A Voice for the Voiceless

By: Julia Moreno

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations Associate Article Editor

A Ukrainian soldier flying a drone in the Donetsk region. New York Times, October 21, 2026. Photo courtesy of Reuters. 

For more than a week in mid-October 2026, Ukrainian officials reported that SpaceX’s Starshield, the military-grade counterpart to Starlink, had begun to disrupt drones flying above around 160 kilometers per hour. Sources from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and an adviser of Zelenskyy stated that SpaceX imposed the restrictions without prior warning and disrupted several missions. The speed range of these drones matter because Ukraine uses these interceptor drones to shoot down Russian attack drones. If the interceptor drones are unable to fly at around 160 km/h, they are an ineffective interceptor. 

After Zelenskyy reported speeds had been restored on October 24th, Elon Musk acknowledged that SpaceX had restricted Starlink in Ukraine. He said that Ukraine’s military had violated Starlink’s terms of service by using it for offensive drone strikes, and maintained that Starshield is a separate system controlled by the US government. Ukrainian officials dispute that claim, and administration officials have given conflicting accounts of their own role.

The reported Starshield cap tests whether a company’s responsibility to respect human rights, as set out in the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) on Business and Human Rights, extends to degrading a service on which a conflict-affected population’s defenses depend even where the company’s underlying concern is legitimate. 

The UNGP, endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011, set a global standard to expected conduct for companies that exist independently of states’ own compliance. Companies should avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts and address them when they occur (Principle 13(a)), carry out ongoing due diligence to identify and mitigate actual and potential impacts (Principle 17), and seek ways to honor and respect internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements (Principles 23(b)). Principle 12 ties the responsibility to the International Bill of Human Rights, which includes the right to life under ICCPR Article 6. In conflict-affected settings, the Working Group on Business and Human Rights call for heightened due diligence. 

A no-notice throttle of systems that are the forefront of defense for Ukraine, amounts to contributing to adverse human rights impacts, and falls short of the due diligence the Principles expect, even if SpaceX’s concern about offensive use was genuine. 

SpaceX may respond that it had no duty to provide the service in the first place, but the UNGPs ask whether a company’s conduct contributes to the harm, not whether the service was owed. A company’s “activities” according to Principle 13’s commentary include both actions and omissions. Therefore, the question is how SpaceX changed a service Ukraine had come to depend on, not whether it was obligated to offer it. 

Principle 18 and its commentary expects impact assessment and consultation before major changes in operations, including policy changes. Additionally, even where a company has a genuine concern about how its service is being used, Principle 19’s commentary says to weigh factors. For example, comparing the severity of Ukraine’s alleged violation of terms and whether restrictions on Starshield would itself have adverse human rights consequences. 

Here, the reported facts suggest the problem was not SpaceX’s reason for acting, but how it acted: without notice, consultation, or a reasonable assessment of the effect of Ukraine’s defenses. The risk was also foreseeable: Musk himself said the Ukrainian front line would collapse immediately if Starlink were turned off. A company that understood the stakes and acted without notice or consultation is in direct conflict with Principles 18 and 19. 

The reported interference with Starlink and Starshield in Ukraine show how a company’s human rights responsibility governs how it restricts services during wartime, not whether it may. SpaceX may have had a genuine concern about offensive use, and the UNGPs do not ask a company to ignore those concerns. However, where the service has become part of the state’s defense, Principles 18 and 19 expect notice, consultation, and an assessment of the consequences before a company acts; the reported facts here suggest those steps were not followed. Musk’s own acknowledgement of Ukraine heavily relying on Starlink makes the risk hard to categorize as unforeseeable. The Principles are not binding law, and this situation shows how little formal accountability exists when a private company’s service is heavy intertwined within a state’s defense system. Until that gap is addressed, a company’s own process and procedures may be the main safeguard for those who depend on it. 

For further information, please see: 

Al Jazeera – Ukraine’s access to Starlink a decision for Elon Musk, Rubio says – 22 Oct 2026

CBS – Musk chose to restrict Ukraine’s access to SpaceX satellite network, sources says – 21 Oct 2026

CBS – Elon Musk’s Starlink and Starshield, and what they mean to Ukraine in the war against Russia – 26 Oct 2026

PBS – Musk says he was behind Starlink speed restriction after service in Ukraine is restored – 24 Oct  2026

United Nations Human Rights – Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

United Nations – Issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises : note / by the Secretary-General – 21 July 2020

United Nations Development Programme – Business, Human Rights and Conflict Affected Regions: Towards Heightened Action

United Nations Human Rights – The Corporate Responsibly to Respect Human Rights

https://papuanewguinea.un.org/en/download/4164/21260

By: Moises Ramirez Gomez
Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

WASHINGTON, D.C., United States – On September 18, 2026, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”) issued a report concluding that the United States is responsible for violating the rights of Tennessee death row prisoner Christa Pike, including her right to equality before the law under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Tennessee attempted to execute her by lethal injection, but the attempt failed. Afterward, the Tennessee Department of Correction stated that it followed every step of the state’s execution protocol, which does not allow for additional procedures.

Christa Pike appears in a Nashville court on April 12, 2012, in an earlier, separate case. 

Pike was sentenced to death after the 1995 killing of Colleen Slemmer, which she committed at age 18. In the year 2020, attorneys from Cornell Law School and the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee petitioned the Commission and requested precautionary measures, arguing that her trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence, that she had endured prolonged solitary confinement, and finally, that Tennessee’s execution methods violated her rights. Alongside this, they argued that, as the only woman on Tennessee’s death row, her isolation was a reflection of gender discrimination, because men on death row were housed together.

The Commission found violations of Pike’s rights to life, liberty and personal security, equality before the law, health and well-being, a fair trial, protection from arbitrary arrest, and due process. As a result, it recommended reparation, review and commutation of her sentence, her removal from solitary confinement, and reforms to ensure adequate counsel is given in capital cases. The Commission also noted that the American Declaration does not prohibit the death penalty in itself, but concluded that executing Pike after proceedings that violated her rights would be a serious violation of her rights to life and due process. The United States had objected earlier in the proceeding, telling the Commission in 2020 that Pike had not exhausted domestic remedies and that the jury considered her mental health as a mitigating factor.

Because the United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, Pike’s case was assessed by the Commission under the Declaration rather than by the Inter-American Court. The Commission first sent its findings to the United States on October 15, 2025. Here, they asked for information on compliance within one month. According to Diplomacy and Law, a legal commentary site, the findings do not change Pike’s Tennessee sentence, nor do they act as a stay in Tennessee courts. Alongside this, the same commentary points that Report 197/26, the Commissions published decision on the Pike’s case, does not say whether Tennessee can attempt a second execution. 

Considering this analysis, whether international law limits a second execution attempt is unresolved. Report 197/26 does not address a repeat attempt, and there is no applicable treaty provision or Inter-American decision it reviewed that bars one outright. On October 1, the UN human rights chief and nine UN experts urged Tennessee not to pursue another attempt. The governor has halted the remaining 2026 executions, and has additionally ordered an independent review. The state says the Tennessee Supreme will decide whether to set a new date. 

In conclusion, Pike’s case leaves two questions open: what effect the Commission’s findings will have in Tennessee, and whether a second lethal injection attempt is permitted. 

For further information, please see:

Diplomacy and Law – Can Tennessee Execute Christa Pike Again? What International Law Says – 7 Oct. 2026

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – IACHR Publishes Merits Report on Death Penalty and Detention Conditions of Christa Pike In the United States – 24 Sept. 2026 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – IACHR Urges the United States to Refrain from Applying the Death Penalty Against Christa Pike, Beneficiary of Precautionary Measures – 18 Sept. 2026

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – Reports No. 197/26, Case 14.754, Christa Pike – 18 Sept. 2026

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – Resolution 95/2020, Precautionary Measure No. 1080-20 – 11 Dec. 2020

By: Abigail Wilcher

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Senior Article Editor

United States President Donald Trump, Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen alongside Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen after signing the updated 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement, courtesy of the White House.

