is finished, he prays again, repeating the despicable act over and over.

 

The modern day sexual slavery and human trafficking is now legal under ISIS law. The harrowing tale takes place in the open, in the de facto capitol city of Raqqa, Syria. Four years ago Syria was a secular country run by a dictator, but secular. Christians openly prayed, Kurds coexisted with the majority of Muslims and all lived in a modern, highly educated country. Not any more. Recently smuggled footage of daily life in Raqqa (link here) appears to be a normal city with children playing, women in burkas and men carrying AK-47s.

 

But hidden from the cameras are the thousands of sexual slaves and the harsh life ISIS has imposed on their existence.

 

A recent United Nations report concluded: “Members of ISIL/ISIS may have committed crimes against humanity by perpetrating: murder, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, sexual slavery, sexual violence and persecution, committed as part of widespread or systematic attacks directed against civilian populations pursuant to or in furtherance of an organizational policy to commit such attacks.”

 

It continues; “by perpetrating murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, outrages upon personal dignity, taking of hostages, the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, directing attacks against the civilian population, directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, historic monuments, pillaging a town or place, committing rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence, conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years or using them to participate actively in hostilities, ordering the displacement of the civilian population, destroying or seizing the property of an adversary.”

 

The United Nations report further elucidated that the terror organization seeks to exterminate the entire Yazidi population– this constitutes genocide under UN rules.

 

 

The world is now hearing from the survivors of ISIS abuse who retell their stories, describing a well-thought out process that began with the abduction, where they were transported to large warehouses, and then they were cataloged and prepared for sales in viewing rooms. The radical Islamic terrorists even provided a delivery service to their new owners, the ISIS fighters.

 

The rape begins immediately. Often times the Islamic extremists share their sexually enslaved women with fellow fighters or family. Once ISIS owners are finished with the girls, some as young as 7, it’s legal under ISIS law to sell the seriously abused girls, like a common car, replete with a sex slave registered contract.

 

From the beginning of the current Middle East war, Human Rights Watch has carefully documented the organized sexual assault, rape, slavery, as well as forced marriages to ISIS forces. The UN considers the acts to be war crimes and crimes against humanity, something that will send the perpetrators to the Haag once the war ends.

 

But were these hideous acts predicted? In October 2014, ISIS acknowledged in its publication Dabiq that its warriors captured Yazidi women and girls and they considered them the “spoils of war.” They rationalize sexual violence by falsely claiming Islam permits sex with non-Muslim “slaves.” The allegations in the terrorist version of a Time magazine story appear to be a widespread practice and a well-thought out plan of behavior by ISIS, according to Human Rights Watch.

 

“Yazidi women and girls who escaped ISIS still face enormous challenges and continuing trauma from their experience,” Gerntholtz said. “They need urgent help and support to recover their health and move on with their lives.”

 

Human Rights Watch also asserts that ISIS is selling the Yazidis for up to $2,000 US dollars.

 

In a Dabiq article “The revival of slavery before the hour” ISIS has publicly approved enslaving women and children. The story went further and said ISIS was simply reviving a custom justified under Sharia (Islamic law).

 

A white paper document, issued by ISIS’s Research and Fatwa Department states: “It is permissible to buy, sell, or give as a gift female captives and slaves, for they are merely property, which can be disposed of… It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn’t reached puberty if she is fit for intercourse; however if she is not fit for intercourse, then it is enough to enjoy her without intercourse… It is permissible to beat the female slave as a [form of] darb ta’deeb [disciplinary beating].”

 

The so-called law sheds light on war crimes that not only hurt their victims, but also devastates family members. The demoralizing act of rape is common practice in today’s Middle East Wars and illustrates that ISIS is willing to use rape as a weapon of war to silence the masses into submission.

 

“The offensive on the mountain (Sinjar) was as much a sexual conquest as it was for territorial gain,” said Matthew Barber, a University of Chicago expert on the Yazidi minority. The professor happened to be in Sinjar when ISIS surrounded the mountain last summer. After witnessing the brutality up close, he created a foundation that provides psychological support for those lucky enough to getaway.

 

 

Experts contend that ISIS is committed to the genocide of all Yazidis. The reason lies in their religious belief’s that make them polytheists. The Yazidis obey a strict oral interpretation rather than a written scripture like the Koran. ISIS views them as unbelievers, and hate them more than Christians and Jews, who can receive limited protections under the Koran as “People of the Book.”

 

Not surprisingly, Islamic theology scholars disagree on the real interpretation of verses that “okay” rape and sanctions slavery. These same scholars argue that slavery in Islamic scripture comparable to the Bible.

 

“In the milieu in which the Quran arose, there was a widespread practice of men having sexual relationships with un-free women,” explains Kecia Ali, an associate professor of religion at Boston University and author of a book on slavery. “It wasn’t a particular religious institution. It was just how people did things.”

 

However, Cole Bunzel, a scholar of Islamic theology at Princeton University, says there are a number of references in the Koran, which states; “Those your right hand possesses.” He contends that phrase has been interpreted to mean female slaves. He also claims the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, may be allowed today under strict followers of the Koran. “There is a great deal of scripture that sanctions slavery,” said Bunzel. “You can argue that it is no longer relevant and has fallen into abeyance. ISIS would argue that these institutions need to be revived, because that is what the Prophet and his companions did.”

 

In an effort to stop Western girls from traveling to the region to serve in ISIS, British charity groups, like AMAR that is chaired by British Prime Minister David Cameron, have invited Yazidi survivors to speak about the realities of life under the brutal terrorist group.

 

There have been a number of British girls that have left their Westernized life for the terrorist movement or caliphate in Syria. ISIS is tremendously successful in its use of social media and has lured untold numbers of British girls to Syria in the last year.

 

ISIS leader mercilessly raped American hostage

 

While the ongoing war with ISIS in the Middle East has reached a stalemate, US counter-terrorism officials confirmed that former US hostage Kayla Mueller was not only raped by her captors, but the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, considered the American his own sex slave. Mueller died in a coalition air strike is Syria this past February that targeted other ISIS leaders, but killed several ISIS hostages as well.

 

On Friday, Mueller’s family confirmed to ABC News that the government told them about the sexual assaults. “We were told Kayla was tortured, that she was the property of al-Baghdadi. We were told that in June by the government.” If the loss of one’s child is not enough, the heartache that accompanies the fact a child suffered horrific acts of rape only inflicts more pain.

 

However, the use of rape as a weapon of war is nothing new. During WWII, Adolf Hitler used similar tactics as ISIS to crush the will of the enemy. The Nazi’s split up Jewish women and men killed the males and raped some of the women and children.

 

Taking a page from Hitler, Sun Tzu and Stalin, the self-professed Caliphate leader al-Baghdadi, personally asked that the US humanitarian aid worker be held at his oil and gas minister, Tunisian, Abu Sayyaf’s home, US intelligence officials said. “Baghdadi was at the house of Sayyaf. He delivered Kayla Mueller, live and in person.”

American officials confirmed the allegations from many reputable sources, including two Yazidi girls who were held in the same facility. Sources explained that it’s important to have access to human intelligence sources on the ground. The involvement of Baghdadi also illustrates the ease ISIS’s top leader can move freely and without fear of US knowledge.

 

ISIS uses new weapon mustard gas

 

If, rape, beheadings, stonings, whippings, burnings, were not enough, US officials have confirmed that the ISIS terror organization has used mustard gas on the Kurds in northern Iraq. But how did the ruthless terror group get its hands on the mustard gas?

 

There are a couple of likely scenarios. First, after the fall of Saddam Hussein unknown quantities of mustard gas went missing. The former dictator of Iraq notoriously used poison gas on the Kurds in northern Iraq, which was a major reason the US was duped into believing the dictator had weapons of mass destruction. Once Saddam was captured, he admitted to his FBI interrogator that he made up the WMDs in an effort to keep Iran from attacking Iraq. The other likely source of procuring the poisonous gas is Syria or Libya.

 

The new revelation only complicates the effects on the battlefield.

 

Chemical-weapons experts have long worried that the internationally banned mustard gas could end up in the hands of the ISIS terror group or al-Qaeda affiliates. “Mustard isn’t VX or sarin,” a US military official explained. “It has to be used in high concentrations to be fatal.” The gas was used in World War I, and causes severe blisters, blindness as well as significant respiratory damage.

 

Alistair Baskey, a White House National Security Council spokesman, said the administration is aware of the reports and is seeking additional information. “We continue to take these and all allegations of chemical weapons use very seriously,” he said.

 

In the meantime the world continues to watch in horror.

 

© Copyright 2015 Kimberly Dvorak All Rights Reserved. This copyrighted material may only be copied or reproduced upon the written consent of the author. The unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work is illegal. Criminal copyright infringement, including infringement without monetary gain, is investigated by the FBI and is punishable by fines and federal imprisonment.

UN Humanitarian Chief Says He is ‘Horrified’ by Attacks on Civilians in Syria
U.S. News and World Report
Albert Aji and Bassem Mroue, Associated Press
August 17, 2015

The United Nations humanitarian chief said on Monday he is “horrified” by the attacks on civilians taking place in Syria, singling out in particular government airstrikes the previous day that killed nearly 100 people in a Damascus suburb.

The protracted conflict not only “severely affects” the lives of millions of people in Syria but also threatens the stability of the entire region, Stephen O’Brien said at a press conference in Damascus.

The stark warning comes amid a surge in violence as Syrian government troops, Islamic militants and rebels carried out attacks that killed and wounded dozens Monday, including in President Bashar Assad’s coastal stronghold of Latakia.

“Attacks on civilians are unlawful, unacceptable and must stop,” O’Brien said, speaking at the end of a three-day visit to Syria, during which he met senior officials and visited the central province of Homs.

Government air raids on Sunday killed at least 96 people in the eastern Damascus suburb of Douma, making it one of the deadliest single incidents since the crisis began in March 2011. The airstrikes hit a vegetable market in the suburb, which is a stronghold of the Islam Army rebel group.

Syria’s conflict has killed more than 250,000 people, according to United Nations.

“I am particularly appalled by reports of airstrikes yesterday, causing scores of civilian deaths and hundreds injured, right in the center of Douma,” O’Brien said. “I am horrified by the total disrespect for civilian life in this conflict.”

He appealed to all parties to protect civilians and respect international humanitarian law, and also expressed concerns for 4.6 million Syrian “stuck in hard-to-reach and besieged areas.”

O’Brien also lambasted armed groups for cutting off water in Damascus, saying it was unacceptable to “use access to water and other services as a weapon of war.”

Water cuts have been used before in the Syrian civil war, with Damascus and the northern city of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and former commercial center, most affected.

In Washington, State Department spokesman John Kirby said the United States “condemns in the strongest possible terms the Assad regime’s deadly airstrikes” on the Douma market.

“The Assad regime’s brutal attacks on Syria’s cities have killed thousands of people and destroyed schools, mosques, markets, and hospitals,” Kirby said, adding that they “demonstrate the regime’s disregard for human life.”

U.N. special envoy Staffan de Mistura also condemned the Douma airstrikes.

“Hitting crowded civilian markets (and) killing almost one hundred of its own citizens by a government is unacceptable in any circumstances,” de Mistura said, repeating calls for the warring sides to urgently start a dialogue toward a political solution.

Also Monday, the rebels in Damascus’ wider eastern suburbs — an area known as Eastern Ghouta — imposed a curfew, fearing more government airstrikes and saying the curfew was imposed out of concern for civilian lives. The rebel statement said the curfew would go on until further notice. Douma is part of Eastern Ghouta.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported 22 air raids on Eastern Ghouta on Monday, including seven in Douma. The Local Coordination Committees said Douma was hit with mortar shells.

Douma-based activist Baraa Abdul-Rahman said the streets there were empty and most people were staying indoors. “There is a situation of terror and fear in the town,” he said via Skype.

In Turkey, the head of the main Western-backed opposition group, the Syrian National Coalition, blasted the government over Douma’s air raids and urged the international community to help bring officials behind the “massacres and war crimes” to the International Criminal Court.

Iraq: UN officials underscore need to bring perpetrators of Sinjar tragedy to justice
UN News Centre
August 3, 2015

United Nations officials have reiterated the need to bring perpetrators of last year’s tragedy, in which militants from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked as many as 200,000 civilians – most of them from vulnerable communities – causing them to flee to Sinjar, to justice as well as to increase protection for women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence.

It was a year ago that the attacks took place on members of the Yezidi community, as well as members of the Shi’a Turkmen, Shi’a Shabak and Christian communities, causing them to flee to Sinjar.

“In the days that followed, amidst horrific killings, ISIL hunted down and caught hundreds of women and girls from ethnic and religion minorities, instituting a pattern of sexual violence, slavery, abduction and human trafficking that continues to this day,” the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, said in a statement on the first anniversary of the tragedy.

She noted that first-hand accounts from internally displaced persons and refugees, some of whom she met during a visit to the Middle East in April, confirm systematic sexual violence, particularly against Yezidi women and children aged between 8 and 35 years.

Young women are being “sold” in open markets, gifted to foreign fighters, trafficked for sex in the region to raise funds and increase recruitment among ISIL’s ranks, she stated, adding that women and girls are also used for forced procreation, to populate the desired new “Caliphate” with children who can be raised in ISIL’s own “warped image.”

“These appalling crimes of sexual violence in conflict, which may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and/or acts of genocide, will not be forgotten. The international community stands united in the goal of pursuing the perpetrators and holding them to account.”

She reiterated her calls on the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL to include protection and empowerment of women and girls in their strategies to counter terrorism.

Also speaking out was the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ján Kubiš, who strongly condemned ISIL’s continuous and deliberate terrorist strategy to target and exterminate entire communities on the basis of their ethnic background, religious beliefs or faith.

“This is especially harrowing for women, girls and children who are treated with untold brutality. We demand and support the liberation of Yezidi and other women and girls held by ISIL in captivity, often sold and used as sex slaves,” Mr. Kubiš said in a news release.

He stated that the instigators and perpetrators of the crimes committed against civilian populations and on ethnic or religious grounds, some of which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, will sooner or later be brought to justice.

Mr. Kubiš, who is also head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), also acknowledged the efforts and support of the Government of Iraq and of the Kurdistan Regional Government, assisted by the international community, to the affected minorities.

At the same time, he underscored that “a more forceful and coherent action on the protection of minorities must take place, including active steps to ensure zero tolerance to impunity for those committing crimes against any and all humanities.”

NGO Reports

Sudan: Don’t We Matter?: Four Years of Unrelenting Attacks Against Civilians in Sudan’s South Kordofan State
Amnesty International
August 17, 2015

Since armed conflict began in June 2011 between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N), people living in SPLA-N controlled areas of Sudan’s South Kordofan state have endured an unrelenting campaign of aerial and ground attacks by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). As the conflict enters unabated into its fifth year, Amnesty International urges the Government of Sudan, the SPLM/A-N, and other governments to take immediate steps to end violations of international human rights law, open up access to humanitarian relief, and uphold the human rights of the people of South Kordofan.

‘Nowhere Safe for Civilians’: Airstrikes and Ground Attacks in Yemen
Amnesty International
August 17, 2015

Civilians in Yemen are bearing the brunt in the conflict raging between Huthi militias (and army units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh), who seized control of the capital and large parts of the country since last September, and anti-Huthi armed groups (and army units loyal to exiled President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi), who are supported by a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces have also killed and wounded civilians, in unlawful airstrikes which failed to distinguish between military targets and civilian objects in Huthi-controlled areas.

Syria: ‘Left to Die Under Siege’: War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Ghouta, Syria
Amnesty International
Syria Team
August 11, 2015

Thousands of civilians remain trapped in Eastern Ghouta, an area to the north and east of Damascus that has been continuously besieged by Syrian government forces since 2013. They have little access to food, water, medicines, fuel or electrical power due to the ongoing blockade by government forces, and the actions of non-state armed groups that largely control the area. The government has failed to comply with UN Security Council demands that they allow UN humanitarian agencies free access to deliver aid to civilians under siege across the country.

WORTH READING

Beyond Strategic Rape and between the Public and Private: Violence Against Women in Armed Conflict
By Aisling Swaine
August 13, 2015

This study gets to the heart of examining what counts as conflict-related gender violence under international law. Using empirical research from Liberia, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste, the study specifically explores and explains variance beyond strategic sexualized violence employed in some conflicts, to analyze the ways that private individualistic violence is influenced by conflict across the three case studies. Proposing a set of variables as possible determinants of wide-ranging forms of violence, the study proposes that on a continuum of “political public violence” to “endemic private violence,” there are forms of violence that may sit somewhere “in between.” The analysis queries where this “in-between”‘ violence should fit in the thresholds provided by law and what consideration should be given to the political and private violence nexus that the research demonstrates.

From Violence to Mobilization: Women, War, and Threat in Rwanda
By Marie E. Berry
August 15, 2015

Theories of social movement emergence posit “threat” as an important concept in explanations of mobilization. This article uses the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide to investigate whether threats that stem from mass violence can also have a mobilizing effect. Drawing from interviews with 152 women in Rwanda, I reveal how threatening conditions created by the genocide and civil war initiated a grassroots mobilization process among women. This mobilization featured women founding and joining community organizations, engaging in new forms of claims making toward state institutions, and eventually running for political office. Two mechanisms facilitated this process: the social appropriation of feminine values for the reconceptualization of women as legitimate political actors, and the brokerage of connections between individual women, organizations, and government institutions by foreign actors. I conclude by suggesting that this mobilization served as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the meteoric rise of women in Rwanda’s politics.

Human (In)Security and Social Identity Group: The Case of Jihadi Terrorism in Africa
By Isaac Kfir
August 15, 2015

This paper examines the link between human insecurity and social identity groups. It is argued that pervasive insecurity, necessitated by a weak and fragile state system and coupled by weak governance, encourages individuals to identify with radical Islamic groups. One way to address this problem is by promoting a stronger human security discourse in addressing the root causes of terrorism.

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Tunisians Support the Truth Commission
AllAfrica
By Olfa Belhassine
August 12, 2015

Tunis – “Have you heard of transitional justice?”, “Do you know what kinds of abuses transitional justice deals with?”, “What do you expect of transitional justice?”, “Have you heard of the Truth and Dignity Commission?”, “Do you have confidence in the Truth and Dignity Commission?”, “Do you think it is necessary that the truth be revealed about serious abuses committed in the past?”, “Do you think the special chambers will be able to deal with past human rights violations?”

These are some of the questions in a quantitative survey on “Tunisians’ perception of transitional justice”, whose results were recently released by the Truth and Dignity Commission.

The survey was commissioned in March by the Tunis office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which has been supporting the transitional justice process in Tunisia since 2011. It was carried out by the Independent Survey and Statistics Institute (ISTIS).

One of the objectives of the survey was to ask Tunisians directly what this new concept of restorative justice means for them, and gather information about their expectations on judicial procedures and institutional reforms. It questioned 3,547 men and women throughout Tunisia. According to the Truth and Dignity Commission, information from the survey will allow the Commission to strengthen or adjust its future strategy, better support victims and further boost involvement of civil society organizations in its ongoing activities.

According to Anouar Moalla, head of the Commission’s information and communication unit, the ISITIS survey reflects the paradox of the Tunisian context. “We see a real split between some of the elite who only speak ill of us, and a silent majority who are satisfied overall with the work of the truth commission and the way transitional justice is developing,” he says.

Revealing past abuses

The survey found that 65.6% of respondents had heard of transitional justice, especially through television. 78, 5% of those who had heard of transitional justice said they thought it was a “necessity for Tunisia”, especially to “guarantee transition to rule of law”.

While 63.8% thought the process was slow, respondents said they expect it to reveal the truth (76.8%), to install the principle of accountability (44%), provide moral and material reparations to victims (36.3%), and reconcile Tunisians (34%). 86.3% also want criminal procedures against persons who committed human rights violations during the dictatorship, 9.7% even want them deprived of their civil rights and only 8.8 % would prefer them to be granted amnesty.

While 62% had heard of the Truth and Dignity Commission and 67.2 % said they have confidence in it, 48.6% said its main mission should be to “seek the truth about past violations and corruption”. This is another statistic showing that Tunisians questioned in this survey want an end to the totalitarian system based on nepotism. 97.3% of respondents said they think fighting corruption should be one of the main objectives of institutional reforms.

The publication of the ISITIS survey report comes at a crucial time when the Truth and Dignity Commission is under the most serious political pressure since its creation in June 2014. A bill on “national reconciliation” recently proposed to parliament by President Beji Caied Essebsi would divest the Commission of its power to arbitrate in financial cases and end procedures and prosecutions against businessmen and civil servants suspected of corruption.

‘Reconciliation’ Should not Sideline Justice
Jakarta Post
By Param-Preet Singh
August 14, 2015

Indonesia’s government is preparing to lift the lid on decades of gross human rights violations whose victims have gone without redress and whose perpetrators have never been brought to justice.

But there are already serious questions about whether the government will empower the proposed “reconciliation commission” to pursue the minimum standard of acceptable justice: criminal accountability.

President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is expected to unveil details of the proposed Reconciliation Commission in his Aug. 14 State of the Nation address. Such a commission, first mooted on May 22 by Attorney General Muhammad Prasetyo, would be composed of representatives of the Attorney General’s Office and the National Commission on Human Rights.

The commission’s mission is to seek a “permanent solution for all unresolved human rights abuses” of the past half century.

That’s a tall order. The short list of abuses that Prasetyo said the commission would focus on starts chronologically with the massacres of 1965-1966 that killed up to 1 million people.

The victims included members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), ethnic Chinese, as well as trade unionists, teachers, civil society activists and leftist artists. In the half century since the mass killings, the Indonesian government has repeatedly sought to justify them as a necessary defense against the PKI.

Other atrocities on the commission’s task list include the Trisakti and Semanggi 1 and 2 incidents of 1998 in which unknown gunmen killed unarmed peaceful protesters, an attack by alleged security forces on Wasior, Papua, in 2001 and a campaign of extrajudicial killings linked to security forces between 1982 and 1985 known as the Petrus shootings.

To date, the government has provided few details of the commission’s precise objectives or the resources it plans to allocate it to achieve those goals – but it has already indicated that the commission will not conduct investigations into specific incidents.

On May 13 Attorney General Office’s spokesman Tony Tribagus Spontana said the government was opting for a “reconciliation process” as a means to get “away from the shackles of so-called investigations which will likely bring us to blame one another”.

Spontana hinted that the commission would instead focus on compensating victims through an as-yet-unspecified “proper settlement mechanism”.

Providing compensation or other forms of redress to victims of grave human rights violations is necessary, but it’s only a small fraction of what is needed to obtain justice and achieve longer-term reconciliation.

Nor is it enough to simply uncover the “truth”, as important as that may be. Finding out what happened can fill crucial gaps in a society’s understanding of its past and help direct a future path.

But unless those responsible for the injustices of the past are fully and fairly held accountable for their actions, the wrong message will be sent to prospective perpetrators of future crimes.

Instead of replacing an accountability mechanism, a reconciliation commission empowered to address rights abuses of the scale and severity of those in Indonesia over the past 50 years should pave the way for prosecution of those most responsible.

The proposed commission in Indonesia therefore has the potential to be a much-needed step on the long road to justice, but only if its structure, procedures and practices are consistent with human rights standards.

The government’s approach thus far has not inspired a lot of confidence: a coalition of Indonesian civil society organizations and family members of victims of past atrocities have already criticized the proposed reconciliation commission as no more than an “effort to preserve impunity”.

As truth mechanisms in other countries have made clear, there is no precise recipe for achieving a rights-compliant and effective process, but there are at least three critical ingredients: independence, impartiality and transparency.

The civil society reaction thus far suggests that the government has a long way to go.

Any credible truth and reconciliation commission should operate independently from the government. Efforts by the executive to interfere in the commission’s work – which can take many forms, including efforts to manipulate its budget – could be a death sentence for the commission’s credibility.

Impartiality is similarly non-negotiable. Efforts to frame the mandate in a way that only takes the views of one side, for example, would at best deliver a skewed version of events. A one-sided version of the truth risks exacerbating, rather than easing, tensions.

Transparency is vital to foster national ownership over the commission’s work. Broad consultation with civil society and other key stakeholders at all stages will be essential.

There should be clear, objective criteria to appoint commissioners, the commissioners should reflect the broader society at large, including those victimized, and their appointment should be subject to public confirmation hearings. The commission’s findings should be public.

There are practical considerations as well. Witnesses may need protection because of their participation in the process.

And those responsible for past abuses, who provide statements, should be granted some protection, although these should not be confused with immunities or amnesties, which are inconsistent with international law.

President Jokowi has an opportunity to start the process of bringing meaningful justice to Indonesia’s huge numbers of victims of rights violations.

Ensuring that the reconciliation commission is poised to announce that has the potential to be a historic step in that direction.

But the government would do well to remember that reconciliation will not come from a one-sided version of the truth.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the United States
Reuters
By: Ronald C. Slye
August 15, 2015

It may be time for a U.S. Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with America’s legacy of slavery. Political analysts referred to the nation’s “original sin” of slavery while discussing recent police killings of unarmed black men. Other incidents of race-based violence continue to plague U.S. society.

I teach law focusing on transitional justice and have worked with two national truth commissions. From 1996 to 2001, I was a consultant to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, which examined that country’s legacy of racism, slavery and apartheid. From 2009 to 2013, I was one of three international commissioners on Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which addressed human-rights violations committed over 45 years. Each was established by its respective government as an independent commission. Each panel had its challenges. Yet both shed light on the systematic historical injustices that, like it or not, defined each country.

Could a truth commission work for the United States? It would certainly help Americans confront the nation’s past racial injustices. Truth commissions are designed to analyze the systemic context of historical offenses and trace their continuing effects today.

South Africa’s Archbishop Tutu listens at the 10th anniversary of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Cape Town

Truth commissions allow diverse constituencies to tell their sides of the story and examine the history and results of gross violations of human rights. Because they are not courts of law, the panels cannot legally prosecute or punish people. Both these attributes – taking a broad analytical view of historical injustices and their impact on today’s society, as well as providing a safe place for people to discuss their experiences and perspectives – are crucial in any national conversation about the legacy of slavery.

My experience with the two commissions in Africa underscores the importance of who is chosen to lead the panel and the breadth of its mandate.

The commissioners must bring a diversity of skills. People not open to hearing the perspectives of others would do a poor job of fostering the national conversation required. Though it is important to have commissioners with a legal background, my experience shows it is also crucial to have people from other disciplines, including psychology, history, human rights, economics and racial and ethnic conflict.

It is also useful to bring in people from other countries. A number of commissions, including in Kenya, Sierra Leone and Guatemala, did this. It enriches the discussion, for example, to include people from Africa to address the legacy of slavery.

Who heads the commission is critical. South Africa was blessed to have Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who witnessed and suffered through apartheid. Perhaps the United States could turn to President Barack Obama. He has roots in Africa, and his family and ancestry embodies the country’s complex racial history.

During Obama’s recent trip to Africa, he pledged to do more involving U.S.-African relations after he leaves office. Leading a national, or even international, conversation on slavery and its legacy might be a smart way to start that engagement.

Apart from deciding who would staff such a commission, it is also key that the panel’s mandate be broad enough to encompass the complexities of the history and legacy of slavery. At the same time its mandate should not be so broad that it becomes unfocused.

The South African truth commission’s mandate, for example, was later viewed as too narrow. It did not closely examine the crime of apartheid – and so did not engage directly with the effects of institutionalized racism. The Kenyan truth commission’s mandate, by contrast, was too broad. It was charged with examining not only criminal assaults such as assassinations, massacres and rapes but also violations of civil, economic and social rights. The mandate of a truth commission on slavery would need enough flexibility to explore the complexities of the problem and its legacy – but not so broad as to overwhelm the panel and ensure its failure.

The legacy of slavery is complex. There can, of course, be no first-hand testimony. Yet the United States is still influenced by the inheritance that slaves and slaveholders have bequeathed to us.

My experience in Kenya and South Africa taught me that most people cannot be reduced to the categories of good or bad. People responsible for the worst atrocities in each of the countries often had redeeming qualities. Some who perpetrated violations against others were themselves victims of injustice.

One of a truth commission’s most essential functions is to separate the character of a person from the character of his or her actions. We often fall into the trap of wanting to reduce people to good or bad, innocent or guilty.

A person may be guilty of committing a terrible violation, for example, but we do a disservice by viewing him or her only through that single act. My experience taught me that people are more willing to acknowledge and address their own wrongdoing – or that of their ancestors – if they can be assured they won’t be judged solely on those bad acts. Human beings are more complex, whether it is a 19th-century slaveholder or a person today on death row.

I am a descendant of slaveholders. My ancestor, Robert Carter, was one of the wealthiest landholders – and one of the largest slaveholders – in colonial Virginia. His wealth and power earned him the nickname “King” Carter. His descendants include two presidents – William Henry Harrison and Benjamin Harrison – five signers of the Declaration of Independence, Robert E. Lee and me.

King Carter’s grandson, Robert Carter III, held hundreds of slaves and, like many of his contemporaries, administered what he labeled as “stern punishments” that today we would not hesitate to call a crime against humanity. Yet this same man freed more than 450 of his slaves in 1791 – the single largest act of emancipation by any slaveholder.

Carter’s journey to this unprecedented act of defiance and liberation is complicated. In his youth, he did appear more compassionate with his slaves than many of his contemporaries. His conversion to an antislavery Baptist Church may have been the defining moment that compelled him to harness his spiritual beliefs into concrete action.

Yet many of Carter’s contemporaries had exhibited the same traits. Some attended the same church. None of them, however, rejected slavery as Carter did.

For the 450 slaves and their families freed by Carter, it was an extraordinary, life-changing event. Carter was a racist who participated in one of the modern world’s worst crimes against humanity. He also performed a profoundly generous act anchored in the ideals of liberty and freedom taking hold in the new United States.

Carter’s act of freedom and liberation cannot negate his complicity in one of the worst crimes against humanity. They both define him as a person.

America’s national debates about race are too often simplistic and polarizing. They produce copious amounts of heat and noise, but little light. We often fail to acknowledge the complexity of our history, both personal and collective.

Yet one now senses a shift in the public mood. The remarkably swift forgiveness from the families of those killed in the Charleston church – a more pure example of Christian love is hard to find these days – has shamed many of us to reflect rather than react.

The mobilization around removing the Confederate battle flag from government buildings has led to a tentative national conversation about how we memorialize and remember the Civil War, the war in which the promise of freedom anchored in the American Revolution was finally achieved. We are beginning to engage at a national level about the messages conveyed by statues and memorials to the Confederacy. It is a much-needed conversation.

Carter’s contradictions are with us today. A country founded on ideals of freedom, liberty and human rights at the same time enslaved millions of people during most of its first century. There is no question that Americans have made progress in fulfilling the aspirational ideals that animated the founders of this country. There is also no question that the country still has a long way to go to acknowledge and address the violence and oppression that is a part of U.S. history.

A truth commission would not – and could not – solve the problems that America faces because of its original sin of slavery. The appropriate test for a truth commission is whether it furthers the nation’s efforts to engage meaningfully with the present manifestations of past violations.

Refusing to recognize and engage with past injustices compounds the effect of that history and can even result in new injustices. Acknowledging such history can, if we choose, lead to a renewed effort for more Americans to address the legacy of slavery and racism that still runs deep in U.S. society.

Victims of Armed Conflict Pressure Indonesia for Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Channel News Asia
August 19, 2015

Victims of the armed conflict in the Indonesian province of Aceh are demanding an explanation for the violence and killings that plagued the region for three decades from 1976.

They have pressed authorities to set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as promised in the peace agreement signed by the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government in Helsinki ten years ago.

An estimated 12,000 people were killed during the bloody struggle that ended in August 2005.

Acehnese women are among many looking for answers. Many of them lost their husbands, children or family members, with some going missing and others killed.

“I am keen to know why an innocent person was shot at,” says Madam Nurfanidar, whose husband was shot dead in front of her. “I don’t know the answer ’til today.”

Some of the women have been seeking closure for more than five years.

“Eventually I found my husband at the hospital mortuary. I asked whether there was such a person. I checked the register and found my husband’s name, Jamaludin,” said Madam Husni, the wife of a victim.

“His photo matched with the one taken of the body. I confirmed it was my husband. That was three months after he was abducted.”

Thirteen years later, she still does not know why her husband was abducted, and killed.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which promised to provide answers as part of the peace agreement, has yet to be set up.

“From the onset we’ve been in consultation with the central government. But we’ve been told countless times by the central government that the national law on Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been annulled by the Constitutional Court. ” said Abdullah Salleh, Chairman of the Aceh Parliamentary Commission.

However, because the province enjoys special autonomy status, he said he believes there is a way out of the current legal impasse.

“We can possibly continue to push for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Aceh if there’s also political will from the central government,” he said.

“It should not be viewed as a process of establishing who is wrong; who is right,” said Hendra Saputra, the Coordinator of KontasAceh, the Aceh Commission for the Disappearances and Victims of Violence.

“But it is a process to unearth what truly happened in Aceh. It is an education for our future generation.”

COMMENTARY AND PERSPECTIVES

The UK Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed: Treaty and Customary IHL Provides No Authority for Detention in Non-international Armed Conflicts
By Alex Conte
August 6, 2015

Last week’s judgment in Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence is rich in analyses and observations concerning detention in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). One of the key issues assessed concerns the power to detain in NIACs under IHL.

The Secretary of State’s position on this point commenced with a challenge to traditional classifications of armed conflict, contrasting purely internal conflicts with armed conflicts between two States (para 168). It was contended that the legal position concerning the authority to detain in a NIAC now reflects a more complex factual position than that captured under traditional classifications. A third classification must now be recognized: ‘internationalised’ NIACs. This echoes the ICRC’s Opinion Paper on internment, which speaks of ‘NIACs with an extraterritorial element’, in which “the armed forces of one or more State, or of an international or regional organization, fight alongside the armed forces of a host State, in its territory, against one or more organized non-State armed groups” (page 7).

To paraphrase, ‘if it looks and feels like an international armed conflict, let us apply IHL rules on international armed conflicts by analogy’. This is a dangerous approach that the Court of Appeal carefully avoided, instead focusing on its proposed implications.

Absence of prohibition

A preliminary question before the Court of Appeal was whether IHL allows for non-arbitrary deprivation of liberty, by virtue of the fact that Rule 99 of the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL positively prohibits arbitrary detention, but does not expressly prohibit non-arbitrary detention. The Court ultimately accepted, however, that modern international law is such that an approach under which ‘absence of prohibition equals authority’ is outdated and cannot stand as a proper basis of authority for detention (para 197). The Court was right. No credible lawyer could genuinely assert that lack of an express prohibition constitutes authority to deprive persons of their liberty.

Authority to detain derived from customary international law

On this point, it was argued that States involved in internationalised NIACs do detain persons, and have done so for many years on the understanding that they can as of right (para 222). In other words, a customary norm of IHL has developed in the context of this third category of conflict. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that: “…we do not consider that in the present state of the development of international humanitarian law it is possible to base authority to detain in a non-international armed conflict on customary international law” (para 242). The Court is correct, of course, although it left the door open for the possibility that such a custom might crystalise in time.

Authority to detain derived from Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II

The central focus of this post is on the Secretary of State’s proposition that authority to detain in a NIAC can be derived from IHL treaty law. Relying on Common Article 3 and Articles 5 and 6 of Protocol II, the Secretary of State argued that these provisions imply an authority to detain in NIACs. Support was taken from Gill’s and Fleck’s proposal (see para 240) that although IHL treaty law concerning NIACs is less explicit in stipulating the legal basis for operational detention than IHL treaty law concerning IACs:

“…a generic power to that effect is implicit in Common Article 3, in as much as it identifies as one category of persons taking no active part in hostilities ‘those placed hors de combat by… detention’. Articles 5 and 6 of (Protocol II) also refer to ‘persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained’, which makes it clear that the deprivation of physical liberty of a person is contemplated in the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts.”

