Since the attacks in Paris last month, discussions about Syria have focused exclusively on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the growing refugee crisis. In an effort to counter ISIS and limit the flow of refugees, Europe and the United States have been sending Syrians all the wrong messages. The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) has compiled and summarized just a few of the most problematic messages over the last three weeks:

1. National Security Takes Priority Over Mass Human Suffering

In the wake of a coordinated and far-reaching attack like the one in Paris, it is understandable that national security is a top priority for Europe. It is the role of the state to protect its citizens, and European governments have been acting accordingly. But the issue of refugees has become so much entangled in the national security debate that the two disparate topics have become blurred in the media and political rhetoric. Since the start of the conflict, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has justified his brutality by claiming that those who oppose him are terrorists and should be treated as threats. Instead of viewing the refugee crisis as a humanitarian problem and human rights failure, the current international debate has reinforced Assad’s justifications by painting refugees as a national security problem, ignoring the mass human suffering Syrians have experienced after four years of war.

1. The Need to Fight ISIS Excuses Assad

In recent weeks, the world has united against ISIS. The UK, which previously voted against military involvement, decided last week to expand airstrikes into Syria. Germany has said it will send 1,200 ground troops, and France has been aggressively bombing Syria since the Paris attacks. Russia, a Syrian government ally, has welcomed these efforts, which have by and large deflected criticism from Assad. In addition, the growing consensus among the anti-ISIS coalition is that Assad will need to be part of negotiations and the future transition in Syria. As a result, pressure on Assad has waned. For Syrians, it seems as though the West is willing to now turn a blind eye to Assad’s crimes in order to stand united against ISIS, a no doubt brutal extremist group, but not the original cause of the Syrian conflict.

1. Turkey’s European Union Accession is about Keeping Refugees Out, Not Democracy

Over the last several years, Turkey has been in a downward spiral with regards to democracy and free speech. Journalists and social media activists are being targeted at an unprecedented rate, anti-Kurdish violence and rhetoric is increasing, and many observers criticized the political manipulation of the latest round of elections. Five years ago, when Europe stalled accession negotiations, Turkey was in a much better position than it is now to accede; yet, despite Turkey’s democratic downturn, the EU has recently agreed to relaunch accession talks if Turkey takes measures to prevent refugees from migrating to Europe. In reaching this decision, the EU has apparently decided to ignore its first criteria for accession talks — guarantees of “democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” The message is that the EU is willing to sacrifice its democratic values for guarantees that refugees will be kept out of Europe, thus discrediting many of the EU’s founding principles.

1. Syrians Do Not Have a Voice in Their Own Future

Many of the conversations about Syria’s future transition appear to be happening behind closed doors between high-level, non-Syrian officials. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he had a fruitful discussion about the parameters of a Syrian transition with US President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the climate change talks in France. Even in the recent Vienna talks on Syria, only the foreign ministers of the International Syria Support Group (including Russia, the US, several EU countries, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) attended. Syrian representatives — either from the government or the opposition — were notably absent. Despite the oft repeated mantra that Syrians must be the ones to decide their future, the broad trajectory of a peace plan and transition are being negotiated without Syrian participation, and many Syrians on the ground are confused and uninformed about the process.  

1. Political Bargaining Does Not Account for Human Rights

Talks planned for Vienna after the New Year will eventually include Syrian participation, as the Syrian government and a delegation of the Syrian opposition are expected to begin negotiating an end to the four year conflict. In addition to the Syrian National Coalition, the delegation will include leaders of the armed opposition. Already, Saudi Arabia has invited potential members of the delegation to a meeting in Riyadh to prepare. Jordan has been tasked with determining which of the groups and relevant factions should be excluded from Vienna due to ties with terrorism, but a satisfactory human rights record is not a factor for determining eligibility. Representatives from Jeish al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham will likely participate in both the Saudi prep meeting and the Vienna negotiations. While it is true that the buy-in of fighters is needed to assure the success of any future deal, many of these armed groups are responsible for gross human rights violations. Since the talks will involve extensive political bargaining, it would be a shame for the leaders of Jeish al-Islam to have a role in Syria’s transitional government simply because they had a seat at the table. Which brings us to the last point of concern…  