New York, New York – September 22, 2026, the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Government of Greenland published an agreement amending and supplementing the original April 27, 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement (“Agreement”). The 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement is a bilateral treaty signed by the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark on April 27, 1951, under the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, granting the United States military rights in Greenland during and after the Cold War. The 2026 Agreement preserves that foundational architecture while adapting it to an increasingly contested Arctic, where intensified military activity and strategic competition have elevated regional security concerns.

Under Article IV of the 2026 Agreement, the United States may modernize and expand operations at Pituffik Space Base and establish additional defense areas at Narsaruaq and Mestersvig. Additional installations may be proposed, subject to consultation and mutual agreement among the United States, Denmark, and Greenland (“Parties”). However, if negotiations do not yield agreement within 90 days, the issue must be escalated through successive diplomatic channels. These provisions enable expanded U.S. capabilities while withholding any unilateral authority to create new defense areas absent consensus. Article VI further enhances operational access by authorizing the movement of military aircraft, vessels, and personnel throughout Greenland, including its territorial waters. The Agreement also contemplates expanded defense capabilities associated with the proposed Golden Dome missile defense system. At the same time, all military activities must accord due respect to Greenlandic society, including traditional hunting, fishing, and cultural practices.

Pituffik Space Base pictured in northern Greenland on October 4, 2023, courtesy of Getty Images.

Beyond operational matters, the Agreement incorporates significant national security safeguards. Article IX generally prohibits non-NATO states from establishing military installations or maintaining a persistent military presence in Greenland without the Parties’ agreement. Article X similarly constrainscertain foreign investments involving critical infrastructure, natural resources, and other sensitive sectors where national security or public order may be implicated.

Article XI addresses the Agreement’s durability and Greenland’s constitutional trajectory. It provides that the Agreement has no expiration date and may be amended only by mutual consent. Should Greenland exercise a right to independence, Denmark and Greenland must ensure that the newly independent state remains within NATO and assumes the existing defense obligations. This provision foregrounds complex issues at the intersection of national self-determination and treaty commitments that extend beyond the territory’s present constitutional status.

The amended Agreement updates a Cold War–era framework for a contemporary Arctic security environment defined by strategic competition, heightened maritime and air activity, and the salience of space and cyber domains. By clarifying NATO’s role, codifying access and mobility, and enabling modernization and expansion of Defense Areas, the Agreement positions Greenland as a critical node in allied early warning, space, and North Atlantic defense architectures. For Greenland, provisions emphasizing “maximum respect,” local sourcing preferences, and structured consultation seek to align defense imperatives with societal, environmental, and economic considerations, acknowledging self- governance and the aspiration that benefits flow to local communities. The restrictions on non-NATO military presence and the investment-screening mechanism establish a firmer perimeter against strategic influence via basing or critical-sector investments, reflecting broader transatlantic security-screening trends. Finally, the Agreement’s permanent nature and its independence-contingency clause aim to preserve continuity in defense obligations across potential constitutional outcomes, thereby mitigating uncertainty for long-term basing, interoperability, and allied planning. Ultimately, the amended 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement modernizes a Cold War defense framework for today’s Arctic, expanding allied flexibility while embedding consultation and economic-security guardrails likely to shape Greenland’s strategic future.

For further information, please see:

The Avalon Project – Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark – 27 April 1951.

The White House – Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Together with the Government of Greenland – 22 Sept. 2026.

gettyimages – Thule Air Base Stock Photos – 2023.

The White House – United Nations General Assembly 2026 – September 22, 2026 – 2026.

Monica Rodriguez Santana

Impunity Watch Staff Writer 

An exterior view of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, March 31, 2021. Photo Courtesy of Reuters and Piroschka van de Wouw.

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Russia has requested the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security to extradite International Criminal Court (ICC) president and Japanese national, Tomoko Akane, among eight other ICC officials. 

The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on October 8, 2026, that it had sent a request to the Dutch government for the extradition of the nine ICC officials following their conviction in absentia in a Moscow City Court in December 2025. The named officials include the court’s current president Tomoko Akane, first vice-president Rosario Salvatore Aitala, second vice-president Reine Alapini-Gansou, and judges Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, and Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez. The remaining three individuals named no longer sit on the court, including former president Piotr Hofmański, former judge Bartram Schmitt, and former ICC prosecutor Karim Khan. 

The Russian Court found all nine individuals guilty of knowingly bringing an innocent person to face criminal liability, unlawful detention, and an attack on persons enjoying international protection. The named officials received prison sentences ranging from three and a half years to fifteen years. 

This move from Russian authorities comes as retaliation for the ICC’s warrants issued in 2023 against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the presidential commissioner for children’s rights, for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. The ICC has held them responsible for the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia. 

According to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, the 2023 warrants issued by ICC officials violated international law and were issued without any evidence. 

Russia has cited its 2016 presidential order withdrawing its intention to become a party to the Rome Statute as the grounds for not recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Rome Statute is the international treaty that founded the ICC in 2002, to which neither Russia nor the United States are parties. 

This action coincides with the United States’s sanctions on ICC officials, including president Akane, as a result of the U.S. campaign launched in July 2026 to “dismantle the threat posed by the International Criminal Court to U.S. sovereignty.” The ICC authorized an investigation in 2020 into alleged crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, as well as targeting the U.S. and Israel in its investigation into the conflict in the Gaza Strip. 

This conflict creates a point of contention for Japan as it navigates continued support for the ICC while its closest ally, the United States, works to dismantle the institution. Japanese spokesman Masanao Ozaki stated that the Japanese government plans to “respond appropriately, including by making further representations to Russia” and “maintaining communication with the ICC and other states parties.”

Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, during a recent parliamentary session, stated, “We have consistently supported the ICC in accordance with our efforts to uphold the rule of law, and we will continue to do so.” 

For further information, please see: 

Anadolu Ajansı – Russia seeks extradition of 9 ICC officials convicted in absentia – 9 Oct. 2026

ICC – Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Mediazona – Performative mail. Russia requests the extradition of current and former ICC judges sentenced in absentia over the Putin warrant – 8 Oct. 2026

NHK World Japan – Russia requests handover of nine ICC officials – 8 Oct. 2026

The Japan Times – Japan calls Russia’s request to extradite ICC head Akane regrettable – 9 Oct. 2026

ua.news – Russia is demanding that the Netherlands extradite the ICC officials who issued an arrest warrant for Putin – 8 Oct. 2026

By Frank Ruscito 

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor 

On September 30th, 2026, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Alabama filed a lawsuit with the United States Supreme Court to overturn ‘Shield Laws’ enacted in the wake of the Dobbs’ decision. These laws ensure medical professionals practicing in pro-choice states are protected from legal action by state governments that deny patient access to reproductive care. 

Governor Kathy Hochul and pro-choice activists, including Dr. Margaret Carpenter, at the signing of the New York State’s “Shield Law” on December 19th, 2025 (Photo Credit: Center for Reproductive Rights) 

Washington, D.C – The filing, Louisiana; et al. v. New York; et al., asserts that the defendant states are engaged in a scheme to nullify the decision to overturn Roe made in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization by circumnavigating state level abortion bans. They present a legal theory that the defendant states have violated multiple constitutional provisions including the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Equal-Sovereignty Doctrine, and the Commerce Clause prescription on the interstate transfer of goods, in this case medications banned for purchase or use by state law. 

The rapid closure of reproductive health facilities following Dobbs has led to one in five women in the US reporting that they are geographically isolated from any form of contraceptive care. This collapse in women’s health services is reflected in all three of the plaintiff states, being ranked 46^th to 50^th in a national ranking of quality of women’s health care. Reproductive rights activists and medical professionals have created inroads into southern states through telehealth prescription services and the mailing of medication intended to empower patients to exercise agency over their right to become or remain pregnant. This has led to a series of lawsuits directed at New York medical personnel by plaintiffs in Texas and Louisiana for civil damages alleging harm from prescribed medications including the case of Dr. Margaret Carpenter, which resulted in a call for extradition by Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry to face criminal charges and potentially up to 15 years in prison for providing prescription medication. As of this writing New York Governor Kathy Hochul has declined to extradite Dr. Carpenter in line with the state’s ‘Shield Framework’ and has described the attempted removal as political theater on behalf of state Republicans in Louisiana. 