This approach forms the basis of the ICRC’s assertion that Common Article 3 and Protocol II govern deprivation of liberty in NIAC (page 6). Because Protocol II – which relates exclusively to NIACs – explicitly mentions internment, the ICRC expresses the view that this confirms that internment “is a form of deprivation of liberty inherent to NIAC” (page 7).

The Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that “it is not possible to base any implication of a power to detain in an internationalised non-international armed conflict purely on a treaty” (para 219). The Court of Appeal most certainly got it right, for various reasons.

If the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols had intended to provide a power to detain in a NIAC, this would have been expressly provided

Normal principles of interpretation require that, where certain matters have been explicitly set out in a legal instrument, the lack of similar explicit reference elsewhere in the legal instrument calls for interpretation that such matters are excluded (the principle of expressio unius). It is therefore relevant to contrast the way in which the authority to detain is dealt with in the context of international versus non-international armed conflicts.

The authority to detain in an IAC is set out in great detail within IHL treaty law. Specific authorisation and substantive grounds are specified in Article 21 of Geneva Convention III (concerning POWs) and Articles 42 and 78 of Geneva Convention IV (concerning civilians posing a serious threat to security). In contrast, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are silent concerning grounds or procedures for internment in the context of a NIAC.

In the High Court, Mr Justice Leggatt therefore stated that: “I think it reasonable to assume that if CA3 and/or AP2 had been intended to provide a power to detain they would have done so expressly – in the same way as, for example, Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention provides a power to intern prisoners of war. It is not readily to be supposed that the parties to an international convention have agreed to establish a power to deprive people of their liberty indirectly by implication and without saying so in terms” (para 242). This conclusion is intimately linked to the question of why IHL treaty law omitted explicit authority to detain in NIACs, influential for the Court of Appeal and considered next.

It is highly plausible that the negotiating States to the Geneva Convention did not want to authorise grounds for detention in NIACs

It is not genuinely conceivable that the parties negotiating the Geneva Conventions should have been so specific in the drafting of Geneva Conventions III and IV concerning detention in the context of IACs and then leave an only vaguely implied authorisation in the context of NIACs.

In fact, there are cogent reasons why negotiating States would not have wanted to establish a legal authority to detain persons in non-international armed conflicts. Given that Common Article 3 applies to “each Party to the conflict”, and that Protocol II applies to non-State armed groups that are able to implement Protocol II, Justice Leggatt focussed on one of the cornerstones of IHL: reciprocity. He observed that: “…providing a power to detain would have meant authorising detention by dissident and rebel armed groups. That would be anathema to most states which face a non-international armed conflict on their territory and do not wish to confer any legitimacy on rebels and insurgents or accept that such groups have any right to exercise a function which is a core aspect of state sovereignty” (para 245). The Court of Appeal thus gave weight to the fact that “the original ICRC draft of the Geneva Conventions which provided for the application of the Conventions in their entirety to non-international armed conflicts was rejected” by the negotiating States (para 178).

If Common Article 3 and Protocol II were to be interpreted as implying an authority to detain in NIACs, it would be necessary (but it is not possible) to identify the scope of such an implied power

As noted, IHL prohibits arbitrary detention. The commentary to Rule 99 explains that State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts, noting also that the arbitrary deprivation of liberty is incompatible with the requirement that detainees be treated humanely, reflected in Common Article 3.

Common Article 3 and Rule 99 in this respect reinforce the general prohibition against arbitrary detention. This prohibition is reflected in Article 9(1) of the ICCPR, which provides that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention” and requires that any deprivation of liberty be “on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law”. These phrases echo the prohibitions against arbitrary deprivation of liberty on the one hand and unlawful deprivation of liberty on the other.

Two requirements arise from this. The first, as confirmed in the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the right to liberty (para 11), is that any detention that lacks a legal basis is both unlawful and arbitrary, and thus in violation of both aspects of the prohibition. The second is that the law must be defined “with sufficient precision to avoid overly broad or arbitrary interpretation or application” (para 22). If a person is detained without such legal authorization, the deprivation of liberty is unlawful and thereby in violation of Article 9(1).

From this second requirement, it follows that the law must identify the scope of any express or implied authority to detain. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols do not point to the scope of any power to intern in NIACs. Indeed, the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL points to no express or implied authority to detain in the context of NIACs. It instead recognises that: “The prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty in non-international armed conflicts is established by State practice in the form of military manuals, national legislation and official statements, as well as on the basis of international human rights law”. There is no assertion, or even vague suggestion, that Common Article 3 and/or Protocol II imply a legal authority to detain.

Justice Leggatt was therefore correct to take the view that it is not possible to deduce the scope of any implied power from the Conventions or their Protocols (para 246), with the Court of Appeal concluding that this fact could not be overcome (paras 217-218).

Because the scope of any implied power to intern in NIACs is not discernible, such internment would be arbitrary

General Comment 35 of the Human Rights Committee states (at para 64) that: “Security detention authorised and regulated by and complying with international humanitarian law in principle is not arbitrary” (emphasis added). The non-arbitrary nature of detention in armed conflict is thereby predicated as detention that satisfies the following cumulative elements: (i) it is authorized by IHL; (ii) it is regulated by IHL; and (iii) it is thereby capable of being evaluated as to its compliance with IHL.

Even if the argument of an implied authority under Common Article 3 and Protocol II were to be accepted (element (i)), the argument fails elements (ii) and (iii) of the Human Rights Committee’s test. Geneva Conventions III and IV specify who in an IAC may be detained, on what grounds, in accordance with what procedures and for how long. In the context of a NIAC, however, it is not possible to point to any such regulation, thus falling short of element (ii). The lack of such regulation not only fails element (ii), it also makes it impossible to ascertain whether any detention in a NIAC complies with IHL (element (iii)).

General Comment 35 also distinguishes between international versus non-international armed conflicts as this concerns any derogation from the right to liberty. In the context of an IAC, it acknowledges that IHL includes substantive and procedural rules that help to mitigate the risk of arbitrary detention. Outside that context, however, the Committee spoke of the need for derogating measures (para 66). It is implicit that the Committee did not consider that IHL rules pertaining to detention in a NIAC provide sufficient procedural guarantees mitigating the risk of arbitrary detention.

IHL contemplates internment as a form of deprivation of liberty in NIACs, but only as a matter of fact, not as a matter of law

While Common Article 3 and Protocol II may contemplate that the detention of persons in a NIAC may take place as a matter of fact, it does not follow that these provisions imply a lawful authority for detention. As simply put by the Court of Appeal: “Regulation is not the same as authorisation” (para 180).

The purpose of Common Article 3 and Articles 5 and 6 of Protocol II is simply to guarantee a minimum level of humanitarian treatment

Common Article 3 and Protocol II require that any detained persons be treated humanely (Common Article 3), that they enjoy certain generally applicable rights and safeguards (such as the benefit of medical examinations: Protocol II, Article 5(2)(d)) and that they enjoy certain procedural safeguards pertaining to prosecution and punishment (Protocol II, Article 6). As noted in the ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols (at para 4440): “Like common Article 3, Protocol II has a purely humanitarian purpose and is aimed at securing fundamental guarantees for individuals in all circumstances” (emphasis added).

Justice Leggatt thus remarked: “The need to observe such minimum standards is equally relevant to all people who are in fact detained, and does not depend on whether or not their detention in legally justified” (para 244). The Court of Appeal agreed (para 218). In short, the central basis for the Secretary of State’s argument was fundamentally flawed: the provisions relied on do not imply an authority to detain; their purpose is to guarantee minimum levels of humanitarian treatment.

Some Thoughts on the Serdar Mohammed Appeals Judgment
EJIL: Talk
By Marko Milanovic
August 10, 2015

In this post I’d like to add a few thoughts on the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Serdar Mohammed, that we already covered on the blog last week (here and here). The case is now heading to the UK Supreme Court, and may also eventually end up in the European Court of Human Rights – although Strasbourg will be looking carefully at the Supreme Court’s judgment even if the case doesn’t find its way to it.

First off, I think everything that can be said about the ‘big issue’ of authority to detain in NIAC has already been said; those already committed to either view are not going to be dissuaded by some novel argument. For my part, I only wish to note that after the Court of Appeal’s (unanimous!) judgment it looks increasingly unlikely that the Supreme Court will overturn the finding of the lower courts (although that of course may still happen), especially bearing in mind the rigour and detail of these lower judgments. It is very difficult for any court to essentially make up rules (in reasoning by implication/analogy/structure or whatever) on who precisely can be detained in NIACs, for how long and under what exact process, in the absence of any meaningful legislative guidance. This is not a gap that most judges would feel comfortable in filling, especially when easy analogies to IACs or (much worse, between targeting and detention) break down.

Second, this is all the more the case because there is nothing inherently impracticable or unworkable about the result that the lower courts have reached. IHL in NIAC does not prohibit detention. It is simply that positive authority for such detention, including the exact grounds and review mechanisms, must be found elsewhere, primarily in domestic law. The UK government lost the case precisely because it had no law of its own on the matter, and because what it did was contrary to domestic Afghan law (and ISAF policy) as well. All the UK has to do in order to resort to detention in NIACs is to either pass its own legislation or persuade its local allies to do so. That may be difficult to pull off politically, but from a judicial perspective does not seem to be too onerous a demand.

Third, the whole practicality point is reinforced by the government’s litigation strategy before the Court of Appeal. Unlike before the High Court (and unlike say Aurel and Sean’s argument), the government all but conceded that no positive authority to detain existed in ‘normal’, purely internal NIACs (see paras. 168 ff). In other words, if say Scotland tried to secede from the UK by armed force, the UK government would have to pass domestic legislation to detain Scottish nationalist rebels. It in special, ‘internationalised’ NIACs outside UK territory that the government is saying that it has inherent detention authority by analogy to IACs. This is in my view a completely arbitrary distinction, which actually exposes the weakness of the authority argument. And, as the Court correctly found, a close scrutiny of the evidence for a particular customary power in such special NIACs doesn’t pass muster. (I do have a further terminological quibble, in that the Court used the term ‘internationalised’ NIAC for these types of NIACs with an extraterritorial or cross-border element. As I have argued elsewhere, the term ‘internationalization’ is best used to denote the transformation of a prima facie NIAC into a proper IAC, e.g. by virtue of the Tadic overall control test, which is not what Afghanistan was anyway; using it otherwise creates a significant potential for conceptual confusion).

Fourth, I don’t find the Court’s approach to the interpretation of Security Council resolutions and Article 103 of the Charter to be entirely persuasive. In particular, the interpretative presumption (applied in Al-Jedda) that the SC does not intend to abridge human rights absent a clear statement to the contrary is not some ECHR-specific, external constraint on the Council, but should be seen a general principle also flowing from the human rights provisions of the UN Charter, equally applying to all states, ECHR parties or not. But since this point was of little actual relevance in the case I shan’t belabour it further.

Fifth, with regard to a possible domestic UK statute, the Court notes (at paras. 10(ii) and 363(iv)) the possibility of adopting legislation which ‘might have taken the form of a bar of specified claims by foreign nationals or have provided for specific authority for HM armed forces to detain in operations overseas. Both of these were accepted before us on behalf of SM to be possibilities. The latter reflects the approach taken by the United States.’ I see nothing problematic in the latter option, and this is in fact what the UK Parliament should proceed to do (while also considering the possibility of enabling extraterritorial derogations from the Convention, that curiously gets little mention in the judgment). The former option, however, is downright perilous, at least as far as Convention claims are concerned. It would be exceptionally difficult to justify discrimination on the basis of nationality in the security detention context (cf. the Belmarsh case; see also here and here). It would also likely be a losing strategy in the long run, especially bearing in mind the number of people with (dual) UK nationality fighting for Isis or other terrorist groups.

Sixth, with regard to extraterritoriality – it is true, as Sean and Aurel note in their post, that the Court expressed some significant reservations with respect to the more expansive approach to the extraterritorial application of the Convention post Al-Skeini (see paras. 8, 93 ff). Those reservations seem to be twofold: first, that the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence is internally inconsistent and that they overruled earlier cases sub silentio without clearly explaining why; and second, that applying human rights in armed conflict poses serious practical difficulties. Both of these concerns are real and valid. But we must also be aware that we would have to work out all of these difficult questions of how human rights apply on the battlefield even in intra-territorial situations – cf. the horrible position Ukraine finds itself in today. As I have argued many times before, the threshold extraterritoriality question should not be used as proxy for avoiding all these tough cases, which need to be looked at and decided on their merits.

I would also note, however, that something very important happens in para. 95 of the judgment, where the Court appears to endorse Leggatt J’ view in Al-Saadoon that the personal model of Article 1 ECHR jurisdiction applies whenever a state uses physical force against a person, thus in effect collapsing this personal model. (I have argued in my book (at 207) precisely that the personal model has to collapse that way and cannot be limited non-arbitrarily, but also that this is not necessarily what the Strasbourg Court wanted to do in Al-Skeini). Essentially the Court of Appeal may already have implicitly decided one of the key issues in Al-Saadoon, thus paving the way to applying the ECHR not only to detention, but to kinetic operations as well.

Seventh, I am surprised that the government persisted with some rather dubious arguments on appeal. First there was the manifestly-destined-to-lose Behrami point on how the conduct of UK troops in Afghanistan is not attributable to the UK, but only to the UN. And then, even more weirdly, that because the UK was acting on behalf of the UN it was entitled to rely on UN immunities before domestic courts. Yes, you read that right – the UK government was saying that it was immune from the jurisdiction of its own courts because it was supposedly acting on the UN behalf. That led to a couple of frankly embarrassing passages in the judgment (para. 76ff), when the Court asked the government whether the UN Secretary-General was even aware that the government was invoking UN immunities (he was not), and the Court then ordering the government to notify the S-G. His legal adviser subsequently replied saying (quite correctly) that ISAF was not a UN operation and that its personnel had no UN immunities to invoke. It is simply beyond me why such arguments – especially the immunities one – ever got made, wasting everybody’s time and energy in the process.

Finally, and on a more trivial note, I’d like to note the very interesting pattern of citation to academic authority (and generally other non-binding persuasive authority as well) in the judgment. Namely, the Court doesn’t seem to cite any scholarship in many difficult parts of the judgment (e.g. those dealing with extraterritoriality, Article 103, relationship between IHRL and IHL, etc), but starts doing that, and at quite length, from para. 171 onwards, when it starts discussing whether there’s authority to detain in ‘internationalised’ NIACs. I have no clear explanation for this – it could be that different judges drafted different parts of the judgment, or that the Court was clear on most of the other issues and needed no help from academics, whereas the detention authority point was so crucial, yet so underdetermined, that recourse to scholarship was particularly helpful.

In any event the Court apparently did find all that scholarship of some use. I’ve also been told that the government argued before the Court of Appeal that it shouldn’t refer to blogs, because we’re supposedly less rigorous and trustworthy than journals since there is no formal mechanism of blind peer review. And I’m really happy that this is not a position that the Court in the end accepted! It cited three EJIL Talk posts (paras. 197, 241), and also extensively discussed a post by Ryan Goodman on Just Security (paras. 208-209). So yay for us.

A New War Crimes Court is Born, but Who is Responsible in Kosovo?
Justice in Conflict
By Aidan Hehir
August 10, 2015

On 3 August, the Kosovo parliament voted to alter Kosovo’s constitution to enable the establishment of a Special Court. The court will investigate evidence uncovered by the European Union Special Investigative Task Force of forced detention, torture, murder and, perhaps most shockingly, organ-harvesting allegedly committed by former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2000.

Kosovo’s war crimes court will deal with important and perhaps unique questions about culpability in transitional justice. The offences under its jurisdiction were committed by agents acting with the sometimes overt and sometimes tacit support of external actors, namely NATO and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). They are the same actors that assumed executive authority in Kosovo for half of the three-year time period under examination. The extent to which these actors will be held responsible for sponsoring and / or tolerating criminality conducted by the KLA will have a profound effect on perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy and thus societal stability within Kosovo.

“Monsters” and “Victims”

Kosovo Albanians generally see the KLA as freedom fighters who brought about their “liberation”, albeit with the aid of NATO’s military intervention in March 1999. The idea that the KLA, or the Kosovar Albanian community more generally, could be guilty of human rights violations jars with the popular conception of “Serbian aggressors” and “Albanian victims”. Indicatively, Ramush Haradinaj, the former Prime Minister and current leader of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, stated: “By approving this court, we are turning ourselves into a monster…we were not monsters; we were victims.”

Kosovo’s declaration of Independence in February 2008 sparked jubilation amongst the majority Albanian population, but this has given way to spiraling anger and dissatisfaction; unemployment remains cripplingly high, wages are low, and corruption is rife. Between December 2014 and February 2015 some 50,000 Albanians left Kosovo in an ill-fated attempt to reach the EU. In March, the UN ranked Kosovo as the fourth largest source of asylum seekers in the world. Amidst this depravation, many naturally take comfort in KLA nostalgia. Unsurprisingly, the prospect of this source of pride being besmirched doesn’t appeal.

The Court’s perceived legitimacy amongst the Albanian community – which clearly has profound implications for peace and stability within Kosovo – will hinge upon the extent to which the actions of the KLA are acknowledged to have been supported – or simply tolerated – by external actors. This external support involved two distinct phases that lie within the Court’s three-year remit: first, the support afforded to the KLA during the struggle against Yugoslav forces from 1 January 1998 until the end of NATO’s intervention on 10 June 1999; and second, the tacit support provided by the international administration established after NATO’s intervention and lasting until 31 December 2000.

Supporting “Terrorists”?

Prior to NATO’s intervention the KLA were known to engage in attacks against Serbian – and also Albanian – civilians; indeed, in February 1998 the US Envoy to the Balkan stated that “[t]he UCK (KLA) is without any question a terrorist organisation” and, a month later, UN Security Council Resolution 1160 condemned “all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army”. Still, evidence now suggests that a number of Western states covertly sent Special Forces into Kosovo in 1998 to train the KLA (James Pettifer (2012) The Kosova Liberation Army, p. 178). More overtly, during Operation Allied Force NATO coordinated militarily with the KLA.

After NATO’s intervention concluded, the Security Council passed Resolution 1244 giving UNMIK administrative powers in Kosovo and charging NATO-led KFOR with maintaining peace and security. Despite the huge international presence, attacks against the Serbian community increased dramatically when NATO’s campaign ended, precipitating a round of “counter-ethnic cleansing”. Reports by Human Rights Watch and the Red Cross recorded that by October 1999 over 200,000 Serbs and thousands of Roma had fled Kosovo in what was described by the then chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Carla Del Pointe as being “…as serious as what happened there before [NATO’s intervention].”

In its initial phase, the international administration made two fateful decisions: one, to tolerate the mass exodus of Serbs and two, to turn a blind eye to the criminality perpetrated by sections of the former KLA. According to a report produced on behalf of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, the international administration, “favoured a pragmatic political approach taking the view that they needed to promote short-term stability at any price.”

There was some logic to this of course. Tackling the criminal elements of the KLA would have led to confrontations with an armed guerrilla organisation whose support they needed. Additionally, stopping the Serbian exodus, and confronting those who targeted Serbs, would have been costly, dangerous and angered sections of the Albanian population. Ultimately, the continued presence of Serbs in cities such as Pristina, Peja and Prizren would have constituted a persistent source of instability whereas their relocation to enclaves such as Northern Mitrovica and Gračanica removed various inter-ethnic flash points.

The lack of robust attempts by UNMIK and KFOR to stop ethnic cleansing and secure the presence of Serbs and other minorities scattered across Kosovo emboldened those intent on driving out the Serbs. As a result, Kosovo became, and largely remains, a mono-ethnic polity, with non-Albanian communities largely corralled into particular enclaves and municipalities where, they “face some of the most hostile conditions of any minorities in Europe.”

Collusion

The leader of the KLA at the time of NATO’s intervention was Hashim Thaci. Feted by NATO from 1998 on, Thaci eventually became Prime Minister and currently serves as Kosovo’s foreign minister. The Council of Europe Report, however, described Thaci as the ‘boss’ of an “organized crime network” active since 1998 and which had committed war crimes, intimidated “moderate” Albanians, and was involved in human trafficking, the sex trade, and heroin distribution.

Crucially, the report also notes that Thaci’s network was facilitated by the international administration established after NATO’s intervention. In a particularly damming section, the report states, “…these men would have been convicted of serious crimes and would by now be serving lengthy prison sentences [but for] faltering political will on the part of the international community to effectively prosecute the former leaders of the KLA.” Thus, those who will be the focus of the Court could not have committed their crimes without the support of those in NATO who sought the KLA’s help between 1998 and June 1999, and the international administration established after NATO’s intervention, which consciously chose to tolerate rather than confront them.

Acknowledging the External Dimension

Investigating crimes committed by the KLA is obviously a welcome development in principle. The Court must, however, acknowledge the extent to which international actors tacitly, and at times overtly, supported the growth of the violent criminal network now under investigation. A narrow focus by the Court will isolate the perpetrators of the criminality from the enabling environment in which they operated, thereby obscuring the role played by the international community in the commission of these crimes. The efficacy of transitional justice in this instance, therefore, is predicated on looking beyond a simple “Albanian versus Serb” narrative.

Blaming the KLA alone is likely to enflame social disquiet in a country already exhibiting pronounced popular disaffection with corruption, economic stasis, political mismanagement, and indeed, with those international actors who now seek to cast Albanians as exclusively responsible for the criminality and human rights violations. A failure to extend the scope of the proceedings, however, will naturally anger Albanians who will wonder how they have come to be punished for engaging in activity encouraged, supported and tolerated by those with the legal, political and military power to stop it at the time.

The Pentagon’s Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press
New York Times
By the Editorial Board
August 10, 2015

The Defense Department earlier this summer released a comprehensive manual outlining its interpretation of the law of war. The 1,176-page document, the first of its kind, includes guidelines on the treatment of journalists covering armed conflicts that would make their work more dangerous, cumbersome and subject to censorship. Those should be repealed immediately.

Journalists, the manual says, are generally regarded as civilians, but may in some instances be deemed “unprivileged belligerents,” a legal term that applies to fighters that are afforded fewer protections than the declared combatants in a war. In some instances, the document says, “the relaying of information (such as providing information of immediate use in combat operations) could constitute taking a direct part in hostilities.”

The manual warns that “Reporting on military operations can be very similar to collecting intelligence or even spying,” so it calls on journalists to “act openly and with the permission of relevant authorities.” It says that governments “may need to censor journalists’ work or take other security measures so that journalists do not reveal sensitive information to the enemy.”

Allowing this document to stand as guidance for commanders, government lawyers and officials of other nations would do severe damage to press freedoms. Authoritarian leaders around the world could point to it to show that their despotic treatment of journalists – including Americans – is broadly in line with the standards set by the United States government.

One senior Pentagon official, who was asked to explain when a journalist might be deemed an “unprivileged belligerent,” pointed to the assassination of the Afghan military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud in September 2001. That example is preposterous because Mr. Massoud was killed by assassins who posed as television journalists and hid explosives in a camera. They were not, in fact, journalists.

The manual’s argument that some reporting activities could be construed as taking part in hostilities is ludicrous. That vaguely-worded standard could be abused by military officers to censor or even target journalists.

Equally bizarre is the document’s suggestion that reporters covering wars should operate only with the permission of “relevant authorities” or risk being regarded as spies. To cover recent wars, including the civil war in Libya in 2011 and the war in Syria, reporters have had to sneak across borders, at great personal risk, to gather information. For the Pentagon to conflate espionage with journalism feeds into the propaganda of authoritarian governments. Egypt, for instance, has tried to discredit the work of Western journalists by falsely insinuating that many of them are spies.

Even more disturbing is the document’s broad assertion that journalists’ work may need to be censored lest it reveal sensitive information to the enemy. This unqualified statement seems to contravene American constitutional and case law, and offers other countries that routinely censor the press a handy reference point.

Of the 61 journalists killed last year, 59 percent died covering wars, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, which published a critical analysis on the Pentagon’s new manual.

In earlier documents on the law of armed conflict, the American military has offered more sensible guidance on the treatment of journalists. A guidebook published in 2012 by the United States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School says that journalists should be protected as civilians “provided they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.”

A spokesman for the National Security Council declined to say whether White House officials contributed to or signed off on the manual. Astonishingly, the official pointed to a line in the preface, which says it does not necessarily reflect the views of the “U.S. government as a whole.”

That inane disclaimer won’t stop commanders from pointing to the manual when they might find it convenient to silence the press. The White House should call on Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to revise this section, which so clearly runs contrary to American law and principles.

The New York Times Is Confused About the Law of War Manual
Lawfare
By Alex Loomis
August 12, 2015

The New York Times earlier called on the Pentagon to “repeal[]” “guidelines on the treatment of journalists covering armed conflicts that would make their work more dangerous, cumbersome and subject to censorship.” The editorial board here referred to three aspects of the Department of Defense’s nearly-1200 page Law of War Manual.

(A disclosure: I interned at DoD’s Office of General Counsel this past summer, and did some minor research on other parts of the Manual in the very late stages of its publication process. But I did not work on any part of the Manual pertaining to journalists, direct participation in hostilities, or any other part mentioned in this post or the Times editorial; all views expressed here are also my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense.)

The Times’ objections were as follows: First, the Times decried the the Manual’s assertion that journalists could in some circumstances be “unprivileged belligerents.” The latter, according to the Manual, “may be made the object of attack by enemy combatants” and “may be punished by enemy States for their engagement in hostilities” (page 162). The Times then blasted as “ludicrous” the Manual’s assertion that “the relaying of information (such as providing information of immediate use in combat operations) could constitute taking a direct part in hostilities” (page 175) and expressed fear that officers might target journalists under this “vaguely-worded standard.” This compared unfavorably to what the editorial characterized as “sensible guidance”—an earlier DoD document that treated journalists as civilians “provided they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.”

The Times objected secondly to what it called the Manual’s “bizarre . . . suggestion” that “[r]eporting on military operations can be very similar to collecting intelligence or even spying,” as well as its recommendation that journalists “act openly and with the permission of relevant authorities.”

“[M]ore disturbing” to the Times is the Manual’s assertion that “States may need to censor journalists’ work or take other security measures so that journalists do not reveal sensitive information to the enemy.” The Times objects that “[t]his unqualified statement seems to contravene American constitutional and case law, and offers other countries that routinely censor the press a handy reference point.”

That sounds bad. But all three objections stem from confusion about what the Manual purports to accomplish.

First, the Manual only “represents the legal views of the Department of Defense” on the laws of war (page 1) (emphasis added). It is “a description of the law as of the date of the manual’s promulgation” (page 3) (emphasis added) of war, as reflected in “treaties and customary international law applicable to the United States” (page 7). Even if every DoD lawyer wanted customary international law to protect journalists whatever the facts on the ground, the Manual would reflect what the law is, not what the lawyers wanted it to be. Thus, the Times’s call that DoD “repeal[]” the offensive provisions does not make much sense and in any case would accomplish little: The Manual merely claims to describe the current state of a certain branch of international law, but does not purport to make new law or counsel policy.

Moreover, the Manual does provide legal support for its assertion that journalists may not directly participate in hostilities without also losing civilian status. It cites the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which guarantees civilian protection for journalists “provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.” The Times editorial approves of the exact same language, which appeared in an earlier DoD guidance. What the Times really objects to, then, is the Manual’s related suggestion that “the relaying of information (such as providing information of immediate use in combat operations) could constitute taking a direct part in hostilities.” But the Manual clarifies that this does not mean “independent journalism” (page 229). Instead, “the relaying of information” refers to activities described in past DoD and German Military guidance, such as

providing or relaying information of immediate use in combat operations, such as acting as an artillery spotter or member of a ground observer corps or otherwise relaying information to be used to direct an airstrike, mortar attack, or ambush; acting as a guide or lookout for combatants conducting military operations[.]

(page 228).

At the end of the day, all the Manual asserts, as a Pentagon spokesman explained in June, is that “[t]he fact that a person is a journalist does not prevent that person from becoming an unprivileged belligerent.” The Manual makes the same point on page 229:

Although performing these activities [including “independent journalism”] does not make a person liable to being made the object of attack, performing these activities also does not immunize a person from attack if that person takes a direct part in hostilities or is otherwise lawfully made the object of attack.

Likewise, the Manual says that medical and religious personnel also lose protected status if they engage in hostile acts (page 436), citing to the Geneva Conventions.

Second, the Manual does not “conflate[] espionage with journalism.” The Times is correct that the Manual describes “[r]eporting on military operations” as “very similar to collecting intelligence or even spying” (page 175). The Manual then cites to its provisions on the definition of a “spy” (page 151).

A person may only be considered a spy when, (1) acting clandestinely or under false pretenses, (2) in the zone of operations of a belligerent, (3) he or she obtains, or endeavors to obtain, information, (4) with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.

Reporting on military operations might involve (1), though some journalists will not seek to gather their material under “false pretenses;” it typically will involve (2), and (3), too. But combat journalism does not involve (4). And importantly, the Manual agrees that the absence of (4) makes a big difference. It thus suggests that journalists “act openly and with the permission of relevant authorities” not because DoD believes they are spies but to help them “avoid being mistaken as spies” (page 175) (emphasis added). If the Pentagon really thought journalism and espionage were equivalent, the Manual would not have referred to the conflation of the two as a “mistake.” Nor does the manual sanction that mistake, or insist that journalists opt for one course of action or another. Instead it merely proposes that journalists “should act openly and with permission,” and further that “appropriate identification[] may help journalists avoid being mistaken as spies.”

Third, the Times ignores the possibility that other areas of law may protect journalists. The Manual is a descriptive account of the law of war only; it naturally does “not [] address applicable Government or DoD policies or regulations” (page 3). The Manual reiterates this point on page 2:

This manual is not a substitute for the careful practice of law. As specific legal issues arise, legal advisers should consider relevant legal and policy materials (e.g., treaty provisions, judicial decisions, past U.S. practice, regulations, and doctrine), and should apply the law to the specific factual circumstances.

On this point, bear in mind that the New York Times editorial approved of past DoD guidelines that “offered more sensible guidance on the treatment of journalists,” and further that Manual does not override past regulations or furnish any specific legal guidance. So while DoD may believe that censorship is permitted under the laws of war, it does not necessarily believe censorship is permitted under the laws of the United States. Dictators might, as the Times suggests, point to the Manual “to show that their despotic treatment of journalists – including Americans – is broadly in line with the standards set by the United States government,” but they would not have much basis for doing so.

None of this is to insist that all of the Manual’s provisions about journalism are accurate reflections of international law. The Manual implicitly acknowledges that it may contain errors: its preface notes that “[a]n effort has been made to reflect in this manual sound legal positions” (page v) (emphasis added), and page vi provides an email address to send comments and suggestions. DoD would undoubtedly benefit from hearing outside perspectives, and the New York Times is right to draw critical attention to the Manual. But the Times in this case missed an opportunity to focus its criticisms at DoD’s actual positions and the actual law.

http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/08/13/is-local-icc-justice-necessarily-better-than-icc-justice/
Justice in Conflict
By Mark Kersten
August 13, 2015

A few weeks ago, the International Criminal Court (ICC) came nail-bitingly close to finally holding proceedings in an affected community rather than in The Hague. Ultimately, the ICC’s president decided that the risks of holding part of the trial of Bosco Ntaganda in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) outweighed the benefits of serving some ICC justice locally. The debate over whether to hold hearings in Bunia raises broader questions: should the ICC be a traveling court? Should its judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers present their cases in the very same contexts and in the same communities where the alleged perpetrators committed their crimes? Beyond issues of security, what are the potential costs of doing so?

The International-Domestic Tension and Dream

In the world of international justice and human rights, it is almost universally accepted that accountability is ideally served locally. Justice is best pursued where victims and survivors reside, where evidence can be collected and presented, and where affected communities can see it being done.

In this line of thinking, global institutions that mete out criminal justice, like the ICC, are not ideal purveyors of accountability. Instead, they are seen as necessary bodies that ‘fill in’ the accountability gaps that result from states being unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute mass atrocities and human rights violations themselves. Put another way, given the option of having no justice or abstracting accountability from affected societies to The Hague, the latter option is always preferable. And here’s the kicker: many believe that if the international community buys into the project of international criminal justice, over time there will eventually be no need for such international institutions. As the commitment to prosecute international crimes spreads, the ICC will work itself out of business and states will be able to justice themselves. As former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo regularly suggested during his tenure, the ultimate success of the Court would be realised when it had no cases in its dock because states meted out justice themselves.

The hope that the ICC’s mere existence and mandate will lead to a world where states prosecute all mass atrocities and human rights violations themselves is, at worst, a promise of unicorns and rainbows. At best, given the existence of regimes like those in Syria and Sudan, and the impunity gap in states with robust judiciaries like the United States and the United Kingdom, it is certainly a very long-term aspiration. This is not to say that this isn’t a good or useful aim to have. But it shouldn’t detract from the myriad of obstacles international criminal justice face today. It also shouldn’t obfuscate from the potential of bringing ICC justice closer to ‘home’.

A Traveling Court

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in seeing the ICC hold hearings in the communities in which the relevant atrocities were perpetrated. This is wholly in line with the Rome Statute of the ICC, which grants the court’s judges the purview to hold hearings, whenever deemed feasible and desirable, in affected communities. Along with the conviction that justice is best served as close to the source of injustice, many also believe that if affected communities truly got to see the Court in action, their oft-stated criticisms would be tempered and those governments that have made a habit of attacking the institution would have a harder time doing so.

In fact, the idea of holding ICC proceedings locally is nothing new. Court officials have previously considered holding hearings in the trials of Thomas Dyilo Lubanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), of senior government officials allegedly responsible for the 2007/08 post-election violence in Kenya, and (in a much less public way) for Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi in Libya. Apart from the recent decision not to hold the Ntaganda trial in Bunia, there are ongoing and advanced discussions about holding the confirmation hearings of child soldier turned Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander Dominic Ongwen in Gulu in northern Uganda.

Indicative of just how widespread the conviction is that local ICC justice is necessarily better ICC justice, it is hard, if not impossible, to find any public statement or article arguing that Ongwen should not be tried in Gulu. One piece insisted that such an in situ trial would be “great news”. In a rare moment of agreement, both the prosecution and defence are on board, suggesting the public face of the ICC, as well as Ongwen himself, prefer proceedings to be held in northern Uganda.
They may be right. But there also needs to be some critical reflection of the general assumption that, if only feasible, then ICC proceedings should occur locally. Feasibility, which would include issues such as security, cost, and the existence of the required infrastructure, is just one part of the necessary calculus. Holding ICC trials locally also needs to be appropriate and, crucially, not hinder the pursuit of impartial justice.

In particular, there is some risk that holding trials locally may deepen the Court’s dependence for cooperation from states, many of which are directly and indirectly responsible for mass atrocities. It is this dependence on states that has resulted in the fact that not a single state actor has ever been targeted by the ICC following a state self-referral. Put more bluntly, so long as the Court is dependent on states for providing security and for protecting witnesses and victims, government actors are likely to enjoy impunity. To target them with prosecution would not only eviscerate such cooperation; the responsibility for any ensuing violence or injustice would be pinned on the ICC.