1. Arms, Not Non-Violence Will Get You a Seat at the Table

Billions of Euros, British Pounds, and US Dollars have been spent to build the capacity of Syrian civil society on the international human rights framework, nonviolent resistance, and democratic transitions. Yet Syrian activists who have dedicated their lives, often as volunteers, to these ideals have not been invited to Riyadh and will likely not have a seat at the table in Vienna. Although a few Syrian “national figures” will attend the meeting in Riyadh, these individuals are not considered to be credible and impartial representatives of the larger civil society. To the knowledge of SJAC, not a single civil society organization will participate. Instead, as previously mentioned, leaders of armed groups, often with tenuous human rights records, will be in attendance. This sends mixed messages to Syrians about the actual importance of the international human rights framework and nonviolence when it comes to power and politics.

These are likely not the messages that Europe and the United States want to be projecting. Yet, many Syrians are already pointing to the abovementioned issues and highlighting the paradox of the statements made by the United States and Europe. There is a need for clarity, particularly in regards to the role of justice as well as the values and ideals that form the basis for Syria’s transition. Because the negotiations and political bargaining that happen today will affect the stability and democratic foundations of Syria tomorrow.

For more information and to provide feedback, please email SJAC at info@syriaaccountability.org.

Between refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), more than half of the Syrian population has left their homes since the war began in 2011. To understand why this has happened and what can be done to reverse it, one must examine the country’s demographics in detail.

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A population shortfall

Syria currently has around 16 million residents — a far cry from the 2010 UN projection that the population would reach 22.6 million by the end of 2015. The birth deficit and excess mortality (violent and natural) have reduced the natural population growth by half since 2011. Even if refugees are added to the current population figure, the total would be only 21.3 million, or 1.3 million less than the prewar projection.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered 4.2 million Syrians thus far, but that figure undervalues the actual number of refugees by at least 20%. Some refugees refuse to register for fear of being arrested and taken back to Syria (as is happening in Lebanon), while many wealthy refugees do not see the point of registering. So a more realistic estimate of total refugees is 5.3 million.

That number is expected to increase sharply.

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In Aleppo province alone, escalating hostilities have spurred another 200,000 people to leave their homes in the past two months. The Russian offensive and the lack of short-term hope for peace have convinced many living in relatively calm areas to leave as well, and more may follow suit if the recent German-led plan to welcome more refugees is implemented.

Areas of control

Although it is difficult to give an exact number for IDPs, the available data suggests that 6.5 million Syrians have fled violent areas for safer parts of the country. This includes about 2 million who have fled to the current government-controlled zone from areas controlled by other factions, as well as millions of others who fled one regime-controlled area for another due to intense fighting.

The areas held by rebels (the northwest, the south, and other small pockets such as Ghouta) have lost the most people because they are the least secure — Russian and regime airstrikes impede normal life there, and the presence of numerous different rebel factions creates persistent insecurity. The area held by the self-styled Islamic State (IS) seems safer, in part because it has a central authority.

Although religious minorities and secular Sunnis fled Raqqa and Deir al-Zour, they were replaced by foreign jihadists and Syrians displaced from Aleppo. In general, people tend to seek refuge where they have relatives, and where there is no fighting; the identity of the faction that controls the area does not necessarily matter to them as much.

The Kurdish area attracts displaced Kurds but few Arabs — no surprise given that the faction in control, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), aims to make the area ethnically homogeneous.

Mainstream media reports often highlight the fact that the Syrian army controls less than 17% of the country, and IS over 50%.

