Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor
New York City, U.S. — Mahmoud Khalil, a recent Columbia graduate and lawful permanent resident who was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“I.C.E.”) on March 8 and faces deportation, will remain at a detention facility in Louisiana while the court determines whether or not to grant a motion to compel that would require the government to return Khalil to New York City, where he lives and was arrested.
Mahmoud Khalil at Columbia University in New York during a pro-Palestinian protest on April 29, 2024. Photo Courtesy of AP Photo by Ted Shaffrey.
The motion was heard as part of a brief hearing before Judge Jesse M. Furman — a federal judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York — on March 12, during which Judge Furman also ruled that Khalil would be granted one attorney-client call on March 12 and one the following day. Khalil had been previously barred from speaking to his lawyers or family while in detention.
Despite being a green card holder, many believe Khalil has been targeted for his role as a pro-Palestine student activist. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed by Khalil’s attorney, Amy Greer, on March 9, stated that this activism included “calling on the rest of the world to stop providing weapons and support to enable the genocide in contravention with international law.” The petition stresses that speech regarding international law and the obligations of the U.S. therein is “clearly protected by the First Amendment.” During his arrest, I.C.E. agents indicated that Khalil’s green card may have been revoked without due process. A March 10 order by Judge Furman blocked Khalil’s deportation pending court order.
The American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union joined Khalil’s legal team shortly after his arrest. An amended petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed on March 13. The amended petition states that the respondents, members of the Trump administration, have adopted a retaliatory policy to punish non-citizen protesters who are critical of Israel, a U.S. ally. A motion to compel under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1691, was also filed on behalf of Khalil for an order to return him to New York for the duration of proceedings.
Khalil’s arrest has gained widespread criticism by First Amendment and international human rights advocates as many view it as an attempt by the Trump administration to chill free speech — particularly by international students on college campuses — as it ramps up aggressive deportation campaigns. The ACLU called Khalil’s arrest and possible deportation “unlawful” and a representation of the administration’s “efforts to silence speech of which they are critical.”
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – In January 2025, Belize, Cuba, and Ireland joined the growing list of countries that have applied with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for permission to intervene in the high-profile case of South Africa v. Israel, concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip. South Africa initiated the case in December 2023, alleging that Israel violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention through actions taken during its military operations in Gaza. These operations followed the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas, which resulted in over 1,200 Israeli deaths and hundreds of hostages. In response, Israel launched military action in Gaza, leading to widespread destruction, tens of thousands of Palestinian casualties, and a humanitarian crisis.
Photo of the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo Courtesy of the ICJ.
The ICJ issued provisional measures on January 26, 2024, when the Court ordered Israel to “take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of [The Genocide Convention]”, including killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting “conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, and imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group. Per the Court’s order, Israel is required to ensure its military comply with the order, take all measures within its power to prevent and punish direct and public incitement to commit genocide, enable humanitarian aid, preserve evidence, and report compliance with the Court. The case has drawn international scrutiny, prompting several nations to seek involvement through legal intervention.
The interventions by Belize, Cuba, and Ireland reflect a growing international interest in the case, as states invoke their rights under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute. This provision allows any state party to a convention under interpretation, in this case the Genocide Convention, to intervene if it has an interest in the legal questions at hand. While intervening states do not become parties to the dispute, their submissions can influence the Court’s interpretation of international law.
Each country’s decision to intervene highlights differing global perspectives on the conflict and the application of international legal norms. Belize and Cuba have historically aligned with pro-Palestinian positions in international forums, while Ireland has been vocal about human rights issues in the region, often criticizing Israel’s policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. Their involvement underscores the broader geopolitical implications of the case, as debates regarding military actions and the protection of civilian populations remain central to international relations.
As the proceedings continue, the ICJ’s eventual ruling could have far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of the Genocide Convention, state accountability for alleged violations, and the future of international humanitarian law. Beyond its legal implications, the case may influence diplomatic relations and shape global norms on accountability for mass atrocities. The Court’s decisions in the coming months will be closely watched by governments, legal experts, and human rights organizations worldwide.
SAN JOSÉ, Peru – After Peru commenced the privatization of state-owned companies in 1991, the government liquidated the Empresa Comercializadora de Alimentos S.A. (ECASA), along with the jobs of approximately three thousand employees. Although a salary increase was established through bargaining agreements, the government suspended them. In response, the dismissed workers of the ECASA filed an action of protection. The Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favor of the workers and ordered execution of its decision in February of 1993. The process for execution of this decision has remained open for twenty-six years. TheInter-American Commission on Human Rights referred the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) after finding that Peruvian judicial authorities failed to definitively resolve the issues.
Finally, the case was heard by the IACHR which reached a decision on June 6, 2024. The American Commission on Human Rights asked the IACHR to declare the State of Peru responsible for multiple violations of the American Convention on Human Rights, including the right to a fair trial. The IACHR agreed and ruled in favor of the workers. Article 25 of the Convention gives the right to judicial protection. The court found that in order for judicial protection to be effective, states must have the ability and mechanisms to execute final judgements. Peru is to pay $5,000 to each victim identified in the case. In case there are more victims unaccounted for, the court also stated Peru is to create a trade union register.
Attendees of a hearing of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). Photo courtesy of EFE/Alexander Otarola.
This decision relates to a bigger issue: The Peruvian State has failed to enforce judgements against state entities since the 1990s. At a domestic level, courts often delay execution or do not execute the judgement at all. This creates complications as victims die while waiting for enforcement. Peru has not adopted or created the measures necessary to remedy this pattern and avoid future violations. As a result, the IACHR also urges Peru to hold a forum for debate and reflection to analyze the structural issues and allow the workers of ECASA and their family members involved in this case to participate. In an effort to decrease unreasonable delays and increase efficiency, the IACHR also ordered the Peruvian State to implement a mandatory training to inform judges who are unaware of how to handle and execute actions of protection.
Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Senior Article Editor
ITALY – The European Court of Human Rights ruled late last month that inaction by the Italian State in addressing the illegal dumping, burning, and burying of garbage on private land across the Campania region. The waste included hazardous materials, and increased rates of cancer and groundwater pollution have been recorded in the area, effects linked to illegal dumping in the area. This dumping has overwhelmingly been carried out by organized crime syndicates that operate in the Terra dei Fuochi region of Campania.
The court announced in a Chamber judgement that the Italian government’s failure to adequately respond to the situation constituted a violation of the ECHR’s Article 2 Right to Life. The Court paid particular attention to what it perceived to be a serious failure to act diligently and expeditiously despite the State’s knowledge of the situation and its severity. The ECHR Court requested that the state draft a “comprehensive strategy” to address the situation, including the creation of independent monitoring mechanisms and creation of a means of informing the public of the situation, and any dangers presented to them. A 2-year time-limit has been set by the Court for Italy to meet these requests, during which time the pending applications against the State will be adjourned.
Illegal burn pile in Scafati, Italy, near Naples. Photo courtesy of Angelo Ferrillo.
Campania holds 90 municipalities including Naples, the regional capital, and is home to roughly 2.9 million Italian citizens. The initial suit was brought by 41 Italian nationals who live in the Campania region, as well as 5 different organizations based in the region.
The epidemic is largely linked to criminal organizations operating illegal waste disposal services. The Camorra, the primary syndicate behind such operations, began waste disposal operations in the mid-1980’s due to the significantly lower risk compared to other illicit operations, paired with the high potential for profits. The organization operates by undercutting legitimate waste disposal companies who are bound by environmental regulations, taxes on business, and safety requirements that have the effect of driving up the prices of waste disposal. Costs are cut by completely disregarding these safety guidelines, dumping hazardous waste and municipal garbage in quarries, glens, and private property all across the region. This tactic of undercutting legitimate waste disposal services has led to a near monopoly on waste management in Campania for The Camorra.