This potential drawback of local ICC justice can be mitigated by holding select, symbolic and limited proceedings in situ. In the Ongwen case, the Court is only considering having the confirmation hearings held in Gulu. However, if these proceedings are successfully held in northern Uganda, they could create an expectation that more proceedings be done in situ – an expectation that the ICC may not be able to afford to meet.

Yes, Local is Ideal. But…

None of the above should be read as an argument against serving ICC justice locally. But we need to think through the implications of doing so – beyond whether it is feasible for security reasons and beyond the mantra that local ICC justice is always and necessarily better ICC justice. More importantly, this is a call to weigh the demands and expectations of victims and survivors. There is no doubt that many would like to see justice served closer to home. Many others, however, would like to see state crimes prosecuted. Their voices need to be heard as well.

The Dark Side of Peace Enforcement: Sexual Exploitation in CAR
Just Security
By Fionnuala Ní Aoláin
August 14, 2015

Media reports continue to trickle through detailing rape and indiscriminate killing by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR). Despite condemnation by UN Headquarters and some moves toward accountability by those states providing troops, the reports of sexual violence and exploitation continue unabated. Some background to the most recent allegations is set out below. I also explore some of the underpinning legal and political gaps that enable a culture of impunity to thrive in a number of peacekeeping operations.

Sexual Violence

In April 2014, Anders Kompass leaked the United Nations report to French authorities, which detailed the “rape and sodomy of starving and homeless young boys by French peacekeeping troops” at a camp for internally displaced people in Bangui.

The report details abuse by French and nationals of other contributing countries from December 2013 to June 2014. (Access to leaked report as published by Aids Free Project here.)

More reports of sexual violence continued through the summer, with the reported rape of a girl under the age of 16 by Moroccan peacekeeping forces.

Most recently, a 12 year-old girl was raped and two civilians were indiscriminately killed.

UN Responses

“I cannot put into words how anguished and ashamed I am by recurrent reports over the years of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN forces,” said Ban Ki Moon.

On August 13, 2015, the Secretary General also requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council. UN Spokesman Stéphane Dujarric added, “He (the Secretary General) stressed that zero tolerance means zero complacency and zero impunity and that when allegations are substantiated, all personnel whether military, police, or civilians must be held accountable.”

In a May interview with Newsweek, Tony Banbury, the UN’s assistant secretary-general for field support, stated: “We have challenges in achieving criminal accountability justice, but immunity is not one of them.” He did not focus on criticizing or analyzing the placement of prosecutorial responsibility with contributing states, but rather “discussed the “challenges with criminal responsibility and criminal prosecution.” Banbury continued, saying: “The objective is zero cases, but this is an imperfect world. There probably are going to continue to be some cases.”

Graça Machel stated, “the evidence is that things have not changed or improved. Currently, they have gotten even worse.”

Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire claims that the “chaos” of the conflict and atmosphere “merely makes it available for those who might be so inclined, who might actually tip over and might actually do it.”

France

The Huffington Post reports that “[m]ilitary authorities and the Paris prosecutor’s office opened a preliminary investigation and investigators went to Central African Republic in August.”

The French Ministry claims to be in pursuit of criminal prosecution, which will result in “the strictest sanctions against those responsible for what would be an intolerable attack on the values of a soldier.”

François Hollande has stated: “If some soldiers behaved badly, I will be merciless. If this information is confirmed, there will be exemplary punishment.”

Central African Republic Officials

Central African Republic Justice Minister, Aristide Sokambi spoke out to say that the Central African Republic will also be pursuing prosecution of the French soldiers responsible. He added: “I deplore the fact that we haven’t been joined about this investigation when we have cooperation agreements with France. So I’ve instructed the public prosecutor to open an inquiry and then try to collect evidence already available to the French.”

Despite these protestations of horror at the infliction of sexual harm on minors and women in the CAR, the challenge of addressing sexual violence caused by peacekeepers and international personnel is not a new one. During missions in various African states in the mid-1990s to the present, Belgian, Canadian, Italian, and Pakistani peacekeepers were implicated in crimes ranging from torture to rape to murder. Reports of survival prostitution and human trafficking remain a mainstay of the peacekeeping economy.

What would change this? It is fair to say that peacekeeping has a positive impact in many countries experiencing or emerging from conflict and its absence would create multiple other insecurities for populations in conflict-affected states. Taking away the peacekeepers is not the solution. However, when readily identifiable troop contributing states have been consistently implicated in sexual violence, and have consistently shown an unwillingness to train, discipline, and make their soldiers criminally accountable, then the privilege of UN service should be withheld. The bottom line on preventing sexual violence by peacekeepers in the CAR and elsewhere is accountability.

That accountability starts at the very top. Where a force has been implicated in sexual violence then, the United Nations Secretary General has an obligation to seek the resignation of the force commander. This realisation emerges in the decision taken by the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon asking General Babacar Gaye, the head of UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic to resign. In a universe of military command responsibility, the head of a peacekeeping mission is ultimately responsible for the systematic exploitation and violence against populations that troops have a responsibility to protect.

The second step is to meaningfully implement investigation and prosecution procedures. In most cases of sexual violence, a UN investigation takes up to or beyond 18 months. By the time the investigation is over, the evidence has disappeared, victims are more vulnerable and the soldiers have been whisked off home. Investigations have to be resourced intensively and become effective mechanisms to show those harmed that their injuries are taken seriously.

The third step is punishment. In most cases of peacekeeper violence, there are few consequences for the perpetrators. Consistent standards must be enforced by the terms of Status of Force Agreements with troop contributing states. These standards must set out consistent processes and penalties for sexual violence without exception. When soldiers know that the penalties and costs are near zero for violence committed in places far from home, a culture of impunity reigns.

The United Nations continues to issues platitudes to the victims, and occasionally senior heads will roll. In reality though, unless there is consistent articulation and enforcement of penalties within the military chain of command, including for commanding officers, the litany of sexual violence will not go away.

What Happens if American-Trained Rebels Commit War Crimes?
Just Security
By Nathalie Weizmann
August 18, 2015

It is widely known that the US is facing numerous challenges in arming and training a select number of fighters as part of a group known as the “New Syrian Forces,” which are part of the Free Syrian Army’s Division 30, in order to fight ISIS on the ground in Syria. A paltry fifty-four such fighters have completed the “train and equip” program so far, with the Pentagon now vetting and training additional fighters. In mid-July, the freshly trained unit was deployed into Syria, but the Nusra Front abducted a number of fighters on July 28, and stormed their encampment on July 31, capturing, wounding or killing several more. Other fighters left the area, and a number went unaccounted for. Last Sunday, the Nusra Front released seven Division 30 fighters, but a Pentagon official anonymously claimed US-trained fighters were not among them.

A number of questions of international law emerge from the US “train and equip” program, some of which were explored in Michael Schmitt’s post earlier this month. An additional question that merits some consideration is the relationship between the US and “New Syrian Forces” fighters, and whether the US bears any responsibility for these fighters’ actions should they commit violations of international humanitarian law.

Reports indicate that special operations forces working under US Central Command are leading the “train and equip” program. At the outset, the program aimed to provide “basic military gear, including ammunition, small arms, trucks and machine guns to mount on them.” We know today the US has provided fighters with heavy machine guns, communications technology, and laser pointers for directing airstrikes. The fighters also receive a stipend from the US.

When the program was launched, the Pentagon declared it would “not have direct tactical control over the trained units once they deploy in Syria,” but instead would be “establishing links” with fighters so the US could “exert indirect influence on Syria’s chaotic battlefield.” Today, the fighters are said to have direct contact with the US-led coalition, but report to Syrian commanders. US Central Command spokesman Col. Pat Ryder has said the fighters are not under US command and control. Once trained, they return to Syrian rebel groups with whom the US has been working. Ryder has added, “[a] key aspect of the Syria Train and Equip program is to train these personnel as units to effectively fight together, which includes training and developing their leaders and ensuring they have a chain of command that can lead forces effectively and appropriately”.

Now, how do these facts fit into the legal framework on State responsibility? Under international law, a State commits an internationally wrongful act when an act or omission is attributable to it and constitutes a breach of its international obligation. A State will bear international responsibility for such a wrongful act, with one of the legal consequences being the obligation to make full reparation for the material or moral injury caused by that act.

As for when a State is responsible for the conduct of a person or group that is not a State organ or empowered to exercise governmental authority, the International Law Commission has set out the following rule:

The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.

In the 1986 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua decision, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was faced with deciding whether to attribute the contra forces’ actions to the US, which had largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized their military and paramilitary activities. The US had also collaborated closely with the contras to decide and plan operations on the basis of intelligence and logistical support that it had provided to them. The Court held:

that United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by members of the contras without the control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.

In 2007, the ICJ reiterated the attribution test of “effective control” in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case. In deciding whether the Srebrenica massacres were attributable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Court held:

Genocide will be considered as attributable to a State if and to the extent that the physical acts constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or persons other than the State’s own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or under its effective control. This is the state of customary international law, as reflected in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility

Despite the standard of State direction, enforcement, instruction or effective control set out by the ICJ, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) articulated a different test in the Tadic case. (With the International Criminal Court later adopting the ICTY approach in the Lubanga case.) In Tadic, the ICTY was deciding whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s support for the Bosnian Serb armed forces rendered the armed conflict against the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina international. The Appeals Chamber distinguished the required degree of control over private individuals from the required degree of control over an organized armed group such as the Bosnian Serb armed forces. Because a member of an organized group that has structure, a chain of command, and a set of rules will conform to the group’s standards and be subject to its authority, it is sufficient for the group to be under the “overall control” of the State rather than the “effective control” described in Nicaragua. The ICTY explained:

international rules do not always require the same degree of control over armed groups or private individuals for the purpose of determining whether an individual not having the status of a State official under internal legislation can be regarded as a de facto organ of the State. The extent of the requisite State control varies. Where the question at issue is whether a single private individual or a group that is not militarily organised has acted as a de facto State organ when performing a specific act, it is necessary to ascertain whether specific instructions concerning the commission of that particular act had been issued by that State to the individual or group in question …. By contrast, control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and must comprise more than the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training). This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation. Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group.

Of course, the ICJ, and legal experts such as Dapo Akande, have disagreed with the Tadic test for various reasons. For instance, the ICJ has argued that the ICTY standard was used to determine whether or not an armed conflict was international, but that “logic does not require the same test to be adopted in resolving the two issues, which are very different in nature: the degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict on another State’s territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of involvement required to give rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific act committed in the course of the conflict.” Akande argues that the ICJ test for attribution of responsibility is correct, while the test of whether or not there is an international armed conflict is simply whether or not force has been used by one State against another, for example by training and arming non-state armed groups.

It may be tempting to consider another avenue of State responsibility for the actions of non-state actors. In 2013, the government of Austria shared its position against supplying arms to the Syrian opposition, stating, “Should supplied arms be used by armed opposition groups in Syria in the commission of internationally wrongful acts, the States who had supplied these arms and had knowledge of these acts would incur State responsibility for their aid and assistance in the commission of such acts.” The position referred to the Article on State responsibility for aiding or assisting in the commission of an internationally wrongful act: “A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”

However, as the rule clearly states, it applies to a State aiding or assisting another State. Referring to this as a test for “complicity,” Derek Jinks has explained why it only applies to assisting or aiding another State:

The structure of the rules suggests that the lower [complicity] threshold suffices for imputing the conduct of another state because the public character of any such acts is clear-that is, other states clearly have international legal personality. Attribution of the private acts, on this view, is appropriate only if the nexus between the state and the ostensibly private actor confers a public character on the conduct in question-recasts the private acts as “state action.”

Finally, by providing Syrian fighters with the means and skills to engage in war, the US also bears the obligation to ensure that they comply with IHL, even if the fighters’ actions aren’t attributable to it. Under Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I (and also considered to be part of customary law), States must ensure respect for IHL by other participants in an armed conflict. States “may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law.” A useful and recent piece by Knut Doermann and Jose Serralvo explores the content of this obligation of due diligence, which has been reaffirmed by the ICJ as well as the UN Secretary-General, General Assembly and Security Council. The authors explain, “a State with close political, economic and/or military ties (for example, through equipping and training of armed forces or joint planning of operations) to one of the belligerents has a stronger obligation to ensure respect for IHL by its ally. This is precisely the underlying logic of CA 1 …” As what can be considered an offshoot of this, the Arms Trade Treaty, which the US has signed but not ratified, reiterates all States’ obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and translates this into an explicit prohibition of weapons transfers if the transferring State has knowledge that the weapons will be used to commit certain war crimes. Short of such knowledge, a risk assessment must be carried out and the weapons withheld if an overriding risk of serious violations is found.

If we apply the Nicaragua test to what we know about US efforts to train and equip Syrian fighters, the US does not appear to be directing or enforcing the fighters’ actions or to have effective control over their operations. Even under the Tadic test applicable to a State’s influence over organized armed groups, it does not appear that the US is “organi[z]ing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group” (and this is assuming the fighters qualify as an organized group for the purpose of this test). Nevertheless, the US does have an obligation to use its influence wisely and cautiously, and to ensure that the fighters comply with international humanitarian law.

ICTJ | World Report August 2015 – Transitional Justice News and Analysis

In Focus

Youth Working for Justice: Key Agents of ChangeYouth Working for Justice: Key Agents of ChangeOn International Youth Day, ICTJ reaffirms the importance of engaging youth in efforts to reckon with the past in societies grappling with repressive and violent histories.Read More…

World Report

AFRICADespite the post-war boom in Côte d’Ivoire, justice remains elusive, but the country’s presidential election on October 25 is seen as a first important step toward overcoming the past. In Senegal, the unprecedented trial of former Chadian dictator, Hissène Habré – who is accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture – began on July 20, but was adjourned the next day until September 7 so court-appointed lawyers could prepare his defense. Peace talks have resumed in South Sudan, as the warring sides have come under immense international pressure to reach a deal by August 17 or suffer sanctions. Delegates from Namibia traveled to Germany this summer hoping to present President Joachim Gauck with a petition signed by 2,000 German public figures, which calls on the government to accept responsibility for the genocide committed in the African nation at the turn of the nineteenth century. Despite the short delay, those who have been seeking justice for 25 years still feelconfident that justice is at hand. At a conference on Zimbabwe, there was a push for reparations program and talkof adopting new transitional justice principles. This all comes at a time the government is about to operationalize the Peace and National Healing Commission.

Read More…

AMERICASAt the ongoing peace talks in Cuba between the Colombian government and FARC rebels, top negotiators contend that the rebel group must first agree to submit to transitional justice and its disarmament before the government can agree to a bilateral ceasefire. Meanwhile back in the country, Colombian authorities have begun exhuming a mass grave at the La Escombrera landfill, which will hopefully provide families with closure and an end to impunity. In Peru, government soldiers rescuedaround 40 men, women and children who had been kept prisoner in “production camps” for three decades by the Shining Path, the country’s Communist rebel group. In Chile, thirteen soldiers connected on the 1988 attack on democracy activists, Rodrigo Rojas and Carmen Gloria Quintana, were arrested. One of the conscripts, who identified those involved, revealed that there was indeed a “pact of silence” in the army to keep truth from the public. There are two exhibits on display in Canadathis summer related to the history of residential schools and missionaries to Indigenous communities, one is a large “witness blanket” and the other is a collection of artifacts. In addition, a petition with 1,200+ signatures as of late July calls on the government to make the Truth and Reconciliation Commission an election issue.

Read More…

ASIAIn Nepal, victims and civil society organizations are not happy with the recent draft regulations framed by the two truth-seeking bodies, the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), because they don’t adhere to the verdicts of Supreme Court.. The TRC, meanwhile, is preparing to set up a women-only private hearing facilities, in order to encourage rape and sexual assault victims to speak out. The Myanmargovernment pardoned 6,966 prisoners in July, among those released where 210 foreigners and some military intelligence officers.In Indonesia, victims of an armed conflict in the Indonesian province, Aceh, have demanded the country’s authorities set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, promised to them in a peace agreement signed in Helsinki ten years ago. Meanwhile in Bangladesh, two Razakars a part of the armed militia group during the 1971 Liberation War were found guilty of genocide and war crimes. The beginning of August marked the 70th anniversary of the days nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the survivors continue to tell their stories to the new generation. In other news, Sri Lanka pledged to act on a UN war crimes report that will be released within the following weeks, detailing Sri Lanka treatment of Tamils during the country’s guerrilla war.

Read More…

EUROPESerbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vucic, will officially propose a Remembrance Day, commemorating all the victims of the 1990s war, to leaders of leaders of former Yugoslav countries at the end of August. This proposal has already been rejected by Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic and Kosovo Foreign Minister Hashim Thac. In Croatia, thousands celebrated the 20th anniversary of ‘Operation Storm,’ an operation in which Zagreb’s forces defeated rebel Serbs and regained control over 18 per cent of the country’s territory. Days before the anniversary, three NGOs launched an interactive site called the ‘Storm of the Hauge,’ which presents the findings of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY. In Kosovo, the country’s parliament voted to change the constitution and create a special war crimes court. However, opposition parties have argued that the establishment of the special war crimes court violate Kosovo’s sovereignty. Spain’s University of Barcelona has set up the projectThe DNA of memory: the UB DNA Bank of Spanish Civil War victims with the hopes of being able to identity victims of the Spanish Civil War.

Read More…

MENAIn Tunisia, the draft national reconciliation bill on economic and financial offences submitted to parliament in mid-July continues to be the subject of intense debate, drawing criticism from human rights organizations and supporters of transitional justice. In Lybia, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of Col Muammar Gaddafi, and eight others were sentenced to death over war crimes connected to the 2011 revolution. But these verdicts illustrate revenge rather than justice and the expediency of the justice system rather than its effectiveness. In Syria, the UN special envoy invited Syrians to participate in discussions on how to restart peace talks.

Read More…

Publications

Squaring Colombia’s Circle: The Objectives of Punishment and the Pursuit of PeaceThis paper weighs the possible modes and competing policy objectives of punishing FARC members for serious crimes in the context of Colombia’s ongoing peace negotiations. It argues that punishment has to occur in a way that does not damage one of the underlying objectives of the peace process, transforming the FARC from an insurgent group into a political actor.

The Accountability Landscape in Eastern DRCThis report analyzes the response of Congolese judicial authorities to international crimes committed in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2009 to 2014, with a particular focus on the war-torn East (North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri).

More Publications

Robert H. Jackson Center: Announcing the 9th Annual Law Dialogs

International Humanitarian Law Dialogs
The Wrongs We Seek
August 31st- September 1st
The Law Dialogs are a historic gathering of the current and former prosecutors at international war crimes tribunals and renowned academics and law experts. This unique two-day event allows participants and the public to engage in a meaningful dialogue about issues related to modern international criminal law.

Since the first Law Dialog on August 29, 2007, the conference continues to reach a wider audience allowing for meaningful discussions concerning contemporary international criminal law.  This year’s theme will commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre (1995) and the 70th anniversary of the opening commencement of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremburg (1945).

Annually highlights the Law Dialogs include a keynote speaker, lecturers, roundtable discussions, updates from the current prosecutors, student sessions and break- out “porch sessions” on selected topics. The Law Dialogs continue to echo the sentiments of Justice Robert H. Jackson by recognizing international law as “one of the most significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason.”
For more information on this annual conference and this year’s speakers please visit ourwebsite event page.
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 Thank you to our sponsors:
The American Bar Association; The American Red Cross; American Society of International Law; Case Western Reserve University School of Law; The Chautauqua Institution; Impunity Watch; International Peace and Security Institute; International Bar Association; intlawgrrls; NYU Center for Global Affairs; The Planethood Foundation; Public International Law and Policy Group ; The Robert H. Jackson Center; SUNY Buffalo Law School; Syracuse University College of Law; Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute at Washington University School of Law; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
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2015 Summer Interns
This summer, the Robert H. Jackson Center welcomed six interns; Thomas Campion from Hobart College, Ryan Schutte from Dickinson College, Megan Feeney, Ashley Mulryan and Emily Rajakovich from Allegheny College and 2015 Jackson Fellow, Molly White from Syracuse University College of Law. Meet some our 2015 summer interns and Jackson Fellow as we introduce you to each student and share with you their personal reflection on Justice Jackson’s legacy.

Molly White Portage MI, a rising third year law student at Syracuse University College of Law, was the Jackson Law Fellow this summer.  She worked on organizing and writing descriptions for the International Humanitarian Law Dialogs. As well, she worked on a paper cataloging the relationship between the United States and the International Criminal Court.  Additionally she expanded upon a paper concerning Forum Non Conveniens and whether a U.S. person can sue a company incorporated in the U.S. for a tort committed abroad while aiding or abetting a party in a foreign civil war.  The paper used the Syrian conflict as a case study.

Molly’s reflection: Having read Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer in the majority of my classes during my first two years at Syracuse, I cannot help but have an affinity for that opinion.  Jackson’s division of the President’s powers into three categories, specifically the zone of twilight where the President acts in absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority, established a framework for analyzing foreign relations, national security powers, and personal liberties issues.
305 E. Fourth Street, Jamestown NY 14701 | info@roberthjackson.org
 (716) 483-6646| www.roberthjackson.org
The mission of the Robert H. Jackson Center is to advance public awareness and appreciation of the principles of justice and the rule of law as embodied in the achievements and legacy of Robert H. Jackson, US Supreme Court Justice and Chief US Prosecutor at Nuremberg.

War Crimes Prosecution Watch Volume 10- Issue 11 August 10, 2015

War Crimes Prosecution Watch is a bi-weekly e-newsletter that compiles official documents and articles from major news sources detailing and analyzing salient issues pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes throughout the world. To subscribe, please email warcrimeswatch@pilpg.org and type “subscribe” in the subject line.

Opinions expressed in the articles herein represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily those of the War Crimes Prosecution Watch staff, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law or Public International Law & Policy Group.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

TFV Board of Directors Meets to Discuss Lubanga Reparations Plan
ICC-CPI
July 27, 2015

On July 21-22 2015, the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) at the ICC convened in an extraordinary meeting in The Hague to review and discuss progress made in the development of a draft implementation plan for reparations, in the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga, to the benefit of former child soldiers in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Acknowledging the preliminary results of the TFV Secretariat’s consultations with local communities and potentially eligible victims, as well as of an international expert meeting, the TFV Board endorsed the approach undertaken and reiterated the strong interest that it has in ensuring that the draft reparations implementation plan is responsive to the rights and expectations of eligible victims of Mr Lubanga’s crimes – and as such, provides a solid foundation for collective reparations awards to be a meaningful redress of the harm that victims have suffered.

In December 2014, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber confirmed Mr Lubanga’s conviction and sentencing for the crimes of conscription and use of child soldiers under the age of 15, in eastern DRC during 2002-2003. In March, the Appeals Chamber issued a judgement and amended order for reparations against Mr Lubanga, which included the instruction to the TFV to submit a draft implementation plan for reparations to eligible direct and indirect victims by September 2015.

This is the first time that the TFV has been tasked by the ICC to develop a reparations plan, triggering its unprecedented mandate enshrined in the Rome Statute to implement reparations to victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.

The TFV is taking up this challenging and unprecedented task in close cooperation with the ICC Registry, most notably its sections for victims participation and reparations (VPRS) and for public information (PIDS). From May through to the end of June, the TFV conducted consecutive field missions to the Ituri district in eastern DRC to engage with local communities and to have meetings with groups of potentially eligible victims, both male and female. During the same period, the VPRS conducted a preliminary victim mapping exercise.

A multi-disciplinary expert consultation meeting on reparations was held in Belfast at the Ulster University’s Transitional Justice Institute (26-29 May) and convened over 25 practitioners and experts from a variety of backgrounds and geographies, as well as selected staff from the TFV Secretariat and ICC Registry and representatives of the legal counsel for victims in the Lubanga case. The expert meeting considered, amongst others, methods for victim identification for the purpose of collective reparations, applicable standards of proof and causality, as well as methods to assess harm for the purpose of collective reparations.

Recognising the great progress made and challenges overcome since March, the Board also took note of various steps, both from a legal and practical perspective, that need to be taken before finalising the draft implementation plan. The Board reiterated the significance of preparing the plan in such a manner as to also guide the procedures and content of plans in future reparations cases, while reflecting sufficiently the special character of the case at hand.

Noting the report of the Court’s Office of the Internal Auditor (OIA) on the TFV’s internal control framework of the assistance mandate programmes, the Board was heartened by its overall audit opinion that “the TFV has managed well its assistance programs in successfully reaching victims and the affected communities in northern Uganda and DRC through assistance programs” and that, while areas of improvement can be identified, it is “worth noting that the TFV has made some significant achievements since its inception in 2008.” The OIA and TFV intend to make available a redacted version of the audit report to the States Parties in the Fall of 2015.

At this meeting the TFV Board was not able, as intended, to deliberate and decide on the functioning and desired structure of the TFV Secretariat, since the delivery of the draft revision report came too late to be considered. The TFV Board and the Registrar did agree to develop soonest a written arrangement to clarify the administrative relationship between the Registry and the TFV, including the scope of administrative delegation of authority to the TFV Secretariat.

Recalling the need to strengthen the TFV’s ability to complement payments for reparations in current and future cases before the ICC, as well as the need to sustain and expand the TFV’s activities under its assistance mandate, the TFV Board expresses its appreciation to its donors for the significant voluntary contributions and donations they have made to the TFV. The Board is calling upon all interested States and private donors to assist in further growing the financial capacity of the TFV to assist victims of the most serious crimes to overcome the harm they have suffered and rebuild their lives.

Kenya

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Republic of Kenya

PEV Victims Want Fresh Probe on Uhuru Kenyatta
All Africa
By Felix Olick
August 5, 2015

The victims’ lawyer in Uhuru Kenyatta’s former case wants ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda forced to probe the President, former head of Public Service Francis Muthaura and former Police Commissioner Hussein Ali.

All three former suspects had their cases withdrawn by the ICC.

In a surprise application to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Fergal Gaynor, an Irish lawyer, termed investigations against Kenyatta, Ali and Muthaura “manifestly ineffective”.

Gaynor turned the heat on Bensouda, dismissing her decision to withdraw charges against the three and cease further investigations as unlawful.

According Gaynor, Bensouda should expand her scope and charge those she adversely mentioned in connection with the killing spree in Naivasha and Nakuru after the disputed 2007 presidential polls.

“The Chamber must do what it can to preserve and defend the Court’s credibility and its deterrent effect, and to ensure that this effect is not weakened through prosecutorial surrender and inaction following a campaign of obstruction of justice,” Gaynor said.

In January this year, Bensouda named sacked Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Kimemia and the late Security Minister John Michuki as among individuals who were central in the planning of attacks in the Rift Valley.

She also named former MPs George Thuo, Mwangi Kiunjuri, Jane Kihara and John Mututho as among the planners. Speaking barely nine days after US President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Kenya, Gaynor said that there is a very strong perception that Kenyatta’s case was dropped through the influence of the Western powers.

In the Monday filing, the lawyer argues that unlike in the case against Deputy President William Ruto, no one has been charged for corruptly influencing witnesses.

“The Prosecution has not publicly instituted any prosecutions relating to bribery or intimidation of witnesses in this case. This problem clearly undermined the Court’s search for the truth in respect of the allegations against Mr Kenyatta and Mr Muthaura,” he stated.

He also said that Bensouda has failed to seek summonses against hostile witnesses or to use their prior recorded testimony. According to Gaynor, even the prosecution bid to refer Kenya to the Assembly of States Parties for non-cooperation came too late.

Journalist Walter Barasa is wanted by the ICC for bribing and attempting to corruptly influence witnesses in the Ruto case. In the same case, ICC judges issued a subpoena against nine witnesses who declined to testify.

Currently, Bensouda has also applied to the judges to allow use of prior recorded testimony of hostile witnesses against Ruto and his co-accused Joshua Sang.

Bensouda named Solicitor General Njee Muturi and Kabete MP Ferdinand Waitutu as among the powerful individuals who influenced her key witnesses to conceal Kenyatta’s involvement in the bloodshed.

Citing several jurisdictions across the globe, including Kenya, Fergal said that victims must have “safeguards against unfettered prosecutorial discretion”.

William Ruto Accused Fatou Bensouda of Misleading Court on Witness Withdrawal
All Africa
By Valentine Obara
August 5, 2015

Deputy President William Ruto wants International Criminal Court judges to take action against Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, saying she is misleading the court.

Mr Ruto’s lawyer, Karim Khan, claimed that Ms Bensouda misled the court about the circumstances that led to the withdrawal of a witness.

According to Mr Khan, the witness, whose identity has been concealed, was to divulge details on what transpired before, during and after the 2007 general elections.

The witness was to testify on rallies and private meetings that were allegedly attended by Mr Ruto.

Through a submission made to the court by Mr Khan, it is also believed the witness had “details of efforts by prosecution witnesses and third parties to fabricate evidence in order to falsely implicate Ruto in the charges”.

The lawyer says there is evidence to counter the claim by the prosecutor that the witness was withdrawn because he was unwilling to testify.

“Whether the witness was going to provide an account which is favourable to the prosecution is an entirely separate issue and does not justify the prosecution’s silence on such matters,” the lawyer stat

Libya

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Libya: Flawed trial of al-Gaddafi officials leads to appalling death sentences
Amnesty International
July 28, 2015

Today’s convictions of more than 30 al-Gaddafi-era officials, including the imposition of nine death sentences, follow a trial marred with serious flaws that highlight Libya’s inability to administer justice effectively in line with international fair trial standards, Amnesty International said.

Among the nine people sentenced to death for war crimes and other offences during the 2011 armed conflict are Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, and the former Head of Military Intelligence, Abdallah al-Senussi. Twenty-three other former officials were given sentences ranging from life imprisonment to five years in prison, four people were acquitted, and one was referred for medical treatment and not sentenced.

“Instead of helping to establish the truth and ensuring accountability for serious violations during the 2011 armed conflict, this trial exposes the weakness of a criminal justice system which is hanging on by a thread in a war-torn country with no central authority,” said Philip Luther, Middle East and North Africa Programme Director at Amnesty International.

“It’s a case that was always going to test the judiciary, but in the end it has shown the difficulties of delivering justice at a time when the rule of the gun overpowers the rule of law.

“The death sentences – the ultimate human rights violation – add further insult to injury, and should be overturned on appeal.”

It is expected the convictions will be appealed to the cassation chamber of Libya’s Supreme Court. The rights to a fair trial of those found guilty today require a full, independent and impartial review of the procedures and evidence used against them and the Supreme Court must address the serious allegations of fair trial and human rights violations in this case when it hears the appeal. To do this it must exercise its power to review both the evidence seen at the trial and the trial court’s interpretation of the law.

Amnesty International has long called for Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi to be surrendered to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has an active arrest warrant in his name.

“The Libyan authorities refused to hand Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi to the ICC to prove they could administer justice nationally. So far they have failed as he has been subjected to a string of violations. He was effectively tried and sentenced in absentia and continues to be held in isolation in a secret location without access to a lawyer,” said Philip Luther.

“The only route to real justice for the victims of serious crimes perpetrated during the 2011 conflict is to surrender Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi to the ICC and ensure fair trials for all detained al-Gaddafi loyalists.”

Background

The trial of the “symbols of the former regime”, as it is known in Libya, ran from 24 March 2014 to 21 May 2015. Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, Abdallah al-Senussi and 35 other officials, including former diplomats, ministers and members of security agencies, were charged with a string of offences during the 2011 uprising and ensuing conflict. These include: indiscriminate shelling, incitement to rape, giving orders to open fire at demonstrators, recruiting and arming mercenaries and engaging in acts of vandalism, looting and killing.

Amnesty International believes that many of the 37 defendants have been denied the right to legal counsel, to remain silent, to be promptly informed of the charges against them, to challenge the evidence brought against them, and to be present at trial. In some cases, detainees were held incommunicado and in unofficial detention places for extended periods.

Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, who was held in militia custody in Zintan, and seven other defendants held in Misratah were tried via video link. At times, the poor quality of the satellite link undermined their ability to follow proceedings. Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi stopped appearing via video link after the start of the conflict in western Libya last year, which ended in the ousting of Zintan brigades from Tripoli, meaning he was effectively tried in absentia.

The organization understands that many defendants were interrogated without having a lawyer present, despite repeated requests and guarantees provided in Libyan law. Allegations of torture and other ill-treatment raised by the defence do not appear to have been duly investigated. Some were assigned lawyers only after the trial had begun, undermining their right to an effective defence.

Many defence lawyers were not able to visit their clients in private in al-Hadba prison, a high security detention facility where the trial was also held. Some dropped the case amid claims that they were threatened, intimidated and harassed.

The prosecution’s case was largely based on evidence obtained from some 240 witness statements though none was called to the court or subjected to cross-examination. By contrast, defence lawyers were only allowed to call two witnesses per defendant and expressed difficulties in calling witnesses due to the security situation.

The trial was held against the backdrop of renewed conflicts, which led to the collapse of central authority and a split of state institutions in mid-2014. Since then, all sides have perpetrated serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, some of which amount to war crimes. The violence has substantially reduced the international community’s ability to monitor the proceedings, and has further weakened the criminal justice system. The Ministry of Justice of the internationally recognized government based in the east said that it would not recognize the court’s verdict.

LFJL is concerned that the absence of fair trial standards during Gaddafi official trials will jeopardise the right of victims to justice.
Lawyers for Justice in Libya
July 29, 2015

Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL) is concerned that the absence of fair trial standards during Gaddafi official trials will jeopardise the right of victims to justice.

On 28 July 2015, the Tripoli Court of Assize (the Court) sentenced 37 Gaddafi administration officials for offences related to suppressing the 2011 Libyan uprising and for crimes committed during the conflict. Among the officials were Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Senussi, the administration’s former intelligence chief. LFJL is concerned that the defendants’ were denied their fair trial rights and that proceedings were not transparent or accessible to independent observers. This in turn has undermined the opportunity of victims to participate in process and achieve justice for serious human rights violations.

Following their detention and throughout the legal proceedings, many of the defendants have stated regularly that they have been denied their fundamental rights. Complaints have included the denial of the right to be promptly informed of the charges brought against them, to access legal counsel, to challenge the evidence brought against them, and to be present at their trial. There have also been serious allegations that the defendants were subjected to ill treatment during their detention. As a result, several human rights agencies, including the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have expressed doubts that international fair trial standards were upheld.

LFJL is also concerned that the legal proceedings failed to determine individual criminal responsibility for the atrocious crimes or to substantively evidence the chain of command which enabled such acts to be committed. Instead, many of the defendants were held responsible by association for crimes attributed to the Gaddafi administration, without evidencing their individual involvement with specific acts. The admissibility of new evidence to the proceedings was also extremely restricted. This prevented the establishment of a detailed account of the truth behind the serious human rights violations considered during the proceedings.

“Through failing to ensure the defendants’ right to a fair trial, the verdicts released on the 28 July risk undermining the possibility of justice being delivered,” stated Thomas Ebbs, Acting Director for LFJL. “In doing so, the proceedings may have denied victims and their family members the opportunity to hear the truth and for those responsible to be found conclusively accountable.” he added.

The deterioration of the security situation in Libya and the politically sensitive nature of the cases also raise uncertainty as to the Court’s ability to reach impartial and independent decisions. The Libyan judicial system, as a whole, has been effectively suspended for all but exceptional criminal cases since February 2014, due to an increase in the use of violence against judicial bodies intended to obstruct and influence judicial proceedings. To account for these concerns, it was vital that the trial sessions considering the Gaddafi officials’ cases be transparent and open in their decision making processes.