With the 2022 Dobbs decision, the United States has been designated as one of four countries to curtail access to abortion following legalization. In a stunning turn Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, at the time of the decision was forced to comment, claiming that the outcome was a threat to the rights of millions of women, particularly those who are poor or from minority backgrounds. This judicial outcome was championed by the Republican Party and its ideological perspective on the purported immorality of abortion has been extended by the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach. The 2025 reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy or “Global Gag Rule” with regards to family planning services internationally has resulted in the United States being identified as a contributor to the erosion of women’s health resources globally. 

“The Global Gag Rule” predicates funding for women’s health care on ending public support for abortion. It creates a conditional metric that limits international aid organizations from providing complete women’s health care based on their acquiescence to American domestic political prerogatives. This policy as well as other attempts by Trump administration to withdraw from women’s health efforts have imperiled women’s health globally. Almost 11.7 million women and girls across the globe are estimated to have lost access to contraceptive care due to American withdrawals from global sexual and reproductive health efforts.  

The United Nations Gender equality chief has stated that this confluence of new legal barriers on women’s reproductive freedom and influence by political actors in the United States and other nations have weakened the legal position of women worldwide. Based on reports published by the United Nations there has been an observable backslide in women’s rights that began with the current legal regime in the United States. Under the current United States administration’s focus on Republican social prerogatives and historical trends regarding the “The Global Gag Rule” during previous Republican administrations it is likely that American disengagement from global women’s health care will continue and this may lead to a further erosion of women’s reproductive rights in the United States and abroad. 

For further information, please see: 

ABC – Louisiana, Alabama and Arkansas challenge New York’s abortion protections – 30 Sept 2026 

Focus 2030 – State of gender inequality in the world – 2025 edition 

Center for Reproductive Rights – New York’s Strengthened Shield Law Will Further Protect Doctors Prescribing Abortion Medication – 6 Feb 2025 

Center for Reproductive Rights – U.S. Abortion Rights in the Global Context 

Office of Governor Jeff Landry – Governor Jeff Landry Signs Extradition Warrant for New York Doctor -13 Feb 2025 

ABC – Hochul won’t extradite abortion doctor to Louisiana – Feb 13, 2025 

World Metrics – Reproductive Rights Statistics | 2026 Edition 

PubMed Central – The State of International Human Rights Law on Sexual and Reproductive Health: An Overview – 27 Dec 2025 

The Commonwealth Fund – 2024 State Scorecard on Women’s Health and Reproductive Care – 18 July 2024 

The Federal Register – Federal Register :: The Mexico City Policy – 24 Jan 2025 

UN News – Women’s rights are regressing worldwide, warns UN gender equality chief  – 4 March 2026 

By: Carson Roberts

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

Strasbourg, France – Ten children, ages one to five at the time, have not been heard from since Russia took control of Crimea in 2014. On September 22, 2026, a Ukrainian human rights group asked the European Court of Human Rights to recognize that silence as an enforced disappearance.

Women with children in strollers pass armed men believed to be Russian servicemen outside a Ukrainian military base near Simferopol, Crimea, in March 2014. Photo Courtesy of Vasily Fedosenko/Reuters.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) filed the application in January 2023 on behalf of the ten children. When Russia asserted jurisdiction over the peninsula in 2014, they were living in state childcare institutions and under the care of the Ukrainian state. According to UHHRU, more than 4,000 children in Crimea without parental care were automatically declared Russian citizens after the occupation began. Ukrainian authorities requested their return. Russia declined and instead opened adoption procedures. Profiles of these ten children later appeared on Russian adoption and foster placement databases, and information about some has since disappeared from public sources. The applicants say this may indicate that the children have been adopted.

The application relies on two provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights: Article 5, which guarantees the right to liberty and security, and Article 8, which protects private and family life. Under international law, enforced disappearance combines deprivation of liberty with a refusal to acknowledge a person’s fate or whereabouts. The applicants argue that the children were unlawfully detained and their whereabouts concealed, constituting an enforced disappearance under Article 5, and that the arbitrary change of their citizenship violated their rights under Article 8.

The Court held the public hearing at the applicants’ request. It will rule on admissibility and the merits later.

Represented by the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, the applicants argued that the conduct must be read cumulatively. They submitted that imposing Russian citizenship, combined with the ability to change a child’s name, date of birth, and place of birth, erased the children’s social identity as Ukrainians.

Several third parties intervened. International Partnership for Human Rights and the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health jointly submitted that the removal, adoption, and Russification of Ukrainian children are not isolated wartime incidents, but amount to “a deliberate state policy,” planned at the highest levels of the Russian government, codified in federal legislation, and administered by permanent federal institutions. The Government of Ukraine and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute also addressed the Court.

The Russian Government filed no observations and did not appear. The judges pressed the parties on the evidence showing that any of the children had in fact left Crimea or been placed with a family, and on why the application was lodged nine years after the events.

The International Criminal Court has charged similar conduct under a different theory. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of children, covering conduct dating back to at least February 24, 2022. Neither warrant has been executed, and the ICC has no power to make an arrest itself. By contrast, the case before the European Court of Human Rights requires no arrest and reaches back to 2014.

For further information, please see:

Agence Europe – ECHR Holds Hearing on Placement of 10 Ukrainian Children in Russian Adoption System in Crimea – 23 Sept. 2026

Al Jazeera – ECHR Hears How 10 Children Went Missing After Russia Annexed Crimea – 22 Sept. 2026

ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights – 1950

ECHR – Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union on behalf of ten Ukrainian children v. Russia, no. 6719/23 – 10 Jul. 2026

ICC – Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova – 17 Mar. 2023

IPHR – IPHR Addresses European Court of Human Rights on Russia’s Programme of Adoption and Russification of Ukrainian Children – 22 Sept. 2026

By Megan Bush

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

ARUSHA, Tanzania – On June 5, 2026, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights delivered its final judgment in the case of Masudi Said Selemani v. United Republic of Tanzania.  The court ruled that the imposition of a mandatory death sentence without judicial discretion violates due process. 

On July 15, 2010, the appellant killed his cousin, following false reports made by his cousin’s family to the village authorities that the appellant stole maize from a neighbor. Subsequently, on October 18, 2012, Selemani was arrested and arraigned. Selemani was later convicted on May 15, 2013 of murder. Due to the nature of his crime, Selemani was automatically sentenced to death by hanging. Selemani appealed to an appellate court, but the court dismissed his appeal on November 22, 2014.

On August 19, 2019, Selemani filed an application to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights seeking for the court to set aside his death sentence and remove him from death row. The application was accepted.

African Court on Human and People’s Rights during the ruling of the case in Arusha, Tanzania on June 5, 2026. Photo courtesy of The East African.

During the hearings, Selemani argued that Tanzania violated his right to life under Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and his freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment under Article 5.

The court found the imposition of a mandatory death sentence without the allowance of judicial

discretion is a violation of due process. The mandatory death sentence also violates Article 4 because it arbitrarily deprives life. The court additionally found that Article 5 was violated due to Selemani’s prolonged detention on death row, dehumanizing conditions, and the execution method of hanging being implemented.

Due to its findings, the court ordered Tanzania to take all necessary measures to remove the mandatory death sentence provision quickly and to disallow the use of hanging as a method of execution. Additionally, the court directed Tanzania to vacate Selemani’s sentence, remove him from death row, and rehear his case through a procedure allowing judicial discretion. The court awarded Selemani 300,000 Tanzanian shillings in moral damages.

For further information, please see:

African Case Law Analyzer – Selemani v. Tanzania, No. 042/2019 June 2026

OAS – African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter)

The East African – “African Court Orders Tanzania to End Mandatory Death Penalty, Hanging” June 2026

September 25, 2026

By: William Cody Hubbard

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor  

THE HAGUE, Netherlands — The International Criminal Court (ICC) has rejected a request to open an examination into the complicity of European arms dealers contributing to the Yemen conflict. 