While the Italian government has taken steps to address issues of land pollution and air pollution due to burning of hazardous waste (increasing law enforcement efforts cracking down on illegal dumping; increasing punishments for illegally burning trash; adoption of legislative decrees creating government groups to combat the issue) efforts only began as late as 2014, and have not been effective in combatting the environmental damage and health crisis posed by such operations. Recent crackdowns by law enforcement, bolstered by harsher penalties, have been effective in causing Camorra members to inform on their organization to authorities. With any hope, the international pressure of the ECHR will provide further pressure to address the issue more effectively.
SAN JOSÉ, Costa Rica – The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the State of Nicaragua violated political rights, judicial guarantees and judicial protection of Mr. Fabio Gadea Mantilla in the 2011 presidential elections. The IACHR determined that the judicial system of Nicaragua lacked an effective judicial remedy to review decisions.
Fabio Gadea Mantilla giving a speech. Photo Courtesy of El País.
Bolivian attorney Jaime Aparicio, one of Mr. Mantilla’s representatives, discussed the importance of the ruling. He commented, “this is one of the first times the court refers to the electoral issue, meaning that it incorporates the protection of the right to be elected in free and transparent elections into human rights violations.”
This holding follows a year where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights took action on multiple fronts to protect free and fair elections in the Americas. On 30 April 2024, the IACHR released a resolution recognizing election observers as human rights defenders. This resolution mirrored recent statements issued by the UN. The IACHR also issued an extensive report regarding human rights violations in Venezuela following the presidential election of July 2024. Following the election results, the State of Venezuela under President Nicolas Maduro arrested protestors en masse, generating reports of torture and extrajudicial killings.
The IACHR’s holding came the same week as the President of Nicaragua consolidated power. President Daniel Ortega proposed widespread reform to extend executive control over judicial and legislative duties. Under these reforms, the president would have the authority to order the army to intervene to support the police or take executive branch positions. International commentators from the UN have expressed concern about the appointment of Ortega’s wife as “co-president” and a newfound ability for either co-president to name “vice presidents.” This mechanism could be used to keep the presidency of Nicaragua within the family, strengthening the autocratic regime.
Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On March 29, 2023, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution requiring the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an advisory opinion on “the obligations of States in respect to climate change.” The ICJ held public hearings for this opinion from December 2 to December 13.
Members of Vanuatu’s government at an ICJ hearing in December 2024. Photo Courtesy of Piroschka Van De Wouw.
96 countries and 11 international organizations participated in the hearings, including Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Saudi Arabia, the World Health Organization, and the European Union. 90 countries sent written testimony into the ICJ. This case is the largest in ICJ history.
Climate change activists behind this case emphasized that climate change threatens the human rights of people around the world. The nation of Vanuatu, a collection of islands in the South Pacific Ocean, led the movement for the ICJ to consider this case. Vanuatu is increasingly susceptible to the impacts of climate change because of sea-level rise in the Pacific Ocean. Vanuatu’s lawyers believe that many of its citizens will die because of rising sea waters and want those who are responsible to be held accountable for the rise in sea level.
Various courts have recently considered the link between human rights and climate change. In 2024, the European Court of Human Rights held that Switzerland violated its citizens’ human rights by failing to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. In 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court held that human rights are affected by climate change and the government must protect its citizens’ human rights through climate-friendly actions. These decisions acknowledged that human rights are affected by climate change. This link between human rights and climate change is likely to be discussed in the ICJ’s opinion.
This is not the first request for an advisory opinion on climate change from the ICJ. Palau and the Marshall Islands tried to request an opinion around 10 years ago. However, that attempt failed because of political resistance.
This ICJ opinion has not been released yet, but is expected in 2025. Even though this opinion is not binding, it could further the link between human rights and climate change, and serve as a reference for future climate litigation. Many courts use the ICJ’s rulings as guidance, and this decision could lead to increased climate litigation.
STRASBOURG, France – On November 24th, The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) found that the Russian Federation violated the European Convention on Human Rights in their handling of criminal proceedings against applicant Konstantin Aleksandrovic Kotov. The court found that Kotov’s punishments were disproportionate, and he had been punished for actions protected under the Convention.
Russian Police arrest activist Konstantin Aleksandrovic Kotov. Photo Courtesy of Amnesty International.
The case related to convictions Kotov received under administrative and criminal law proceedings regarding public political protests and encouraging others to attend those protests. The protected conduct the Russian Federation punished him for included chanting anti-government slogans, participating in peaceful protests, and calling upon others to do the same.
The Constitutional Court of the ECHR referenced their previous rulings in determining that the sentence was disproportionate. The Court has held that sentencing a person to prison for assembling was only possible when the assembly is not peaceful, where significant harm is inflicted, or where there was real threat of significant harm.
Kotov’s original trial in Moscow lasted less than a day and had a complicated procedural history in Russia itself before reaching the ECHR. His original trial lasted less than a day and he earned a four year sentence in prison for violating Russia’s notorious Article 212.1. The Constitutional Court of Russia remanded the case and the sentence was reduced to a year and a half.
This case is part of a larger effort repress political competition on the part of the Russian Federation, and represents only the first time Mr. Kotov was been targeted. The Russian Federation uses vague anti-extremism laws to prosecute opposition. The Russian court system has prosecuted members of the media under legislation that labels them as “foreign agents,” “undesirables” or “extremists.”
Following this arrest, the Russian government arrested Kotov again in 2024 for donating to Alexei Navalny’s political organizations. The Russian government had labeled them as “extremist.” In August 2024, A Moscow court ruled to place Kotov under house arrest until October. The donation in question was 3,000 rubles, equivalent to $32.60 USD.
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On December 12, 2024, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber III scheduled a confirmation of charges hearing in the case of The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony. The hearing will take place September 9, 2025, marking the first time in the Court’s history that it conducts a hearing in absentia, as Kony remains at large.
Two child soldiers of Uganda’s rebel group, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). Photo Courtesy of Reuters.
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) fighters in the Central African Republic, picture dated April 4, 2012. Photo Courtesy of Voice of America.
Between 1987 and 2006, Northern Uganda endured a brutal conflict between the government and the Lord’s Residence Army (LRA), a quasi-religious group claiming to defend the Acholi ethnic group. Since rising in the early 1980s, the LRA has allegedly targeted civilians with attacks, abducted over 35,000 children as soldiers and sex slaves, and displaced over 1.9 million people into government camps. Despite a 2006 truce, the LRA is said to have expanded its operations into neighboring countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). Despite global efforts to detain him, LRA founder and leader Joseph Kony remains at large, believed to be outside of Uganda.
After ratifying the Rome Statute in 2002, Uganda became the first state to refer itself to the ICC, inviting the Office of the Prosecutor to investigate the LRA’s alleged crimes. Kony’s Warrant of Arrest, originally issued by the ICC under seal on July 8, 2005, was made public on October 13, 2005.
Kony faces 36 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute for crimes allegedly committed between 2002 and 2005.
Counts 1-14: Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such; murdering civilians and attempting to do so; torturing, and/or severely abusing and mistreating civilians and treating them cruelly; enslaving abducted civilians; pillaging and destroying property; and persecuting civilians on political grounds as well as based on their age and gender.
Counts 15-29: Conscription of children into the LRA, and using them to participate actively in hostilities.