Despite the amendments made to articles 241 and 243 of Libya’s Code of Criminal Procedure to allow trial sessions to be broadcasted, several sessions were only aired partially and others not all. Trial monitoring and public access to the proceedings was also extremely restricted by the Court.The United Nation’s Support Mission In Libya’s (UNSMIL) observers were prevented from attending trial proceedings in person from June 2014. The lack of independent monitoring throughout raises serious concerns regarding the Court’s willingness to hold fair and proceedings, LFJL is therefore strongly concerned over the legitimacy of the legal decision making which informed the Court’s decisions in its rulings.

LFJL calls on the Supreme Court to review fully the verdict in an independent and impartial manner. In doing so, the Supreme Court must take into account and remedy the current concerns regarding the legitimacy of the verdict reached. “The recent trial proceedings raise serious concerns about the Libyan legal system’s ability to deliver justice for human rights violations. However, they also create the opportunity for Libya to openly address its systematic faults and, in doing so, protect the rights of defendants and victims of crimes. This is a transitional moment which will affect both the delivery of justice in this case and countless other cases in the future” stated Ebbs.

Libya: Jail Video Alleges Gaddafi Son Abused
Human Rights Watch
August 3, 2015

Libyan authorities responsible for the al-Hadba corrections facility in Tripoli should immediately investigate the apparent ill-treatment of detainees, including al- Saadi Gaddafi, a son of Muammar Gaddafi. A nine-minute video made available by clearnews, an online news site, on August 2, 2015, appears to show officials and guards at al-Hadba prison interrogating and ill-treating several detainees, including al-Saadi Gaddafi.

Prison officials should suspend the guards and others allegedly involved during the investigation. If the ill-treatment depicted occurred, Tripoli’s general prosecutor should promptly begin steps to credibly prosecute those responsible. Al-Saadi Gaddafi has been in pretrial detention since authorities in Niger extradited him to Libya on March 6, 2014.

“The graphic video that seems to show prisoners being beaten raises serious concerns about the methods used to interrogate al-Saadi Gaddafi and other detainees at al-Hadba prison,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director.” The Tripoli authorities need to urgently establish exactly what did occur, put in place measures to protect all detainees from abuse, and hold anyone responsible for that kind of treatment to account.”

In the undated video, several men, some in uniform and others in civilian clothes, are seen interrogating al-Saadi Gaddafi, who is partially blindfolded but clearly identifiable. At one point, Gaddafi is made to listen to the screams of at least two other men apparently being beaten outside the room and then is made to watch them being beaten. Human Rights Watch could not identify with certainty either of the men, although they seem to be prisoners at al-Hadba.

Toward the end of the footage, an interrogator asks Gaddafi if he’d rather be beaten on his feet or on his buttocks. Gaddafi responds, “What kind of a question is this? My feet.” The interrogators slap Gaddafi several times and beat the soles of his feet, elevated as he lies on his back and tied together on a makeshift metallic structure, with a plastic pipe, causing him to scream in agony.

Guards are seen and heard insulting the prisoners and using profanity. At some point during the video, Gaddafi pleads for “rest” and promises to cooperate. No lawyer or legal representative is visible, and it is unclear whether Gaddafi has had a lawyer to represent him during his detention.

Human Rights Watch tried to call the director of al-Hadba prison to seek clarification but was unable to reach him. Nor has Human Rights Watch been able to verify the sequencing of all elements in the video.

In April 2014, Libya’s official television station aired a series of videos that showed al-Saadi Gaddafi apparently confessing to crimes, from what appeared to be his jail in Tripoli. The videos showed Gaddafi, in a blue prison suit, apologizing to Libya’s people and the authorities for any “destabilization” he may have caused, asking for “forgiveness,” confessing to having worked against the country’s political system, and detailing his interactions with prominent figures in Libya prior to his extradition from Niger.

On July 28, 2015, a criminal court convened at al-Hadba convicted 32 former officials of serious crimes during the uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The court sentenced nine of them to death, including another son of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, along with Abduallah al-Sanussi, Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and Abuzeid Dorda. The court sentenced another 23 former officials to prison terms ranging from five years to life, acquitted four defendants, and dropped charges against one and referred him to a medical institution.

The trial was plagued by persistent, credible allegations of fair trial breaches that warrant independent and impartial judicial review Tripoli’s Court of Assize, including lack of meaningful access to a lawyer and allegations of ill treatment, Human Rights Watch said.

Al-Hadba is under the control of the forces of the former deputy defense minister, whose forces are allied with the Libya Dawn militia coalition. That coalition backs the self-declared authority that controls Tripoli and large parts of Western Libya, and opposes the internationally recognized Libyan government based in the eastern cities of al-Bayda and Tobruk that controls much of eastern Libya.

Libya’s conflict has brought the country’s institutions, including the judiciary and criminal justice system, to near-collapse, with many courts, prosecutors’ offices, and criminal investigation divisions suspending their activities because of worsening security conditions and attacks targeting judges, lawyers, and prosecutors. The ability of the Supreme Court, which sits in Tripoli, to afford impartial remedy is also threatened by current divisions and deteriorating security conditions.

The International Criminal Court has a mandate over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Libya since February 15, 2011. Human Rights Watch has urged the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, to investigate serious ongoing violations in Libya beyond the scope of her current investigation, which is limited to cases from 2011 involving officials of the former Gaddafi government.

Libya is a party to international and regional treaties that impose legal obligations regarding the treatment of detainees. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment obligates Libya to investigate and prosecute all those responsible for torture in its territory. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits anyone from being compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. The Convention Against Torture obligates countries to ensure that any statement “made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”

“No exceptional circumstances justify torture or other ill-treatment,” Stork said. “If the contents of the video footage are verified, the Tripoli authorities should quickly identify those responsible and hold them to account.

Libya: End rampant abductions by armed groups
Amnesty International
August 5, 2015

Rampant abductions by armed groups have become a part of daily life in Libya, said Amnesty International as it launched a campaign digest, ‘Vanished off the face of the earth’: Abducted civilians in Libya, calling for an end to an epidemic of kidnapping blighting the country.

More than 600 people have gone missing between February 2014 and April 2015 according to the Libyan Red Crescent Society (LRCS), and the fate and whereabouts of at least 378 remain unknown, though the real numbers are likely to be much higher.

“Civilians in Libya are living on a knife edge. Widespread lawlessness and chaos have been exacerbated by routine abductions, as armed groups tighten their stranglehold on the country,” said Said Boumedouha, Acting Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.

“Hundreds of civilians have been abducted on a whim simply because of where they are from, or because they are believed to support a rival political group. In many cases, they are kept hostage to pressure an armed group into a prisoner exchange or to coerce the family to pay a ransom.

The collapse of central authority and the absence of law enforcement and a functioning justice system in Libya has created an atmosphere of pervasive impunity which has allowed perpetrators of such abductions to evade prosecution and accountability.”

Hostage-taking of civilians is prohibited under international humanitarian law and during a conflict amounts to a war crime.

Amnesty International is calling on the international community to increase its support to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Libya. So far the ICC Prosecutor has failed to undertake any investigations into crimes under international law committed by armed groups since 2011.

Those abducted by armed groups are routinely tortured or otherwise ill-treated in detention. Many are beaten, threatened with death, held blindfolded for several days, verbally and physically assaulted and often tortured with electric shocks or forced into stress positions. Several have died after being tortured or were summarily killed – their bodies later dumped on the side of the road.

Armed groups must release all civilians, treat all detainees, including captured fighters, humanely, and disclose information about the fate and whereabouts of missing persons. Anyone in detention should also be allowed to have regular contact with their families.

Those abducted include activists, public officials and other civilians seized by unknown assailants based on their political affiliations or in relation to their work.

Among them are 71-year-old former General National Congress member, Suleiman Zobi, and Abdel Moez Banoun, a political rights activist and blogger, who was kidnapped from a parked car near his home after speaking out against the presence of militias in Tripoli and organizing protests on this theme. Abdel Moez Banoun has been missing for more than 300 days. His brother said he had “vanished off the face of the earth”. Nasser al-Jaroushi, a prosecutor, was abducted after investigating the murder of human rights activist Salwa Bugaighis as well as looking into criminal drug gangs.

Humanitarian aid workers Mohamed al-Tahrir Aziz, Mohamed al-Munsaf al-Shalali and Waleed Ramadan Shalhoub were abducted on 5 June as they were on their way to distribute supplies to towns affected by fighting in south-west Libya.

Others who face abductions include migrant workers, foreign consular staff, and members of the Tawargha community who were displaced from their hometown in 2011.

Amnesty International’s campaigning effort, launched today, calls on armed groups to break the pattern of abductions and take a public stand by condemning abductions and torture.

The ongoing UN-sponsored political dialogue which aims to end the violence and form a Government of National Accord also plans to address abductions and illegal detention as part of a set of confidence-building measures. Participants to the dialogue, including local municipal leaders, must now exercise their influence with commanders of armed groups and intervene for the release of all abducted civilians.

Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents – Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire

Search for Justice Lags Post-War Boom in Ivory Coast
Saudi Gazette
By Joe Bavier
July 25, 2015

Four years after the civil war ended in Ivory Coast the economy is booming, but for men like Yaboua Assie, who lost two young daughters in one of the conflict’s most notorious massacres, the justice they seek remains as elusive as ever.

The killings took place in a grassy lot behind the government offices in the small town of Blolequin, an event Assie relives almost nightly in his dreams.

“When I close my eyes, I’m here in this courtyard,” he says, gazing around the walled compound, which was meant to be a refuge for those fleeing the 2011 war.

He stands at the edge of a rectangular depression that until recently was a mass grave containing the remains of 45 massacred civilians.

Two were his daughters: one 12, the other six months old. The bodies were exhumed by an investigative unit charged with prosecuting rights abuses during the conflict, in which campaigners say 3,000 people were killed.

The war started when then-president Laurent Gbagbo refused to quit despite losing an election to Alassane Ouattara in late 2010.

Four years later, with Ouattara in power, Ivory Coast is forging ahead — its economy forecast to grow 9 percent this year — but the quest for justice has lagged behind, hampered by lack of government support, rights groups say.

Gbagbo was extradited to the International Criminal Court in The Hague charged with crimes against humanity. His top political and military supporters were jailed.

Dozens, including his wife Simone who is also wanted by the ICC, were convicted in Ivory Coast this year.

By contrast, Ouattara’s military backers have received top posts in the army, despite allegations they too were responsible for civilian massacres.

With elections in October, Ouattara is keen to face down accusations of ‘victor’s justice’ from sections of Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front party and opposition groups.

The president has pledged no one will be above the law. Last week, rights groups revealed that around 20 former rebels serving in the army had finally been indicted for alleged crimes committed during the crisis.

But the families of many victims have little faith that those who did the killing will pay for their crimes. When pro-Gbagbo mercenaries attacked his neighbors that March day in 2011, Assie saved himself and his 5-year-old daughter by playing dead as the bodies piled up on top of him.

“It’s war. They say to let it go. And we let it go,” he says. “When something is ruined, it’s ruined.”

A POINTLESS SPECTACLE?

In Abidjan, commercial capital of the world’s largest cocoa exporter, the completion of a long-awaited third bridge across the lagoon last year marked a symbolic end to a decade of stagnation following an earlier 2003-2004 civil conflict.

The return of the headquarters of the African Development Bank, which had moved to Tunis in the wake of that conflict, is seen as a sign of a return to stability.

An opinion poll last month by the Washington-based International Republican Institute showed public support for Ouattara.

Two-thirds of respondents said the country was heading in the right direction, and more than three-quarters approved of the job being done by the president.

Yet the same polls underlined one of the main failures of his first term: slow progress towards healing Ivory Coast’s deeply divided society.

The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up in the wake of the conflict recorded the lowest approval rating of the 14 institutions included in the poll at just 37 percent.

And just 18 percent of the country’s citizens believe justice had been served to all Ivorians following the post-election crisis.

“The slow judicial process and dubious impartiality cast a shadow on reconciliation and mid- and long-term stability prospects,” said Gilles Yabi, an analyst and founder of the West Africa-focused think tank Wathi.

Skepticism has bred resistance to the exhumations in some quarters. Justice Minister Mamadou Gnenema Coulibaly, who views them as critical to building criminal cases, questions the motives of those opposed to the process.

“Some think we are looking to incriminate Gbagbo. If they are pro-Gbagbo, they’ll act in bad faith,” he told Reuters.

“Others think we are looking for proof of their own involvement in the crimes and they try to block things.”

The government’s handling of previous investigations has contributed to the reticence. Julien Kpahi last saw his brother loaded into an army truck early one morning in 2012 after an attack on a camp for war-displaced civilians outside the town of Duekoue.Witness accounts implicated government soldiers and pro-Ouattara traditional Dozo hunters in the raid, which took place a year after Gbagbo fell. The government has never acknowledged any role in the violence.

Months later, a survivor led Kpahi to a well where he said his brother’s body had been thrown. Under pressure from human rights groups, authorities opened an investigation, removed six bodies from the well and brought them to Abidjan for autopsy

Kpahi has heard nothing since. Three years later, his brother’s remains have yet to be returned. “I have no hope it will lead to anything,” said Kpahi, who was recently prevented from visiting the well by UN peacekeepers. “For me, it’s pointless … It’s a spectacle.”

FIRST STEP

For Human Rights Watch researcher Jim Wormington, this month’s indictments of pro-Ouattara commanders were a promising sign but only a first step.

Among those formally accused are Lt. Col. Cherif Ousmane, the deputy head of Ouattara’s presidential guard, and Lt. Col. Losseni Fofana, another senior commander.

“To prove its commitment to impartial justice, the government should provide the judiciary with the support it needs to finish the investigations and bring the cases to trial,” he said.

In Duekoue’s Carrefour neighborhood, there are plenty who doubt this will happen. On March 28, 2011, hundreds of people were killed in an area predominantly inhabited by Gueres, an ethnic group seen as among Gbagbo’s staunchest supporters.

Here, no amount of economic progress will convince the war’s victims to turn the page. And residents like Georges Doue, 51, who lost seven members of his family in the massacre, have little faith the government will investigate the killings. “There’s no trust,” he said.

ICC Must Investigate Ivorian President’s Camp for Wartime Abuses: Human Rights Watch
Yahoo News
August 4, 2015

The International Criminal Court must broaden its investigation into the violence that ripped Ivory Coast apart in 2010 and 2011 to include violations committed by loyalists of President Alassane Ouattara, Human Rights Watch said Tuesday.

Since 2011, the Hague-based court’s chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has been probing a conflict that erupted after former president Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede defeat to Ouattara in a vote the year before.

However only Gbagbo and figures loyal to him have been charged so far by the ICC for crimes committed in post-election violence that left at least 3,000 people dead.

Gbagbo, who is in custody in The Hague, is the first former head of state to be prosecuted by the world’s only permanent war crimes tribunal.

“It’s absolutely urgent to get started” with a probe into violence committed by Ouattara loyalists during the war, said Elizabeth M. Evenson, senior counsel of HRW’s international justice programme.

“Additional ICC investigations are necessary, but the focus so far on pro-Ggbabo forces has deeply polarised opinion… about the ICC” within Ivory Coast, Evenson said.

The New York-based rights group warned that a failure to expand the scope of the investigations would leave many in Ivory Coast feeling unjustly sidelined.

“Many victims feel that the court has ignored their suffering,” Evenson said.

Gambian lawyer Bensouda has previously pledged her office would investigate abuses by both sides, but has been held back by limited resources, HRW said.

Evenson’s remarks came as HRW released a report titled “Making Justice Count”, which urged the ICC to do more to involve communities affected by the violence in Ivory Coast in its work.

“ICC officials need to carry out their mandates in a manner designed to ensure that the ICC’s delivery of justice will be accessible, meaningful, and perceived as legitimate — that is, that it can have impact — in countries where it conducts investigations,” the rights group said.

The report criticised the ICC’s failure to deploy an outreach officer, tasked with communicating with the broader communities with a stake in the proceedings, until autumn 2014.

It also said the court has failed to contact Ivorian refugee communities outside the country, which are perceived as allied with Gbagbo.

“During the election crisis, many of them were likely victims or witnesses of crimes carried out by pro-Ouattara forces and militias,” the report said.

“Some members of these communities… perceived the absence of cases against anyone associated with Ouattara during the war as a bias of the court,” it added.

Gbagbo, who was president from 2000 to 2011, has been held in The Hague since his late 2011 transfer. He is awaiting trial for crimes against humanity.

Formed in 2002, the ICC has opened nine cases in eight countries, all in Africa, with accusations it can only deliver victor’s justice.

AFRICA

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

Chad

Chronicler of Crimes by Hisssѐne Habré Confident that Justice Finally at Hand
The Guardian
By Celeste Hicks
August 4, 2015

Souleymane Guengueng sits down with a cold bottle of water and looks out over the Atlantic Ocean. He has been hounded by journalists and film crews, and he’s tired.

He had been expecting to stay in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, for several months, but since the trial of the former Chadian leader Hissène Habré was adjourned until 7 September, the campaigner, who spent a decade gathering testimony from victims and their families for the landmark case, has been wondering what to do.

But he’s in good spirits. “Even if the delay is for another two or three months, that’s not more than the 25 years we’ve already been waiting for justice,” he says. “It’s nothing for us.”

Guengueng seems unruffled by the fact that Habré greeted the announcement of the adjournment by punching the air and giving the V-for-Victory salute to a group of cheering supporters.

“We’ve already succeeded. He’s here in court,” Guengueng says. “During his rule, he was like a god. Everyone was scared of him. No one could believe that this man who used to be like a god could so easily be judged.”

Twenty-five years ago, after spending three years in one of Habré’s secret prisons, Guengueng began a lonely mission to document testimonies from other alleged victims in the hope that one day justice would be served.

Today, Habré is accused of presiding over a network of security agents from the feared Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (DDS), who carried out a campaign of torture, killings and arbitrary detention during his rule from 1982-90. A Chadian truth commission in the early 1990s estimated there could have been up to 40,000 victims.

On 20 July, Habré, now 72, entered the Palais de Justice in Dakar to stand trial on charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture. Dressed in white robes and a turban, he was accompanied by security forces. He raised his fist and cried “God is greatest” before being ushered out.

During his rule he was like a god. Everyone was scared of him. No one could believe this man could so easily be judged

Souleymane Guengueng

The next day came the adjournment to allow court-appointed lawyers time to prepare Habré’s defence. He had refused legal representation and said he did not recognise the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC), a special international criminal tribunal set up in Senegal by the African Union.

For Guengueng, this milestone in African justice came at the end of a long journey that had seen several failed attempts at prosecution: first in Senegal, where Habré fled in exile after being deposed in a coup; then in Belgium, which has universal jurisdiction; and then under the Economic Community of West African States, or Ecowas.

Finally the election of Macky Sall as Senegal’s president in 2012 paved the way for the African Union to set up the EAC, which was to be hosted within the Senegalese court system.

The process has been an emotional one for Guengueng, who sat quietly at the front of the courtroom last week, occasionally wiping away a tear as lawyers for the victims made their opening speeches.

“We will see this trial to the end,” he says. “God has given me strength, and the love of my family, and I still have the courage to come here and keep going until the end.”

Security guards surround the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré on his first appearance at the special international court in Senegal’s capital Dakar. Facebook Twitter Pinterest

Security guards surround the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré on his first appearance at the special international court in Senegal’s capital, Dakar. Photograph: Ibrahima Ndiaye/AP

In Chad, the trial is starting to attract the attention of the public, who have generally voiced scepticism about the many twists and turns in previous attempts to bring Habré to justice. For years, most would either scoff cynically or express indifference when asked for their views on whether they thought Habré would ever face trial.

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But something changed in 2013, with the news that Habré had been arrested after 23 years living peacefully in the Ouakam neighbourhood of Dakar. The EAC was established and in March the unthinkable happened when Chadian authorities took the remarkable step of trying and convicting 20 Habré-era security agents, including the former head of the DDS, Salah Younous, and one of the most notorious torturers, Mahamat Djibrine, known as “El Djonto”.

Many of these agents had been living freely in Chad since the ousting of their leader and some had even occupied government posts. To general amazement, Younous and Djibrine were jailed for life, although these convictions have complicated the process at the EAC, which sought their extradition to Senegal to stand in the dock alongside Habré.

The trial also seems to have revived popular debate: for example, when the EAC was established, there were powerful voices advocating for the trial to be covered by Chadian local media. At least 40 Chadian journalists travelled to Senegal to attend the opening of the trial with the help of a grant from the Open Society Initiative for West Africa.

“The reports that I filed from Dakar received very positive feedback at home,” said Djimadoum Blaise, from the Chadian Press Agency. “People are really getting interested now. Of course, they’re disappointed with the delay, but they have complete confidence that the trial is going to start again in September.”

The EAC has been hailed as a unique breakthrough in African justice, the first time the courts of one African country have tried the former leader of another African country. Although it is still early days, some have suggested that, if successful, the model could act as an alternative to prosecutions by the International Criminal Court, which has become discredited in the eyes of many Africans.

For Souleymane Guengueng, the message is simple. “Ordinary people like us have shown the dictator that if you kill me, if you rape me, if you commit crimes against me, wherever you flee in the world we will pursue you.

“I think that has really opened the minds of people in Chad – that the president is not an untouchable god, he is equal to other Chadians.”

Chad says Security Forces kill Seven Boko Haram militants in clash
Reuters
By Matthew Mpoke Bigg
August 5, 2015

N’DJAMENA, Aug 5 (Reuters) – Chadian forces killed seven Boko Haram militants in a clash on Wednesday, a security source said, as the country tries to secure islands on Lake Chad used by the insurgents as hideouts and bases to launch attacks.

Chad said last week it killed 117 Boko Haram fighters as part of a two-week offensive on the lake that borders Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon.

“Boko Haram fighters in boats opened fire on our forces on the island of Tchoukou Dallah. Seven of their fighters were killed and there were others wounded,” said a security source who declined to be named. There was no independent confirmation.

Thousands of soldiers have been deployed to tackle the militants whose six-year-old insurgency has killed hundreds in recent months.

Boko Haram has stepped up attacks in countries around the lake in recent months in response to a regional offensive. It has also adopted the name Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) after pledging allegiance to the militant group that controls parts of Syria and Iraq.

EUROPE

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, War Crimes Chamber

Official Website [English translation]

Indictment Confirmed in the Case of Nikola Zovko et al.
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
July 29, 2015

On July 16, 2015 the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed the Indictment charging the accused with the criminal offenses as follows: Nikola Zovko – War Crimes Against Civilians under Article 173(1), Subparagraphs c) and e), as read with Article 180(2) of the Criminal Code of BiH; Petar Krndelj – War Crimes Against Civilians under Article 173(1), Subparagraphs c) and e), as read with Article 180, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Criminal Code of BiH; Krešo Rajič – War Crimes Against Civilians under Article 173(1)c) as read with Article 180(2) of the Criminal Code of BiH; Ivica Čutura – War Crimes Against Civilians under Article 173(1)e), as read with Article 180(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH.

The Indictment alleges that the accused Nikola Zovko, as Commander of the Čapljina Police Station, Police Administration Mostar, Internal Affairs Department Mostar; Petar Krndelj as Assistant Commander of the Police Station for Uniformed Police at the Čapljina Police Station, Police Administration Mostar, Internal Affairs Department Mostar; Krešo Rajič, as Military Police Platoon Commander; and Ivica Čutura, as an operative officer for patrol activities – sector leader at the Čapljina Police Station, Police Administration Mostar, Internal Affairs Department Mostar; during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the armed conflict between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croat Defense Council, between July 19, 1993 or at about that date, and July 28, 1993 or at about that date, in the territory of the Čapljina municipality, in violation of the rules of international humanitarian law, committed the killing, inhumane treatment, torture (deliberate infliction of severe bodily or mental pain or suffering), infliction of great suffering or injuries to bodily integrity or health and unlawful detention, of Bosniak civilians.

 

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Official Website of the ICTY

Russia May Offer Medical Treatment to General Ratko Mladic
inSerbia
July 28, 2015

Russian doctors may offer treatment to ex-Bosnian-Serb General Ratko Mladic, representatives for the Russian public committee for the defense of Mladic said in a statement Tuesday.

Mladic, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army of Republica Srpska in the Bosnian War of 1992-1995, is currently at the detention center for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

According to the Committee head, Russian lawmaker Pavel Dorokhin, Russian doctors from Moscow Bakoulev Scientific Center for Cardiovascular Surgery on July 21 examined Mladic in the Hague, upon the initiative of the Committee and under authorization of the Russian president.

“Currently, the Russian doctors are working on the medical statement which will allow conclusions on the state of health of General Ratko Mladic. In case it is needed, Russian side is ready to offer Mladic treatment in Russia with the guarantee by the Russian government,” Dorokhin said.

In the last years, Mladic had several strokes and a heart attack. His defense, unhappy with the actions by ICTY doctors, had been pressing for Mladic to be examined by the Bakoulev Center experts for two years.

Mladic’s trial opened on May 16, 2012. He has been charged with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially for his role in the Srebrenica massacre of 8,000 Muslims in 1995.

‘Operation Storm’ War Crimes Site Launched in Croatia
BIRN
By Sven Milekic
July 31, 2015

Croatian NGOs launched an interactive site showing the findings of the UN war crimes court in The Hague about the Croatian military’s 1995 ‘Operation Storm’ ahead of its 20th anniversary next week.

Three NGOs, the Serbian National Council, SENSE – Centre for Transitional Justice and Documenta, launched the new interactive site called ‘Storm in The Hague’ on Friday in Zagreb in a bid to publicise what is known about the operation ahead of its anniversary.

Operation Storm in August 1995 saw Croatia regain control over 18 per cent of its territory, crushing the secessionist Serb-led Republic of Serbian Krajina statelet.

It also resulted in some 200,000 Serb refugees fleeing Croatia, over 600 mostly elderly civilians being killed, and around 20,000 Serb properties being burned.

The site presents the findings of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY, in the case against Croatian generals Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markac and Ivan Cermak – all three of whom were ultimately acquitted.

Milorad Pupovac from the Serbian National Council said that the site offered information that had been denied to the Croatian public.

“During the trial at the ICTY, almost no one in Croatian society felt the need to point out the facts that have come to light before this court,” Pupovac said.

‘Storm in The Hague’ presents the key arguments from both the defence and prosecution in the case, focusing on five fundamental issues on which they disagreed: the goal of the operation, the purpose of the Croatian military’s shelling, the murders that were committed, the destruction and plunder of property, and the prevention of Serb refugee return.

It also examines the verdict of International Court of Justice in The Hague, which discussed the crimes committed during Operation Storm during mutual genocide suits brought by Croatia and Serbia, both of which were rejected in February this year.

At the launch, Vesna Terselic from Documenta also pointed out that out of around 250,000 Serb refugees from Croatia during the 1995, only 133,075 have returned, while 32,893 are still leaving as refugees, mostly in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Hadzic’s Health “Rapidly Deteriorating”
Institute for War & Peace Reporting
By Daniella Peled
August 2, 2015

Tumour which led to his provisional release is affecting his cognitive skills.

Former Croatian Serb leader Goran Hadzic’s terminal brain cancer means that his ability to participate in trial proceedings is expected to rapidly deteriorate, a medical expert told the Hague tribunal this week.

Hadzic, who served as president of the breakaway Serb state in Croatia, the Republic of Serb Krajina, is charged with 14 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed there in the early 1990s. The indictment includes charges of persecution, extermination, murder, imprisonment, torture, inhumane acts, cruel treatment, deportation, wanton destruction and plunder.

His trial has been suspended since October 2014 when he was diagnosed with a tumour and allowed to return to Belgrade. The chamber has since ordered a number of expert medical reports to establish whether his case should continue.

Forensic psychologist and neuropyschologist Daniel Martell told judges last week that the tumour had rapidly metastasised to multiple locations within Hadzic’s brain, affecting cognitive skills.

Martell told the court he had spent two days examining the defendant and carrying out numerous tests, including presenting him with more than 500 written questions. The expert said he included tests to identify any attempt at “malingering” or overstating the symptoms.

“Mr Hadzic in every case passed these tests, indicating he was giving good effort and not exaggerating his problems, and so I believe my findings are valuable and reliable indications of his functioning, and not the product of manipulations,” Martell said.

The psychologist found that Hadzic’s IQ had deteriorated and was currently 95, an estimated fall of some 20 points. The defendant also had short-term memory problems.

“He will not remember something he told you that morning or he will not remember something you just watched on television,” the expert said, adding that this amounted to a noticeable “level of impairment”.

As for the prognosis, Martell emphasised that Hadzic’s tumour was “rapidly progressive”.

“This means as it sounds – it gets worse quickly,” he continued. It’s the most aggressive brain cancer that one can have… it can be expected to continue to grow, and his capacity to participate [in legal proceedings] will continue to deteriorate. He will get worse.

“The nature in which he gets worse depends on where the tumour goes,” Martell explained. “At this point his frontal lobes are fairly well preserved, his language centres are fairly well preserved, but if the tumour begins to invade the language centres or the executive control centres, a further deterioration in those behaviours [can be expected] on top of the ones that are already impaired involving attention, concentration and memory.”

 

Domestic Prosecutions In The Former Yugoslavia

Kosovo Govt Prepares New War Crimes Court Vote
Balkan Insight
By Una Hajdari
July 30, 2015

The Kosovo government announced on Thursday that it is ready to call another vote on the controversial special court after it failed to gain approval in parliament last month because of opposition from many MPs.

A date for the parliamentary session has not been set, but the government said it would meet on Friday and reinitiate the process, which requires parliament to approve constitutional amendments to allow the court to be established.

The move signals that there will be the necessary majority to pass the amendments, after Kosovo came under mounting pressure from the US and the EU in the wake of last month’s failed vote.

“The resubmitting of these constitutional amendments to parliament and their ratification is of special importance to the Republic of Kosovo in the process of fulfilling the obligations it has taken on towards its international partners,” the government said in a statement.

So called ‘specialised chambers’ will be created at each level of the Kosovo judiciary to deal with allegations that Kosovo Liberation Army fighters were involved in the killings, abductions, illegal detentions and persecution of Serbs, Roma and Kosovo Albanians believed to be collaborators with the Serbian regime.

But veterans’ associations and opposition parties have claimed that the new court is an insult to the KLA’s armed struggle to escape Serbian control during the 1998-99 conflict.

Foreign Minister Hashim Thaci also failed to persuade a number of MPs from his Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) to vote for the court.

Thaci has been the main proponent of the court, even though the allegations, which first surfaced in a report by Council of Europe rapporteur Dick Marty in 2011, mention him as well.

The PDK is considered to be the successor to the KLA, and Thaci served as political head of the guerrilla force at the height of the conflict.

Opposition parties, including Vetevendosje, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo and the Initiative for Kosovo, have all been strongly critical of the court and openly celebrated when it was not ratified by parliament.

MPs from the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) of Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, who opposed the KLA and its actions in the 1990s, voted strongly in favour of the court.

US diplomats have warned that a failure to vote for the court could lead to it being set up by the UN Security Council – as has been proposed by Serbia’s ally Russia.

‘Operation Storm’ War Crimes Site Launched In Croatia
Balkan Insight
By Sven Milekic
July 31, 2015

Three NGOs, the Serbian National Council, SENSE – Centre for Transitional Justice and Documenta, launched the new interactive site called ‘Storm in The Hague’ on Friday in Zagreb in a bid to publicise what is known about the operation ahead of its anniversary.

Operation Storm in August 1995 saw Croatia regain control over 18 per cent of its territory, crushing the secessionist Serb-led Republic of Serbian Krajina statelet.

It also resulted in some 200,000 Serb refugees fleeing Croatia, over 600 mostly elderly civilians being killed, and around 20,000 Serb properties being burned.

The site presents the findings of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY, in the case against Croatian generals Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markac and Ivan Cermak – all three of whom were ultimately acquitted.

Milorad Pupovac from the Serbian National Council said that the site offered information that had been denied to the Croatian public.

“During the trial at the ICTY, almost no one in Croatian society felt the need to point out the facts that have come to light before this court,” Pupovac said.

‘Storm in The Hague’ presents the key arguments from both the defence and prosecution in the case, focusing on five fundamental issues on which they disagreed: the goal of the operation, the purpose of the Croatian military’s shelling, the murders that were committed, the destruction and plunder of property, and the prevention of Serb refugee return.

It also examines the verdict of International Court of Justice in The Hague, which discussed the crimes committed during Operation Storm during mutual genocide suits brought by Croatia and Serbia, both of which were rejected in February this year.

At the launch, Vesna Terselic from Documenta also pointed out that out of around 250,000 Serb refugees from Croatia during the 1995, only 133,075 have returned, while 32,893 are still leaving as refugees, mostly in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bringing The Truth To Light – Kosovo Parliament Votes To Set Up Special Court
Deutsche Welle
By Pandeli Pani
August 4, 2015

War crimes committed by Albanians? This is precisely what is stirring emotions in Kosovo and people there think the accusations are unfair. It is generally perceived that the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, (1998-99) gained the country’s long-desired independence.

This event is practically sacred to the people in Kosovo. It is also one of the reasons why it took around five years for the parliament in Pristina to approve the constitutional amendment and ultimately set the stage for the special court.

Since 2011, an EU special investigation team has gathered substantial evidence against former commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army during the war and in the period immediately thereafter. Now, law authorities can press charges against the suspects. The evidence will be examined by the new special tribunal. Former commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as present-day politicians and representatives of the people must now fear the long arm of the law.

Many parliamentarians resisted for a long time: In the first vote at the end of June, the two-thirds majority was not attained in the parliamentary vote. And even today, the tribunal is euphemistically referred to as the “professional chamber” or the “office of the special prosecutor.”

For years, most people in Kosovo believed that war crimes had only been committed by the others: the Serbs and their collaborators. There had never been talk of the KLA’s crimes.

Things only changed when the former Special Rapporteur of the Council of Europe, Dick Marty, made serious allegations against the KLA leadership in his report in December 2010. In the late 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army allegedly committed war crimes against the Serbian minority, the Roma and so-called Albanian collaborators during and after the Kosovo conflict, asserted the Swiss diplomat.

The list of crimes includes murders, abductions, expulsions, rape, narcotics trade and the destruction of churches. But what really made the headlines was Marty’s controversial accusation that KLA fighters harvested the organs of Serbian captives and sold the body parts on the black market. However, no evidence of such activities has been provided. Furthermore, Marty’s report accuses Hashim Thaci, currently Kosovo’s minister of foreign affairs and the first prime minister of the country from 2008 to 2014, of weighty offenses.

Kosovo, as a state, is not being charged with alleged crimes. Allegations have mostly been made against individuals. The EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, described the decision as “not easy, but necessary in order to bring the truth to light.”

Despite the officially proclaimed willingness of the representatives of Kosovo to do everything possible “to ensure a safe and appropriate environment for the work of the special tribunal,” as President Ahtifete Jahjaga promised, the war crimes tribunal will have two headquarters – one in Kosovo and one in The Hague.

Like the EU special investigation team, this court is run exclusively by international judges and carries out most of its work in The Hague. The reason for two tribunal headquarters has nothing to do with the fact that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is located in The Hague: Witness protection in Kosovo is severely inadequate.

“Everyone knows everyone or is related to each other or is a friend of a friend,” says journalist and publicist Milaim Zeka in an interview with DW. So it is possible to informally influence potential witnesses. But journalists who report on cases are also threatened and put under pressure.

Stefanovic: Investigation Of Crimes Against Serbs In Kosovo Priority
InSerbia
By Tanjug
August 4, 2015

Serbian Minister of Interior Affairs Nebojsa Stefanovic stated on Monday that the investigation of all crimes committed against Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija constitutes one of the priorities, together with the implementation of the Brussels agreement.