Yemen’s Houthi followers on December 17, 2024, on the outskirts of Sana’a, Yemen. (Photo by Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images)

In 2019, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), along with other organizations such as Mwatana for Human Rights and Amnesty International, filed a formal communication submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC requesting an investigation to determine whether European corporate and government actors aided and abetted war crimes committed by Saudi Arabia in conjunction with the war in Yemen. 

The communication details 26 incidents of airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-UAE Coalition on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, a museum, and heritage sites which could amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute. 

According to the ECCHR, the Office of the Prosecutor did not provide any specific legal reasoning as to why it declined to open an investigation, coming to this conclusion almost seven years after the communication was submitted. 

The OTP is granted the ability to initiate investigations based on information received by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the ECCHR, and may do so if the OTP determines that the crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute. The ICC may then choose to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter. 

Because the OTP did not provide specific legal reasoning as to why it did not initiate a preliminary investigation, NGOs are left to speculate. The Arms Trade Litigation Monitor (ATLM) argues that there could be a hurdle in establishing a causal link between the conduct of the alleged accomplices of the war crimes and the crimes themselves, reasoning that ambiguity in the nature of arms dealing, such as end-user transfer dates, is a significant challenge to establishing criminal liability. 

An argument made in support of prosecution is that European arms dealers should be held criminally liable for war crimes, or crimes of aggression, under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which says that a person shall be held criminally liable for a crime if they aid, abet, or provide the means for the commission of the crime. 

Opponents of the OTP decision say that the lack of international accountability lets arms dealers continue to act with impunity. 

Similar cases had been filed in ICC member states such as in Italy; however, there is currently a lack of investigation happening in domestic jurisdictions in Europe regarding criminal liability for arms dealers’ involvement in war crimes. 

For further information, please see:  

European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights – ICC rejects request to open examination into complicity of Rheinmetall and other arms traders in Yemen conflict – 11 May 2026

European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights – Made in Europe, bombed in Yemen

Arms Trade Litigation Monitor – Arms in Yemen at the International Criminal Court

Human Rights Watch – Yemen: Coalition Bombs Homes in Capital – 21 Dec. 2015

Arms Trade Litigation Monitor – Individual Criminal Liability for Arms Exports under the ICC Statute: A Case Study of Arms Exports from Europe to Saudi-led Coalition Members Used in the War in Yemen – 18 Oct. 2019

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

September 23, 2026

By: Conner Scholze

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

WASHINGTON, D.C., United States – Filing suit in 2011, practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious movement that started in China in the 1990s, alleged that an American technology company built the surveillance tools China used to find and detain them.

Surveillance cameras in operation in Shanghai, China in January of 2022. Photo Courtesy of Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News.

Under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act, plaintiffs, who are practitioners of the Falun Gong religious movement, contended that the Chinese Government persecuted them due to their religious beliefs. Specifically, these victims alleged that Cisco Systems, Inc., aided and abetted international law violations including torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, forced labor, detention, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, and forced disappearance. Through developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend Falun Gong practitioners, the plaintiffs believed that Cisco aided and abetted in violating international law. One plaintiff sought to go so far as to bring a claim against two Cisco executives individually for aiding and abetting torture. Defendant, Cisco, is an American multinational technology corporation that designs and manufactures internet networking devices and services for the communications and information technology industries.

Among the statutes involved, the Alien Tort Statute is a procedural tool that grants federal district courts jurisdiction over civil suits brought by foreign nationals “for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The Torture Victim Protection Act creates civil liability for anyone acting under color of law of any foreign nation who subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.

In June of 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved whether a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting exists under the ATS and under the Torture Victim Protection Act.

As Cisco would ultimately convince the Court, the Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional statute that does not create new private actions for violations of international norms because Congress is tasked with creating private rights. Cases involving the ATS inherently implicate the political branches.

In reaching its decision, the Court drew on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which established that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action. However, Sosa left open a narrow possibility that courts could recognize new causes of action under a two-part test guided by the international norm and judicial discretion. Sosa determined whether a Mexican national who was abducted and arbitrarily detained in Mexico could sue those involved in U.S. courts. On the issue of interpreting the Torture Victim Protection Act, the majority found that the statute’s silence on aiding and abetting created no liability for the two Cisco executives.

In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that under the Torture Victim Protection, subjecting an individual to torture ordinarily means the person “consciously and culpably participates in the torture so as to help make it succeed.”

As American companies continue to operate and sell abroad, the decision forecloses aiding and abetting liability under both statutes for U.S. corporations and their executives, redirecting foreign nationals seeking redress to Congress, the Executive, or other international actors.

For further information, please see:

Supreme Court of the United States – Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, No. 24-856 – 23 June 2026

Supreme Court of the United States – Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 – 29 June 2004

The Alien Tort Statute, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute – Feb. 2024

H.R. 2092 – Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Library of Congress – 25 Nov. 1991

Supreme Court – Alien Tort Statute Does Not Authorize Judicially Created Causes of Action, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP – 25 June 2026

By Kamryn Page

Associate Editor Journal of Global Rights and Organizations

On March 30th, the Israeli Knesset approved legislation that significantly expanded the use of the death penalty, marking a major shift in Israeli criminal law and raising concerns about compliance with international human rights standards. The development comes in the wake of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) July 2024 Advisory Opinion, which found Israel in violation of international legal obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

The newly approved law introduces capital punishment as the default sentence for individuals convicted of intentional killings classified as terrorism in the West Bank. While Israeli law has historically permitted the death penalty in limited circumstances such as genocide, it has not been applied since 1962, and the new framework allows military courts to impose death sentences by a simple majority absent a prosecutorial request requirement, and mandates execution within 90 days with no possibility of commutation or pardon. 

Critics of the new framework argue that it disproportionately targets Palestinian because Israeli settlers in the West Bank are excluded from its application, despite the framework not explicitly targeting a specific nationality or ethnicity. Within Israel, civilian courts may also impose the death penalty for intentional killings deemed to threaten the existence of the state. Human rights organizations argue that the law introduces discriminatory practices and weakens due process protections such as limited access to legal counsel and reduced oversight mechanisms. 

The ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion provides a critical legal context for evaluating the law’s implications, where the Court emphasized that states must ensure equal protection under the law and uphold fundamental rights, including the right to life. 

Human rights advocates argue that the new death penalty law contravenes both these principles, as well as obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 6 of the ICCPR restricts the use of capital punishment to the “most serious crimes” and requires stringent fair trial guarantees.  

Moreover, the European Union has reiterated its long-standing position that the death penalty is incompatible with human dignity and has called for measures in response to Israel’s actions.  

The broader significance of the legislation lies in its potential to deepen concerns about systemic discrimination and accountability. In expanding capital punishment within a contested legal and territorial framework, the law may further strain compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.  

Furthermore, as international scrutiny intensifies following the ICJ’s findings, the implementation and legal challenges to this legislation will likely remain a focal point in ongoing debates over justice and impunity in the region. 

For More Information:  

Council of the European Union – Israel: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the approval of the Death Penalty Bill by the Israeli Parliament – March 31, 2026

Death Penalty Information Center – Israel Passes Mandatory Death Penalty for Palestinians Convicted of Terrorism, Flouting International Law and Drawing Widespread Condemnation – April 2, 2026

Human Rights Watch – Adoption of death penalty law by the Israeli Knesset requires urgent EU measures – April 2, 2026

Reuters – Israel passes death penalty law for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks – March 30, 2026

United Nations – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – 1967

 

By: Eric Boutros
Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

A proposed “Finalissima” match between Argentina and Spain, envisioned as a high-profile soccer contest between continental champions, ultimately failed to materialize amid governance constraints, security concerns, and unresolved institutional accountability. While framed as a logistical and scheduling issue, the collapse of the fixture reflects deeper structural questions about how authority is exercised and reviewed in international sport.

The Finalissima, originally scheduled for March 27, 2026, in Qatar, and jointly organized by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL), and coordinated with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), represents more than a sporting event. These organizations operate as transnational regulators, establishing binding rules governing player release, competition structure, and international scheduling. Although formally private associations, they exercise authority resembling that of public regulatory bodies: their decisions shape labor conditions, commercial markets, and access to international competition on a global scale.