Counts 20-36: Perpetrating the crimes of enslavement, forced marriage, torture, and sexual slavery in relation to young women.
The confirmation of charges hearing is not a trial. Under Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute, a Pre-Trail hearing assesses whether sufficient evidence exists to establish substantial grounds for believing the individual committed each alleged crime. The Prosecutor may rely on documentary or summary evidence and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.
Under the Rome Statute, confirmation of charges proceedings at the Pre-Trial stage may proceed in the suspect’s absence under specific conditions outlined in Article 61(2)(b). In this instance, the Chamber determined that the conditions were met because (i) Kony qualifies as a person who “cannot be found”; (ii) all reasonable efforts have been made to ensure his appearance and notify him of the charges and the hearing date; and (iii) there is sufficient cause to hold the confirmation of charges hearing in absentia. In absentia cases, the person shall be represented by counsel where the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that it is in the interests of justice.
If the charges are confirmed, the case can proceed to trial only if the accused is physically present before the Trial Chamber under Rome Statute Article 63.
MYANMAR—On November 27, 2024, the ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan submitted an application to the ICC’s judicial division to issue an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, the acting President of Myanmar, for crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya. This application came after extensive investigations by the Office of the Prosecutor from 2019—2024. ICC judges must now decide whether the application meets the standard for issuing an arrest warrant.
Min Aung Hlaing, acting President of Myanmar. Photo courtesy of Ye Aung Thu/Agence France-Presse, Getty Images.
Although the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority, have lived in Myanmar for centuries, they have never been recognized as an official ethnic group and have been denied citizenship since 1982, making them the world’s largest stateless population and vulnerable to exploitation and sexual and gender-based violence and abuse. The Rohingya have experienced decades of discrimination and violence leading to frequent waves of human rights violations. However, 2017 marked the largest mass displacement of the minority group as the military burned entire villages, killed thousands of families, and partook in other human rights violations. As a result, more than 2.6 million Rohingya were internally displaced and almost one million sought refuge in Bangladesh. In 2021, the Myanmar military seized power in a coup led by Min Aung Hlaing, sentencing then-president Aung San Suu Kyi to 17 years in prison. This shift in power set off another wave of violence and triggered a new refugee crisis.
Before Myanmar’s current self-appointed prime minister led the 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing was a career army officer and commander in chief since 2011, with a reputation for attacks on ethnic groups. Since 2021, his regime has cracked down violently against political opposition, imprisoned pro-democracy protesters, and threatened punishment for civilians who refused to join the military. Under his command, over 27,000 people have been arrested and 21,000 are still detained, and more than 260 people were reportedly tortured to death.
The ICC’s legal process for sentencing a perpetrator of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and/or crimes of aggression takes part in 6 steps. First, the Office of the Prosecutor determines whether there is sufficient evidence of crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Second, the Prosecution submits an application to judges to issue an arrest warrant, which is what the Prosecutor asked of the ICC judiciary on November 27 of this year. Third, the pretrial stage marks the initial appearance of the suspect before the judges, as well as a confirmation of charges where the judges decide if there is enough evidence to go to trial after hearing each sides’ arguments. Fourth, in the trial stage, the prosecution tries to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the judges issue a verdict and, if found guilty, a sentence for up to 30 years, or, up to life in special circumstances. Fifth, both sides may appeal the verdict and sentence. Finally, if the verdict is not overturned, the accused serves his or her sentence in a member state that has agreed to enforce ICC sentences.
The ICC’s Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing was met with support from several different countries, as well as the Rohingyas and the country’s National Unity Government (which was established by elected lawmakers after the 2021 coup), who urged the ICC judges to swiftly issue the warrant and called on ICC member states to enforce the warrant to “uphold justice and international law.” If the ICC judiciary decides to issue the warrant, however, there are other procedural roadblocks in the way to Min Aung Hlaing’s arrest, as Myanmar is not an ICC member state, and the acting President rarely travels to states that are members who can serve an arrest warrant.
Slovakia – The ECHR held that the State of Slovakia violated a woman’s Article 4 rights which protect from slavery and forced labor and required the State to pay 41,000 Euros in damages.
The European Court of Human Rights Headquarters, which recently heard B.B. v. Slovakia. Photo Courtesy of the European Court of Human Rights.
Applicant B.B., a Slovak national, was initially raised in State care before moving in with a family, for whom she worked as a maid. She eventually was kicked out of the home and found herself homeless. In 2010, it was arranged by an unnamed party, “Y”, for B.B. to go to the United Kingdom with him, work as a prostitute, manage his household all while earning no money. With no other alternative to homelessness, B.B. went willingly.
Two years later she was taken in by the Salvation Army and returned to Slovakia in 2012 under a program for the support and protection of victims of human trafficking. She was then registered with a state supported charity for human trafficking victims, Charita, until the government ultimately informed the charity that “Y” was charged with pimping instead of human trafficking; the group then had no choice but to release her from their care.
This misstep did not cease Charita’s efforts to support the applicant as they continued to send information concerning the ordeal in the UK to the Banska Bystrica police. The force noted the human trafficking concerns, but, due to jurisdictional issues, the case was sent to the Humenne police force who treated the conduct as pimping despite investigators from the UK concluding that B.B. had been trafficked.
In November of 2015, Y was found guilty of pimping and sentenced to one-year in prison, a far shorter sentence than that of a human trafficking conviction. The judgment was appealed to and affirmed by the regional court. In 2017, both the Minister of Justice and B.B. herself launched 3 total complaints each of which were unsuccessful in the Supreme Court.
The complaints specified that the Slovakian authorities’ failure to treat the offense as one of human trafficking had violated B.B.’s rights under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article, meant to prohibit slavery and forced labor, includes an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into a credible suspicion of human trafficking; the state did not conduct such an investigation.
Eventually, this case was brought to the European Court of Human Rights in September 2021. The court had two issues to resolve:
Whether the State was obligated, under Article 4 of the Convention, to carry out an effective investigation into the credible claim of human trafficking.
Whether the State complied with such an obligation, if it existed.
The evidence of this case supported the presence of such credible suspicion of human trafficking especially when considering B.B.’s vulnerability and lack of a reasonable alternative. The court held that Article 4 does create an obligation to critically investigate national and transnational trafficking regardless of whether it was a part of an organized scheme or whether it was an independent instance. The court found that the State did not uphold its obligation and thus violated B.B.’s article 4 rights.
The initial categorization of this conduct as pimping, rather than human trafficking, permitted “Y” to escape liability for violating a fundamental human right. This violation persisted when the State failed to investigate despite sufficient evidence and numerous appeals. The lenient sentencing on this matter undermines deterrence, safety, and effectiveness of both Slovakia’s counter-trafficking efforts and the Convention of Human Rights as a whole.
Ultimately Slovakia has to pay B.B. 26,000 euros in respect of non-pecuniary damages as well as 15,000 euros with respect to litigation costs and expenses.
STRASBOURG, FRANCE- On October 8, 2024, in the case of M.A and Z.R v. Cyprus, the ECHR ruled that the Cypriot government violated the rights of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in Cyprus.
Photo of refugees on a Cypriot Marine Police boat after being rescued from their own sunken boat off the southeastern coast of Cyprus. Photo courtesy of Petros Karadjias.
M.A. and Z.R. are Syrian nationals who fled their home, Idlib, Syria, in January of 2016 for their own safety and to escape civil war. They ended up in Lebanon where they stayed in camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While at these camps, they allege that there was no access to healthcare or employment opportunities, and they were not entitled to their basic rights. Fearing that they might be sent back to Syria, seeing as Lebanon was sending Syrians back home after the Beirut explosion of 2020, they decided to seek asylum in Cyprus.