Reacting to the Monday debate in the Kosovo parliament concerning the constitutional amendments the adoption of which would make room for constitution of a special court in charge of prosecuting war crimes committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo-Metohija, Stefanovic said that investigation of all crimes committed against Serbs constitutes a priority.

When it comes to its southern province, Serbia will insist on full implementation of all the agreements reached in Brussels, he told reporters.

Stefanovic underscored that it is very important for Serbia to implement the Brussels agreement and render into practice the points agreed on concerning the community of Serb municipalities and other parts of the agreement that will make room for safety and survival of Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija.

Kosovo Approves New War Crimes Court
Jurist
By Emelina Perez
August 5, 2015

Kosovo’s Parliament [official website] approved the creation of a war crimes court on Monday which will investigate alleged war crimes committed by ethnic Albanians during the 1998-99 guerrilla war. Members of parliament also passed laws to create the office of the prosecution and to finance defense counsel for those accused. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a rebel group of mostly ethnic Albanians who fought for independence from Serbia, has for years been accused of past war crimes and intimidating witnesses. Many former members of the KLA are now high-ranking politicians. Although the court will be under Kosovo law, it will be located [Reuters report] in the Netherlands, funded by the European Union, and the judges and prosecutors will be made up of foreigners. Advocacy group Human Rights Watch (HRW) [official website] called the amendment a “step toward justice” [press release] but is urging for strong procedures to protect witnesses.

War crimes committed during the Kosovo War have been prosecuted in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) [official website], but relations between Serbia and Kosovo remain strained. Last month, 11 Kosovo Albanian men were sentenced [JURIST report] to prison for war crimes. In February 2014, Serbia’s war crimes court convicted [JURIST report] nine former paramilitaries for their involvement in the genocide of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999. Two former Serbian secret service officials were arrested [JURIST report] under suspicion that they planned the 1999 killing of an anti-government journalist. In 2013 Amnesty International [advocacy website] accused [JURIST report] the UN Mission in Kosovo of failing to adequately investigate war crimes committed during the conflict. Kosovo held its first local elections [JURIST report] in November 2013 since it seceded from Serbia in 2008. Serbia still does not recognize the secession.

 

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)

Official Website of the Extraordinary Chambers
Official Website of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT)

Ex-Cadre Tells Tribunal of Suicides at Airport
The Cambodia Daily
By George Wright
JULY 30, 2015

A witness at the Khmer Rouge tribunal on Wednesday told of people committing suicide at the Kompong Chhnang airport construction site, including a woman who threw herself under a moving truck.

Kheun Vat, who joined the communist guerrillas in 1970 and is the last witness to give evidence in Case 002/02 about the airport site, said she heard stories about other workers who took their own lives after she was transferred there in 1977.

“I heard about a rock-transportation-vehicle driver who said that a youth worker actually ran into the truck and that he couldn’t brake on time and killed the person,” she said. “I was rather afraid to hear that.”

“There was another person…who jumped up off the vehicle and killed himself,” she said.

Ms. Vat, a low-ranking cadre whose husband was killed by the regime on suspicion of having ties to the Vietnamese, spoke of numerous disappearances at the worksite and admitted that she feared for her own life.

“There was a messenger, who was close to my husband from the same unit, who wrote a letter secretly to me…and that’s how I learned about his arrest,” she said.

“What he said in the letter was to advise me not to make any more inquiries about my husband because he was taken away.”

Asked by senior assistant prosecutor Travis Farr if people had been free to leave the airport site, Ms. Vat replied that workers had to stay “vigilant” at all times or face unknown consequences.

“If any worker was liberal and didn’t adhere to the instructions, that person would be removed. Upon hearing that, I was rather concerned and had to be very vigilant,” she said.

“It was my thought that if I was not vigilant enough, and if anyone knew about it or my superiors knew about it, they would report the matter to upper echelons [and] I would be in a risky situation.”

During the morning session, witness Mam Soeum, who was testifying in relation to the Trapeang Thma Dam worksite in Banteay Meanchey province, said there were so many forced marriages— often held in darkness—at the site that newlyweds sometimes struggled to identify their spouses after the ceremony.

“Some of them got confused with their spouses because there were so many men and women who were married at the time,” Mr. Soeum said. “After the ceremony was completed, some of them could not find their wives, and before they got married, most of them did not know one another at all.”

Witness recalls regime’s fall
The Phnom Penh Post
By Rebecca Moss
July 31, 2015

Khim Vat was 29 when the Khmer Rouge regime fell. She was loaded into a military truck at the Kampong Chhnang airport worksite that day, alongside pregnant women and children, and heard the sound of gunshots as the vehicle fled to the west.

During the second portion of her testimony before the Khmer Rouge tribunal yesterday, Vat, a former member of the communist militia, recalled the chaos of the Vietnamese invasion.

“Everyone tried to board a truck,” she said. “We thought we could not survive.”

Several women gave birth in the moving lorry.

“In my opinion at the time, capitalists were the rich and powerful . . . They oppressed us, and they did not let us have any freedom,” Vat said of her decision to supported the communist movement.

However, she described a similar enslavement under the Khmer Rouge leadership, including her forced marriage to a stranger disabled on the battlefield, and her demotion out of a military capacity and into the rice fields.

“I had no choice,” she said. “I would follow Angkar.”

With the conclusion of her testimony, the line of questioning in Case 002/02 turned again to the conditions surrounding the January 1 dam.

Om Chy, a slight, 63-year-old, testified about his role as a unit chief, supervising 500 workers as they built irrigation canals linked to the dam.

Chy said his unit worked 16-hour days clothed in a single set of tattered pajamas, without access to clean water or sufficient food.

Despite his senior status, he added, everyone had to abide by the regulations set forth by the Khmer Rouge or face being detained, re-educated or tortured.

“During the regime, every worker, including myself, did not dare refuse,” Chy said.

He remembered the public arrest of a teenage boy, the disappearance of neighbours who never returned and purges of his own senior leaders.

“We lost trust with each other and had to work on a daily basis to survive,” he said.

Close to his worksite was the Baray Choan Dek pagoda, a place he resolutely asserted was where “enemies” – suspected of being foreign spies or merely “inactive” workers – would be executed.

Chy was one of the few to enter the pagoda walls and return alive.

Before the regime fell, the security centre was transferred to another village and the unit chief was invited to the pagoda for a cadre meeting.

The space, he said yesterday, still held the evidence of its recent misdeeds.

“I actually saw blood stains on the wall in the dining hall . . . pieces of clothing strewn on the ground,” he recalled.

“The bad odour [from the corpses] was still lingering in the air.”

 

Iraq

Grotian Moment: The International War Crimes Trial Blog

Iraq: UN Officials Underscore Need to Bring Perpetrators of Sinjar Tragedy to Justice
UN News Centre
August 3, 2015

United Nations officials have reiterated the need to bring perpetrators of last year’s tragedy, in which militants from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked as many as 200,000 civilians – most of them from vulnerable communities – causing them to flee to Sinjar, to justice as well as to increase protection for women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence.

It was a year ago that the attacks took place on members of the Yezidi community, as well as members of the Shi’a Turkmen, Shi’a Shabak and Christian communities, causing them to flee to Sinjar.

“In the days that followed, amidst horrific killings, ISIL hunted down and caught hundreds of women and girls from ethnic and religion minorities, instituting a pattern of sexual violence, slavery, abduction and human trafficking that continues to this day,” the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, said in a statement on the first anniversary of the tragedy.

She noted that first-hand accounts from internally displaced persons and refugees, some of whom she met during a visit to the Middle East in April, confirm systematic sexual violence, particularly against Yezidi women and children aged between 8 and 35 years.

Young women are being “sold” in open markets, gifted to foreign fighters, trafficked for sex in the region to raise funds and increase recruitment among ISIL’s ranks, she stated, adding that women and girls are also used for forced procreation, to populate the desired new “Caliphate” with children who can be raised in ISIL’s own “warped image.”

“These appalling crimes of sexual violence in conflict, which may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and/or acts of genocide, will not be forgotten. The international community stands united in the goal of pursuing the perpetrators and holding them to account.”

She reiterated her calls on the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL to include protection and empowerment of women and girls in their strategies to counter terrorism.

Also speaking out was the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ján Kubiš, who strongly condemned ISIL’s continuous and deliberate terrorist strategy to target and exterminate entire communities on the basis of their ethnic background, religious beliefs or faith.

“This is especially harrowing for women, girls and children who are treated with untold brutality. We demand and support the liberation of Yezidi and other women and girls held by ISIL in captivity, often sold and used as sex slaves,” Mr. Kubiš said in a news release.

He stated that the instigators and perpetrators of the crimes committed against civilian populations and on ethnic or religious grounds, some of which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, will sooner or later be brought to justice.

Mr. Kubiš, who is also head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), also acknowledged the efforts and support of the Government of Iraq and of the Kurdistan Regional Government, assisted by the international community, to the affected minorities.

At the same time, he underscored that “a more forceful and coherent action on the protection of minorities must take place, including active steps to ensure zero tolerance to impunity for those committing crimes against any and all humanities.”

 

Syria

ICJ Acknowledges Request for Inquiry Into Syria-bound MİT Trucks
Today’s Zaman
July 30, 2015

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has acknowledged receipt of an email sent by a Turkish political party requesting an investigation into the case of arms-filled trucks bound for Syria and operated by the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) that came to national attention after they were intercepted on the orders of a prosecutor in southern Turkey last year.

The court has not yet decided to open an investigation, despite some news reports circulating among Turkish national media.

The People’s Liberation Party (HKP) lodged a petition with the ICJ seeking an inquiry into the trucks belonging to MİT on the grounds that any arms shipment to the warring factions in Syria represented a clear breach of international norms and amounted to a war crime.

“The Office of the Prosecutor confirms receipt of the communication. We will give consideration to this communication, as appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” the court said in an email sent to the HKP’s lawyer on Thursday, adding, “However, please note that this does not mean an investigation has been opened, nor that an investigation will be opened by the Office of the Prosecutor.”

The HKP filed a criminal complaint against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Interior Minister Efkan Ala and MİT UndersecretaryHakan Fidan, the OdaTV news portal said in late May. Speaking to Turkish media recently, HKP leader Nurullah Ankut claimed that the attempt by MİT to deliver arms is not just a crime by the Erdoğan administration but amounts to a joint crime committed by the US, the UK and the EU.

While the party leader was optimistic about the prospect of an investigation against the Turkish government members, some experts have disagreed with this perspective.

Although Turkey might have violated international law by delivering weapons to warring factions in Syria, there is need for proof of an official order from Ankara that those weapons were to be used to target civilians, which constitutes a war crime. Given the unlikelihood of such an order emerging, the prospect of an inquiry being launched against the Turkish government seems dim.

Doğan Erkan, an HKP lawyer, told Turkish media that while the court may lack the jurisdiction to try the government, it could reach the verdict that it had committed a war crime.

In January 2014, gendarmes stopped Syria-bound trucks in the southern provinces of Adana and Hatay after prosecutors received tip-offs that the vehicles were illegally carrying arms to Syria. The weapons were allegedly intended for extremist groups in Syria, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaeda affiliates.

The HKP reportedly maintained in the criminal complaint that the government had committed a war crime and had violated the Turkish Constitution, the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and the Geneva Conventions by sending weapons to the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

“No matter what public post the suspects occupy, it is obvious that they must be tried in court for these war crimes,” it said in the complaint, which demanded that the suspects be prosecuted.

Barrel Bombs, Not ISIS, Are the Greatest Threat to Syrians
The New York Times
By Kenneth Roth
August 5, 2015

As the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or ISIS, commits horrendous videotaped executions, it might seem to pose the greatest threat to Syrian civilians. In fact, that ignoble distinction belongs to the barrel bombs being dropped by the military of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The Islamic State has distracted us from this deadly reality.

Barrel bombs are improvised weapons: oil drums or similar canisters filled with explosives and metal fragments. They are dropped without guidance from helicopters hovering just above antiaircraft range, typically hitting the ground with huge explosions and the widespread diffusion of deadly shrapnel. They pulverize neighborhoods, destroy entire buildings and leave broad strips of death and destruction.

The Syrian military has dropped barrel bombs, sometimes dozens in one day, on opposition-held neighborhoods in Aleppo, Idlib, Dara’a and other cities and towns. They have pulverized markets, schools, hospitals and countless residences. Syrians have described to me the sheer terror of waiting the 30 seconds or so for the barrel bomb to tumble to earth from a helicopter hovering overhead, not knowing until near the very end where its deadly point of impact will be.

From the start of the war, the Assad government has pursued a murderous policy toward Syrian citizens who happen to live in areas that have been seized by opposition armed groups. The apparent aim is to kill and terrorize civilians (and destroy civilian structures) so as to drive civilians from opposition-held areas and to send a warning of the misery that attends anyone whose neighborhood is taken by opposition groups. Mr. Assad is thus pursuing the “total war” strategy that the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war flatly prohibit and criminalize.

Beyond killing civilians, barrel bombs are playing a big part in forcing Syrians from their country. In most wars, civilians can find a modicum of safety by moving away from the front lines. But Mr. Assad’s indiscriminate use of barrel bombs deep in opposition-held territory means that for many there is no safe place to hide. That ugly reality has played a major part in persuading four million people to flee the country.

Yet the international community has made little effort to stop Mr. Assad’s barrel bombing of civilians. The two governments with the greatest potential to influence Mr. Assad — his principal backers, Russia and Iran — have refused to get him to stop. Western governments have been reluctant to exert strong public pressure on them because of other priorities — Ukraine, in the case of Russia, and the nuclear deal, in the case of Iran. The European Union is putting far more effort into stopping Syrian asylum seekers from reaching the Continent than addressing the root causes of their flight. The United States and Turkey recently announced a plan to make a 60-mile strip in northern Syria an “ISIS-free zone,” but the goal is to fight ISIS militants, not protect civilians.

In February 2014, the United Nations Security Council demanded an end to the “indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs,” but it has not done much to stop it. Western governments are now proposing a new Security Council resolution that would have the United Nations monitor the use of barrel bombs and that hints at, though does not actually impose, sanctions should the barrel bombing continue.

If Russia blocks further Security Council action, Western nations should start ratcheting up public pressure on Damascus for using this indiscriminate form of warfare and on Moscow and Tehran for backing it.

Because of Western reticence, too few people understand the extraordinary slaughter that the Syrian military is committing with its barrel bombs. Mr. Assad’s chlorine gas attacks, terrifying as they are, kill a tiny fraction of the barrel-bomb toll, though they have recently attracted more attention than the barrel bombs.

Western nations should also continue to collect evidence of Syrian war crimes, and if Russia persists in blocking the International Criminal Court from having jurisdiction to pursue war-crimes charges, an alternative tribunal should be found.

One reason for soft-pedaling is a fear that ending the barrel-bomb attacks might undermine Mr. Assad’s ability to cling to power, and thus facilitate an Islamic State takeover. But barrel bombs are so imprecise that the Syrian military does not usually drop them near the front lines, for fear of hitting its own troops. They are useful mainly for pummeling civilian neighborhoods.

That is one reason residents of opposition-held parts of Aleppo told me that, unlike in almost any other war, some civilians have — astonishingly — moved closer to the front lines, preferring to brave the more predictable artillery and snipers than the barrel bombs’ random death from the sky. The failure to address the barrel bombs arguably helps extremist groups like the Nusra Front and the Islamic State, which recruit Syrian members by presenting themselves as the most powerful military force to counter Mr. Assad’s government’s atrocities.

President Obama has reportedly been reluctant to act too decisively in Syria for fear that he might then “own” the country and the chaotic mess it has become. But firmer pressure on Syria, Russia and Iran to stop the barrel bombs wouldn’t make the United States responsible for anything other than fewer civilians dead, injured and displaced.

Some say that, rather than targeting a particularly monstrous weapons system, the best way to end the barrel bombs is to make peace. That is a laudable goal, but few believe a negotiated solution to the Syrian crisis is anywhere near. In the meantime, virtually all the Syrians I have spoken with agree that stopping Mr. Assad’s barrel bombs is probably the single most urgent task to reduce their suffering now.

 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

Australia Arrests Nurse Who Says He Worked With ISIS Under Duress
The New York Times
By Michelle Innis
July 25, 2015

A 39-year-old nurse from Melbourne who said he was forced to work with the Islamic State militant group in Syria was arrested upon returning to Australia, the authorities said Saturday.

The nurse, Adam Brookman, was arrested Friday night at Sydney’s international airport on a warrant related to what the authorities said was his involvement in the Syrian conflict, according to the Australian Federal Police. He surrendered to the authorities in Turkey on Tuesday, the police said in a statement. The statement did not identify Mr. Brookman by name, but his activities have been widely reported in the Australian news media.

The police did not say what charges Mr. Brookman might face. But antiterrorism laws passed last year make it illegal for Australians to be in the Syrian city of Raqqa, a control center for the Islamic State, without a legitimate reason. A conviction is punishable by prison sentences of up to 10 years. Providing material support to a militant group like the Islamic State, which is also known as ISIS or ISIL, is punishable by harsher sentences.

Mr. Brookman, a convert to Islam, told The Sydney Morning Herald that he went to Syria to do humanitarian work, but that he was forced to work with the Islamic State after he was wounded in an airstrike and taken to a hospital controlled by the group. He said he never took up arms and focused on medical tasks; eventually, he said, he was able to escape and, later, to cross the border into Turkey.

The Sydney Morning Herald, citing court documents, reported Saturday that Mr. Brookman was accused of working as a guard for the militant group. He was flown in police custody from Sydney to Melbourne, in the state of Victoria, where he was expected to appear in court on Monday, the newspaper said.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott said Thursday that 120 Australians were fighting on the side of extremists in Syria and Iraq, and that 160 other Australians actively supported extremist groups. He said that hundreds of people had been questioned about their travel plans and that the government had confiscated the passports of more than 100 Australians to stop them from joining the fighting.

“Australians have been consistently warned that by becoming involved in overseas conflict they are putting their own lives in mortal danger,” the federal police said in a separate statement. “If there is evidence an Australian has committed a criminal offense under Australia law while involved in the conflict in Syria and Iraq, they will be charged and put before the courts.”

The government is preparing legislation that would allow it to prevent known terrorists who are dual citizens from returning to Australia by stripping them of their Australian citizenship.

FBI: Islamic State Sympathizer Charged in Backpack Bomb Plot
The New York Times
By The Associated Press
July 28, 2015

A man described by the FBI as an Islamic State sympathizer who hoped to mount attacks on U.S. soil was charged Tuesday with plotting to detonate a nail-filled backpack bomb on a Florida beach.

A criminal complaint unsealed Tuesday charges 23-year-old Harlem Suarez of Key West with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction in the U.S. If convicted, he could face a maximum punishment of life in prison.

Authorities say Suarez came to the FBI’s attention through his Facebook posts praising the Islamic State group and containing extremist rhetoric.

In April, Suarez allegedly posted, “Be a warrior, learn how to cut your enemies head and then burn down the body learn how to be the new future of the world Caliphate” — a reference the Islamic State goal of building a regional fundamentalist entity.

The FBI says he later added a request “from any brother. How to make a bomb send me a video or something, what do I need to make it.”

Suarez made his first court appearance Tuesday in Miami and was being held without bail with a detention hearing set for next week. His temporary attorney, Richard Della Fera, said in an email that Suarez “may be a troubled and confused young man but he is certainly not a terrorist.”

“He comes from a very good, hard-working family that arrived here from Cuba in 2004 because they yearned for freedom. They raised their son to love this country,” Della Fera said.

Attempts to reach friends and family members via email and telephone were not immediately successful.

The complaint says Suarez told an FBI informant he wanted to make a timer bomb, bury it on a Key West beach and detonate it remotely. Suarez was arrested Monday after taking possession of an inert explosive device provided by an FBI informant. Suarez had given the informant some bomb supplies, including two boxes of galvanized nails, the backpack and a cellphone to be used as a detonator, according to the complaint.

“I can go to the beach at the night time, put the thing in the sand, cover it up, so the next day I just call and the thing is gonna, is gonna make, a real hard noise from nowhere,” Suarez told an FBI source in a recorded call, according to the complaint.

Suarez was being monitored for months by U.S. authorities and never made an actual explosive, and there was no indication in the FBI complaint that he had contact with any Islamic State militants overseas. Still, Miami’s FBI special agent in charge, George Piro, said the alleged threats had to be taken seriously.

“There is no room for failure when it comes to investigating the potential use of a weapon of mass destruction,” Piro said.

Among other things, the FBI says Suarez also sought to make an Islamic State recruitment video using a script he wrote himself. It eventually was made under FBI surveillance at a motel in Homestead, according to the complaint, with Suarez dressed in a black tactical vest, black shirt, mask and yellow-and-black scarf.

“American soil is the past, we will destroy America and divide it in two, we will rais(e) our black flag on top of your white house and any president on duty (cut head),” Suarez says in a script for the video.

The FBI says Suarez also ordered an AK-47 assault rifle on the Internet and intended to have it delivered to a Key West pawn shop. Although he could legally purchase the weapon, the FBI says, Suarez incorrectly filled out paperwork and it was returned to the seller.

Several dozen people have been charged in the U.S. with attempting to fight alongside the Islamic State and other militants or with lending them material support.

‘I Am an American’ Says Man Who Tried to Join Islamic State
The New York Times
By The Associated Press
July 28, 2015

A Georgia man who wrote he was “ready for jihad” before buying a one-way ticket overseas to try joining the Islamic State group was sentenced to federal prison Tuesday after he sobbed to the judge, “I am an American.”

Leon Nathan Davis III of Augusta was sentenced to 15 years, the maximum punishment allowed. A pale, bearded man with a Southern accent, the 38-year-old Davis pleaded guilty in May to seeking to help a known terrorist organization.

He was arrested at the Atlanta airport last October trying to board a flight to Turkey. Davis later said his plan was to be smuggled into Syria so he could join the Islamic State group as a recruiter and an English teacher.

During his sentencing Tuesday, Davis told the judge he had been “brainwashed” by writings and online propaganda of radical Muslims not long after he converted to Islam while imprisoned for cocaine trafficking a decade ago.

“I allowed myself to stray away from the truth of my religion, which is peace, love and humility,” Davis said. “They brainwashed me into thinking that hatred and death were the way into heaven.”

Despite his apologies and acknowledgement of wrongdoing, prosecutors insisted Davis was far from harmless.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Carlton Bourne showed the judge a photograph Davis posted online of himself holding a shotgun and surrounded by other weapons. Bourne said Davis added the caption: “ready for jihad.”

About a year before buying his plane ticket, Bourne said, Davis posted online: “One of my greatest desires is to kill Zionists and bring down Israel and the United States of America.”

Despite being a convicted felon, Davis owned six rifles, four handguns and two shotguns, according to prosecutors who originally charged him with illegal gun possession. That charge was dropped as part of a plea deal.

Davis posted “stupid things” on social media, said his defense attorney, Michael Loebl. But with no military training and a bad back, Davis posed “a low-level threat, if any,” Loebl said.

Davis underwent a genuine religious conversion while in prison from 2005 to 2008, Loebl said, and became so dedicated that he taught himself to read and write Arabic. He said Davis’ interest in radical Islam peaked when he left prison and was able to access writings, videos and other materials online.

Davis and his attorney insisted he never meant harm, particularly to Americans. Davis was born in Augusta and had a father who served in the military. At the time of his arrest, he was selling dietary supplements. He told the judge that because of his actions, his wife, an Iraqi citizen, has been barred from returning to the U.S.

“I love my country and I am an American,” Davis said through loud sobs. “This is the best country in the world and it deserves better.”

Authorities have charged several dozen people in the last year with trying to fight alongside the Islamic State and other militants or with lending them material support.

U.S. District Court Judge J. Randal Hall said he chose the maximum punishment for Davis in hopes that it might deter others, though he also voiced concerns Davis might use prison to recruit more Islamic State supporters.

“In light of the clear evidence of their savagery and brutality, he chose to travel there and join them,” Hall said. “This is a serious offense against our nation. We need to impose a serious sentence.”

2017 Trial Set for 2 Men Accused in Plot to Kill Blogger
The New York Times
By The Associated Press
July 29, 2015

A 2017 trial date is scheduled for two men charged with conspiring to support the Islamic State group in a plot to kill a conservative blogger known for provoking Muslims.

Judge William Young set the date Wednesday for Nicholas Rovinski, of Warwick, Rhode Island, and David Wright, of Everett, Massachusetts. Defense attorneys sought the extra time to review thousands of documents and computer records.

The men have been held without bail since pleading not guilty last month to conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist organization.

Prosecutors allege they plotted with Usaamah Rahim to behead blogger Pamela Geller, who organized a Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest in Texas in May. The plot wasn’t carried out.

Rahim was killed by investigators who say he lunged at them with a knife when they approached him June 2 in Boston.

Man From Buffalo Area Is Charged With Trying to Aid ISIS
The New York Times
By Stephanie Clifford
July 30, 2015

As law enforcement increasingly focuses on stopping Americans from supporting the Islamic State, a man from the Buffalo area has been arrested and charged with trying to join the terrorist group.

The man, Arafat M. Nagi, 44, of Lackawanna, N.Y., becomes the latest in a string of arrests of American citizens and residents accused of trying to support the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. Federal prosecutors in Brooklyn, Minneapolis and elsewhere have brought at least two dozen such cases this year.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation recently changed how it handles suspected Islamic State sympathizers, emphasizing speedy arrests over extended periods of monitoring, to quickly head off potential attacks in the United States. Officials say the group uses social media to encourage people to carry out small attacks.

Defense lawyers, however, say the Islamic State cases can be weak because many rely on cooperating witnesses or informers and because activity that may seem suspicious is not necessarily criminal.

“There is nothing inherently illegal about any of my client’s actions as alleged in the complaint, and we look forward to learning more about the government’s case at Friday’s bail hearing,” Mr. Nagi’s lawyer, Jeremy D. Schwartz, said in an email.

A cooperating witness previously convicted of terrorism offenses alerted the F.B.I. to Mr. Nagi in August 2014, prosecutors said. The witness said Mr. Nagi often talked of jihad and got into “verbal altercations over his jihadi beliefs.”

Officials looked at his travel records and found that he had gone to Istanbul in July 2014 and had traveled on to Yemen. He returned to the United States in September, after the witness had spoken to the F.B.I. Interviewed at the airport upon his return, Mr. Nagi told officers from Customs and Border Protection that he did not support terrorist groups.

However, investigators took Mr. Nagi’s iPad, iPhone and cellphone upon his return, and, after obtaining a warrant, searched them. They found a WhatsApp conversation in which Mr. Nagi, discussing an earlier trip to Turkey and Yemen in 2012, wrote in part that he wanted to “help the Syrian people.” He had returned home early, he said, because of a gallbladder issue.

Investigators found that before a 2012 trip, Mr. Nagi had bought a tactical vest, an army combat shirt, body armor, combat boots and a flag with the shahada, the Muslim declaration of faith. Heading into his 2014 trip, he kept buying militarylike items, such as a “Hamas-style” headband from eBay, a combat face mask and night-vision goggles.

A Twitter account traced to him also contained posts that seemed to show him swearing allegiance to the Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and celebrating Islamic State beheadings, investigators said. They added that about half of the Twitter accounts he followed contained terrorism-related postings.

Another informer told the government that once Mr. Nagi returned home, Mr. Nagi said he had pledged himself to Mr. Baghdadi and the Islamic State. The informer believed that Mr. Nagi “may do something in the United States.” By 2015, Mr. Nagi was making plans to go to Turkey and Yemen again, the informer said, and the informer, who was reporting to the government, apparently made plans to go with him “in order to elicit information from him,” an F.B.I. agent wrote in the criminal complaint.

Mr. Nagi was arrested early on Wednesday, and appeared in Federal District Court in Buffalo later in the morning. If convicted on the charge of seeking to provide material support to a terrorist group, he could face up to 15 years in prison.

“We continue to call upon people to contact law enforcement if they know of someone who has been influenced by ISIL rhetoric on social media,” Brian P. Boetig, special agent in charge of the F.B.I.’s Buffalo division, said in a statement.

Eight Million Civilians Living in State of Fear in Syria, Iraq
Assyrian International News Agency
August 5, 2015

The Islamic State has engaged in widespread and systematic human rights violations of the most serious kinds in Syria and Iraq, brutally forcing some eight million people to assimilate, flee or face death, according to a United Nations expert.

“These violations may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and widespread attacks on the civilian population,” Ben Emmerson, the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, said in his report.

An estimated eight million people live under the Islamic State territory in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. “The brutal nature and overall scale of abuses appears to be intended to reinforce the group’s absolute monopoly on political and social life and to enforce compliance and conformity among communities under its control. The result is that civilians who remain in ISIL-controlled areas live in a state of constant and almost unimaginable fear,” Emmerson said.

The Islamic State has targeted religious and ethnic groups in Iraq and Syria and committed acts of violence against civilians because of their affiliation with them. These communities have been forced to assimilate, flee or face death, he explained. “In Iraq, violence against the Yezidis have been reported with men being separated from women and children, then taken to ditches and brutally executed,” he added.

Extremely vulnerable to violence and discrimination, women face sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual slavery, killings, enslavement, and rape. They are confined to their homes and forced to adhere to a strict dress code, pointed out the expert. And children as young as six have been raped, tortured and kidnapped. Children as young as 8 years old have also been trained and used in military roles.

“They are reportedly made to watch videos of beheadings, and mass executions to desensitize them to forms of violence employed by ISIL.” The growing military capacity of ISIL also means the spread of fear and terror on civilians, Emmerson continued, emphasizing that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have now joined the ranks of non-State armed groups from about 80 countries around the world.

Addressing the military response by the international coalition of States, led by the United States, he said that civilians living in ISIL-controlled territory are mainly residing in urban areas where many of the coalition air strikes have been performed. It has also been reported that ISIL strategically places its fighters among civilians, in civilian areas or uses hospitals and schools as military bases, to provoke civilian casualties in the event of attacks by the coalition.

The UN Rapporteur then called attention to the lack of transparency with coalition operations in Iraq and Syria. “Each nation participating in the air war operates under unique rules of engagement, and transparency levels differ significantly,” the expert noted. While air strikes are carried out by different sources, it is difficult to know which States were responsible for an event and when they will occur.

The special rapporteur recalled the coalition states’ obligations under international law to ensure that their military operations are ‘transparent and accountable,’ and that any civilian death resulting from these operations is ‘promptly, independently and impartiality’ investigated. Highlighting the failure by the Security Council to take appropriate and immediate action to protect civilians in affected areas, Emmerson also stressed the need for the international coalition of states engaged in military acts against ISIL to ensure that measures are put into place to protect civilians and prevent further casualties.

 

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Official Website of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
In Focus: Special Tribunal for Lebanon (UN)

STL Prosecutor Says Probe into 3 Other Attacks has not Stopped
Naharnet Newsdesk
August 2, 2015

Special Tribunal for Lebanon Prosecutor Norman Farrell has said that the court has been investigating the attacks on MP Marwan Hamadeh, the former head of the communist party, George Hawi, and ex-Defense Minister Elias Murr.

Farrell told As Safir daily published on Tuesday that in addition to ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s murder, the STL is “working on” the assassination attempt against Hamadeh in October 2004, the killing of Hawi in June 2005 and the attempted murder of Murr in July the same year.

In 2011, Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen received a request from the Office of the Prosecutor to determine whether or not these cases are connected to the February 14, 2005 assassination of Hariri.

He ruled that the Prosecutor had presented prima facie evidence that each of the three cases are connected, and are thus within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

But As Safir said that there has been no information since 2011 on the progress made into the investigation of the three cases.

The Prosecutor has not issued any indictment, only saying in a yearly report issued by the STL that the three crimes are a “priority” for his office, said the report.

The office refused to divulge information on whether any progress had been made, only telling As Safir that it does not discuss cases that are still under investigation.

Meet the Pyromaniac Playboy Leading Hezbollah’s Fight in Syria
The Daily Beast
By Alex Rowell
August 3, 2015

Meet Mustafa Badreddine, the pyromaniac playboy leading the Party of God’s fight in Syria.

To close friends, he is “Dhu al-Faqar,”—the name, meaning, “the cleaver of vertebrae,” of the legendary double-tipped sword given by the Prophet Muhammad to his son-in-law, Ali bin Abi Talib, the patron imam of Shia Islam. To the Kuwaiti government, who sentenced him to death in 1984 for a spate of audacious bombings on targets including the American and French embassies and the airport, he is Elias Fouad Saab. To prosecutors at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague, who are currently trying him in absentia on suspicion of assassinating Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005, he is Mustafa Amine Badreddine. To genteel dining companions—and multiple mistresses—entertained at his seaside home north of Beirut, he is the boat-owning, Mercedes-driving Christian jeweler, Sami Issa.

Or, rather, he was. The Frank Abagnale Jr. of jihad has found yet another preoccupation in the last few years. According to sources as discrepant as the U.S. Treasury Department and a militantly pro-Hezbollah newspaper in Beirut, the man who also goes by the name Safi Badr is currently leading the Party of God’s military intervention against the Syrian uprising, personally sitting in on meetings between President Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. It’s a distinction that earned the “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” a fresh dose of American sanctions just last week.

Not that he’s spending all his days on the road. He was spotted back in Lebanon in January at the funeral of his nephew Jihad Mughniyeh—son of his cousin, brother-in-law, and lifelong partner-in-war-crime, the late Imad Mughniyeh—who had been killed in the Syrian Golan Heights by an Israeli drone strike that, according to a New York Times report, had in fact been intended for Badreddine (his real name) himself. He had “dropped out of the gathering,” at which an Iranian Revolutionary Guards general was also present, “at the last minute.”

Such improbable escapes are seemingly second-nature to the former death row inmate who owes his life to the insane decision by Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990, opening the prisons and sending Badreddine on his merry way to the Iranian embassy, to be welcomed and swiftly redeployed to Beirut, where the civil war had conveniently just ended. Under the patronage of the Syrian occupation newly legitimized by the international community in the 1989 Taif Agreement, Dhu al-Faqar and his fellow “Islamic Resistance” mujahideen were about to spend some of their happiest years bringing misery and death to the 1,500 Israeli troops who would remain in south Lebanon till the year 2000.

Among the reasons Badreddine isn’t far better known is that, officially, he barely exists. In the words of STL prosecutor Graeme Cameron, “There are few official records in Lebanon relating to Mustafa Badreddine […] He has never been issued a passport. He has never been issued a driver’s license. He is not the registered owner of any property in Lebanon. The authorities have no records of him entering or leaving Lebanon. No records are held by the Ministry of Finance which would reflect that he pays any taxes. There are no bank accounts in any of the banks or any of the financial institutions in the country in his name.” In summary, “Badreddine passes as an unrecognizable and virtually untraceable ghost throughout Lebanon, leaving no footprint.”

“Hezbollah has many heads, some of them quite visible, like their social welfare networks and parliamentary presence,” Nicholas Blanford, veteran Lebanon reporter and author of Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel, told The Daily Beast. “Other parts are not so visible. The world that Mustafa Badreddine inhabits is one of those dark, invisible ones.”

So much for Mustafa. “Sami Issa,” on the other hand, did leave prosecutors something of a footprint—an Italian-made, leather-soled one at that. According to Cameron, as “Issa,” Badreddine was “the de facto, but not the registered owner of a jewelry business with several branches in Beirut. He [had] an apartment in Jounieh, registered in the name of another, and a boat registered and insured in the name of another. He drove an expensive Mercedes automobile which was not registered in his name. He had several concurrent girlfriends and was seen regularly in restaurants and cafes socializing with his friends.” (The prosecution had not responded at the time of publication to an inquiry by The Daily Beast as to how exactly it came into this knowledge.)