This quasi-public role has increasingly drawn scrutiny in international legal discourse, particularly when decisions affect the rights and interests of athletes and affiliated stakeholders. In this regard, the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland is instructive. There, the Court recognized that the regulatory framework of international sport, though formally private, can have significant implications for individual rights, particularly when affected parties are effectively bound to centralized dispute-resolution mechanisms. The decision reflects a broader acknowledgment that sports governing bodies, by virtue of their structural dominance, operate within a space that implicates principles traditionally associated with public law.

Initial support for the fixture centered on its commercial appeal and symbolic significance. A match between Argentina and Spain promised substantial global engagement and reinforced ongoing cooperation between European and South American football institutions. However, even before external risks emerged, the proposal encountered structural resistance. FIFA’s international match calendar strictly limits available windows, while clubs retain contractual control over player participation. These overlapping constraints reflect a system in which authority is distributed among multiple actors, each with veto power, yet no single entity capable of unilaterally resolving conflicts.

Geopolitical instability ultimately proved decisive. The match was under consideration for Qatar, placing it within a region affected by escalating conflict in the Middle East. As security conditions deteriorated, governing bodies were forced to assess whether proceeding would expose players, staff, and spectators to foreseeable risks. The decision to cancel the fixture can therefore be understood as a form of institutional risk mitigation, consistent with broader expectations that entities exercising regulatory authority take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm.

At the same time, the failure to relocate the match underscores the limitations of the current governance structure. UEFA, CONMEBOL, and FIFA each possess partial authority over scheduling, venue selection, and competition approval, yet none exercises comprehensive control. This fragmentation creates gaps in accountability, where collective decision-making can obscure responsibility. When outcomes result from the interaction of multiple institutions, it becomes difficult to identify a single actor responsible for either the failure to proceed or the inability to find alternatives.

The diffusion of authority is further compounded by the absence of meaningful avenues for review. The cancellation of the Finalissima was not subject to judicial scrutiny, nor was there a clear forum for affected stakeholders, such as players, clubs, or commercial partners, to challenge the decision. As highlighted in Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, the governance structures of international sport often rely on internal or specialized dispute mechanisms that may limit access to independent judicial oversight. In circumstances such as this, where no formal dispute resolution process is triggered, the accountability gap becomes even more pronounced.

The collapse of the proposed Finalissima, therefore, illustrates a broader structural concern: governing bodies exercise regulatory power with transnational impact, yet remain only partially constrained by legal mechanisms designed to ensure transparency, reviewability, and responsibility. While the decision not to proceed may have been justified by legitimate safety concerns, the process by which that decision was reached, and the absence of oversight, raise important questions about governance in a system that increasingly resembles public administration in all but name.

Going forward, this episode highlights the need to reconsider how authority is structured and reviewed in global soccer. As international soccer competitions grow in scale and significance, the institutions that govern them may face increasing pressure to adopt more transparent procedures, clearer lines of responsibility, and mechanisms for independent review. Without such reforms, similar disputes may continue to expose the tension between private governance and public accountability on the global stage.

 

For more information:

Sam Marsden, Spain vs. Argentina Finalissima cancelled due to Middle East conflict, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2026)

Spain v Argentina Finalissima match in Qatar cancelled amid conflict, Al Jazeera (Mar. 15, 2026)

Messi, Yamal and the Finalissima that never was, The Athletic (New York Times) (Mar. 17, 2026)

Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, App. Nos. 40575/10 & 67474/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 2, 2018)

By: Abigail Wilcher

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

Strasbourg, France – Osman Kaval (Mr. Kaval), a prominent businessman and human rights advocate, remains unlawfully detained despite two rulings from the European Court of Human Rights declaring his detention arbitrary and politically motivated.

Mr. Kaval is well-known for his involvement in numerous civil society initiatives. Mr. Kaval was arrested in Istanbul in 2017 and placed in pre-trial detention one month after his arrest. Mr. Kaval faced criminal charges related to his alleged participation in the mass protests in the 2013 Gezi protests and the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. Mr. Kaval is serving an aggravated life sentence in Marmara Prison for attempting to overthrow the government. Currently, Mr. Kaval is serving an aggravated life sentence in Marmara Prison, along with other high-profile prisoners, for attempting to overthrow the government.

After unsuccessful attempts to challenge the proceedings in domestic courts, Mr. Kaval appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In 2019, the Court determined that his detention was arbitrary and politically driven, finding that he was detained for exercising fundamental human rights. Further, the Court found that Turkish authorities aimed to silence him. However, despite this judgment and a subsequent European Court of Human Rights decision in 2022 regarding Turkey’s failure to implement the 2019 ruling, Mr. Kaval was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Mr. Kavala has since filed a second application to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging violations of rights under numerous Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. Specifically, Mr Kavala argues that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair hearing), 7 (no punishment without law), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association, taken together with Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) have been violated as a result of the continuing arbitrary and politically motivated deprivation of his liberty which breached the terms of the ECtHR’s 2019 judgment.

The European Court of Human Rights will hold a Grand Chamber Hearing to review Mr. Kaval’s continued detention following the Court’s 2019 decision ordering his immediate release. The proceedings will address whether Turkey’s refusal to comply with that judgment, as well as Turkey’s later imposition of a life sentence in 2022, constitutes ongoing violations of Mr. Kaval’s rights. Mr. Kaval’s continued imprisonment illustrates the broader systemic failures in Turkey’s legal system by using excessive and prolonged detention. Furthermore, Osman Kaval’s imprisonment has become a defining test of whether the European Court of Human Rights’ judgements carry meaningful authority when member states fail to comply with its orders.

 

For more information:

Türkiye – Statement by the Spokesperson on ECtHR ruling against Türkiye in the Kavala Case (Nov. 7, 2022)  

Kavala v Türkiye (Third Party Intervention)  

ECHR – Case of Kavala v. Türkiye (No. 2): a Six-Week Deadline is Set for Submitting Requests for Third-Party Intervention (Dec. 12, 2025)  

Türkiye: Osman Kavala Marks 7 Years Behind Bars Wrongly Detained Rights Defender Awaits New European Court Ruling (Nov. 1, 2024)   

Jailed Since 2017, Kavala says Turkish Government Made an Example of Him to Intimidate Activists (Feb. 25, 2026)  

 

By: Spencer Kwabena Boateng Mensah 

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer 

ACCRA GHANA & ABUJA NIGERIA – In the long constitutional history of Ghana, few episodes have generated as much legal and political debate as the removal of former Chief Justice Gertrude Araba Esaaba Sackey Torkornoo. 

The controversy, which began with petitions alleging misconduct in early 2025, quickly expanded into a complex legal saga spanning domestic courts and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice in Abuja. Nearly two years after the events that triggered the dispute, the case remains a reference point in discussions about judicial independence, constitutional procedure and the limits of executive authority. 

Justice Torkornoo assumed office as Ghana’s 15th Chief Justice on 12 June 2023, following her nomination by then-president Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo and approval by Parliament. 

Her elevation marked another milestone for women in the judiciary—she became the third woman to lead the country’s Supreme Court since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. 

For nearly two years, her tenure appeared relatively stable. That changed in March 2025. 

On 25 March 2025, three petitions seeking her removal were submitted to President John Dramani Mahama. The petitions accused the Chief Justice of administrative misconduct and irregularities in the management of judicial resources. 

Under Article 146 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, the removal of a superior court judge—including the Chief Justice—follows a defined procedure. The president must consult the Council of State of Ghana and determine whether the petitions disclose a prima facie case before appointing an investigative committee. 

After reviewing the petitions and consulting the Council of State, the president announced on 22 April 2025 that such a prima facie case existed. Justice Torkornoo was suspended pending an investigation by a five-member committee. 

The most senior justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana, Paul Baffoe-Bonnie, stepped in as acting Chief Justice. 

The First Legal Challenges 

The suspension immediately triggered litigation. 