To obtain asylum in Cyprus, M.A. and Z.R. paid smugglers $2,500 each. They had set sail in early September of 2020 on a boat with 30 other refugees. When arriving at the territorial waters of Cyprus, their boat was intercepted by the Cypriot coastguard. They were told that they could not continue their journey, even after M.A. and Z.R. explained their situation. On September 8, after 2 days of being stranded at sea under the control of the Cypriot Marine Police, they were forced onto another boat and sent back to Lebanon where the Lebanese police questioned and detained them before letting them go. As of today, M.A. and Z.R. still live in Lebanon under the UNHCR.
M.A. and Z.R. brought this suit against the Cypriot court, claiming that their refusal of asylum procedure and forcible departure back to Lebanon violated Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No.4, and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Cypriot government, on the other hand, argued that they returned M.A. and Z.R. back to Lebanon on the basis of a bilateral agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon, which provided for readmission of individuals who entered Cyprus unlawfully. The Cypriot Government contended Lebanon is a safe third country because they (1) have a good relationship with Lebanon and (2) because of the UNHCR and the presence of other UN bodies there to help refugees.
ECHR RULING
The ECHR ruled in favor of M.A. and Z.R., stating that the Cypriot government violated Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No.4, and Article 13 of the Convention by refusing them asylum and forcibly sending them back to Lebanon without reviewing their claims and circumstances.
Violation Under Article 3
Article 3 of the Convention conveys that no person shall be subjected to degrading or inhumane treatments. The court stated that it cannot overlook the fact that M.A. and Z.R. were stranded at sea for two days under Cypriot authority just to be forcibly sent back to Lebanon without even having their asylum claims investigated.
The Court also stated that Cypriot officials should have known of the various shortcomings of the Lebanese asylum system and weighed the consequences of sending M.A. and Z.R. back. There is no evidence that the Cypriot officials assessed the ineffective asylum process or the living conditions of the asylum seekers there before sending them back. Cyprus officials knew or should have known of these conditions, yet they forced M.A. and Z.R. back to persecution without looking into their situation.
The Cypriot government also argued that they thought Lebanon was a safe third country because of their bilateral agreement with each other and the presence of UN bodies. In response, the Court reiterated that countries should not rely on others for their own refugee obligations.
Hence, under Article 3, the court ruled that Cyprus failed their refugee obligations and to follow the proper procedures for assessing asylum claims before sending M.A. and Z.R. back to Lebanon.
Violation Under Article 4 of Protocol No.4
Article 4 under Protocol No.4 prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens. Exceptions to this article only happen where this collective expulsion is done reasonably after proper examinations of the aliens in the group as individuals. Here, the Cypriot government did not investigate any claims of any of the refugees on the boat and still expelled them back to Lebanon.
The Court says that the purpose of this article is to prevent States from removing foreign nationals without first examining their circumstances. Here, the Court rules that Cyprus forcibly returning M.A. and Z.R. to Lebanon without investigating their circumstances and asylum claims falls under the definition of collective expulsion and they are thus in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No.4 under the Convention.
Violation Under Article 13
Article 13 expresses the right to an effective remedy. In the case present, the Cypriot authorities deprived M.A. and Z.R. of an effective remedy by not examining their claims and forcibly deporting them back to Lebanon. This article was read in conjunction with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.
The ECHR has ruled on behalf of Syrian refugees and hold Cyprus liable for not following proper refugee procedure in examining the asylum claims of M.A. and Z.R. and forcibly sending them back to conditions that they were trying to escape.
There are many stories of Syrian refugees similar to M.A. and Z.R., where they have been refused of asylum procedures by Cypriot authorities and were forced back to Lebanon to face persecution and risk being sent back to Syria. This ruling can change the landscape of refugee rights and bring awareness to the inhumane treatments that the Cypriot government imposes on Syrian refugees seeking asylum.
Nicaragua – The Inter American Commission of Human Rights concluded the State of Nicaragua liable for the murder of journalist Ángel Gahona López while he was covering a protest and urgently calls for their continued human rights violations to cease.
Members of the community honor Ángel Gahona López after he was killed while covering a protest. Photo Courtesy of Noticiero El Meridiano.
On July 4th, 2024, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (The Commission) filed a case with the Inter American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) against Nicaragua concerning the execution of journalist Ángel Gahona López on April 21, 2018. The Commission concluded that the State of Nicaragua is responsible for violating Lopez’s rights to life and freedom of expression and concluded that the State failed to provide evidence to support the use of force against Lopez given the amplified and intense circumstances.
While covering protests against State violence in April 2018, Lopez was fatally shot. Although he did receive medical assistance from nearby civilians, witnesses reported that state officials present at the scene failed to provide any aid, further indicating that this was motivated by the state itself rather than being a random and unfortunate occurrence. Lopez died just a few hours later. The Merits Report indicated that a state agent was responsible for the murder and also indicated that the murder was linked to Lopez’s work as a journalist reporting on anti-government protests.
The Commission ultimately concluded that the State of Nicaragua violated the American Convention on Human Rights’ articles 4.1, 8.1, 13, and 25. These articles pertain to individuals having the right to an impartial hearing, freedom of thought and expression, to have their life respected, and the right to judicial protection.
Two young men were initially convicted of his murder but were released in 2019 under Law 966, which is also known as the amnesty law. This law was passed by the National Assembly of Nicaragua and intended to provide “broad amnesty” to all people who played a role in events throughout the country from April 18th, 2018, until the law entered force. This essentially applied to political crimes, and otherwise related crimes, which is why the two men were released. The Commission previously denounced this law on the grounds that it would exonerate those who committed grave human rights violations.
After finding the State of Nicaragua at fault, the Commission suggested that the State, in response to an array of human rights violations over the last 10 years, undertake reparations such as providing financial compensation to victims of human rights violations, conducting thorough investigations into matters such as Lopez’s death, and implementing protocols to prevent repetition of these ghastly acts.
The death of Ángel Gahona López was not an isolated incident. The State of Nicaragua has committed a lengthy series of human rights violations over the last several years. In fact, the Commission recently published a statement condemning the State for depriving its citizens of basic human rights and imprisoning many of them in appalling conditions. The Commission is not only calling upon the Nicaraguan government to cease its relentless persecution of human rights defenders but has also called upon the international community to provide support to those suffering at the hands of the government.
Unfortunately, as evidenced by the death of Ángel Gahona López, the plight of journalists in Nicaragua and other Central American countries, as well as internationally, is dire. In 2018 alone, there were 95 journalists killed on the job. Lopez’s death not only added to the number of journalists killed worldwide but is just one more example of the many heinous acts committed by the Nicaraguan government over the last decade.
STRASBOURG, France – On October 15th, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held that Russia violated the right to Freedom of Expression in the case of Gadzhiyev and Gostev v. Russia. The case concerned two applicants who were dismissed from their jobs after criticizing workplace practices without permission. The ECHR’s ruling challenged Russia’s strict prohibition on public statements issued by State employees.
While the ECHR ruled on Mr. Gadzhiyev and Mr. Gostev’s cases together, their individual claims were slightly different. Mr. Gadzhiyev served as a police colonel for the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior since 1978. In 2013, after his previous attempts to raise awareness about corruption within regional police forces failed, Mr. Gadzhiyev arranged a meeting with the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs. In anticipation of this meeting, he gave four interviews with media outlets in which he claimed the presence of corruption. On March 1st, 2013, the Minister of the Interior of Dagestan opened an investigation and found that Mr. Gadzhiyev failed to get permission from the Public Relations Department for interviews. Ultimately, he was dismissed from his post because he failed to seek this approval and spoke out negatively against a government agency, which was a violation of domestic law. All national courts ruled against or dismissed Mr. Gadzhiyev’s case on the grounds that he criticized a government agency without concrete facts to support his claims.