Which, undoubtedly, is one way to go about unsuspected of being arguably Hezbollah’s best-ever bomb maker. And there is much in his choice of Jounieh, of all places, as adopted home that must have brought him mirth. This scenic bay at the feet of verdant, pine-smothered slopes some 20 minutes north of Beirut is Lebanon’s Cote d’Azur, where blue-blooded Francophones take their surgically-inflated girlfriends out to sail or waterski. At its northern end sits the once-glorious Casino du Liban—hangout of Sinatra and Brigitte Bardot—just a stone’s throw from the red light district. Nor are these the only ways in which it’s an atypical locale for an Islamic fundamentalist.

During Lebanon’s Civil War (1975-1990), Jounieh was de facto capital of the ethnically-cleansed Christian canton, ruled by vehemently anti-Muslim warlords openly backed by the army of Menachim Begin and Ariel Sharon. Indeed, from his apartment, “Issa” could possibly see the Aquamarina resort—still popular to this day—where Israeli boats would arrive periodically to replenish supplies. Who said Khomeinists can’t do irony?

How did Badreddine go from international terrorist to cross-wearing adulterer and to Hezbollah’s Syria commander? His biography starts with geography. He was born in 1961 in Ghobeiri, an inauspicious, overcrowded neighborhood in the concrete “belt of misery” on Beirut’s southern fringe, populated mostly by newly arrived Shia from the rural south seeking a piece of the capital’s climbing prosperity. When the civil war broke out, exactly one week after Badreddine’s 14th birthday, Ghobeiri and its environs formed a stronghold of the Palestinian and allied Muslim militias, encompassing the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps that would later witness an infamous massacre at the hands of their Christian foes. With his cousin, the indefatigable Imad Mughniyeh—eventually assassinated in a joint CIA-Mossad operation in Damascus in 2008—Badreddine joined and was trained by the Palestinian Fatah faction, adding to what a PLO veteran described as “a kind of roving Shiite fight club” embedded within the otherwise Sunni force. This sectarian distinction, though of little consequence in the early years, began to sour the air in the wake of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, not least when Saddam Hussein, a key sponsor of the PLO much admired by the fedayeen rank and file, began murdering major Shia figures like Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. By the time of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Badreddine and his cousin had defected to a pro-Tehran ultraist offshoot of the Shia Amal Movement, later to call itself Hezbollah, the Party of God.

He was evidently, even then at just 21, an established explosives virtuoso, for it was only one year later that he would carry out the world-headline-grabbing attacks in Kuwait, which included a truck-mounted suicide bomber smashing into the U.S. embassy, killing six. It’s believed he also contributed, as Mughniyeh’s bomb maker, to the similar—if much more spectacular—attack two months earlier on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 servicemen, watching the largest non-nuclear explosion in history unfold shoulder-to-shoulder with his cousin from a nearby rooftop. “During the planning stages [of the Beirut attack], Badreddine apparently developed what would become his trademark explosive technique: adding gas to increase the power of sophisticated explosives,” writes Matthew Levitt, author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.

Having hit on a winning formula, Badreddine has seemingly found no reason to change it. The STL prosecution argues the m.o. used in Kuwait—where Badreddine personally surveilled the bomb sites in advance, hand-picked the vehicles to be used, and delegated specific roles to a small team of subordinates—bears much in common with the approach uncovered in the Hariri case. According to the telecommunications analysis that forms the basis of the prosecution’s case, Badreddine was in possession of no fewer than 13 cellphones, in near-continuous contact with his four co-conspirators (among them another brother-in-law, Salim Jamil Ayyash). The call records show that for three months leading up to the Valentine’s Day suicide bombing, Badreddine micromanaged his team as they executed such tasks as following Hariri around town, buying the Mitsubishi van to be used on the day, and arranging for a phony claim of responsibility for the attack by a nonexistent Sunni jihadist group.

On at least one occasion, Badreddine himself tailed Hariri. At other times, he ran the show from places as various as Beirut’s southern suburbs, home to Hezbollah’s headquarters; Jounieh; and Faqra, a remote ski resort 1,500 meters above sea level where Hariri owned a vacation home. Former CIA operative in Lebanon Robert Baer, who was hired as a consultant by STL prosecutors, writes in his book, The Perfect Kill, that Badreddine even conducted business from inside the Casino du Liban, where he was fond of “spending his nights.”

Of course, not all of Badreddine’s phone calls were strictly work-related. When he wasn’t catching up with his wife, Fatima, or making appointments with his fellow gastronomes, his “several concurrent girlfriends” understandably consumed a portion of his time. Some may even have sensed he was up to something—at 2:31 a.m. on the very night before the attack, he sent one an SMS reading, “If you knew where I have been you would be very upset.”

Precious little else is known about these extramarital companions. Baer, the ex-CIA spy, assures readers in his book they were “beautiful,” lured by the pseudo-entrepreneur’s “large pleasure yacht” and “nouveau riche” extravagance. Conceivably, some were met on campus at the Lebanese American University (LAU), where “Issa” studied political science between the years 2002 and 2004. (None of the six LAU poli-sci professors contacted by The Daily Beast would admit to knowing “Issa” during his time. “[The] administration is very edgy about faculty talking about it,” said one, on condition of anonymity.) At any rate, according to The New York Times, Badreddine felt sufficiently attached to the women to disobey a 2009 order from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to lay off the public appearances for a while. He “refused to give up his luxurious lifestyle and went on using his Sami Issa identity.”

In this, his character departs from that of Mughniyeh, who had no public life of any kind (and who preferred to marry a second wife, an Iranian named Wafaa, rather than betray his first one, Badreddine’s sister Saada). Perhaps, having inherited the office of his oldest comrade upon his 2008 assassination, Badreddine felt able at last to step out of the shadow of his predecessor. It’s worth noting that, while theirs is often portrayed as a mentor-protégé relationship, Badreddine is actually the elder of the two, and has been described by one Hezbollah member as the “more dangerous” one. Their bond, in reality, seems to have been most like a fraternal one, with Mughniyeh, for example, naming his eldest son Mustafa. When Badreddine was jailed in Kuwait, Mughniyeh went on a personal rampage to get him out, hijacking at least three commercial planes (Kuwait Airways Flight 221 in December 1984, TWA Flight 847 in June 1985, and Kuwait Airways Flight 422 in April 1988) and kidnapping every Westerner in Beirut he could get his hands on with the explicitly declared intent of swapping the hostages for his brother-in-law. At least five passengers and seven abductees lost their lives when his demands went unmet.

Once Badreddine—or “Elias Saab”—did at last make it out of his Kuwait cell, he reportedly began working with Mughniyeh not just on the south Lebanese front but also a number of exciting new side ventures into which Hezbollah began investing resources. These included the so-called “Unit 1800,” founded in the 1990s to assist Hamas and other Palestinian militants south of the Lebanese border in their own operations against Israel. Badreddine would eventually come to lead Unit 1800, according to The Times. There were also yet more ambitious projects outside the Middle East altogether. If it’s true, as a now-dead Argentine prosecutor believed, that Mughniyeh was involved in the van-driven suicide bombing that killed 85 civilians at a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, then it would be no surprise if his sidekick Badreddine had a role as well.

More recently, the toppling of the rabidly anti-Shia dictatorship in Baghdad in 2003 offered God’s Partisans the strategic opportunity of a lifetime, which they wasted no time in seizing, quickly forming a new “Unit 3800” to help the Iranian Revolutionary Guards create Hezbollah duplicates among Iraq’s Shia so as to maximize Tehran’s stake in the new Iraq at the expense of all other takers. The experience, in which Badreddine apparently played a “coordinating” role, would prove invaluable when yet more Khomeinist proxy militias had to be assembled to combat the armed insurrection in Syria from 2012, though it was not without unintended consequences: Hezbollah fighters in the town of Qusair were reportedly displeased to discover the tunnel-building methods and equipment they’d dutifully passed on to Hamas had ended up in their opponents’ hands. Not for the first time, Badreddine may have reflected, had his trust in erstwhile Sunni brothers been poorly repaid.

The Party has long since cleared rebels out of Qusair, and much of the surrounding territory besides. But how much longer can Badreddine’s luck last? Three years into a war that Assad himself admits is straining his troops, Hezbollah is today sending boys too young to grow facial hair to the front lines—and watching them return in body bags at a faster rate than ever. Badreddine’s motto, according to the pro-Hezbollah paper, is “Either I return carried as a martyr, or carrying the banner of victory.” With yet another Israeli strike Wednesday in the same Quneitra province in which Dhu al-Faqar so nearly perished in January, one wonders how many bookies would bank on seeing that banner in the near future.

 

War Crimes Investigation in Burma

Myanmar Releases Almost 7,000 Prisoners in Holiday Amnesty
The Wall Street Journal
By Shibani Mahtani and Myo Myo
July 30, 2015

Myanmar on Thursday released almost 7,000 prisoners on a presidential pardon, including more than 200 foreigners and former military-intelligence officers, according to officials.

Among the foreigners released were 153 Chinese loggers who had been sentenced to life in jail last week, a move that could ease tensions between Myanmar and its northern neighbor.

Zaw Htay, director of the office of President Thein Sein, said in an interview that 6,966 prisoners were released in an amnesty, including 210 foreigners and nine former military-intelligence officers who were purged under Myanmar’s previous ruling junta.

He didn’t provide details on the foreigners who were released. But Win Naing Lynn, head of the prison in Myitkyina where the Chinese loggers were being held on charges of illegal logging, said that all of them had been released “in accordance with the amnesty, and the friendship between China and Myanmar.”

The loggers had been dealt unusually long sentences by the Myanmar government. Their arrest had angered officials in China, who had urged Myanmar to reconsider the length and severity of the sentences.

Hong Lei, spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, said that China had been in “close communications” with Myanmar throughout the process, according to a statement posted on the foreign ministry’s website. The statement added that the Myanmar government was handing over the individuals to Chinese authorities.

Thursday’s amnesty was one of the largest that Myanmar has seen in recent years. But activists and officials say they haven’t yet determined how many prisoners of conscience were among those released. A representative for the Bi Mon Te Nay journal, a weekly publication in Myanmar, said that four of their journalists and the publisher of the journal were released after spending almost a year in jail for articles that the government considered defamatory.

Among the military-intelligence officers released was Than Tun, a former brigadier general, and Tin Htut, son-in-law of the former prime minister and head of military intelligence Khin Nyunt.

About half a dozen other former military-intelligence officials were released late last year in a similar amnesty. These men were close associates of Mr. Khin Nyunt, released in 2012 after spending almost a decade under house arrest after falling out of favor with Myanmar’s military hard-liner Senior Gen. Than Shwe, who led the former junta.

The prisoners were freed from various locations across the country, including the notorious Insein prison north of downtown Yangon, where thousands of political prisoners were held under Myanmar’s military regime. Relatives gathered outside the prison gates on Thursday morning, waiting for news of their incarcerated family members.

The presidential pardons are in line with Mr. Thein Sein’s promise to free all prisoners of conscience, and others purged by the military regime, during his term. Myanmar jails were supposed to be free of prisoners of conscience by 2014, but the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a watchdog group which monitors the situation of political prisoners in Myanmar, says about 158 remain.

The amnesty comes as Myanmar gears up for a landmark election this November, which will be a key test of how far democratic reform has taken hold in this former pariah state after nearly six decades under military rule.

Mr. Thein Sein, who has led the nominally-civilian government since 2011, hasn’t ruled out seeking a second term as president, officials say.

 

Terrorism

Accused ‘Lone Wolf’ Arraigned on State Terrorism Charges in Killing of NJ Student
Fox News
By Pamela Browne and Rick Leventhal
August 4, 2015

The Muslim extremist accused of the random killing of a New Jersey college student last year in a case that first spotlighted the threat of “lone wolf” ISIS sympathizers acting on American soil was arraigned Tuesday on terrorism charges.

Ali Mohammad Brown, who is already facing charges in the murders of four men, including Brendan Tevlin, 19, and three Washington state men, faces the enhanced terrorism charges brought by New Jersey prosecutors. Brown, who told investigators he killed Tevlin on June 25, 2014, as an act of “vengeance” for innocent lives lost in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Iran, is being held at the Essex County Correctional Facility in lieu of $5 million bail.

Last week, Allison Tevlin, the mother of Brendan Tevlin, told Fox News’ “Greta Investigates” team that the additional charge of terrorism brought against her son’s accused murderer “is a good thing.” Allison Tevlin and her husband were on hand at the Newark courthouse for Tuesday’s procedure.

“Hopefully it will bring more attention to my son’s case,” she added, noting her family “has been always confused why it didn’t receive more attention.”

This is the first murder case in New Jersey in which a defendant has been charged with terrorism under state law. Besides allegedly killing Tevlin on June 25, 2014, Brown is also accused of killing three other men in Washington state earlier last year. They were 30-year-old Leroy Henderson, Dwone Anderson-Young, 23, and Ahmed Said, 27.

In October 2014, Fox News was first to reveal that Brown had ties to a disrupted terrorist cell, a terrorist training camp on U.S. soil, and federal investigations going back more than a decade.

Details of Brown’s criminal life and connections to radical Islam prior to the murders of the four young men is under renewed scrutiny by authorities in both New Jersey and Washington state.

After his arrest in West Orange, N.J., in July 2014, Brown, 29, told detectives from both states that he “was engaged in jihad” and referred to the specific murder of Tevlin as a “just kill.”

Tevlin was murdered in West Orange while sitting in his car at a traffic light. He was shot eight times. In addition to Brown, two other men were arrested in Tevlin’s murder — Jeremy Villagran and Eric Williams. Charges against Villagran and Williams were recently dismissed.

In Seattle, authorities say ballistics link the same 9-mm. handgun that Brown used to kill Tevlin to the three other homicide investigations in Washington.

On June 1, 2014, in Seattle, Dwone Anderson-Young and Said were killed “execution style” as they sat inside a car.

Authorities say the same weapon was used on April 27, 2014, to gun down Henderson as he walked the streets of Skyway, Wash.

Two former FBI agents from the Joint Terrorism Task Force, or JTTF, told Fox News that Brown also may have traveled to one of the first terrorist training camps on U.S. soil when he was a teenager known as “Dog Cry Ranch.”

When former FBI Agents David Rubincam and David Gomez were interviewed by Fox in Seattle, Gomez said, “I believe Ali Mohammad Brown at some point traveled to Bly, Ore., prior to his arrest for financial institution fraud.”

The JTTF executed 19 search and arrest warrants in November 2004 after a 30-month investigation, which became known as the “Ranier Valley Roundup.” No one, including Brown, was charged with terrorism at the time.

Ethiopian Muslims Accused Of Terrorism, Jailed For 22 Years After Obama’s Visit
International Business Times
By Morgan Winsor
August 4, 2015

An Ethiopian court has jailed 18 Muslims, including clerics and a journalist, for terms of up to 22 years under controversial anti-terrorism laws in the mainly Coptic Christian country. The group was convicted last month on charges including terrorism and conspiracy to establish an Islamic state, after they were arrested three years earlier for protesting against the government, according to Ethiopia’s privately owned Addis Standard magazine.

Four of the defendants were sentenced to 22 years in prison each, while the sentences for the other 14 ranged from seven to 18 years. All 18 have denied the charges and said they were mistreated during their detention, BBC News reported. The group was among hundreds of thousands who staged protests in 2011 and 2012 over the government’s alleged interference with the affairs of Ethiopia’s highest religious body for Muslims.

Human rights groups have listed Ethiopia as the world’s second-worst jailer of journalists and one of the most repressive regimes in Africa. The severe sentencing came just weeks after U.S. President Barack Obama’s controversial trip to Ethiopia, during which he called on the government to improve its tainted record on governance. However, human rights activists criticized the U.S. president for not putting more pressure on the Ethiopian government to change its authoritarian ways, which it has long denied.

While meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in the capital Addis Adaba last month, Obama largely praised the “democratically elected” government as an “outstanding partner” in fighting Islamist militants and stemming violence in the easternmost corner of Africa. But Ethiopia’s ruling party, which has governed for the past 24 years, has been widely accused of rigging elections and intimidating voters.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, led by Desalegn, and its allies secured all of the parliamentary seats in the country’s May 24 general elections, which lacked any viable competition or oversight by Western observers. Opposition leaders accused the ruling party of stifling dissent to ensure victory.

In 2009, Ethiopia passed two anti-terrorism laws that used broad language to define terrorism and terrorists, which human rights activists said the government has used to throw journalists and opposition leaders in prison without substantial evidence. At least 60 journalists have fled the East African country since 2010, while others sit in jail, according to a January report by Human Rights Watch.

Nearly 34 percent of Ethiopia’s 83 million people are Muslims. The minority community has been protesting since 2011 after the Ethiopian government allegedly insisted the Islamic Supreme Council accept members from an Islamic sect known as al Ahbash and tried to impose its teachings on the Muslim community. The government also allegedly sought to influence the operations of the Awalia mosque in Addis Ababa, according to Human Rights Watch.

“There seems to be no limit to the Ethiopian government’s use of its anti-terrorism law and unfair trials to stop peaceful dissent,” Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director of Human Rights Watch, has said. “The government’s treatment of these Muslim leaders bears the hallmarks of a politically motivated prosecution.”

Saudi Court Convicts Ex-Soldier of Terrorism and Joining IS
The New York Times
August 4, 2015

Semi-official Saudi news websites say a former soldier has been found guilty of fighting for the Islamic State group in Syria and has been sentenced to nine years in prison.

A court in Jiddah found the soldier guilty of taking part in training and violent operations with the Islamic State group in Syria. Saudi Arabia is part of the U.S.-led coalition carrying out airstrikes against the group in Syria and Iraq.

The court also barred him from traveling abroad for nine years after he completes his prison sentence and fined him 5,000 Saudi riyals (approximately $1,300).

News websites Alriyadh, Okaz and others carried the verdict Tuesday, saying the soldier had been working in the military corps before fleeing to Syria via Turkey.

Anjem Choudary Faces UK Terrorism Charges Over Islamic State
BBC News
August 5, 2015

Radical preacher Anjem Choudary has appeared at Westminster Magistrates’ Court charged with inviting support for the so-called Islamic State.

He and another man, Mohammed Rahman, indicated they would plead not guilty.

Anjem Choudary was remanded in custody until 28 August.

Both men have each been charged with one offence under section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, alleged to have taken place between 29 June 2014 and 6 March this year.

The BBC’s Simon Jones, reporting from outside the court, said that when asked by the judge to give an indication of how he would be pleading Choudary said: “Cameron and the police are guilty.”

The judge replied to say he took that to mean he would be pleading not guilty.

Mr. Choudary 48, was described in court as a “high-profile figure” in the media and on social media.

The court also heard that the charge is related to him sending messages to his 32,000 followers on Facebook.

‘Lectures’

Mr. Choudary, of Ilford in east London, and Mohammed Rahman, 32, of Whitechapel in east London, were arrested on 25 September last year on suspicion of being members of IS, which is a proscribed organisation.

Proscription means membership of the militant group is a criminal offence, and that the organisation cannot lawfully operate in the UK.

Sue Hemming, of the Crown Prosecution Service, said: “It is alleged that Anjem Choudary and Mohammed Rahman invited support for Isis [also known as IS] in individual lectures which were subsequently published online.”

Mr. Choudary is the former UK head of Islamist group al-Muhajiroun – also known as Islam4UK – which was banned in 2010.

The former lawyer planned an Islam4UK march through Wootton Bassett, Wiltshire, to honour Muslims killed in the Afghanistan conflict, but those plans were later scrapped.

The town is where repatriated bodies of dead UK soldiers were driven through the streets from nearby RAF Lyneham.

Ofcom launched an investigation into interviews broadcast on BBC, ITV and Channel 4 with Mr. Choudary in the days following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court Rules to Allow Military Trials for Suspects in Terrorism Cases
US News & World Report
By: Asif Shahzad
August 5, 2015

Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled on Wednesday to allow military trials for terror suspects — the latest in the government’s intensified campaign against terrorism in the wake of last year’s Taliban attack on a school that killed nearly 150 people, almost all of them children.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif welcomed the decision, which is seen as a major victory for his government, but critics and rights activists say it goes against the constitution and civil rights.

The ruling gives the green light for army courts to try civilians suspected in terrorism cases, said Zafrullah Khan, the government’s legal adviser. It followed several petitions that challenged a decision by parliament earlier this year to allow military courts to prosecute terror suspects over the next two years.

But the ruling also prompted concerns that the military courts could now sentence civilians to death in speedy trials held in secret, without due process or the oversight of human rights experts, the media or the public.

Pakistani human rights activist Husain Naqi said military courts were unconstitutional and “violate the basic right of fair trial and rule of law.” The group he works with, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, has raised concerns over the rising number of executions, urging the government to abolish the death penalty.

Khan, the adviser, said the ruling basically upheld the earlier parliament decision. In Pakistan, the parliament has broad rights, including approving amendments to the constitution.

Pakistan has been fighting Islamic militancy for over a decade but authorities took extraordinary measures after the Peshawar school attack, including lifting a moratorium on executions, in place since 2008.

Since the lifting of the moratorium, nearly 200 convicts on death row have been hanged in Pakistan. Militants, too, have been executed among that number, but the majority of them were people convicted of other crimes.

The Pakistani Taliban have been waging war against the state in a bid to overthrow the government and install their own harsh brand of Islamic law, or Sharia. Over a decade of violence, including suicide bombings and armed attacks, has killed tens of thousands of Pakistanis.

When the parliament established the military courts for terror cases, the prevailing argument was that civilian courts are not able to successfully try and convict terrorist suspects since such suspects are able to intimidate witnesses, prosecutors and judges.

In one example, judges would have tea and cookies brought to one of Pakistan’s most feared Islamic militants, Malik Ishaq, during past court proceedings against him. Ishaq was gunned down and killed while being transported in a police van last month.

Also, scores of judges and prosecutors have pulled out of almost 200 cases, including some 70 trials over the killings of minority Shiite Muslims, against Ishaq apparently fearing for their own lives.

The prime minister told lawmakers in parliament he hopes the decision will discourage terror attacks. “Unusual situations warrant unusual measures,” Sharif said.

Constitutional lawyer S.M. Zafar said the decision shows the “civilian government, army and courts are on the same page in the fight against the menace of terrorism.”

But another lawyer, Sheikh Ahsanuddin, criticized the ruling, saying it will undermine the judiciary and civil rights.

“We fear the military courts will override justice,” he said, adding he will file a review appeal against the Supreme Court’s ruling.

It was not immediately unclear when the military trials, which are held in secret, will resume. The trials were suspended pending the petitions to the Supreme court.

U.S. Terrorism Victims File Lawsuit Targeting Part of Iranian Nuclear Deal
The Wall Street Journal
By Nicole Hong
August 5, 2015

A group of American terrorism victims filed a lawsuit Wednesday asking a federal judge to stop the U.S. government from releasing billions of dollars in Iranian assets as part of the Obama administration’s nuclear deal.

The approximately two dozen victims are Americans injured or killed in suicide bombings in and around Israel from 1995 to 2006 and their family members.

The victims previously sued Iran and were awarded over $1.5 billion, including $152.7 million in compensation, by federal judges who found that Iran helped support the terrorist attacks against them. Iran hasn’t paid the judgments, some of which date back over a decade.

If the nuclear deal, which was reached on July 14, is approved by Congress, it would return an estimated $100 billion to $150 billion in overseas bank accounts back to Iran, making it more difficult for terrorism victims to seize that money as part of their judgments, the victims’ lawyers said in a complaint filed in Manhattan federal court on Wednesday. The money, which is primarily from frozen oil profits, should instead be given to victims, they argue.

“To release the funds instead of turning them over to the victims would make a farce out of this hard-fought legal process,” said Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, one of the lawyers representing the victims.

Congress is expected to review the agreement and vote on it in early September.

The lawsuit targets Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew. A spokeswoman for the State Department said the department doesn’t comment on pending litigation. The Treasury Department didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Mr. Obama has called on Congress to approve the deal and threatened to veto any vote against it. The negotiated deal will limit Iran’s nuclear activity for at least a decade in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.

The victims have been trying to enforce their judgments and have gone after Iranian assets for years, according to their lawyers, including an unsuccessful attempt to benefit from Iranian artifacts being held at museums in Boston and Chicago.

In the past two decades, victims have been awarded a total of approximately $45 billion by U.S. federal judges in lawsuits against Iran, none of which has been paid by Iran. Although some victims see the nuclear deal as a potential catalyst to pressure Iran to negotiate with victims, others have expressed concerns that the deal could reduce the victims’ leverage and make it more difficult to stop Iran from financing terrorism.

 

Piracy

On the trail of fuel oil pirates in Southeast Asia
SeatradeMaritime News
By Vincent Wee
July 27, 2015

The most recent ReCAAP ISC half yearly report has revealed the scale of the sharp rise in fuel siphoning and hijacking incidents in the first half of the year and also revealed some patterns in the practice.

Regular followers of Seatrade Maritime News would have noticed the increasing regularity with which incidents of hijacking, leading to siphoning/theft of fuel cargoes, have occurred in the South China Sea (SCS) as well as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), especially in the last two months.

ReCAAP figures show that the number of siphoning incidents has risen to eight in the first half of this year, compared to five during the same period in 2014, and one incident in 2011, while no such incidents were reported during the equivalent first half periods in 2013 and 2012. In addition, it should be noted that there were also three attempted siphoning/hijacking cases that were unsuccessful due to various reasons including intervention from authorities.

According to ReCAAP’s analysis, in all the 11 incidents, more than half involved perpetrators operating in groups of seven to nine, usually armed men. Worryingly, nine of the 11 cases involved perpetrators armed with serious weapons such as guns and knives. However, in the incidents involving perpetrators armed with guns, the firearms were not discharged except in the incident involving Orkim Harmony where one of the crew was shot in the leg.

In addition, in the incident involving Lapin on Feb 13, the perpetrators threatened the crew with an “explosive” package left onboard the vessel, which was subsequently found to comprise only an electric circuit with no explosives or detonator attached.

While not going beyond its information sharing mandate, ReCAAP acknowledges that there are criminal syndicates at work and has sought to educate masters and crew on evidence preservation so that “critical leads and evidence can be collected and shared with the INTERPOL to build its maritime piracy database to connect the dots and narrow down the identities of syndicates, individuals and masterminds” behind the racket.

Anecdotal evidence from the incident reports also suggest that not only are the syndicates well organized, with significant assets, but on the lookout to expand, with one syndicate even reportedly trying to recruit members from among the crew they were hijacking at the time.

The Malaysian-flagged product tanker Orkim Victory for example, was hijacked barely hours after it left the refinery in Malacca. The hijackers of the Orkim Harmony meanwhile reportedly had access to a tugboat during their attack.

Apart from the usual warnings to maintain enhanced vigilance and producing a guidance focusing on best practices for the relevant tanker industry, incorporating interviews with ship owners whose vessels had been boarded before, ReCAAP has also highlighted once again the need to address the issue from the onshore end.

Meanwhile, at an overall level, the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia during the first half rose 18% to 106 compared to the same period last year and reflects the continuous rise in incidents since 2013.

It is interesting to note how the practice has persisted despite the falls in oil price over the same period. Whether it remains a lucrative enough business under future market conditions, or whether it is just another branch of business for the pirates remains to be seen.

Piracy analysis: EU Somali coastguard initiative delivers
IHS Maritime 360
By Girija Shettar
July 27, 2015

The EU’s capacity building division has delivered more training and equipment to the Somali coastguard in Mogadishu, although experts warn that the trained officers should also be paid if maritime security efforts are not to fail.

EUCAP Nestor (Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean) has delivered six Nissan 4×4 vehicles and IT and communications equipment such as computers and GPS devices to enhance on-shore capability and connectivity. Training in navigation and basic maritime investigation has been given over the last 12 months.

The future role of the developing Somaliland coastguard in the security and development of the region was discussed at a high level meeting in April. Hosted aboard the EU Naval Force flagship, HNLMS Johan de Witt, it was attended by representatives from Somaliland authorities, international partners, and non-governmental organisations.

However, an expert on Somalia, Dr Stig Hansen, told IHS Maritime that failing to ensure good, regular wages for trained up officers in the security sector and custodial officials was one area where international development efforts continued to fail the region.

Hansen, who conducted field research in Mogadishu during 2005-14 and is the author of Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013), said, “It’s the biggest crime in Somalia for the last 10 years: raising armies, raising police, raising custodial officials, and not paying them. This helps piracy a lot and it helps Al Shabaab a lot.”

He said presidents had performed inconsistently when it came to guaranteeing good, regular pay to security sector employees. He pointed out that if officers were not paid, the institutions they were trained to uphold simply did not exist. The risk is that unpaid security players will not uphold the law and may actively act against it.

Time bomb

“It’s a time bomb for when you withdraw the navy and security measures offshore,” said Hansen, who added that officers had in the past turned to piracy because they had not been paid.

“This way, the UN has participated in training the pirates. This is straight idiocy,” he said.

Wages could easily be a condition of international development projects, said Hansen, who was puzzled as to why this had not been the case to date.

“There is a lot of commercial interest in the development sector,” said Hansen. “People who want to promote their projects and don’t want to scrutinise them properly. I am not talking about Somalis here, I am talking about non-African officials as well as African officials within these sectors.”

Programmes needed to be properly vetted locally, he said.

His views are supported by fellow Somalia expert Dr Brittany Gilmer, author of Political Geographies of Piracy: Constructing Threats and Containing Bodies in Somalia (Palgrave, 2014) and a former consultant for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) high-profile regional office.

Gilmer told IHS Maritime that development projects, including the prisons built to hold pirates, tended to increase internal tensions by ignoring cultural and political realities.

With the counter-piracy story evolving into the broader one of maritime security and development in the Horn of Africa, Gilmer said efforts are geographically mismatched.

Contradictions include development projects that are launched in areas with better security (Somaliland, Djibouti) to prevent people turning to piracy: innocent populations are thus labelled as potential pirates, creating a “pirate craze” where a potential pirate is more likely to win counter-piracy-related development projects, said Gilmer. Innocent people living in less secure areas such as Puntland do not benefit, while ex-pirates do, under rehabilitation and jobs programmes.

More perilously, some projects threatened to increase internal tensions by failing to take into account cultural and political realities, say Gilmer and Hansen.

Pirate prisons are an example. The strong clan system in Somalia means that every official or individual has clan loyalties and obligations. Prisoners will be granted “amnesties” from their clan leaders and disappear, said Hansen.

“You need to have a wide dialogue that includes the clans because, make no mistake about it, the clans are able to give amnesties to the people inside the prisons. That prisons inside Somalia are not clan-based is just an illusion,” he said.

Gilmer agreed. “A clan leader once told me: if you want to stop piracy, then let us implement our own system,” she said.

Meanwhile, clan politics hamper the new system. Gilmer recounted an experience at Hargesia prison in Somaliland. The prison refused pirates from Puntland, fearing retaliations, which have included Puntland pirates kidnapping Somaliland citizens in exchange for the release of prisoners.

“Government officials we were working with in Somaliland said if they took Puntland pirates it would increase tensions between the regions,” said Gilmer.

Clans have their own judicial system and traditionally, wrong-doers are dealt with by their clan leaders. The prison system takes this responsibility away from the clans, effectively undermining local regulatory structures.

“Clans need to have some kind of ownership of the justice process so that they will respect its workings. Otherwise it will not function,” said Hansen. “Local entities have very close connections with the clan systems in [their region] and can handle [the prisoners] better than another region could.”

Asked if development in one part of Somalia could thus offer jobs for people in other parts of the country, Gilmer said that free interflow of people between regions was hindered by clan divisions. “Where you place development projects is geopolitical,” she said.

Thus, while naval patrols offshore are “helping to keep Somalis in Somalia”, according to Gilmer, capacity building on shore is maintaining the status quo for the poorest and most vulnerable Somalis.

However, development of the Port of Mogadishu by Turkey’s Albayrak Group, announced in June, may offer hope for troubled south-central Somalia. A video of the plan at http://bit.ly/1elmOVN envisions the port cashing in on the 60% of world maritime trade that passes through the region.

Hansen said the facility could be the key port for central Somalia, regenerating its key exports of camels and goats to Saudi Arabia, and leading to expanded infrastructure generating alternative livelihoods. But, with security in the area extremely tentative, “it needs a long-term strategy”, he said.

East Africa: Military Surveillance Keeps Somali Pirates At Bay
Hellenic Shipping News
August 1, 2015

Military incursions on and off-shore Somalia have helped end piracy attacks on key shipping routes around the Gulf of Aden, new data showed even though maritime experts called for caution.

The current lull solidifies a trend since May 2012 when the last successful hijacking took place, raising hope for more reliable shopping services and lower cost of goods leaving and entering the east African market.

“Encouragingly, in the second quarter of 2015, no reports were received off the coast of Somalia,” Pottengal Mukundan, director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) said.

“Although no attacks have been reported off Somalia, IMB advises that the security situation in the Horn of Africa remains uncertain. IMB urges ship masters to remain vigilant when transiting these waters and to adhere to the industry’s best management practice.”

Piracy off the coast of Somali has in the past few years cost the global shipping industry billions of shillings in ransom pay-outs to secure captured vessels, cargo and crew.

The menace has also led to increased operational costs due to higher insurance premiums and use of longer alternative routes round the Cape. Not forgetting hiring of special security personnel to escort vessels through the Gulf of Aden and other measures such as watchtowers and razor wire.

Prices of basic industrial and household items have also risen sharply after shipping lines passed on the additional costs to consumers down the supply chain.

A deployment of naval forces around the Gulf of Aden has helped lower the incidents of piracy attacks in the past two years.

International navies have stepped up pre-emptive action against pirates, including strikes on their bases.

But even as piracy off the shore of Somalia seems contained, authorities in hotspots around the world registered mixed trends.

In South East Asia there has been sustained hijacking of small coastal tankers by maritime pirates, averaging one attack every two weeks. Five small tankers were hijacked in South East Asian waters in the second quarter of 2015 alone, bringing the total number of vessels hijacked globally in 2015 to 13.

Globally, 134 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships were reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in the first six months of 2015; an increase on the 116 reports for the corresponding period in 2014.

Pirates managed to board 106 vessels and were responsible for 13 hijacking cases and 15 attempted attacks worldwide. So far in 2015, 250 crew members have been taken hostage, 14 assaulted, 10 kidnapped, nine injured and one killed.

United Nations and Somali fishing officials warned in March that a rise in illegal fishing off Somalia could spark a resurgence in piracy, nearly three years after the pirates’ last successful hijacking in the Indian Ocean.

Alan Cole, an official at the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, said piracy could return as criminal gangs and pirates use the rise in illegal fishing as a pretext to hijack other vessels.

“The international community has spent millions of dollars trying to counter piracy, help Somalia and make sure that (sea) trade is not interrupted. But because of the activity of a relatively small number of illegal fishing vessels, all that is put at risk,” Cole said.

 

Gender-Based Violence

Who’s Fighting Human Trafficking? U.S. Releases Rankings
CNN
By Hilary Whiteman
July 28, 2015

Cuba, Kenya and Saudi Arabia are doing better at fighting human trafficking. Egypt, Ghana and Bulgaria are doing worse.

That’s according to the latest annual report from the U.S. State Department, which rates 188 countries on their efforts to stamp out trafficking in persons.

Secretary of State John Kerry says the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report aims to enlighten, energize and empower activists fighting the “human trafficking industry” across every continent.