One of the earliest challenges came from legislator Vincent Ekow Assafuah, who asked the Supreme Court to halt the removal process. His argument centered on whether the president had followed the correct constitutional procedure before determining that a prima facie case existed. 

On 6 May 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed the application, allowing the process to continue. 

A second challenge soon followed, again questioning the legality of the suspension and the committee proceedings. On 21 May 2025, the Supreme Court rejected that challenge as well. 

These rulings cleared the way for the investigative committee to proceed with hearings. 

Inside the Investigation 

The committee began its hearings on 15 May 2025, meeting regularly to examine the allegations contained in the petitions. 

Because Article 146 proceedings are held in camera, much of the investigation unfolded outside the public eye. Nonetheless, the process generated intense public debate and scrutiny. 

Justice Torkornoo herself publicly criticized the proceedings during a national address on 25 June 2025, describing what she believed to be fundamental procedural flaws. 

“The perversion of law, rules and due process… are driving the proceedings,” she said at the time, arguing that the investigation had strayed from constitutional standards. 

Turning to the Regional Court 

While the committee hearings continued in Ghana, the dispute also reached the regional level. 

On 4 July 2025, Justice Torkornoo filed a case against the Ghanaian state at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. The application alleged violations of her rights under regional human-rights law and argued that the suspension prevented her from carrying out the constitutional duties of her office. She sought reinstatement or other relief and $10 million in damages.  

Her legal team asked the court to declare that Ghana had breached its obligations and to grant remedies that could include restoration of her judicial status or compensation. 

The filing added an international dimension to a dispute already dominating Ghana’s constitutional landscape. 

The Historic Removal 

The committee eventually completed its investigation and submitted its report to the president. 

On 1 September 2025, President Mahama announced that he had accepted the committee’s recommendation and removed Justice Torkornoo from office for “stated misbehavior.” 

The decision marked an unprecedented moment: no sitting chief justice had previously been removed through the Article 146 procedure in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. 

For supporters of the process, the decision demonstrated that constitutional accountability mechanisms could be applied even to the judiciary’s highest office. Critics, however, warned that the episode risked undermining public confidence in judicial independence. 

Litigation Continues 

The removal did not end the legal battle. 

On 17 September 2025, Justice Torkornoo filed a new challenge at the High Court in Accra, seeking judicial review of the decision to remove her. The case questioned whether the investigative committee and the president had strictly complied with constitutional requirements. 

Meanwhile, the ECOWAS court case continued to move through preliminary stages in Abuja. 

Legal observers pointed out that while the ECOWAS court can determine whether a state violated international human-rights obligations, it cannot directly overturn decisions made under a country’s constitution. Instead, the court can issue declaratory judgments and order compensation if violations are found. 

Beyond One Case 

Even as the legal proceedings continued, Ghana’s political institutions moved forward with filling the vacancy in the judiciary’s top office. Parliament began considering the nomination of Justice Paul Baffoe-Bonnie as substantive Chief Justice. 

The episode nevertheless left a lasting imprint on Ghana’s constitutional discourse. 

For scholars and legal practitioners, the Torkornoo affair has become a case study in how constitutional removal mechanisms operate—and how fragile the balance between judicial independence and accountability can be. 

A year after the first petitions were filed, the dispute continues to echo in courtrooms, legal journals and public debates across West Africa. 

Key ECOWAS Court Decisions 

1. Interim Measures Request – Dismissed 

On 19th November 2025, the ECOWAS Court dismissed her application for provisional measures, which sought to halt the investigation and removal process while the case was pending. 

The court held that she failed to demonstrate urgency or imminent irreparable harm, partly because she filed the request months after the suspension.  

However, the court acknowledged that the case raised a prima facie human-rights issue, meaning the main lawsuit could proceed.  

1. Amendment of the Case – Granted 

 On 30th January 2026, the ECOWAS Court granted Torkornoo permission to amend her claim so that it explicitly challenges not only her suspension but also her final removal from office.  

The court rejected Ghana’s objection and directed the government to file an amended defence within 30 days responding to the expanded allegations.  

Present Legal Position  March 2026 

At the moment, the case is still pending before the ECOWAS Court as only procedural rulings have been issued. No final judgment on the merits has been delivered and Ghana has been ordered to respond to the amended claims. 

 

For further information, please see:  

Ghana’s President Removes Country’s Chief Justice after Investigation -September 1, 2025 

ECOWAS Court Dismisses Former CJ Torkornoos Bid to Halt Investigative Committees Work – November 19, 2025

Ghana Dispatch: Regional African Court Orders Ghana to Respond to Alleged Human Rights Violations – December 28, 2025 

By: Julia Wheeler 

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations and Impunity Watch News 

Medmoune v. France arises out of doctors’ decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from patient “A.M.”. This decision was made despite A.M.’s drawn up advance directives, which stated his wishes for the continuation of life-sustaining treatment, even in the case of permanent loss of consciousness and ability to communicate. This raises the legal question of whether this decision was a violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Background – Bruay-sur-l’Escault, France:  

In May of 2022, A.M., a 44-year-old male, was run over by a commercial vehicle that he was repairing. He suffered severe trauma, including cardiorespiratory arrest and prolonged oxygen deprivation. A.M. was admitted to the Valenciennes Hospital ICU, where it was determined that he no longer had brain-stem reflexes or brain activity and had sustained anoxic injuries.  

On May 31, 2022, pursuant to Article R. 4127-37-2 of the French Public Health Code, the hospital began its collective procedure, the process doctors follow when deciding whether to limit or withdraw treatment. On June 1, 2022, the doctors decided that treatment would be withdrawn on June 9, 2022. The applicants challenged this decision, and before the withdrawal date on June 8, 2022, the Lille Administration Court suspended it. Revisiting the decision on July 15, 2022, the head of the ICU again decided to withdraw treatment on July 22, 2022. The applicants again challenged this through an urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom, which the Administrative Court dismissed on July 22, 2022.  

The applicants appealed to France’s highest administrative court, the Conseil d’État, seeking review of the constitutionality of the legal provision authorizing the hospital’s decision. The Constitutional Council upheld the constitutionality of the provision on November 10, 2022, and the Conseil d’État dismissed the applicants’ action. 

As a final recourse, the applicants requested an interim measure from the ECHR under Rule 39. They hoped to be granted a stay of execution of the July 15, 2022, decision, and continuation of treatment while their case was pending. The judge denied the applicants’ request. 

Treatment was withdrawn on December 26, 2022, and A.M. passed away that day.  

Applicants’ Claim/Argument 

The applicants claimed that A.M.’s right to life under Article 2 was violated, as was his right to respect for private life under Article 8, and his freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article 9 of the Convention. 

They criticized France’s Public Health Code for permitting doctors to override patients’ advance directives deemed “manifestly inappropriate,” arguing that this grants excessive discretion to doctors which in turn creates a risk of arbitrary interference with Convention rights.  

Decision 

The Court upheld the French legislation framework as compatible with Article 2. Under the Convention, States have the discretion to determine which factors to consider and how to weigh competing rights and interests. 

The Court acknowledged that the doctors were initially unaware of A.M.’s advance directives. After reviewing them, the medical team concluded that following the directives was not compatible with A.M.’s medical condition, and that continuing treatment would be considered “unreasonable obstinacy,” meaning it would provide the patient with no real benefit. The team also considered the family’s objections but decided that these could not override their medical judgment. The Court found that A.M.’s wishes were properly considered throughout the process. 

The Court found that the State had provided the applicants with prompt and reasonable judicial remedies, which considered various factors, such as medical evidence and A.M.’s advance directives. Therefore, the State has complied with its positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention.  

The Court referenced prior rulings to reiterate that while Article 8 protects personal autonomy, it does not bind States to advance directives, as they may utilize their discretion. On this basis, the Court found the French framework compatible with Article 2. Further, the Court held that applicants’ Article 9 complaints were sufficiently addressed by its Article 2 analysis.  

Significance 

This case is the first before the ECHR where it involves not a patient’s advance directives to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, but their directives to continue the treatment.  