Photograph of Moscow Metro. Photo Courtesy of David Burdeny.
Mr. Gostev was an employee of the Moscow Metro since 1992 and, in 2014, became chairman of the Metro Workers’ trade union. After a series of technical accidents, the trade union organized protests to draw attention to the safety conditions of the metro service. After further issues, Mr. Gostev gave two interviews with media outlets, during which he commented on the safety deficiencies of the metro system. The Moscow Metro Authority issued a reprimand to Mr. Gostev, as all employees were required to publish material through the metro press service and not engage with the press directly. After his second interview was published, the Authority fired Mr. Gostev. National courts rejected Mr. Gostev’s application, stating that he had been informed of the proper procedures for communicating with the press but chose to ignore them. They found that his dismissal was not an infringement of freedom of expression, only a restriction on his exercise of this right.
Due to their similarity, the ECHR considered Mr. Gostev and Mr. Gadzhiyev’s case at the same time. The court determined that the purpose of their statements was to safeguard the public and they had no malintent. Although the domestic courts ruled a lack of evidence, numerous police officers corroborated Mr. Gadzhiyev’s claims, demonstrating their validity. Furthermore, while domestic courts claimed Mr. Gostev’s statements could have harmed Moscow Metro, they failed to show any evidence of harm.
Ultimately, the ECHR ruled that the severity of punishment was disproportionate to the crime, given the relevance and legitimacy of Mr. Gostev and Mr. Gadzhiyev’s statements. They ruled that strict enforcement of Russian law prohibiting or discouraging any negative statements made to the public could deter employees, union representatives, and whistleblowers from voicing legitimate concerns.
While the court held that Russia was to pay 9,950 and 10,500 euros to Mr. Gadzhiyev and Mr. Gostev, respectively, the ruling implied a broader disagreement with Russian law and its application regarding the prohibition of public statements against the State. Ultimately, the ECHR suggests Russia should evaluate the presence of democratic procedures within the State when claiming that interference with freedom of expression is unnecessary in a democratic society.
STRASBOURG, France– On October 8, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in four separate cases that Turkey had violated Article 10 of the European Convention for Human Rights, the right to freedom of expression. According to the ECHR, the Turkish government wrongfully imposed on seven individuals suspended sentences of imprisonment and lengthy probations for comments each had made criticizing the governing bodies of Turkey, including the President and Prime Minister at the time.
Photo of a crowd with a Turkish flag on a street. Photo courtesy of Emir Bozkurt.
The Convictions
Bayram Yorulmaz, Abuzer Serdar Özlü, Binali Erdoğan, Mihriban Şorli, Tugay Kurnaz, Saide İnaç, and Jinda Açıkgöz were all convicted by Turkish courts of offenses under the Turkish Criminal Code as a result of either verbal or written criticisms of the Turkish Government or its officials. The convictions included:
Bayram Yorulmaz: A public official at the Adana courthouse in Turkey charged with the offense of insulting a public official.
Abuzer Serdar Özlü: A Turkish national convicted of public denigration of the Turkish Nation, the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and the judicial bodies of the state for nine publications he had made on his Twitter account in March and April 2016.
Binali Erdoğan: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic via a Facebook post.
Mihriban Şorli: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic via comments she made verbally during an altercation with police officers.
Tugay Kurnaz: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic and overtly insulting a public official via Facebook and Twitter.
Saide İnaç: A German national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic by sharing an article via Facebook post, which stated that the President of the Republic had provoked attacks on the Kurds and caused their massacre.
Jinda Açıkgöz: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic via Facebook posts.
The Criticisms
The individuals’ criticisms varied in severity. Some examples include:
Mr. Yorulmaz: “They sneeringly give each other as gifts the paintings of the people they condemned to death… What is this? Effrontery? Insolence? Perversion?”
Mr. Özlü: “You suspended the Constitution and cancelled out the police and the judiciary because of the bribes this man distributed to your Ministers!”
Mr. Erdoğan: “You and your damned presidency, that’s enough!”
Ms. Şorli: “You [your] dishonourable Tayyip (şerefsiz) can’t do anything to me, Tayyip’s soldiers killed my brother in the mountains, I’m going to retaliate.”
The Sentences
For each of the convictions, the Turkish Government handed down the following sentences:
Individual
Imprisonment
Probation
Bayram Yorulmaz
Eleven months and twelve days, suspended
Five years
Abuzer Serdar Özlü
Five months, suspended
Five years
Binali Erdoğan
Held for one month in pre-trial detention and sentenced to ten months, suspended
Five years
Mihriban Şorli
Ten months, suspended
Five years
Tugay Kurnaz
One year, two months and seventeen days, suspended
Five years
Saide İnaç
One year, five months and fifteen days, suspended
Five years
Jinda Açıkgöz
One year, two months and seventeen days, suspended
Five years
The ECHR’s Ruling
In each of the cases, the Turkish Government argued that the suspension of the prison sentence meant that the individuals had not suffered any obligations or restrictions, and therefore did not have victim status. However, the ECHR determined that despite the suspension of the imprisonment, the criminal convictions amounted to an interference with their exercise of the right to freedom of expression as the sentences may have had a deterrent effect. The ECHR further noted that the Turkish national authorities failed to weigh the interests at stake in accordance with the criteria in Turkey’s case law and the interferences were not shown to have been necessary in a democratic society.
Citing Durukan and Birol v. Türkiye, the ECHR explained that Article 231 of Turkey’s Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the suspension of pronouncement of judgments entailing convictions, did not offer the required protection against arbitrary infringement by the public authorities of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention for Human Rights.
The ECHR found that the Government of Turkey had violated the right to freedom of expression in each case and ordered Turkey to pay following penalties:
ARUSHA, Tanzania – On October 3, 2024, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights reached a decision on provisional matters in Moadh Kheriji Ghannouchi and Others v. Republic of Tunisia. This case involves several political activists whom the applicants allege have been wrongfully imprisoned without probable cause detained. These activists are members of the Ennahda Party, a major political group in Tunisia aiming for Islamic democracy. Applicants on behalf of the activists allege that during detention these activists were deprived of their right to dignity and protection against cruel punishment. The Court ordered the Republic of Tunisia to better protect the current detainees. By this order, the Republic of Tunisia must eliminate barriers to communication between current detainees and lawyers or medical personnel. They must also adequately inform the detainees of the basis for their detention, and report on any measures taken to fulfil these orders within 15 days of the decision. However, the court dismissed the request for release of the four detainees.
Loved ones and supporters of Ridha Bouzayene gather at his funeral service. Photo courtesy of Al-Sabil.
The applicants also allege that the Republic of Tunisia infringed upon a detainee’s right to life although no conclusion on this issue has been reached. Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ensure and protect one’s right to life. Ridha Bouzayene, a well-known member of the Ennahda Party, died during a protest against the Government in the Republic of Tunisia on January 14, 2022. He went missing at the demonstration and five days later it was discovered he had died from injuries inflicted by police.
Mr. Bouzayene’s death also implicates the right of peaceful assembly, protected by Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Mr. Bouzayene went missing during what the applicants allege to be a peaceful protest and sustained fatal injuries while exercising his rights.