But still, some of the 2015 rankings are controversial with rights groups questioning whether politics has trumped that ambition.

Malaysia, for example, has been upgraded, while Thailand remains on the list of worst-performing countries. Both are part of of people-smuggling route for Rohingya Muslims fleeing persecution in Myanmar.

Mass graves holding the bodies of dozens of migrants were discovered in Malaysia earlier this year, after the cutoff for this year’s TIP Report.

The report raises Malaysia to the Tier 2 Watch List from bottom-ranked Tier 3, where it fell last year, after two consecutive years of failing to do enough to address the issue.

The fall was an automatic downgrade, in compliance with rules introduced by the State Department in 2013 that dictate a country has to move up or down after two years on the Tier 2 Watch List.

Thailand was also demoted for the same reason, but this year remains on Tier 3, an apparent discrepancy for activists who were pushing for both countries to remain in Tier 3.

State of human trafficking

The U.S. State Department puts countries that do the most to fight human trafficking in Tier 1, and the least in Tier 3. Tier 2 includes a Watch List for countries in danger of dropping to Tier 3.

This year, 18 countries were upgraded and another 18 were downgraded. Those downgraded from the Tier 2 Watch List to Tier 3 included Belarus, Belize, Burundi, Comoros, the Marshall Islands and South Sudan.

Penalties for countries demoted to Tier 3 are at the discretion of the U.S. President, but could include restrictions on non-humanitarian assistance and funding.

Alongside Malaysia, upgrades from Tier 3 to the Watch List included Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Papua New Guinea, and Uzbekistan.

Kerry said: “It is a battle against money. It is a battle against evil. It is remarkable that in 2015 we face a modern-day version of slavery.”

Mass migrant graves

Two months ago, it emerged that deep in the jungle along Malaysia’s border with Thailand were abandoned makeshift prisons once thought to hold migrants held for ransom by human traffickers.

Alongside wooden cages were mass graves believed to hold the bodies of Bangladeshi migrants and Rohingya Muslims fleeing Myanmar, also known as Burma.

Similar macabre scenes had been earlier uncovered in jungle camps in Thailand, after a series of raids by Thai police. On Friday, Thailand announced it had charged 72 people with crimes of human trafficking and was looking for another 32 suspects still at large.

In May, Malaysia hosted talks with delegates from Thailand and Indonesia about how to address the growing crisis of migrants trapped on trafficking boats off the coast. Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to take the migrants in, provided they were given help to resettle them with one year.

However, the raids, arrests and talks came after the March 2015 cut-off for consideration in this year’s report, which will raise questions as to why Malaysia was upgraded, yet Thailand remains on Tier 3.

Rights activists point out that Malaysia is one of the countries in negotiations with the U.S. as part of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. An amendment to the Trade Promotion Authority Act states a fast-track deal can’t be done with a country that’s on the Tier 3 list.

Phil Robertson, Asia division deputy director for Human Rights Watch, said: “Malaysia’s record on stopping trafficking in persons over the past year is far from sufficient to justify this upgrade from Washington. Migrants are being trafficked and abused with impunity, Rohingya victims’ bodies are being pulled from shallow graves at the border and convictions are down year on year. How can the State Department call this progress?”

He added: “The discussion on Malaysia is… a triumph of diplomatic writing trumpeting process rather than impact. This upgrade is more about the TPP and U.S. trade politics than anything Malaysia did to combat human trafficking over the past year. Sadly, this action does significant damage to the credibility of a report that is a critical part of global efforts to combat slavery.”

Before the report’s release, the Alliance to End Slavery and Trafficking (ATEST) said any move to upgrade Malaysia would be “purely political and incredibly detrimental to combating human trafficking in that country.”

Meanwhile, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement saying its ranking “does not accurately reflect the significant efforts” made over the year. It said Thailand “translated its genuine political will to combat human trafficking into practical policies, effective implementation, and concrete results” calling the issue a national priority.

It added Thailand had cracked down on trafficking gangs and corrupt officials, and was tackling slavery in the fisheries industry.

Other notable changes on this year’s list:

Cuba’s promotion from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 Watch List comes just a week after restoration of the country’s diplomatic ties with the U.S., which were frozen in 1961.

After three consecutive years on the Tier 2 Watch List, Kenya — where Barack Obama has just made his first trip since becoming U.S. President — made it back on the Tier 2 list. It follows last year’s recommendation to increase the number of prosecutions, raids and inspections of potential trafficking hubs.

Saudi Arabia also made it off the bottom tier after making progress in prosecuting offenders and protecting trafficking victims. However, the 2015 report said that it was still not “proactively” investigating and prosecuting employers for withholding workers’ passports and pay.

Of the downgrades, Belarus earned an automatic demotion to Tier 3 after two years on the Watch List, as did Comoros, an island off the coast of Eastern Africa, where the report says children are particularly at risk of forced labor.

Child trafficking is also considered to be a huge problem in Ghana, which dropped to the Watch List from Tier 2. The country is set to receive $5 million in U.S. aid to combat the problem after the signing last month of the Child Protection Compact Partnership. The money will be used to pursue offenders, rehabilitate victims and educate the public.

Egypt also dropped to the Watch List, following its poor record of addressing the sexual exploitation of women and children. This year’s report said that while the country had set up a national anti-trafficking hotline, its efforts to address the problem focused on Egyptian nationals, not foreign trafficking victims.

Considered a corridor for men, women and children trafficked to Western Europe, Slovenia was downgraded from Tier 1 to Tier 2. The report said that while the country was trying to train law enforcement officers, prosecutions were at a five-year low and there had been no convictions at all during the year.

Mexican State Hands Down Historic Sentence for Femicide
Reuters
By Lizbeth Diaz, Anna Yukhananov, and Lisa Shumaker
July 28, 2015

Five men in northern Mexico were sentenced to an unprecedented 697 years in prison for the gender-driven killing of 11 women, in a state where hundreds of young women have been murdered since 1990.

The sentence was the longest-ever given for a femicide, the killing of a woman due to her gender and was based on scientific evidence, said an official at the attorney general’s office in the state of Chihuahua, home of the border city of Ciudad Juarez, which in 2008 recorded one woman missing each day.

“They used ploys to recruit young women into prostitution and drug distribution,” Chihuahua’s attorney general’s office said in a statement. “Then, when they were no longer ‘useful,’ they took their lives and threw their bodies in the Navajo Arroyo, in the Valley of Juarez.”

In addition to prison time of nearly 700 years each, those sentenced also have to pay a total of 9 million pesos ($550,000) in damages to the families of the victims, whose bodies were found in 2012.

Authorities have prosecuted some of the cases but have not always handed down long prison sentences due to the ambiguity around declaring femicides, and also to the overall high rate of impunity in the country, where many crimes go unpunished.

Mexico’s Supreme Court in March for the first time ordered that a case be probed as a femicide, after prosecutors in the State of Mexico initially labeled it a suicide, based on an investigation seen as plagued by anomalies.

The National Citizen Femicide Observatory, a coalition of human rights groups, believes that some 3,892 women were murdered in Mexico between 2012 and 2013, but only 16 percent of cases were investigated as femicides.

Nigeria Boko Haram Crisis: Army Rescues 178 People
Reuters
By Lizbeth Diaz, Anna Yukhananov, and Lisa Shumaker
July 28, 2015

In a statement released on Sunday, it said that 101 of those freed were children and a further 67 were women.

The statement did not say if the girls abducted from a school in Chibok in April 2014 were among them.

The military also says that a Boko Haram commander was captured and several camps were cleared.

Boko Haram has killed some 5,500 civilians in Nigeria since 2014.

More than 200 of the Chibok girls are still missing, more than a year after they were kidnapped from their school in northern Nigeria.

Last October, the government said it had secured an agreement for a ceasefire and the release of the girls taken from Chibok, but Boko Haram subsequently denied this.

The abduction of the girls in Chibok sparked global outrage with many joining a campaign online to free them using the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls.

Several nations including the US and China vowed to help find them and there have been reported sightings of the girls, but none has been found to date.

At least 2,000 women and girls abducted by Boko Haram since the start of 2014, according to the human rights organisation Amnesty International.

Boko Haram’s insurgency, and the army campaign against it, have killed more than 15,500 people since 2012. The violence has recently spread to neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Somalia, Where 95% of Girls Undergo Female Genital Mutilation, May Soon Ban Practice
Huffington Post
By Eleanor Goldberg
August 4, 2015

Somalia has one of the highest rates of female genital mutilation in the world, but the country may soon bring that figure down to zero.

Currently, about 95 percent of girls in Somalia between the ages of 4 and 11 undergo FGM, according to UNICEF. Set on shielding girls from the harmful procedure, the country’s Ministry of Women Affairs and Human Rights announced that it will introduce a law that will ban FGM altogether, Somali news outlet Horseed Media reported.

‘’Time has come for us to eradicate this bad practice and protect the rights of girls and women in our country,’’ Sahra Mohammed Ali Samatar, minister of Women Affairs, said at a recent conference.

FGM, a practice that involves the partial or total removal of the external female genitalia for no medical benefit, was officially banned by the UN in 2012, but the procedure is still widely practiced.

That same year, Somalia indicated it would ban the practice, but activists say this latest measure is more “concrete,” Brendan Wynne, of advocacy group Equality Now, told HuffPost in an email.

Across the globe, more than 125 million girls and women have been subjected to FGM, according to WHO. In addition to facing such health risks as hemorrhage, bacterial infection, infertility and recurring urinary tract infections, girls are often cut with razors or knives without any anesthetic.

“I was just 7 years old when I was cut,” Leyla Hussein, a British woman who is originally from Somalia, told WHO. “The first thing I heard was my sister screaming. Then it was my turn. Four women held me down while they cut my clitoris. I felt every single cut. The pain was so intense -– I blacked out.”

Samatar’s announcement comes on the heels of President Barack Obama’s Africa tour where he pushed for women’s rights and the outlawing of misogynist practices.

While speaking in Kenya, Obama called on the country to stop cutting its girls, among other damaging traditions.

“There’s no reason that young girls should suffer genital mutilation, there’s no place in a civilised society for the early or forced marriage of children,” Obama told a crowd of 4,500 people. “These traditions may go back centuries; they have no place in the 21st century.”

While it’s challenging to combat centuries-old traditions, other African nations have already demonstrated that eliminating the procedure is possible.

In May, as one of his final acts as president, Goodluck Jonathan banned the procedure in Nigeria, the Guardian reported. It was a particularly impressive feat considering that Nigeria accounts for about quarter of all FGM cases worldwide.

“This is fantastic news and a landmark moment,” UK international development secretary Justine Greening told the Guardian. “We are now one step closer to ending this harmful practice.”

 

UN Reports

In ISIL-controlled territory, 8 million civilians living in ‘state of fear’ – UN expert
UN News Centre
July 31, 2015

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has engaged in widespread and systematic human rights violations of the most serious kinds in Syria and Iraq, brutally forcing some 8 million people to “assimilate, flee or face death,” according to a United Nations expert.

“These violations may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and widespread attacks on the civilian population,” according to Ben Emmerson, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

An estimated 8 million people live under ISIL territory in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.

“The brutal nature and overall scale of abuses appears to be intended to reinforce the group’s absolute monopoly on political and social life and to enforce compliance and conformity among communities under its control. The result is that civilians who remain in ISIL-controlled areas live in a state of constant and almost unimaginable fear,” said Emmerson in his report, which was presented to the Human Rights Council last month.

ISIL has targeted religious and ethnic groups in Iraq and Syria and committed acts of violence against civilians because of their affiliation with them. These communities have been forced to assimilate, flee or face death, he explained. “In Iraq, violence against the Yezidis have been reported with men being separated from women and children, then taken to ditches and brutally executed,” he added.

Extremely vulnerable to violence and discrimination, women face sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual slavery, killings, enslavement, and rape. They are confined to their homes and forced to adhere to a strict dress code, pointed out the expert. And children as young as six have been raped, tortured and kidnapped.

Children as young as 8 years old have also been trained and used in military roles. “They are reportedly made to watch videos of beheadings, and mass executions to desensitize them to forms of violence employed by ISIL.”

The growing military capacity of ISIL also means the spread of fear and terror on civilians, Mr. Emmerson continued, emphasizing that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have now joined the ranks of non-State armed groups from about 80 countries around the world.

Addressing the military response by the international coalition of States, led by the United States, he said that civilians living in ISIL-controlled territory are mainly residing in urban areas where many of the coalition air strikes have been performed. It has also been reported that ISIL strategically places its fighters among civilians, in civilian areas or uses hospitals and schools as military bases, to provoke civilian casualties in the event of attacks by the coalition.

The UN Rapporteur then called attention to the lack of transparency with coalition operations in Iraq and Syria.

“Each nation participating in the air war operates under unique rules of engagement, and transparency levels differ significantly,” the expert noted. While air strikes are carried out by different sources, it is difficult to know which States were responsible for an event and when they will occur.

The Special Rapporteur recalled the coalition states’ obligations under international law to ensure that their military operations are “transparent and accountable,” and that any civilian death resulting from these operations is “promptly, independently and impartiality” investigated.

Highlighting the failure by the Security Council to take appropriate and immediate action to protect civilians in affected areas, Mr. Emmerson also stressed the need for the international coalition of States engaged in military acts against ISIL to ensure that measures are put into place to protect civilians and prevent further casualties.

Experts like Mr. Emerson work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity.

UN Officials Denounce West Bank Arson Attack that Killed Palestinian Child
The Jurist
By Colleen Mallick
August 1, 2015

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and recently appointed UN special envoy in the Middle East Nickolay Mladenov condemned the arson attacks in the West Bank on Friday that killed a Palestinian child and severely wounded the child’s parents and sibling. “Continued failures to effectively address impunity for repeated acts of settler violence have led to another horrific incident involving the death of an innocent life,” reads the statement from Mr. Ban issued by a spokesperson in New York. “The absence of a political process and Israel’s illegal settlement policy, as well as the harsh and unnecessary practice of demolishing Palestinian houses, have given rise to violent extremism on both sides.” Mr. Mladenov stated [UN report] that the “heinous murder was carried out for a political objective,” and “the need for an immediate resolution of the conflict and an end to the occupation” is imminent. The Secretary-General urges both sides to reconcile and move towards peace. The attack occurred in the Occupied West Bank village of Duma, when Jewish extremists allegedly set fire to a Palestinian home while the family slept.

The Israel-Palestine conflict continues to be a significant international legal issue. Amnesty International (AI) on Wednesday released a report that points to evidence of war crimes committed by Israel in the August 2014 retaliation for the capture of an Israeli soldier by Hamas. The attacks led to 135 Palestinian civilian deaths, including 75 children. In June Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki said that he had presented documents to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assist in the investigation of alleged Israeli war crimes. Also in June, a report released by the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict found that both Israel and Hamas may have committed war crimes during the conflict. In May, AI accused Hamas forces of leading a series of abductions, torturous acts and unlawful killings against Palestinians. In April a UN independent board of inquiry announced that it uncovered evidence that at least 44 Palestinians were killed by “Israeli actions” while sheltering at UN locations during the Gaza conflict.

Iraq: UN officials Underscore Need to Bring Perpetrators of Sinjar Tragedy to Justice
UN News Centre
August 3, 2015

United Nations officials have reiterated the need to bring perpetrators of last year’s tragedy, in which militants from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked as many as 200,000 civilians – most of them from vulnerable communities – causing them to flee to Sinjar, to justice as well as to increase protection for women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence.

It was a year ago that the attacks took place on members of the Yezidi community, as well as members of the Shi’a Turkmen, Shi’a Shabak and Christian communities, causing them to flee to Sinjar.

“In the days that followed, amidst horrific killings, ISIL hunted down and caught hundreds of women and girls from ethnic and religion minorities, instituting a pattern of sexual violence, slavery, abduction and human trafficking that continues to this day,” the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, said in a statement on the first anniversary of the tragedy.

She noted that first-hand accounts from internally displaced persons and refugees, some of whom she met during a visit to the Middle East in April, confirm systematic sexual violence, particularly against Yezidi women and children aged between 8 and 35 years.

Young women are being “sold” in open markets, gifted to foreign fighters, trafficked for sex in the region to raise funds and increase recruitment among ISIL’s ranks, she stated, adding that women and girls are also used for forced procreation, to populate the desired new “Caliphate” with children who can be raised in ISIL’s own “warped image.”

“These appalling crimes of sexual violence in conflict, which may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and/or acts of genocide, will not be forgotten. The international community stands united in the goal of pursuing the perpetrators and holding them to account.”

She reiterated her calls on the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL to include protection and empowerment of women and girls in their strategies to counter terrorism.

Also speaking out was the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ján Kubiš, who strongly condemned ISIL’s continuous and deliberate terrorist strategy to target and exterminate entire communities on the basis of their ethnic background, religious beliefs or faith.

“This is especially harrowing for women, girls and children who are treated with untold brutality. We demand and support the liberation of Yezidi and other women and girls held by ISIL in captivity, often sold and used as sex slaves,” Mr. Kubiš said in a news release .

He stated that the instigators and perpetrators of the crimes committed against civilian populations and on ethnic or religious grounds, some of which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, will sooner or later be brought to justice.

Mr. Kubiš, who is also head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), also acknowledged the efforts and support of the Government of Iraq and of the Kurdistan Regional Government, assisted by the international community, to the affected minorities.

At the same time, he underscored that “a more forceful and coherent action on the protection of minorities must take place, including active steps to ensure zero tolerance to impunity for those committing crimes against any and all humanities.”

 

NGO Reports

Don’t We Matter?: Four Years Of Unrelenting Attacks Against Civilians In Sudan’s South Kordofan State
Amnesty International
August 3, 2015

Since armed conflict began in June 2011 between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N), people living in SPLA-N controlled areas of Sudan’s South Kordofan state have endured an unrelenting campaign of aerial and ground attacks by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). At various points during the last four years, there have been military offensives by one or both parties to the conflict which have increased the dangers faced by civilians. In April 2014 the Sudanese government launched a military operation called “Decisive Summer” whose implementation involved an intensified campaign of aerial bombardment, and increased civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property. As the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States enters its fifth year, there is once again intensified military activity. There was a sharp increase in attacks by the SAF in April 2015, making it one of the months with the highest number of attacks since the start of the armed conflict. The conflict continues unabated at this time.

 

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

For Hissène Habré, a Trial by Refusal
New York Times
By Thierry Cruvellier
July 27, 2015

DAKAR, Senegal – Surrounded by 10 muscular prison guards, Hissène Habré, his frail body entirely swathed in white, looked smothered in his chair. He was sitting in the front row of the immense courtroom, fingering Muslim prayer beads. His boubou covered all but his eyes, and they were partly hidden by his glasses.

Mr. Habré, the 72-year-old former president of Chad, is accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture regarding the deaths of an alleged 40,000 people during his rule between 1982 and 1990. July 20 was the first day of his trial before the Extraordinary African Chambers, a special court he has repeatedly denounced as “illegitimate and illegal.” And almost as soon as it started, it stopped: Mr. Habré, and his lawyers, refused to participate, and on the next day the proceedings were suspended.

The Habré trial is the event of the year in the field of international criminal law. With tensions growing between the African Union and the International Criminal Court – which African states accuse of being biased against them because it prosecutes mostly crimes committed in Africa – the E.A.C. was being touted, at least by Senegal’s justice minister, as the advent of an “Africa that judges Africa.”

But on the first day of what may be the court’s only trial, Mr. Habré derided the E.A.C., or C.A.E. in French, as the “Comité administratif extraordinaire,” the Extraordinary Administrative Committee. He called the judges – two from Senegal, one from Burkina Faso – “simple functionaries tasked with carrying out a political mission.” As the hearing was about to begin, Mr. Habré stood up and shouted, “Down with imperialism! Down with traitors! Allahu Akbar!” A dozen of his partisans rose from their seats nearby and chanted: “Long live Chad!” “Long live Habré!” “Mr. President, we are with you!”

The Habré case suffers from the same types of deficiencies that have plagued other international criminal trials. Idriss Déby, the president of Chad since 1990, whose government covers more than one-third of the E.A.C.’s budget, was Mr. Habré’s army commander in chief. But he will not be judged in Dakar. Neither will France nor the United States, even though both countries – which are also funding this trial – supported Mr. Habré during his rule. And so naturally, Mr. Habré’s defense strategy rests on denouncing the court for being biased and partial, and calling it a front for Western governments and nongovernmental organizations.

Other defendants in recent major trials for mass crimes have also been defiant. At the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, both Slobodan Milosevic and Vojislav Seselj dismissed their lawyers and claimed the right to defend themselves. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza called his trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda “a masquerade,” boycotted it and refused to meet his court-appointed lawyers. (After being sentenced to a long prison term for genocide, he did pick a new counsel for the appeal.) But even that Mr. Habré will not do. In the view of François Serres, one of Mr. Habré’s lawyers, responding to the charges in the indictment, even with outrage, or simply appearing in court would lend too much credibility to the proceedings.

The second day of the trial, last Tuesday, Mr. Habré was again hauled into the courtroom by force. This time he was immured in silence. The court appointed three new lawyers to defend him, and scheduled the next hearing for Sept. 7. This was in order to “defend the interests of justice,” both the chief prosecutor and one of the lawyers explained. But when court officials and lawyers invoke the interests of justice, it’s usually when they have run out of other arguments.

William Bourdon, a lawyer for the victims – who, under Senegal’s civil law system, may be parties to the trial – dismissed Mr. Habré’s defense as a strategy “of cowardice and desertion.” Jacqueline Moudeina, a Chadian lawyer for the victims who fought for more than 20 years to bring this case to court, said it was “preferable” that the court appoint lawyers to represent Mr. Habré, even though they might just be like “decoration.” But Reed Brody, counsel and spokesperson of Human Rights Watch, had said before the trial that such an assignment would be “something of a catastrophe.”

Mr. Habré’s refusal strategy stings because it turns the sacrosanct principles upheld by human rights defenders against them. Mr. Habré’s trial is inevitable, and its outcome seems preordained, yet it must appear to be exemplary. To proceed with it without Mr. Habré and his lawyers, as they demand, would perhaps be the best way to rob their strategy of its disruptive power. But it is a move the court cannot allow itself to make: Rules of criminal procedure require the presence of a lawyer for the accused.

In the courtroom on the second day, Clément Abaitoufa, one of the better-known victims of torture under Mr. Habré’s regime, was gloomy and stone-faced: “This is going to be difficult to manage, but we had to expect it.” Leaning on his cane, Souleymane Guengueng, another famous survivor, abandoned neither his customary serenity nor his bright smile. “We must be patient,” he said. “The court must assert its authority.”

When Mr. Habré was brought out of the courtroom, his supporters gathered around him and applauded. Without a word, he raised his skinny arms in the air and clenched his fists, and before disappearing behind a wall of hulking guards from the prison security unit, made the two-fingered V sign for victory.

Mavi Marmara Case Update: Prosecutor Files Notice of Appeal
Just Security
By Alex Whiting
July 29, 2015

Last week I argued here that the ICC Prosecutor should appeal or refuse to follow the Pre-Trial Chamber’s (PTC) majority order to reconsider her decision not to open a formal investigation into the Mavi Marmara incident. On Monday, the Prosecutor filed her notice of appeal, citing three grounds: (1) the PTC showed inadequate deference to the Prosecutor, who is best-situated to assess gravity of potential situations at the investigation-opening stage; (2) the PTC erred in its application of the gravity test, relying on evidence taken out of context and in isolation; and (3) the PTC failed to address certain, specific arguments and pieces of evidence put forth by the Prosecution.

The Prosecutor has thus signaled her intent to attack the core of the PTC’s approach, arguing that the PTC institutionally overstepped its role and in addition so diluted the gravity test as to render it almost meaningless. The notice of appeal also means that it is almost certain that the Prosecutor will never accede to opening an investigation into the Mavi Marmara incident. Even if the Appeals Chamber refuses to hear the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, or (and this is very hard to imagine) it hears the appeal and sides with the majority of the PTC, the Prosecutor still has the final word on whether to open an investigation, as I outlined in my post last week. Given the Prosecutor’s very strong rejection of the PTC’s reasoning in her notice of appeal, it is difficult to imagine the Prosecutor ever changing her mind.

Monday’s document is just the notice of appeal. The Prosecution will have 21 days from the date of the PTC decision to file its appeal and then Comoros and the victims will have 21 days to respond before the Appeals Chamber renders its decision.

Gone But Not Forgotten-The Ongoing Case of Jean Uwinkindi at the ICTR and MICT
Opinio Juris
By Oliver Windridge
July 29, 2015

A sometimes forgotten aspect of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s work is the transfer of 10 of its 13 outstanding cases back to Rwanda and to France for domestic prosecution. To be precise, of the 13 outstanding cases, the ICTR have transferred two currently detained accused to France (Bucyibaruta and Munyeshyaka) and two to Rwanda (Uwinkindi and Munyagishari). The remaining nine accused remain at large, of which the ICTR transferred seven to Rwanda for domestic prosecution if and when they are arrested (Sikubwabo, Ryandikayo, Ntaganzwa, Ndimbati, Munyarugarama, Mpiranya, Kayishema), while the Bizimana and Kabuga cases remain at the ICTR, or rather the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), the mechanism established to carry out functions, including trying outstanding cases, after the completion of the ICTR and ICTY mandates. But even if sometimes forgotten, transferred cases are likely to come back into the spotlight this year with MICT President Theodor Meron’s landmark 13 May 2015 decision to constitute a new referral chamber to examine whether Jean Uwinkindi, the first ICTR accused to be transferred to Rwanda, should remain in Rwanda for trial or be brought back under the auspices of the MICT for trial.

As background, in 2011 Uwinkindi became the first ICTR accused to be transferred to Rwanda for domestic prosecution under Rule 11 bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This transfer was a watershed for the ICTR, and in particular the ICTR Prosecutor, who had tried and failed on several previous occasions to transfer cases to Rwanda, all of which were subsequently tried at the ICTR ( See Munyakazi, Gatete, Kanyarukiga and Hategekimana).

Uwinkindi opposed the transfer mainly on fair trial concerns, however the Trial Chamber found that Rwanda had markedly improved its criminal justice system since denying previous applications for transfer mentioned above, and granted the Prosecution’s request to transfer, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appeals Chamber . In order to allay concerns over potential post-transfer issues, particularly over the availability and protection of witnesses, the transfer decision included a monthly monitoring system, designed to ensure any material violation of Uwinkindi’s fair trial rights in Rwanda would be brought to the attention of the ICTR President so that action, including possible revocation could be considered by the ICTR (and now MICT). The monitoring system also allowed the ICTR/MICT to examine any issues over future financial constraints including any failure by the Rwandan authorities to make counsel available or disburse funds. Therefore, since 2011 the ICTR/MICT has received monitoring reports on a monthly basis (all the reports can be accessed at the bottom of this page.). Importantly, in its 2011 referral decision the ICTR also granted Uwinkindi permanent standing to petition the ICTR/MICT.

On 16 September 2013, Uwinkindi filed a request for revocation of the 2011 referral decision, stating that the Ministry of Justice of Rwanda had failed to make the necessary funds available for his defence to allow his team to contact defence witnesses and hire defence staff and that his counsel had not been paid since February 2013. On 12 March 2014, MICT President Meron, sitting as a single judge, dismissed Uwinkindi’s request for revocation, finding that the submissions on various funding issues had been either rendered moot or were still the focus of ongoing negotiations and may be subject to further review within the Rwandan courts. President Meron did not however rule out the filing of further requests for revocation should the circumstances warrant.

In March 2015, the MICT monitor filed its March 2015 report, in which it stated, inter alia, that in a meeting between Uwinkindi and the monitor Uwinkindi requested the MICT President to recall his requests for transfer of the case from Rwanda “to another jurisdiction where ₣heğ could get a fair trial” (March Monitoring Report, paragraph 60). In the same meeting Uwinkindi expressed his displeasure with counsel assigned to him, expressing his desire to be represented by counsel of his choice, including Mr. Gatera Gashabana his former counsel and asserting lack of fair trial rights in Rwanda ( I recommend reading the whole report, it makes for very interesting reading).

This led President Meron, under the auspices of Uwinkindi’s ongoing standing to petition the MICT, and noting that he was not represented by counsel, to consider Uwinkindi’s claims in the March report as renewed application for revocation of his transfer. This decision to consider Uwinkindi’s request as a an application to revoke can be seen as the MICT taking a wide and pragmatic approach to Uwinkindi’s claims. The result of which is that President Meron has ordered the creation of a new referral panel to consider Uwinkindi’s application to revoke his transfer and bring the case back to the MICT, albeit somewhat strangely describing the referral panel as a “Trial Chamber” despite not being a trial and the 2011 chamber being referred to as “referral chamber”. Nevertheless, the referral panel/trial chamber will be composed of MICT Judges Joensen, also the ICTR President, presiding alongside Judge Sekule and Judge Arrey. What is the difference between this application and the previous applications which were dismissed by President Meron? Although not explicitly examined in the 13 May 2015 decision, it may well be a question of time; over a year has passed since Uwinkindi’s last request for revocation and, according to Uwinkindi, the same issues of mounting a proper defence continue to bedevil his case, something which at some point the MICT must at the very least look into.

Interestingly, the 13 May 2015 decision considers the March 2015 report the trigger to create the referral panel, and does not mention Uwinkindi’s 28 December 2014 revocation application that was supplemented by further submissions on 16 January 2015, although a subsequent 5 June 2015 decision by President Meron ordered Uwinkindi’s latest request for revocation to be referred to the referral panel also.

Since the creation of the referral panel matters have progressed swiftly with Judge Joensen assigning himself as pre-trial judge (again using the confusing term “trial”) on 21 May 2015 and on 22 May 2015 setting out a time line for the submission of briefs, response and replies that will be triggered once Uwinkindi is appointed counsel. On 22 June 2015 the MICT Registry appointed Uwinkindi’s former counsel Mr. Gashabana as counsel in this matter meaning Uwinkindi must file his brief in support of the revocation request within 30 days of assignment of counsel, and the MICT OTP and Rwanda must file their responses within 30 days of Uwinkindi’s brief, and Uwinkindi must file his reply within 10 days of the responses, meaning that, roughly, the case should be fully briefed by the end of August 2015.

What should be made of this development? I would argue that the 13 May 2015 Decision to form a referral chamber should be seen as a landmark decision for the ICTR/MICT. Not only is it the first referral panel created to consider a transferred persons request at the ICTR/MICT, the decision also demonstrates a welcome degree of pragmatism by treating Uwinkindi’s latest remarks to the MICT monitor as an application to revoke, although this could be seen as inevitable given that in the 15 months or so since his last application was dismissed very little has improved according to Uwinkindi. Also, at a very basic level the very fact that the matter is before the MICT should be welcomed. Some feared that with the referral in 2011 we would not see or hear of Uwinkindi again; his case disappearing into the Rwandan justice system. But we see the ICTR and now MICT living up to its promises by sending monitors and regularly considering Uwinkindi’s requests for revocation of the transfer, and on this occasion ordering assessment by a panel of judges.

It is also important to recognise that although still very much a lever that has to be pulled by Uwinkindi, the ICTR’s decision to grant Uwinkindi permanent standing to petition the ICTR/MICT has also worked, obviating the need for subsequent chambers to examine jurisdictional issues and removing the chance for parties to oppose revocation applications, although how this permanent standing is viewed in Rwanda I do not know. This framework of ongoing standing again indicates a level of continued commitment and involvement by the ICTR and demonstrates a potential middle ground between retaining a case at an international tribunal and an international tribunal washing it hands completely of a case.

Whilst we do not know what will happen, what seems clear enough is that should the Trial Chamber uphold the request Uwinkindi’s case would come back before the MICT for trial. If the Trial Chamber were to reject the request Uwinkindi’s case would continue to be tried in Rwanda. Either way the decision will presumably be subject to appeal, indicating that a final decision is unlikely very quickly.

What impact will this decision have on other cases? For Bernard Munyagishari the other ICTR accused currently facing trial in Rwanda, who has also petitioned the ICTR/MICT for revocation of his transfer, it does provide a possible future route for consideration although it should be noted that so far his applications have been denied by President Meron. (The cases transferred to France, Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta, are not subject to any requests for revocation at present.)

But in addition to the impact of Uwinkindi’s case on Munyagishari and the ICTR/MICT, does this transfer framework have future application elsewhere? The answer is likely dependent on the nature of the tribunal. Arguably the two main elements driving the transfer of ICTR cases are the maturation of the Rwandan criminal justice system to a point where it could take on domestic prosecution of ICTR accused, and the expiration of the ICTR’s mandate. Similar factors are likely to occur for future ad-hoc tribunals with limited mandates and possibly a large number of accused. For permanent tribunals however the ICTR transfer framework’s application is less obvious. Transfers at the ICTR only gained traction some 15 years into its life and towards the end of its mandate. Given the permanency of the ICC and the hope that cases can be handled quicker, the need to transfer cases due to the maturation of the domestic criminal justice system and closure of the tribunal may not be applicable to the ICC (although could the ICC impose limited mandates per situation?). Furthermore, where the approach of the ICC Prosecutor has often been to indict only those at the very top, again the likelihood of a number of accused eligible for transfer some years on seems less likely. So with an open ended mandate and smaller number of accused per the ICC is realistically unlikely to follow this transfer framework. For example, with recent discussion on a new Special Criminal Court for Central African Republic (SCCAR), could the ICC transfer cases to the SCCAR but use the ICTR transfer framework to retain jurisdiction to hear applications for revocation from accused? Unlikely, as applying the ICTR transfer framework, this would only occur for accused indicted before the ICC who are then transferred- requiring significant ICC resources to investigate and issue indictments.

This brings me to my final point. Irrespective of the nature of the tribunal, the ICTR transfer framework is very much a Prosecution-led approach and requires significant work from the Prosecutor to investigate, issue indictments and prepare cases that could be tried at the international level. Therefore practically, is it likely future Prosecutors will be willing to do the amount of work done by the ICTR Prosecutor before then pushing for transfer? Where resources are limited it seems unrealistic to expect Prosecutors at international tribunals to take cases all the way to the door of the court, only then to transfer them to domestic courts.

In conclusion, it appears the transfer framework has succeeded in retaining a link between Uwinkindi’s domestic trial and the ICTR/MICT through its monthly reports and the permanent standing granted to Uwinkindi allowing the ICTR/MICT to consider requests at any time. In short, the transfer framework seems to have worked irrespective of what the referral chamber will decide, although it is difficult to describe the transfer framework as an outright victory given that Uwinkindi’s allegations relate to the alleged failure of the Rwandan system to uphold his fair trial rights, a transfer which the ICTR itself sanctioned. As to future application, ad-hoc international tribunals with set mandates and a large number of accused could apply a similar framework but for permanent tribunals such as the ICC, unless it sets strict mandates to its situations, with an open ended mandate and smaller number of accused per situation the need to transfer cases as done by the ICTR is unlikely to arise. In any event, whether this transfer framework remains a ICTR/MICT model or finds a broader use in the future, Uwinkindi’s case once again demonstrates the fine balance between prosecutions at international tribunals and domestic prosecution of international crimes.

Justice, But Only For Some; The Trial of Hissène Habré
Justice in Conflict
By Kelly-Jo Bluen
July 30, 2015

The trial of former Chadian President Hissène Habré in Senegal last week reflects many of the tensions afflicting international justice. Habré, who is charged with crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes, relating to the death of an alleged 40,000 people between 1982 and 1990, denounced the court as a colonial project before being forcibly removed from the courtroom. The trial was subsequently postponed until 7 September, for Habré’s defence counsel to review court files.