For further information, please see: 

ECHR  

Judgment Medmoune v. France – Press Release Issued by the Registrar of the Court  

Public Health Code: Article R. 4127-37-2  

ECHR Case Law 

By: Jocelyn Anctil 

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer 

NUEVA SAN SALVADOR, El Salvador – On October 6, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights received a submission to hear Case 12.787, Natividad de Jesús Ramírez and Family v. El Salvador. This case arises from the extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances of several Ramírez family members in 1982, after they were labeled subversive enemies during El Salvador’s civil war, when the military government targeted Catholic Church activists as communist threats. 

During El Salvador’s internal armed conflict (1980-1991), the Ramírez family was active in the Catholic Church which subjected them to raids, threats, arrests, and assaults by public state officers. In 1982, state forces killed Rufino and Teresa Ramírez, while five other family members, Natividad de Jesús Ramírez, Salvador Ramírez, José Elías Ramírez, Jorge Alberto Ramírez, and Guadalupe Roble, were forcibly disappeared and their whereabouts remain unknown today. 

Since then, the Ramírez family has made numerous efforts to find answers and bring justice to their family, including seeking assistance from the Attorney General of El Salvador and the Inter-American Commission. The Commission launched an investigation and concluded that El Salvador is responsible for violating multiple rights of the victims, including their right to life in Merits Report 150/23. The Merits Report was sent to El Salvador and after efforts to reach a settlement failed, the Commission submitted the case to the Court.  

The victims’ family wants the truth about what happened to their loved ones and accountability for their loss. They claim, and the Commission found, that El Salvador failed to investigate, preserve crime scenes, perform autopsies, or conduct effective searches. The Commission’s recommendations urge the Court to order El Salvador to investigate disappearances, identify remains, provide healthcare to relatives, pursue criminal investigations with gender perspective, and adopt non-recurrence measures like DNA databases and accession to the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. 

Although the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has yet to decide whether to accept the case, doing so would give the Court an opportunity to clarify the standards of investigation and specialized procedures required of each state when cases involve disappeared persons. 

This case represents the challenge of holding El Salvador’s government for what occurred during the civil war, during which an estimated 75,000 civilians were killed or forcibly disappeared, with 85% of violence committed by state forces according to the UN Truth Commission. El Salvador’s amnesty law, which blocked prosecution of civil war atrocities, was struck down by the Inter-American Court in 2012 and invalidated by El Savador’s Supreme Court in 2016. However, investigations into civil war crimes have remained stagnant with many cases still in impunity decades later. 

For Further Information Please See: 

Caso de ejecuciones extrajudiciales y desapariciones de la familia Ramírez es presentado ante la Corte IDH – VOCES Diario digital | El Salvador 

El Salvador: Tackling Impunity Past and Present – Inter-American Dialogue 

El Salvador – CJA 

IACHR takes to Inter-American Court case concerning extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances in El Salvador 

January 16, 2025 

By: Ethan Kassem, Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor   

Individuals with disabilities have a legal right to participate in decisions that impact their lives according to international human rights law. Against that backdrop, states are generally required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) to actively and closely consult with individuals with disabilities along with the organizations that represent them when developing laws and policies that impact such individuals. Accordingly, Australia’s recent policy changes offer an increasing attempt at matching both national and international programs with evolving legal requirements for participation and inclusion.  

The Australian government announced a historic $50 million investment on December 3, 2025, aimed at bolstering disability rights throughout the Indo-Pacific area through its flagship program “Stronger Movements, Stronger Futures.” Despite the disproportionate number of individuals with disabilities residing in the Indo-Pacific, the announcement was made to coincide with the International Day of People with Disabilities, signifying both a symbolic and practical commitment at advancing equality and inclusion in an area where disability remains widely under-addressed in law, policy, and development practice.  

The initiative, which primarily aims to strengthen organizations led by individuals with disabilities by enabling their participation in national, regional, and international decision-making, represents the largest Australian international investment specifically dedicated to disability rights and equality. This initiative seeks to foster collaboration and peer-to-peer learning in order to build a stronger and more unified disability rights movement. Additionally, this policy aligns with the growing body of international human rights legislation concerning the participation and inclusion of individuals with disabilities.  

As part of this investment, Australia will partner with three leading organizations of people with disabilities: the International Disability Alliance, Pacific Disability Forum, and ASEAN Disability. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Penny Wong, has gone on to state that this movement primarily seeks as a means of empowering individuals with disabilities to lead change, remove barriers, and create opportunities for full and equal participation in society. Australia has since placed a large emphasis on its commitment to removing barriers and creating opportunities for full participation in society nothing that inclusive societies demonstrate greater potential for both economic growth and social cohesion. 

Unlike prior disability-related funding, which sought to place a larger emphasis on support services, this initiative primarily seeks to invest in the infrastructure of the disability rights movements themselves. By funding disability-led organizations rather than what might be deemed a more “traditional” assistance program, this initiative serves as an effective means of strengthening the ability for individuals with disabilities to have a larger influence on government legislation while holding governments accountable. Australia’s initiative highlights the fact that disability rights are viewed as an essential feature of human rights governance and democratic participation, as opposed to an incidental social issue.  

For further information, please see:  

ADDC welcomes landmark investment to advance disability rights in the Indo-Pacific 

Australia invests $50 million to strengthen disability rights across the Indo-Pacific 

Australia Pledges $50M to Boost Indo-Pacific Disability Rights 

CBM Australia welcomes investment to bolster disability rights in the Indo-Pacific  

How institutional investment is reshaping specialist disability accommodation in Australia 

By: Mya DeJoseph  

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor  

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rhaman, also known as “Ali Kushayb,” was sentenced by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on December 9, 2025, to 20 years imprisonment. Back in October 2025, Abd-Al-Rahman was convicted of 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection to his involvement in events taking place in Darfur, Sudan between August 2003 and March 2004.  

Background  

In the early 2000s, conflict began between the Government of Sudan, backed by the Janjaweed militia, and Darfur rebel groups. During this time, Abd-Al-Rahman was a senior leader of the Janjaweed who conducted coordinated attacks in villages of Darfur whom the Janjaweed believed to be in support of the rebellion against the Government of Sudan.  

 After being charged with 31 counts in connection to war crimes and crimes against humanity between 2003 and 2004, Abd-Al-Rahman surrendered himself to the International Criminal Court in 2020. Following a trial taking place over a period of 2.5 years, Abd-Al-Rahman was found guilty of 27 charges relating to murder, sexually violent crimes, forcible transfer, pillaging, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity. He was found to have both given orders to the Janjaweed which led to these crimes, as well as being a direct perpetrator himself.   

 Sentencing  

In its sentencing procedures, the ICC has broad discretion and seeks to achieve aims of retribution and deterrence through its punishments. The sentence given must be proportional to the crime committed, appropriately reflect culpability of the defendant, and take into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the gravity of the crimes, aggravating factors, and mitigating factors.  

The Prosecution sought a joint sentence of life imprisonment, highlighting Abd-Al-Rahman’s deep involvement in the crimes, the profound impact of his crimes on the community, the cruelty of these crimes, and the defenseless victims. The Defense argued a life sentence to be inappropriate, urging Abd-Al-Rahman’s immediate release, or in the alternative a seven-year imprisonment sentence. In offering mitigation, the Defense submitted to the court that a life sentence for Abd-Al-Rahman would not be appropriate considering his age, personal circumstances, his degree of culpability, his lack of prior criminal history, and the fact that he voluntarily surrendered himself to the ICC.  

In sentencing Abd-Al-Rahman to 20 years imprisonment, the Chamber noted that the sentence would have been longer had the mitigation offered by the Defense not been accepted. The Chamber found this sentence to be appropriate considering the purposes of punishment, the victims’ harm and suffering, Abd-Al-Rahman’s good behavior while in detention, and his voluntary surrender. The Chamber also noted factual overlap between some of the crimes, which played a role in the sentencing determination.  

The time that Abd-Al-Rahman has already spent in detention, which began after his voluntary surrender and subsequent custody on June 9, 2020, will be accounted for as “time served” and will be deducted from his sentence.  