Applicants also allege the Republic of Tunisia discriminated against Mr. Bouzayene based on his political opinion which further violates his rights protected by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Constitution of Tunisia purports to establish a Constitutional Court, yet the Court has not been operational. As a result, the applicants further allege that the Republic of Tunisia has not upheld the independence of lawyers and the judiciary, leading to the ineffective investigation of Mr. Bouzayene’s death. As of this decision, the Tunisian judicial system has not found anyone responsible for Mr. Bouzayene’s death and the applicants maintain he was arbitrarily deprived of life. The applicants request the Court to order the Republic of Tunisia to open an investigation into Mr. Bouzayene’s death.
The provisional decisions in this case, requiring the Republic of Tunisia to better inform and protect current detainees, may indicate a favorable decision to Mr. Bouzayene’s family in the future regardless of their denial of release.
STRASBOURG, France – On September 17, 2024, in the case of Pindo Mulla v. Spain, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Spain had violated the right to privacy and religious freedom of Ms. Rosa Edelmira Pindo Mulla, a Jehovah’s witness, by administering blood transfusions against her will. The ruling marks another victory for individual autonomy and religious freedom in healthcare, reaffirming the ECHR’s commitment to self-determination.
Photograph of the Pindo Mulla v. Spain judgement delivery. Photo Courtesy of the European Court of Human Rights.
Ms. Rosa Edelmira Pindo Mulla, an Ecuadorian national living in Spain, firmly opposes blood transfusions due to her religious beliefs. Following a series of medical evaluations between May and July 2017, she was advised to undergo surgery to remove a myoma. In preparation for the procedure, she issued two legal documents—an advance directive and a lasting power of attorney—refusing blood transfusions under any circumstance.
On June 6, 2018, Ms. Pindo Mulla was admitted to the hospital due to severe internal bleeding. She reiterated her refusal of a blood transfusion and was transferred to a specialized hospital in Madrid that could provide alternative treatments. However, multiple miscommunications during this transfer—including incomplete sharing of her advance directive, unclear information about treatment preferences, and a failure to consult with her or her family—resulted in a duty judge authorizing blood transfusions without knowledge of her legal documents or religious beliefs. The doctors administered three life-saving blood transfusions while Ms. Pindo Mulla was unaware and unable to give informed consent.
Ms. Pindo Mulla pursued her case through each level of the Spanish judiciary before appealing to the ECHR. Both the local judge and the provincial court concluded that the absence of her advance directive and insufficient evidence of her refusal justified the transfusion. When the case reached Spain’s Constitutional Court, she argued that medical professionals violated her rights to legal protection, physical integrity, and freedom of religion, under Articles 24, 15, and 16 respectively of the Spanish Constitution. Ultimately, her appeal was deemed inadmissible as it did not meet the “special constitutional significance” threshold under Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
On March 13, 2020, Ms. Pindo Mulla brought her case to the ECHR, claiming that Spain violated Article 8 (right to respect for private life) and 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Spain relinquished jurisdiction to the ECHR on July 4, 2023, and the Grand Chamber hearing took place on January 10, 2024.
The court scrutinized the medical professionals’ decision-making process and evaluated whether they had shown sufficient respect for Ms. Pindo Mulla’s autonomy. Based on its investigation, the court determined that the doctors’ shortcomings in providing incomplete information and failing to confirm consent prevented her from exercising self-determination and autonomy. The court ruled that Spain had violated Article 8 in light of Article 9 and ordered the government to pay Ms. Pindo Mulla 12,000 Euros in non-pecuniary damage and 14,000 Euros for her legal costs and treatment expenses.
In this case, the ECHR had to carefully weigh the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR and the right to religious freedom. While medical professionals justified their actions as necessary to preserve life, the court held that when a patient refuses treatment freely, autonomously, explicitly, and without ambiguity—as Ms. Pindo Mulla had done—the right to autonomy supersedes the right to life. By ruling in her favor, the ECHR reaffirmed the primacy of self-determination in healthcare and strengthened the legal protections of religious minorities in medical jurisprudence.
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On 2 February 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a landmark decision for Ukraine’s case against Russia regarding genocide allegations. The ICJ rendered its decision on the preliminary objections concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). 32 States intervened.
Dead bodies are placed in a mass grave on the outskirts of Mariupol, Ukraine. People cannot bury their dead because of the heavy shelling by Russian forces. Courtesy of Evgeniy Maloletka and the Associated Press.
Ukraine employed an exceptional legal maneuver. Because there is no international court with jurisdiction over UN Charter violations or the crime of aggression, Ukraine used the dispute resolution provision in the CPPCG to bring Russia to court. To justify its invasion, Russia claimed Ukraine was committing genocide against the Russian ethnic minority in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine used Russia’s disinformation against it. Ukraine argued that this established a dispute under the CPPCG and called for Court resolution. While the Court ordered Russia to suspend its military operations in the region to begin its provisional measures and investigations, Russia unsurprisingly ignored the order.
While these provisional measures seemed a big win for Ukraine in the early stages of the war, the mixed decision in February of this year has left many claiming the Court failed to deliver. The ICJ unanimously dismissed Russia’s procedural objections in its judgment, ruling that the Court can decide on the merits if Ukraine violated the CPPCG in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. Many human rights advocacy organizations highlighted how important the admissibility of reverse compliance claims is as Russia continues to spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and hate speech. The unanimous dismissal of Russia’s procedural objections in the genocide case was a victory for Ukraine’s legal battles. Still, many regret that the ICJ did not determine Russia’s false allegations of genocide to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to fall within the scope of the CPPCG. By sustaining Russia’s objection regarding subject-matter jurisdiction by a 12 to 4 vote, the Court raised significant concerns about applying the CPPCG in broad contexts.
Ukraine’s pyrrhic victory means that its conduct, not Russia’s has been the subject of the hearing. However, the Court has still been able to review Russia’s key justification for its military campaign. Anton Korynevych, Ukraine’s legal team leader told reporters, “It is important that the court will decide on the issue that Ukraine is not responsible for some mythical genocide, which the Russian Federation falsely alleged that Ukraine has committed.”
Additionally, Russia’s violations of the Court’s provisional measures order might also give Ukraine some more room to maneuver. However, they must contend with a Court likely unwilling to rule on an issue in the borders of its jurisdictional boundaries, especially when its ruling will likely be ignored. A redundant declaration of illegality, while satisfying, may do little more than keep waning support mobilized. The nations condemning Russia’s acts would likely condemn regardless of the Court’s rulings, and Moscow has had no reservations ignoring the holdings.
This may pose additional challenges to the international community when addressing serious human rights violations. The Court is in the middle of a highly charged political, legal, and military confrontation with no police or military to back its decisions. The only formal mechanism for Court decision enforcement is referral to the Security Council. But when the state subject to the decision retains a permanent seat on the Council, the chance of an enforcement resolution is slim. The Court must be careful to preserve its legitimacy in light of its predicament. While there were no obviously negative consequences of the mixed decision, it has pushed Ukraine to focus even more intensely on evidence collection of human rights violations and crimes committed by Russian forces to increase the chances of future legal victories.
This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On January 31, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a landmark judgment in the Ukraine v. Russia case concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
Protester at a rally calling for Crimea to remain a part of Ukraine. Courtesy of Spencer Platt and Getty Images.
While the Court dismissed most of the allegations presented by Ukraine, it did investigate claims concerning the suppression of Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea. The Court’s ruling that Russia violated certain obligations under the CERD–regarding the educational rights of the Ukrainian-speaking community in Crimea–while limited, was still significant in demonstrating the importance of protecting minority rights and cultural identity.