The Dakar-based Court where Habré is being prosecuted is the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC), an African Union mandated chamber with jurisdiction to prosecute “the person or persons most responsible for crimes and serious violations of international law” in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990.

This trial presents a critical juncture to reflect on two pertinent issues, both for the case and for the international justice architecture. First, in light of the well-documented role of Western powers in the Chadian conflict’s Cold War dimensions, and those that preceeded them during French colonial rule, the trial presents an opportunity to consider more expansively who “the persons most responsible” for gross atrocities might be in Chad. Second, and related to the divorce between complicity and accountability in the face of politics, the Habré case is revealing in terms of how notions of accountability are framed within the existing lexicon of international criminal justice.

Structural and Direct: Lines and webs of complicity

Unequivocally, the prospect of accountability for Habré is extremely important. A 2010 Human Rights Data Analysis group report that analysed evidence from the Chadian Documentation and Security Directorate (DDS) details abuse, torture, summary executions, and murder, as well as Habré’s knowledge of the abuse.

In addition to Habré, however, there exists a complex web of complicity at both direct and structural levels. While dominant narratives of international justice operate in quasi-biblical binaries of good and evil, the reality of the Chadian case is far more complex. When Habré came to power in 1982, it was, in large part, as a result of a CIA covert operation. The newly-elected US President, Ronald Reagan, was enmeshed in Cold War paranoia about Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and was jittery about Gaddafi’s troops’ advance into Chad. Once Gaddafi announced the prospects of a Libya-Chad merger Reagan became increasingly threatened and convinced of the importance of Gaddafi’s defeat. A 1981 CIA report on Libya elucidated the extent of US obsessive Gaddafi apprehension, focusing on the threat nexus of international terror and Soviet expansionism. It specifically detailed the vulnerability of Gaddafi’s “over-extension” in Chad and detailed a subtle approach as “an open Western challenge could rebound to Qaddafi’s advantage transforming him from outcast to Muslim martyr.”

With the explicit aim “to bloody Qaddafi’s nose” and “to increase the flow of pine boxes back to Libya,” Reagan and the CIA enlisted Habré a former Defense Minister who had been based on the Chad-Sudan border since his thwarted attempt on the Presidency in 1980. Habré’s ascent to presidency was seen as critical to the anti-Gaddafi campaign. President Reagan subsequently signed a formal intelligence order releasing several million dollars in covert support to Habré and, by June 1982, the future Chadian leader and 2,000 of his troops, armed and funded by the US, had reached N’Djamena and Habré assumed the presidency in Chad.

In addition to covert financing, the US provided an estimated $182 million in military and economic assistance during Habré’s Presidency. It provided machine guns, jeeps, missiles, surveillance aircraft, among other military hardware. A document from the DDS obtained by Human Rights Watch details training in the US in 1985 of Chadian security agents. Two of those who underwent training were found, during the Chadian Truth Commission to be Chad’s “most feared torturers”.

While the US covert operation was instrumental in cementing and maintaining Habré’s presidency, Chad was a Cold War geopolitical quagmire. Ariel Sharon, then Prime Minister of Israel agreed to provide aircraft weapons, advisors and, together with President of Zaire (present day Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mobutu Sese Seko, provided training for Habré’s troops in concert with the Zairian military.

France’s complicity is altogether more expansive and structural. France, which (officially) colonised Chad until 1960 employed a policy characterised by deliberative disunity between and within the predominantly Muslim north and predominantly Christian South. French colonial officers exploited differences to their advantage, instrumentalising cleavages for purposes of maintaining power and resources. Indeed, the very tensions that fomented decades of civil war and oppression in Chad, so readily dismissed by many Western analysts as “tribal” were entrenched by French colonialism. In the course of Habré’s presidency, keen to maintain its neocolonial hold on Chad, and blighted by the increasingly prominent role of the US in Chad, France supplied 3,000 troops, logistical support, equipment, and air power for Habré. During the course of the Presidency of François Mitterand, the French campaign in Chad from 1983 to 1984 was France’s largest military intervention since Algeria.

In addition to the atrocities committed by US and French forces in the course of the Chadian-Libyan war, western powers were aware and not deterred by the executions and torture being committed by Habré’s security forces in Chad, which in many cases using weaponry, finance, and training provided through by their Cold War allies. An Amnesty International Report as early as 1983 detailed the abuses taking place in Chad. In 2000, a former senior U.S. official remarked, “it is fair to say we…chose to turn a blind eye.”Perhaps the clearest indication of this approach was in June 1987, when President Habré was invited to the White House where President Reagan remarked, “today President Habre emphasized that his government is committed to building a better life for the Chadian people…I assured him that we will continue to do our best…to help reach President Habre’s laudatory goals”.

Implications for (International) Justice

International complicity in Chadian atrocities is hardly a secret. Human rights groups, analysts, historians and even the most conservative, status quo Western media outlets refer to Habré as a “western-backed dictator” and many acknowledge the specificites of Cold War dynamics. What is perplexing, but unsurprising then, is the disjuncture between this acknowledgement, and the determination of the appropriate course of action. Western complicity is treated as an unfortunate throwaway eventuality, stripped of its egregious role in the conflict. It is particularly telling that both the US and France are EAC donors, donating $1 million and €300,000 respectively towards the Chambers’ budget.

Temporally, the court has jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes committed from 1982 to 1990. While this precludes accountability for the destruction and systemic preconditions to conflict created by French colonialism, it does include within its timeframe Western responsibility during the Cold War. The Court, however, will try only Hissène Habré as delineated by the prosecution. On the implications of international backing for the case, EAC Prosecutor Mbacké Fall notes, “neither France nor the US felt concerned by the Habré regime’s massive human rights violations. But, having said that, I don’t think it will have an incidence on Habré’s guilt.” There is no scope, at this point, for criminal justice or other forms of accountability for Habré’s Western allies.

The Habré case, perhaps most poignantly, illustrates the politics of a singular focus on individualised criminal accountability and the problematics of negating internationalisation. Without diminishing the importance of holding Habré accountable, it should be noted that he is not singularly responsible. While the precepts of individualised accountability for gross crimes are important, in individualising, and particularly in individualising within the framework of contrived temporal jurisdictional limitations, two critical factors are excluded. First, we exclude accountability for historical complicity in proliferating structural conditions which cause violence because they precede the proscribed temporal mandate. Second, the language around individualised accountability, derived from a specific set of liberal ideas preclude accountability for external actors, in localising that which is often international and designating responsibility and command in ways that exclude external actors.

There is thus is a disjuncture between much of the vocabulary surrounding international criminal justice and the realities it seeks to address. Many conflicts, and specifically those in a Cold War context of protracted neo-colonial relationships are internationalised. The selectively-employed concept of “sovereignty” is flaccid where external advisors, funders, and patrons have the power, through capacity support, technical training, weapons, and money, to directly influence politics. The lenses offer us “civil war” despite international sponsorship and “state terrorism” despite transnational frameworks.

In so doing, they allow for the continued entrenchment of a dichotomy which posits a well-behaved West in opposition to a barbaric Africa. In this context, and specifically in Chad, where there is such an apparent a link between the atrocities committed and the US and French governments, prosecuting domestic actors in isolation without assessing international ones cannot purport to do justice in a fashion that is truly international. Again, this is not to suggest that Habré should not be held accountable; he should. But the focus on Habré to the exclusion of other powerful actors is insufficient and unjust in the context of layered and internationalised complicity for crimes.

Tears in Our Eyes: Third State Obligations in International Law
EJIL: Talk
By Başak Çali
July 30, 2015

In early January 2015 the Republic of South Korea sold 1.9 million tear gas canisters to Turkey. With this sale came much campaigning against it. Amnesty International’s “Korea, do not sell us tear gas” campaign received over 50,000 signatures of support. The goal of this campaign was to highlight how the Turkish police force has been and continues to be to this day reckless and excessive in its use of tear gas on certain domestic demonstrations. Reckless and excessive use which, according to data collected by the Turkey Human Rights Joint Platform, led to the death of 19 Turkish citizens between 2006 and 2013 – including four children.

The sale of such large quantities of tear gas to a country that has a proven track record of using it frequently and recklessly raises important questions of international law. It raises questions in particular with regard to the responsibility of third states for internationally wrongful acts and the standard of proof required to establish such responsibility. Put simply, did South Korea commit an internationally wrongful act when it sold tear gas to Turkey?

Tear gas and international law

The name tear gas encompasses a group of substances that irritate mucous membranes and cause stinging sensations and tears. The effect of tear gas is normally considered temporary for a healthy adult so long as they are able to breathe fresh air shortly after exposure. Fatalities have been caused when tear gas has been used in closed spaces, on unhealthy adults or the elderly, or when canisters have been fired directly at protesters.

The use of tear gas is prohibited in wartime both by the 1925 Gas Protocol and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The 1993 Convention, however, explicitly includes a clause in Article 1(5), inserted at the insistence of the United States, stating that “Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.” Article II(7) of the 1993 Convention further defines a “Riot Control Agent” as “Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.” This clause, by implication, signals a regime of permissibility for riot control agents – including tear gas – during peacetime.

Peacetime riot control, including the use of tear gas as a riot control agent, is not prohibited under any body of international law. Having said this, the effects of tear gas on the enjoyment of individual rights fall within the scope of international human rights law (IHRL) ((Cf. Maslen ed., Weapons under International Human Rights Law, CUP, 2014).

The use of tear gas can have rights-undermining consequences on the protection of the right to life (in particular, as I note above, if used in closed spaces or if tear gas is fired at closed range directly at protesters), the absolute prohibition of torture and ill treatment, freedom of assembly and the right to health. It also raises unique concerns for specially protected groups, such as children, the elderly, disabled, detainees and prisoners. In addition, if used as part of a widespread or systematic policy against a civilian population, the use of tear gas can come under the scope of crimes against humanity.

Tear gas before human rights bodies and courts

Committees of the ICCPR, the CAT, the CRC and the ICESCR have all raised concerns about the effects of use of tear gas on the enjoyment of rights protected by their treaties (See for example, Concluding Observations of the CCPR to Ecuador, (CCPR/C/ECU/CO/5, 2009); Concluding Observations of the CRC to Panama (CRC/C/PAN/CO/3-4, 2011). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association has raised specific concerns about tear gas use, pointing to the fact that “[w]ith regard to the use of tear gas, the Special Rapporteur recalls that gas does not discriminate between demonstrators and non-demonstrators, healthy people and people with health conditions.” He also warns against “any modification of the chemical composition of the gas for the sole purpose of inflicting severe pain on protestors and, indirectly, bystanders.” (A/HRC/20/27, para. 35).

The use of tear gas, in particular by Turkey, has been subject to repetitive litigation before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In a series of cases under the Ataman Group, the ECtHR found that the use of tear gas against peaceful protesters, or persons deprived of their liberty constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment. The Committee on the Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe issued guidelines for tear gas use and indicated that it must be prohibited in closed spaces within the Council of Europe member states.

Tear gas exports and third state responsibility

Assessing third state responsibility for tear gas use requires us to turn to the states that import tear gas. To assess the responsibility of tear gas importers requires answering two levels of questions. First, what triggers third state responsibility in international law? Second, what standard of proof is required to engage third state responsibility, such as that of South Korea, in cases of tear gas export?

The first question takes us to Article 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. This provides that:

‘A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:

(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and

(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State’

Let us address these conditions in reverse order.

The internationally wrongful act

The internationally wrongful act in the case of tear gas use is the use of tear gas by the exporting states in ways that undermine their IHRL obligations to respect and ensure human rights. IHRL bodies have all identified that punitive, excessive, or disproportionate use of tear gas is a violation of IHRL. In our example, South Korea is a state party to the ICCPR, the CAT as well as the ICESCR and the CRC, so is Turkey. In other words, punitive, excessive or disproportionate use of tear gas constitutes an international wrongful act both for Turkey and South Korea.

Knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act

This is where things get tricky. What standard of proof satisfies the knowledge of an internationally wrongful act? The International Law Commission sets the bar high in its commentaries. It requires that:

The relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State internationally wrongful and;

The aid or assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act.

In other words, the fact that South Korea has knowledge of any non-IHRL compliant use of tear gas is not sufficient to trigger its responsibility under Article 16. South Korea must intentionally seek to contribute to the non-IHRL compliant use itself. In our specific case, it would not be possible to prove that South Korea was intentionally seeking to undermine the prohibition of torture or freedom of assembly in Turkey.

Does IHRL support a less stringent test?

Article 16 in its current interpretive state leaves us with a lot of Korean tear gas to be used in non-IHRL compliant ways in Turkey. Is this where we have to leave this issue?

The UN recommendations and the emerging state practice may point to an alternative and a less stringent test. In 2005, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment pointed to the preventative duties of third states under IHRL. He asked exporting states to consider the risks associated with tear gas use. Specifically, he recommended exporting states must ‘prohibit the transfer of certain forms of equipment whose use in practice has substantially revealed a substantial risk of abuse and unwarranted injury’ (UN Doc E CN4/2005/62, page 11). The EC Regulation 1236/2005 of June 2005 legalized this view with respect to EU export policy. Significantly, it instructed EU member states to take into account available international court judgments and UN recommendations when assessing such risk.

The major tear gas exporting states (the US, Brazil, South Korea, and the UK) too have in place varying schemes of risk assessment for the export of teargas directly by states themselves or by private companies domiciled in these states. In the US, there is a multi-level agency vetting of foreign military sales prior to sale and a possibility to temporarily halt sales. In the UK, there is ex-post review that investigates whether there is a pattern of abuse in the importing state. In Brazil, the government committed to a review with regard to its tear gas export to Bahrain. Perhaps more significantly, South Korea has a review policy. When explaining the decision to halt the sale of tear gas to Bahrain, a South Korean official said that “I want to provide assurance and confirmation that [officials from KNPA, DAPA, MoFA, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Defence] are almost fully in agreement over forbidding the export of tear gas for human rights violations.”

Back to our case

What then are we to make of Turkey’s latest shopping spree? Here, standard caveats must apply. The recommendation of the Special Rapporteur on Torture is just that: a recommendation. It has no independent custom generating qualities. EU Regulation is a clear divergence away from Article 16 of the ILC, but cannot in and of itself generate custom. The practice of tear gas exporting states, however, does require more attention. Their policies, albeit not uniform, do point to the fact that the state practice of the most relevant group does not support the ‘intent to facilitate’ test of the ILC. Rather, domestic legal and governmental practice (key indicators of custom emergence) at the very least centre on the substantial risk of abuse or serious effect on rights enjoyment tests.

Whether this is sufficient to crystallize custom, and in what precision, however, does demand a more careful study. If intentionality is not a necessary condition, then what is? The future holds more tears in our eyes in Turkey and beyond. One thing we can see clearly through its haze, however, is the need to rethink the ILC Commentary paradigm for third state responsibility for specific types of international wrongful acts in the light of emerging custom that does not lend full support to it.

The Africa-ICC Relationship – More and Less than Meets the Eye (Part 3)
Justice in Conflict
By Mark Kersten
August 3, 2015

Over the last two weeks, I have attempted to critically examine and assess the relationship between African states and the ICC. In the first post, I critiqued popular assumptions about the relationship, namely that it is viewed as either the result of an unfair, neo-colonial ICC targeting an unwitting continent or of a misunderstood institution that is, in reality, representing the interests of Africans as a ‘Court for Africa’. Attempting to understand the politics and complexity of the relationship between African states and the ICC, such perspectives do more to obfuscate than illuminate.

In the second installment, I explored three cases: the surrender of senior Lord’s Resistance Army commander Dominic Ongwen to the ICC, the visit of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to South Africa, and the prosecution of heads of states. None of these crucial developments and issues can feasibly be explained by the dominant understanding of the Africa-ICC relationship.

Of course, it would be wrong to assume that these posts have been able to do anything more than scratch the very surface of this dynamic relationship. To insist otherwise would be to fall prey to oversimplifying the relationship. But what I have tried to demonstrate is that the Africa-ICC relationship is far more complex, both legally and politically, than presented by the Court, African states, or most observers. We need to do better than seeing the relationship within harsh dichotomies or tropes. If nothing else, that is the result of this three-part series.

In this third and final post, I want to expand the way that we look and judge the Africa-ICC relationship. Specifically, I want to argue that we need to expand the parameters of our understanding by examining and assessing the relationship not between African states and the Court but by taking a broader view of the engagement of African communities with international criminal justice. But first, here are some more direct conclusions that flow from this series.

Open and Honest Discussion

All of the parties involved – African states, the Court, and observers of all stripes – can and should do more to foster a more open and honest discussion and debate regarding the concerns and criticisms that African communities have of the ICC. Proponents of the Court need to understand that the criticisms levied against the institution are either real or so widely perceived to be real that they need to be treated as such.

At the same time, the ICC itself desperately needs to improve the way it communicates its work, particularly to affected societies. The Court’s public relations strategies are ineffective and, as a direct result, the ICC’s role is too often misunderstood, feeding a fertile breeding ground for misperceptions. The Court has done very little to deal with the critical conceptions of its work head-on. Its social media strategy is essentially non-existent and its website does little more than the dead-end of the internet to advance an accessible understanding of the Court’s work. Being more transparent, improving its social media engagements, and instituting a innovative and smart public relations strategy could dramatically improve knowledge of the Court’s work in affected communities and around the world.

At the same time, there is a need, for all parties, to acknowledge that the ICC has not – and perhaps cannot – transcend international politics. A recent op-ed suggested that the Court’s focus on African states is a result of them being ‘low-hanging fruit’. Indeed, there is a debate to be had about whether the Court’s focus on African states is the result not of them being African but because they are weaker states where the Court has jurisdiction. Part of this is structural: many strong states (the United States, Russia, China, etc.) haven’t signed the Rome Treaty and are often outside the jurisdictional reach of the Court and yet are able to steer the Court’s focus via referrals from the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, there is at least some correlation between fragile states, political violence, and weak judiciaries – all of which are variables that help establish weak state ‘candidates’ for ICC and other forms of humanitarian intervention.

For scholars and interested observers, it behooves us to interrogate this nexus of power, political interest and justice. The primary focus of analysis of the ICC – both critical and not – has been on the Court’s impacts in those states and regions in which it has intervened. This has spawned an important debate on issues such as the relationship between conflict resolution and accountability as well as how to establish accurate measures of the ICC’s effects. These are no doubt important, but we should also go behind the veneer and explore the largely untapped relationship between diplomacy and the Court. Here, as I have argued elsewhere, we need a much richer understanding of the institutional interests that guide the ICC’s decision-making and, ultimately, its interventions. Gaining such an understanding may just be the key to truly discerning the Court’s selectivity both between situations and within them.

In general, the debate about the Africa-ICC relationship needs much more critical analysis. There is both more and less than meets the eye. But the way the relationship has been presented to date hinders, rather than helps, us see it.

Taking a Broader Look – More than Meets the Eye

Digging deeper into questions of power and diplomacy would enrich our understanding of the Africa-ICC relationship. But we also need to do a much better job understanding the broader relationship between African communities and international criminal justice. There needs to be a shift in focus away from myopically examining the ICC-Africa relationship to the role and development of international criminal justice on the African continent. And here there is a tremendous wealth of projects that needs more sustained attention and scrutiny.

There are numerous ongoing proceedings against alleged perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In addition to the ongoing proceedings against Hissein Habré in Senegal, there have been domestic trials of ICC indictees, including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi in Libya as well as former Ivorian first lady Simone Gbagbo. For a host of reasons, these trials, especially those of former Gaddafi regime officials, have been highly controversial and rightly criticized. It may be too soon to announce the onset of an era where we are witnessing an “Africa that judges Africa”, but it does seem evident that states are taking prosecutions for international crimes increasingly seriously and view such prosecutions as part of their national political interest.

In response to crises that instigated ICC interventions, governments in both Uganda and Kenya have created institutions within their judiciaries that are able to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Crucially, the International Crimes Division in Uganda and especially the International and Organised Crimes Division in Kenya, hold the promise of linking the prosecution of transnational organised crimes to international crimes, an almost completely unexplored terrain that desperately needs attention. Thus, while both institutions have severe limitations, the fact that the governments of Uganda and Kenya see that it is necessary to create bodies that are focused on prosecuting international crimes domestically is an important and novel development. Moreover, while the work of these institutions may be limited by direct or indirect political interference, over time, brave investigators and prosecutors may be able to have a major role and impact in meting out justice and accountability for atrocities.

For the last few years, there has been much discussion about the potential expansion of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to include international crimes. Serious questions need to be answered before that can happen, notably the ever-sticky issue of who will pay. Moreover, the endeavour would be virtually pointless if the court was prohibited from prosecuting any government officials and thus was relegated to being a court solely for rebels. Nevertheless, it is a welcome move that African states and groups are seriously discussing and debating a regional institution that would prosecute international crimes. If nothing else, it drives the continued discussion of African responsibility and ownership for justice and accountability forward.

There’s little doubt that African communities and leaders are demonstrating that the ICC is not the only game in town. When it comes to prosecuting mass atrocities on the continent, it is not ‘ICC or nothing’. Nor should it be. The Central African Republic has recently created a hybrid tribunal to investigate alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by anti-Balaka and Séléka forces. While the Special Criminal Court is still more of an intellectual exercise and paper tiger than a functioning reality, if established and staffed, the hybrid tribunal would work in a complementary fashion with the ICC, ensuring that a broader section of perpetrators is held to account.

In addition to these projects and developments, it can’t be forgotten that hundreds, if not thousands, of civil society organizations across the African continent work tirelessly to promote awareness of human rights abuses, push for justice, and acknowledge the suffering of victims and survivors of atrocities. African communities have an embarrassment of riches when it comes to leadership on issues of justice and accountability.

All of these projects and developments have limitations and all face serious political obstacles. But they demonstrate that real and potential leadership on international criminal justice exists within African states. Moreover, looking at the ICC-Africa relationship through the broader lens of the development of international criminal justice on the continent may expose more useful avenues for understanding the relationship between the Court and African states.

From the outset of the Court’s creation, African states and communities have been indispensable to the work and functioning of the ICC. In recent years, however, the relationship has suffered. What is needed now is sustained and critical attention that appreciates the rich political and legal complexity of the relationship between the Court and African states, as well as the remarkable developments in international criminal justice on the continent.

The Reason Why the UK Lost the Serdar Mohammed Case
Just Security
By Jonathan Horowitz
August 3, 2015

The United Kingdom Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defense last Thursday. The decision, which assessed the lawfulness of the 110-day security detention of a suspected Taliban commander by UK forces in Afghanistan in 2010, sheds important light on how human rights law and international humanitarian law interact in the context of security detention in an extraterritorial non-international armed conflict.

The Court ruled that the United Kingdom had sufficient legal authority and grounds to hold Mohammed for the first 96 hours of his detention and, for those four days, the Court also ruled that the United Kingdom afforded him appropriate procedural guarantees. The same wasn’t true for the next 106 days of his captivity. The Court made this ruling on the basis of Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

As to the substance of the decision, the Court had to determine the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law. Without reciting all the points covered, one of the more important parts of the decision was the Court’s reaction to the Secretary of State’s claim that Article 5 can be modified under the notion that international humanitarian law is lex specialis and therefore its rules should take primacy over human rights law. The Secretary of State based its claim on Hassan v. United Kingdom (ECtHR) but, as the Justices rightly noted, that case involved an international armed conflict (IAC) and addressed a legal matter (detention) that is covered by detailed rules of international humanitarian law. To determine if Hassan was, in fact, relevant, the Justices said they needed to determine if the international humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict (NIAC) similarly contained relevant detention rules.

This brings us to the heart of the case and as we’ll see in a moment, the Secretary of State’s reliance on Hassan falls flat . . . sort of.

Before determining the relationship between Article 5 and IHL in the context of a NAIC, the Court sought to determine what, if any, other legal authority may have allowed the United Kingdom to detain Mohammed in Afghanistan. The Court looked to the UN Security Council and Afghan domestic law. (The Court noted that it did not assess UK domestic law in this portion of the decision because the Secretary of State did not raise it.)

With respect to Afghan law, there was no legal authority that allowed detention beyond 72 hours. With respect to the UN Security Council, the Justices determined that the Council, through Resolution 1890, provided ISAF with an authority to detain and, in turn, ISAF decided to limit that detention authority to 96 hours, and only 96 hours. The United Kingdom, therefore, derived an authority to detain from the Council. (The Court similarly concluded that ISAF’s detention rules, and the United Kingdom’s own detention rules, set out sufficient grounds for detention.)

With the first 96 hours covered legally, the Justices then assessed whether international humanitarian law granted an authority and grounds for the United Kingdom to detain beyond 96 hours. Ultimately, their conclusion affirmed those of us (me included) who believe that international humanitarian law, which does not contain an explicit authority to detain in NIAC, does not contain an implied authority to detain in NIAC. The Justices were also not convinced that customary international law provided an authority for security detention in NIAC.

The Justices came to this conclusion after reviewing a wide range of legal arguments, literature, state practice, and opinio juris. The Court rejected the notion that an authority to detain under IHL exists in the absence of its express prohibition under IHL. It also rejected the argument that the IHL of NIAC contains an implicit authority to detain and, in particular, that an authority under IHL to use lethal force implies the less grave authority to detain. In support of its view, the Court noted that States purposefully refused to grant the authority to detain under IHL so to guard from giving that same authority to non-state armed groups; recognized that States clearly demonstrated their desire to retain certain sovereign authorities under international law, which include an ability to detain and maintain law and order on their own terms; and found it problematic that if an authority to detain could be implied in the IHL and NIAC, that body of rules contains no grounds or procedures for security detention.

Moreover, in so much as proponents for an implied detention authority rely on the Geneva Convention rules for POWs and internees (which apply to international armed conflict) to fill this gap, the Court labeled this approach “highly controversial” and said that there is a “certain artificiality” in basing the authority to detain in the IHL that applies to a non-international armed conflict while basing its scope and the safeguards on the IHL that applies in international armed conflict.

The Court then had to assess what procedural safeguards the United Kingdom needed to afford Mohammed and whether it did so sufficiently. The Court does this through an assessment of what is called “irreducible core procedural requirements”-requirements put forth by the Secretary of State (which are based heavily on IHL) but which the Court sees as being common to IHRL. These requirements were 1) humane treatment, 2) the entitlement of detainees to be informed promptly of the reasons for their detention in a language they understand, and 3) periodical review by an impartial and objective authority to ensure that if, prior to the cessation of hostilities, there ceased to be imperative reasons of security to detain a person, he or she should be released.

Oddly, having discounted Hassan, the Court nonetheless measured the United Kingdom’s actions largely against IHRL and IHL standards, perhaps as a way to play the Secretary of State at its own game of using IHL. But, in doing so, the Court quickly skimmed over the important legal question of whether a State must make a formal Article 15 derogation to implement a security detention regime that limits Article 5 rights and allows something other than a court to determine the lawfulness of a person’s detention. Instead, the Court jumped past this issue and determined that the periodic review was not impartial and objective; expressed “real doubt that it is authorised to determine ‘the lawfulness’ of continued detention;” and said there was no opportunity of the detainee to participate in the reviews of his detention.

The Justices conclude “even if Article 5 had to be modified to reflect the fact that this detention was in the course of a non-international armed conflict, the minimum procedural safeguards required by international law in such a conflict would not have been met.”

In addition to its substance, the context in which this decision arrived is important. Justice Lloyd Jones and Justice Beaston add fodder to the ongoing debate about the inappropriateness of extending the Convention’s jurisdiction to overseas military operations. For those unfamiliar, the gist of the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation is that the Convention applies extraterritorially when a State has effective control over an area or when it has power and control over an individual, regardless of where that territory or individual is located.

The Justices say that various practical and legal difficulties arise from applying the Strasburg court’s interpretations on extraterritoriality and they even express “significant legal reservations” about the Strasburg court’s interpretations (interpretations which the UK Supreme Court has taken on board). While practical and legal difficulties exist, this is not a new challenge for law and it’s no reason to throw the baby (i.e., the European Convention) out with the bath water. For that reason it was appropriate, indeed required, that the Justices, be it somewhat begrudgingly, applied the Strasburg court’s views.

Before they did so, however, they pointed the Secretary of State to a legislative fix. Legislation, the Justices say, “might have taken the form of a bar of specified claims by foreign nationals or have provided for specific authority for HM [Her Majesty’s] armed forces to detain in operations overseas.” If the Secretary of State seriously considers proposing either of these legislative approaches, the second suggestion seems to sit best with the Convention and, in particular, its article on the right to an effective remedy.

The Right to a Remedy in Armed Conflict-International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and the Principle of Systemic Integration
Opinio Juris
By Vito Todeschini
August 5, 2015

In 2013, the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Regional Court of Bonn issued their judgements in two cases ‒ Varvarin and Kunduz respectively ‒ concerning Germany’s participation in the NATO-led operations in Serbia/Kosovo and Afghanistan. These judgments confirm and exemplify a general trend in domestic case law, which denies that victims of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) have a right to bring claims directly in the domestic courts of the allegedly responsible State (Gillard, pp. 37‒38). This finding is mainly based on the lack of an obligation on States under IHL to provide individuals with enforceable remedies against violations. Domestic courts, however, tend to overlook the complementary role that human rights law (HRL), the other legal framework governing armed conflicts, may play in this context.

This contribution explores this possibility, arguing that HRL may supplement IHL with regard to the right to a remedy. The analysis assumes the perspective that IHL and HRL are complementary legal frameworks. It further employs the principle of systemic integration, codified in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, to interpret IHL in light of HRL. An alternative interpretation will be proposed, namely that victims of IHL violations should be allowed to bring claims in the allegedly responsible State’s courts on the basis of the right to a remedy under HRL.

The Right to a Remedy: HRL v. IHL

The right to a remedy is enshrined in several human rights treaties (inter alia, Articles 2(3) ICCPR; 13‒14 CAT; 13 ECHR; 25 ACHR; 7(1)(a) ACHPR), under which States Parties have an obligation to establish domestic remedies capable of finding and redressing human rights violations. The concept of remedy generally presents two dimensions: procedural and substantive. The procedural aspect regards the right to have access to a competent body, which may be judicial or administrative depending on the seriousness of the violation. The substantive dimension concerns the right to reparation, which includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition (Shelton, p. 7). Effectiveness is the distinctive element characterising a remedy. To be effective, a remedy must be accessible, enforceable, and provide redress if a violation is found (HRCtee GC31, paras. 15‒16). A final feature of remedies is their dependency on the previous infringement of another right.

The situation differs radically with regard to IHL. According to Articles 3 HC IV and 91 AP I, a State must provide compensation for the IHL violations it is responsible for. This rule is considered to be customary and applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The drafting history of Article 3 HC IV shows that its objective is to provide victims of violations with the right to bring a claim directly against the responsible State (Kalshoven, pp. 830‒837). Yet, post-WWII domestic case law has generally departed from this original construction and interpreted such provision as conferring on States, not victims, the right to claim compensation (CIHL Study, pp. 544‒545; Zegveld, pp. 507‒512; Henn, pp. 617‒623). Additionally, there is no specific rule in IHL providing how a victim can enforce the right to reparation. It can be concluded that, at best, victims of IHL violations have a substantial right to reparation but not a procedural right to a remedy. In this respect, the question is whether HRL, which also applies in armed conflicts, may provide individuals with a procedural remedy for unlawful harm suffered in war time.

Systemic integration between IHL and HRL

The relationship between IHL and HRL may be considered from two perspectives: competition and complementarity. Generally, whenever two rules belonging to the different regimes are both applicable and in competition, human rights treaties are interpreted taking into account IHL rules (ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 25; HRCtee GC31, para. 11). For instance, the human rights to life and personal liberty in armed conflicts may be modified in light of IHL rules on targeting and internment (ICJ Nuclear Weapons, para. 25; ECtHR Hassan, paras. 102‒106). On the other hand, IHL and HRL rules are not always in competition. Despite being designed to pursue very different objectives ‒ conduct of warfare (IHL) and protection of individuals and groups (HRL) ‒ these bodies of law are also complementary and mutually reinforcing. They share certain common purposes, such as ensuring humane treatment of individuals at any time (HRCtee GC31, para. 11; IAComHR Abella, paras. 158‒160; Hampson and Salama, paras. 6‒8).

One aspect of the complementarity between IHL and HRL is that the provisions of one of these bodies of law may fill the gaps present in the other; for instance, as it is argued here, with respect to the right to a remedy. This operation is made possible by the principle of systemic integration codified in Article 31 VCLT, which provides that in the interpretation of an international norm “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: [… ] (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. Systemic integration is a mandatory part of the interpretive process which demands that a rule of international law be construed taking into account all other international norms, deriving from any source, that are applicable in and relevant to a certain situation (ILC, paras. 413 ff.). The ICJ and human rights treaty bodies have, explicitly or implicitly, resorted to the principle of systemic integration when considering the concurrent application of IHL and HRL (d’Aspremont and Tranchez, pp. 238‒241). Since it allows to interpret one body of law in light of the other, the present analysis employs systemic integration as a legal-theoretical basis to provide remedies under HRL for violations of IHL.

Remedying violations in armed conflicts

In 2006, the German Federal Supreme Court (FSC) held in the Varvarin case that Articles 3 HC IV and 91 AP I do not grant individuals a right to claim reparation for IHL violations directly against a State, and that consequently victims must file any claims via their own government (paras. 10‒14). Although recognising the progressive acknowledgement of the international subjectivity of individuals that has occurred over time, the FSC denied that HRL had modified international law so as to grant individuals a general procedural right to bring claims for IHL violations in a foreign State’s domestic courts (paras. 7‒9, 14‒15). This interpretation has been confirmed in the aforementioned 2013 judgments by the German Federal Constitutional Court in the same case, and the Regional Court of Bonn in the Kunduz case.

It is submitted here that, while considering HRL as a relevant legal framework, the FSC failed to apply the principle of systemic integration in a satisfactory manner. The Court did not refer to the obligations to provided remedies contained in the treaties which Germany is party to, such as the ECHR or the ICCPR. A reasonable application of the principle would have at least required: a) taking into account the provisions on the right to a remedy included in the human rights treaties binding on Germany as well as relative treaty bodies’ jurisprudence; and b) considering whether these provisions have a bearing on the claims regarding IHL violations. Given that under IHL victims are entitled to reparation but have no procedural right to enforce it, it seems sensible for a domestic court to take into account the relevant provisions of HRL which oblige States to provide effective remedies against violations.

In this writer’s opinion, by resorting to the principle of systemic integration the FSC could have argued that the lack of an enforceable right to a remedy under IHL may be read in light of the obligation of States to provide an effective remedy under HRL. Accordingly, the Court could have filled such a gap by deciding that a victim of an IHL violation is entitled to bring a claim against the allegedly responsible State under the same procedures provided for to victims of human rights violations. In this perspective, whereas the breach of the norm would regard a substantive rule of IHL ‒ e.g., the prohibition to kill civilians ‒ the remedy, and therefore the enforcement of the right to reparation, would be exercised as provided for in HRL ‒ e.g., Article 2(3) ICCPR.

The principle of systemic integration is a mandatory part of the interpretive process. Its application to the relationship between IHL and HRL has marked the jurisprudence of several international bodies. This principle requires interpreting one body of law taking account of the other; hence, IHL may be read in light of HRL. Far from being a stretch of existing norms ‒ the reasoning draws on lex lata and not lex ferenda ‒ systemic integration may contribute to fill a major gap in IHL and give substance to the idea that IHL and HRL are, in certain respect, complementary. Besides, and most importantly, victims of IHL violations may be provided with a procedural remedy to enforce directly in domestic courts their right to reparation.