Significance 

This is the only trial that has taken place after the United Nations Security Council referred the Darfur situation in 2005 to the ICC, and conflict in the region is ongoing. Other individuals in Sudan are wanted by the ICC for their roles in genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including former President of Sudan Omar Al Bashir.  However, Abd-Al-Rahman’s conviction is regarded as a step forward and a sense of justice for those victimized by the Janjaweed.  

For further information, please see:  

Coalition for the International Criminal Court – Truth, Justice, and Dignity: Two decades on, justice reaches Darfur with the Abd-al Rahman conviction – Oct. 10, 2025 

Courthouse News Service – Darfur militia chief Ali Kushayb sentenced to 20-year prison term by ICC – Dec. 9, 2025 

Human Rights Watch – ICC Sentences Former Sudanese Militia Leader to 20 Years – Dec. 15, 2025 

Summary of Trial Chamber I’s Sentencing Judgement in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (‘Ali Kushayb’) – 9 Dec. 2025 

The International Criminal Court – Abd-Al-Rahman Case 

The International Criminal Court – Situation in Darfur, Sudan  

The Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (‘Ali Kushayb’), International Criminal Court, Trial Judgement – 6 Oct. 2025 

 

 

Christina Bradic

Managing Editor of Impunity Watch News 

New York, New York — On 11 November 2025, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) convened in New York for a plenary debate under Agenda Item 74 : The Report of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This annual review of the ICC’s activities unfolded at a critical inflection point for the global justice system, as the Court faces unprecedented political pressures, challenges in state cooperation, and existential threats to its independence.  

Judge Tomoko Akane, President of the ICC, delivered the institution’s 2025 Annual Report, underscoring both its judicial work and the growing obstacles to its mission. In her address, Akane warned that “attacks, threats and coercive measures against the Court and its officials pose a serious threat to the administration of justice by the Court and to the global fight against impunity.”   

The backdrop to these remarks is striking. Over the past year, member states and civil society have documented multiple instances of non-cooperation with arrest warrants, cyberattacks, and economic and visa sanctions targeting ICC judges and prosecutors, notably through a U.S. Executive Order imposing sanctions on the Court in February 2025.  These measures were triggered in part by ICC decisions related to investigations in Palestine and other high-profile situations and have become a flashpoint in debates over the Court’s legitimacy and reach. 

Akane’s message was clear: the fight against impunity requires unwavering multilateral support. She reiterated that “crimes that shock the conscience of humanity continue to plague this world,” and that only robust cooperation with states and institutions can enable justice to reach victims and survivors wherever national systems fail.  

Following the President’s report, a chorus of States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the ICC. In a statement delivered on behalf of the European Union, representatives characterized the Court as a “cornerstone of the international fight against impunity,” urged all states to honor cooperation obligations, and condemned attacks on the Court’s personnel and mandate.  Other delegations echoed these sentiments, stressing the need for both political and practical backing as the ICC navigates an increasingly polarized political landscape. 

The resonance of this debate extended beyond the halls of the United Nations. In the run-up to the 24th Assembly of States Parties (ASP24), scheduled in The Hague from 1–6 December 2025, civil society actors and advocacy groups used the UNGA moment to amplify calls for decisive action. Human rights organizations have urged states not merely to issue statements of support, but to translate political goodwill into cooperation on arrest warrants, financial support, and defense of judicial independence.   

At its heart, the UNGA debate illuminated a broader tension in the international justice architecture: as grave crimes proliferate in conflicts from Ukraine to Sudan and beyond, the institutions designed to hold perpetrators accountable are themselves under pressure from geopolitical interests and selective compliance. The ICC’s annual report and the subsequent state debate were thus not only a routine procedural milestone but a crucial political moment, one that showcased both enduring commitment from many states and persistent fault lines in the global fight against impunity. 

If the ICC is to endure as a credible mechanism for accountability, the support expressed at UNGA must translate into concrete cooperation and protection of judicial independence, a challenge that states will revisit in The Hague and beyond. 

For Further Reading: 

Anadolu Agency – International Criminal Court President Urges Global Cooperation to Enforce Arrest Warrants– 12 November 2025 

Coalition for the International Criminal Court – ICC President Akane Presents the Court’s Annual Report to the UN General Assembly – 18 November 2025 

Common Dreams – Mexico, Rights Groups Push Back Against Sanctions Targeting International Criminal Court – 13 November 2025 

European External Action Service (EEAS) – EU Statement at the UN General Assembly on the Report of the International Criminal Court – 11 November 2025 

FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights) – Will States Parties Protect the International Criminal Court or Let It Be Undermined? – 30 October 2025 

Human Rights Watch – Briefing Note for the Twenty-Fourth Session of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties – 19 November 2025 

United Nations e-Statements – Statement by Judge Tomoko Akane, President of the International Criminal Court, to the UN General Assembly — Presentation of the ICC’s 2025 Annual Report – 11 November 2025 

By: Tiffany D. Johnson 

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer 

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Ten years after launching their landmark climate lawsuit against the U.S. government, a group of youth activists have brought their fight for environmental justice to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), arguing that America’s long-standing fossil fuel policies violate international law and endanger basic human rights — including the rights to life, health, and equality. 

Fifteen of the original Juliana v. United States plaintiffs filed their petition on September 23, 2025, represented by the nonprofit Our Children’s Trust, arguing that U.S. fossil-fuel policies violate international law and endanger the rights to life, health, and equality. 

Background 
The petition comes a year after the Juliana case — which accused the U.S. government of violating the constitutional rights of youth by promoting fossil fuel dependence — was dismissed by U.S. courts. With domestic remedies exhausted, the petitioners turned to the regional human rights system. 

The IACHR, headquartered in Washington, D.C., reviews complaints under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which protects the rights to life, liberty, security, health, and equality before the law. The youth argue that by expanding fossil fuel production and denying them access to meaningful remedies, the United States has breached these obligations and committed an internationally wrongful act. 

Their appeal follows two historic Advisory Opinions on climate change, one issued on May 29 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and another on July 23 by the International Court of Justice, both recognizing climate change as a human rights emergency. The IACtHR ruling — the first to declare climate change a human rights emergency — found that States have binding legal duties to adopt ambitious, science-based, and equity-centered climate action. According to the Court, failure to prevent climate harm violates fundamental rights, including those to life, personal integrity, and a healthy environment. 

Justice and Health in the Climate Crisis 
For the petitioners, the crisis is personal. Rising seas, extreme storms, and heat events have destroyed homes and schools, displaced families, and worsened public health conditions. “We were born into a rights violation,” said petitioner Levi Draheim, now 18. “Our home, our safety, and our health have all been compromised.” 

The filing argues that climate change, driven by government policy choices, has deprived young people of the ability to enjoy a safe and stable climate system — a precondition for exercising every other human right. Citing the IACtHR’s opinion, the petition underscores that States and corporations share a legal duty to prevent irreversible climate damage, regulate high-emitting industries, and protect vulnerable communities most affected by environmental harm. 

Significance 
If accepted, the petition would mark the first time an international human-rights tribunal undertakes a full review of U.S. climate policy. 

Together, the IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion and the IACHR petition form a powerful one-two statement: climate inaction is not merely environmental neglect — it is a human rights violation. For the youth petitioners, the message is clear: protecting the planet is inseparable from protecting life and health. 

As the Commission considers their plea, their case may help define a new frontier in international law — one where justice for the climate becomes synonymous with justice for humanity. 

For further information, please see:

The Guardian — US is violating human rights laws by backing fossil fuels, say young activists in new petition —Sep, 25 2025   

Inside Climate News — Climate Activists Thwarted in U.S. Courts Are Headed to an International Tribunal for Review — Sep. 29 2025  

Center for International Environmental Law — What a Historic Inter-American Court Ruling Means for Global Climate Justice — Nov. 6 2025  

International Court of Justice — ICJ Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025: Obligations of the States in respect of Climate Change — Jul. 23 2025 

Inter-American Court of Human Rights — IACtHR Advisory Opinion of 29 May 2025: Climate Emergency and Human Rights – May 29 2025 

United States District Court — Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) — June 1 2023 

United States Ninth District Court of Appeals — Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 — Jan 17 2020