The Court began by recalling that the current proceedings were instituted by Ukraine after events in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in early 2014. With the parties currently engaged in an armed conflict, the Court had limited the scope of its opinion under this treaty significantly, clarifying that it was not ruling on issues beyond the CERD claims. Evidence submitted by Ukraine spans as far back as 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Specifically, Ukraine alleges that Russia is engaged in a campaign of racial Discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea by depriving them of their political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights.
Ukraine instituted the case in 2017 to address events that occurred in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula. Claims under CERD included allegations of systematic discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainian communities in Crimea. Ukraine also asked for reparations for all victims of the erasure and discrimination. The Court ruled on eight specific CERD claims, but ultimately only found Russia in violation of one. The Cout found that Russia violated Articles 2(1)(a) and 5(e)(v) of the CERD because of the educational system it instituted in Crimea after 2014. The Court rejected all of Ukraine’s other claims under CERD.
These included claims of alleged physical violence directed toward these groups because of their political and ideological positions, racially motivated behavior by law enforcement toward members of these groups, and restrictions on media, cultural gatherings, heritage, and education. The one claim the Court found Russia in violation of related to protecting educational opportunities in Ukrainian. Specifically, the court found violations of Articles 2 and 5. It further explained that while declining to offer education in a minority language was not racial discrimination under CERD, the structural changes Russia implemented in schools to change the language of instruction made it unreasonably difficult for children to receive education in their primary language. The Court also found evidence of harassment against individuals choosing to pursue their education in Ukrainian. Thus, it found Russia in violation of these articles.
Since the reorientation of the Crimean education system to Russian, Ukrainian language instruction has fallen by 90%. Despite this, the Court did not find that Russia’s violation of the CERD articles was the sole cause of the decline, and left many hopeful human rights advocates disappointed by the outcome of the case. The ruling came during a myriad of other ICJ rulings based on Russia’s actions in Ukraine and raised questions about the retroactivity of these holdings and evidentiary questions when acts overlap under various human rights treaties. The Court did not provide legal guidance for many of the questions that these cases are raising.
Note: This case was decided in tandem with a ruling on the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT). This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On January 31, 2024, the ICJ delivered a landmark judgment in the Ukraine v. Russia case concerning the Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT). The Court investigated Russia’s alleged violation of five articles and found the nation only violated one. While the Court dismissed most of Ukraine’s allegations, it did investigate and find that Russia failed to fulfill its obligations under the ICSFT by not adequately investigating terrorism financing.
Ukrainian servicemen who were wounded in battle waiting to leave a field hospital near Bakhmut in Eastern Ukraine. Courtesy of Evgeniy Maloletka and the Associated Press.
The first case was filed in 2017 by Ukraine under the ICSFT. It claimed Russia’s support for Russian separatist groups in eastern Ukraine, including in-kind contributions of weapons and training, violated the ICSFT. As part of that claim, Ukraine also argued that Russia violated the ICSFT by failing to investigate, prosecute, and extradite perpetrators guilty of financing terrorism found in Russian territory. The Court rejected all of Ukraine’s other claims under the convention largely because of insufficient evidence. This sliver of a win seemed to do little as Ukraine lost on nearly every other claim of significance.
The situation today is much different than when Ukraine first raised these complaints. This time around, Russia based its objection on the “clean hands” doctrine, which it raised in its Rejoinder on March 10th, 2023. Raising this objection at this late stage meant the Court viewed it as a defense on the merits. Several of the pieces of evidence submitted by Ukraine were already considered in the 2019 Judgement concerning the annexation of Ukraine
Aside from the acts Ukraine referred to by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) after 2019, Ukraine also referred to the acts of armed groups and individuals before 2019. Because the Court previously issued a judgment, the Court had tricky subject-matter jurisdiction questions to untangle, especially as the timeline of events became increasingly muddled. Ultimately, the Court determined there was jurisdiction under Article 24, paragraph 1, and entertained claims. This did limit the evidence and acts the Court could consider and narrowed the scope of the investigation significantly.
The Court did find that Russia violated its obligations under Article 9 of the treaty, related to the mandatory investigations of financing terrorism. An allegation alone is enough to invoke the investigation obligations since the treaty requires a low evidentiary threshold to investigate alleged terrorism financing. Because the Article had a low threshold, it was the only apparent “win” for Ukraine. Many regarded the proceedings as inadequately protecting the human rights regime. Many speculated that these lackluster decisions indicate that the Court is unwilling to intervene in politically charged situations, especially one rife with military confrontation. Some might wonder whether these lackluster decisions signal that the ICJ is having second thoughts about wading into highly politically charged situations. But the Court must work to preserve its legitimacy, especially concerning cases involving one of the Permanent Security Council members since referral to the Security Council is the only way to enforce an ICJ decision.
No one is contesting that Russia is in violation of international law in waging its war, but the variety of cases brought against Russia by Ukraine demonstrates the limits of international law. While nations can condemn Russia for the acts that they were found guilty of under the ICSFT, if the holding remains unenforceable, it is unlikely that anything will change on the ground. Because of this, it is unsurprising that the Court ruled how it did.
Note: this case was decided in tandem with a ruling on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.
STRASBOURG, France – After Russia’s departure from the European Court of Human Rights (EUCHR), questions about how to handle cases pending before the Court and the alleged dilution of standards that initially allowed Russia to join the Court remain.
Kremlin forces in Russian-occupied Donetsk drive tanks during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade, marking the anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in WWII. Courtesy of Alexander Ermochenko and Reuters.
In 2002, the Court issued its first judgment against Russia to assist a Russian national conscripted to work on the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster after brutal radiation exposure. But by 2012, 22,358 complaints had been filed against Russia. With a backlog of more than 120,000 cases, the Court was already facing a docket crisis, only exacerbated by Russia’s expulsion. In 2022, 2,129 judgments and decisions and 17,450 applications were pending against Russia.
The war in Ukraine only raised the count, and ECHR began publishing interim verdicts. Many view these procedural changes as undermining the Court’s ability to handle cases in its jurisdiction. That said, the interim ruling was the first international court to prove Russia’s occupation in Donbas since 2014 and considered the evidence from the occupied territories, including the downing of flight MH17 and actions by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) and members of the Russian military.
But now, after the Russian exit, many question how the Court can handle the previously pending cases without jurisdiction, and these uncertainties are only exacerbated by Russia’s departure from the Council of Europe as well. Critics claim Russia was a thorn in both by weakening democratic standards in exchange for only mild internal reform in Russia.
These tensions have pervaded since Russia considered membership in 1994. And since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the relationship has been a sour one, with Russia refusing to pay dues. When Ukraine filed complaints against Russia’s acts, Russia did not listen to the ensuing Court orders. In 2022, after the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin did not listen to the Court order to stop hostilities. This situation deeply challenges the assumption that it is better to include rogue actors in international legal associations. Since Russia backed out, it is unclear if inclusion led to more harm or good, but it is clear that the Council and associated court were not successful in spreading liberal democracy to Russia as it had hoped.
Russia’s departure has not stopped the Council of Europe from acting on behalf of its victims in Ukraine and previously in Georgia. A key issue in these deliberations is identifying and defining conflict borders, which looks largely at where each state has control of its territory. Relying on past Georgian precedent, the ECHR did not have the jurisdiction to define borders because the “fog of war” prevented recognition of control during active hostilities. But earlier this year, the ECHR was able to rule that Russia controlled the DPR and LPR territories as of 2014 and assigned responsibility for the MH17 flight among other acts. Despite this ruling and revelation of the DPR and LPR alignment with Russia, the Kremlin continues to deny involvement. The ECHR ruling was certainly a political win for Ukraine, confirming the invasion began in 2014, not February 2022. It debunked Russian claims about independent separatist movements justifying the invasion. Russia’s objection to the ECHR’s subject matter jurisdiction over complaints concerning armed conflict was also rejected.
For now, the ECHR is considering issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The ECHR is considering any exceptional circumstances including jurisdiction ratione loci and jurisdiction ratione personae. The ECHR will consider occupation and annexation of another’s territory, whether unlawful or lawful and state agent’s authority over individuals in the territory. This is a win for Ukraine in that it legally declares when the war began, extending it to eight years earlier. The question that now remains is how to address violations that occurred after September 16, 2022, when Russia left the ECHR. It will remain responsible for acts carried out before that date, but no one is expecting compliance in the near future. If it seeks to return one day, a different question will emerge, but until then, the ECHR seems to be limited temporally by which violations it can examine.
This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.
KYIV, Ukraine – The Constitutional Court, Ukraine’s highest legal power, was in crisis before Russia’s invasion in 2022. Now the country, in the middle of armed conflict, must remake its legal institutions if it wants to prosecute Russian aggressors captured in its territory.
The inside of Ukraine’s Constitutional Court House. Photo courtesy of Ukrainian Constitutional Court House website.
From judges with conflicts of interest to alleged presidential interference, to backtracking corruption efforts, Ukraine must find a way to rectify its courts quickly. After a series of failed judicial reform bills, President Zelensky reconvened the Commission on Legal Reform. During the initial days of the Russian invasion, the Constitutional Court delayed major rulings, but now the Court seeks to prosecute individual Russians and perhaps even Russia as a whole for the crime of aggression.
While negotiations on an ad hoc tribunal for the crime of aggression have garnered the majority of the media attention, Ukrainian prosecutors have forged ahead and begun domestic investigations while the international community determines the crime of aggression question. The Ukrainian criminal code prohibits the crime of aggression under Article 437. This includes “‘the planning, preparation, initiation and conduct’ of aggressive war, as well as ‘participation in conspiracy aimed at commission’ of such actions.” The Ukrainian code does not require the prosecuted individual to be in a position of leadership, unlike the Rome statute so even ordinary fighters and soldiers can be found guilty of aggressively waging war and the associated actus reus.
The first conviction of the crime of aggression in the Ukrainian courts happened in May 2022, when 21-year-old Russian tank commander, Vadim Shishimarin was jailed for life after shooting an unarmed civilian, 62-year-old Oleksandr Shelipov, a few days after the invasion began. By July 2022, Ukraine’s prosecutor-general, Iryna Venediktova, and her office were investigating more than 21,000 war crimes and crimes of aggression allegedly committed by Russian forces. By March 2023, at least 26 war crimes suspects had been convicted by Ukrainian courts.
Before Russia’s invasion, national courts rarely saw aggression cases. Now, prosecutors are beginning to align Article 437 of the Ukrainian criminal codes to a more narrow scope, similar to the Rome statute. In the past, legislative attempts to bring Article 437 up the Rome standard failed. These prosecutions offer an interesting case study, as they show legal advocates conforming the code to international standards when the legislation and courts themselves have deprioritized doing so. Even with the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (OPG) sending guidance on standardized prisoner of war (POW) immunity, prosecutors seemed to be conforming to international humanitarian norms on combatant immunity fairly seamlessly.
Despite its corruption crisis, in February of this year, the Court issued a decision on an Article 437 case. It clarified who could be found guilty of the crime of aggression, further aligning Ukraine with international standards, rather than the criminal code’s broad definition. When the decision was released, 99 criminal aggression cases were registered, including cases against typical defendants, like military commanders, foreign intelligence service workers, and high-level state officials, but also including 30 “instigators of war” such as Russian singers and university rectors. While many–if not most–of these will take place in absentia, whether the Court can successfully rule on an atypical defendant’s crime of aggression poses an interesting challenge for the Court.
Additionally, Ukraine’s domestic prosecutors have an important opportunity to set a precedent for how the crime of aggression could be handled at national levels. This could set customary international law norms in an area that has seen little activity in the past century, which could be key to protecting the right to life. It is interesting to note that the list of potential defendants does not include notable suspects in aggression cases like President Putin himself and other members of the Troika. The Court seems committed, at least right now, to preserving the immunity of the Troika before its courts. It seems generally accepted that these personal immunities cannot be surpassed at a national level and will need some kind of extraordinary judicial response.
This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.
THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Since March of 2023, the ICC has sought to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova. However, as Russia is not an ICC signatory, it is unlikely that Putin or Lvova-Belova will be extradited for trial soon.
President Vladimir Putin delivers a statement at the Kremlin in Moscow on July 5, 2024. Courtesy of Alexander Nemenov and Agence France-Presse.
Both are allegedly responsible for war crimes related to unlawful deportation and transportation of population, specifically children, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine as far back as 2022 in violation of Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii). Incidents identified by the prosecutor’s office include deporting children removed from orphanages and child care homes. Many of these children were allegedly given up for adoption in the Russian Federation, and Russian law was changed via presidential decree to expedite citizenship. These acts demonstrate an intention to remove these children from their home country permanently, which violates the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moscow has denied the allegations and called the warrants outrageous.
Pre-Trial Chamber II considered, based on the Prosecution’s applications in February 2023, that there were reasonable grounds to that each suspect may bear responsibility for the unlawful deportation of population and the unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, particularly in prejudice of Ukrainian children. The Court had evidence of individual criminal responsibility for both under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and against Putin for failure to properly control civilian and military subordinates under Article 28(b). The warrants were considered in secret to protect the witnesses and investigation.
Prosecuting a military mastermind is no easy task and could undermine the Court; however, as the crimes addressed are allegedly ongoing, there is some hope that despite the unlikelihood of extradition, public awareness of the warrants may prevent further crimes. The Chamber considered this to be in the interest of justice and allowed the Registry to publicize the warrants’ existence, the suspect’s names, the warrants’ crimes, and the modes of liability the Chamber established.
The UN Commission of Inquiry of Ukraine found that Russian authorities took over 16,200 children out of Ukraine into Russia. The same Commission found evidence of rapes, torture, and killings, and has been investigating as far back as 2013 before the illegal annexation of Crimea. While the ICC can bring a prosecution against political leaders for waging an aggressive war, the Court seems to be focusing on civilian and children’s rights for now. Additionally, while the warrants recognize these acts as war crimes, commentators are making the case that the conduct also constitutes genocide and crimes against humanity. The decision to pursue these as war crimes may be an indication of evidence related to intent. With both the alleged crimes and evidence collection ongoing, the charges may be amended.
The Court has no power of enforcement instead relying on the 124 nations that are signatories to the Rome Statute to arrest those indicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity if they visit their territories. And yet, the Court issued the warrants. The decision to pursue charges against Putin sends a strong signal to low-level perpetrators that none are immune from prosecution and may serve as a deterrent. Plus, while Putin is not the first sitting head of state to be indicted, he is the first leader of a P5 country to be indicted. The ICC arrest warrants have impacted Putin internationally. He did not attend the BRICS summit in August 2023 in South Africa. Besides hindering potential international travel for Putin, the warrants make meeting with Putin less appealing. The stakes for engaging with Putin are becoming increasingly high for foreign governments. Combined with sanctions, the ICC warrants make it harder to ignore Russian actions in Ukraine and the brutality of its war. Even as many celebrate the ICC’s announcement, the Ukrainian government and like-minded partners continue to press for international support for the establishment of the tribunal to hold Russia accountable for the full breadth of crimes committed, specifically the crime of aggression.
This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.