Yet these seemingly shocking figures do not factor in Syria’s geography — namely that 47% of the country is sparsely inhabited steppes. Of course, extending control over some of the steppes may hold strategic interest for IS; Palmyra is a traffic hub with important gas and oil resources, for example, and it borders Iraq and Jordan. In any case, the Assad regime controls the largest share of Syria’s residential areas, and also the most populated area.

Around 10.1 million inhabitants live in the government zone, or 63% of the total resident population. The areas controlled by the other three main factions (Kurds, IS, and rebels) are roughly equal, with about 2 million each. In short, the regime has gone from controlling about 20 million Syrians prewar to about 10 million now. 

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Local ethnic cleansing

The large-scale population movements have not been a simple byproduct of war. Rather, they represent conscious strategies of ethnic cleansing by each faction.

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To be sure, the ethno-sectarian composition of the country as a whole has not changed much, despite the departure of disproportionately Christian and Sunni Arab refugees. Christians have traditionally been scattered throughout the country and do not have their own area of refuge like the Alawites and Druze, spurring many of them to flee abroad.

As for Sunni Arabs, because the insurgency took root in their ranks, they have been the first target of regime repression and airstrikes (though some Sunni clans support Bashar al-Assad and have remained safe in the government zone). Overall, Syria’s current population is 22% religious minorities, 16% Kurds, and 61% Sunni Arabs — in other words, not that different from the prewar composition.

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These figures could change in the coming months, of course, particularly if the PYD creates a continuous zone of Kurdish control along the border with Turkey by seizing territories between Azaz and Jarabulus.

Any such move to connect the northwestern Kurdish enclave of Afrin with the rest of the PYD’s territory in the northeast (known as Rojava) could spur hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs to flee.

Meanwhile, expanded efforts to eliminate IS will likely produce an internal Sunni war between tribes supporting the terrorist group and other factions, creating further refugee flows. 

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For now, Syria’s overall population figures hide the rampant ethnic separation already occurring within territories controlled by each faction.

Acutely aware that its Alawite base is a shrinking minority, the regime has created a zone of control with 41% religious minorities, compared to the national figure of 22%. The army consistently prioritizes asserting its grip over Christian, Alawite, Druze, Ismaili, and Shiite localities.

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In contrast, rebel victories often spur local religious and ethnic minorities to depart. Only the Druze area of Jabal al-Summaq in northwestern Idlib province remains in the rebel zone, enjoying special Saudi protection in connection with Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt — it is the fragile exception that proves the rule. Rebel groups dominate a Sunni Arab territory; the main minority there is Sunni Turkmen, which is probably the most anti-Assad group.

Similarly, all religious minorities tend to flee IS-held areas. Some Kurds have remained behind; IS does not seem to distinguish them from local Sunni Arabs, probably because they are Sunni believers as well. That said, many secular Kurds have fled to PYD territory.

In the Kurdish zone of Rojava, Arabs must agree to live as minorities — as the Kurds did during centuries under Arab rule — or leave. This reversal of power is intolerable for many Sunni Arabs accustomed to dominating the northeast, leading some to support IS.

The fact that the regime-controlled zone is the most diverse does not mean that Assad is more benevolent than the rebels, Kurds, or IS. Rather, it reflects his political strategy.

He knows he must expel millions of Sunni Arabs to make the balance of power more favorable to minorities who support him. He also needs to divide the Sunnis by redistributing land and housing that belonged to refugees, making loyalist Sunnis who remain behind even more beholden to him and pitting them against any who decide to return.

In sum, the Syrian conflict is a sectarian war, and ethnic cleansing is an integral part of the strategy used by various actors, even if they claim otherwise.

What ethnic cleansing means for Syria’s future

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A man rides a bicycle near damaged buildings in Jobar, a suburb of Damascus, Syria

Although many refugees and IDPs will want to return home once peace is established, they will be unable to do so because of their ethnicity and/or political affiliation.

Resettling displaced people will become a strategic question for each player. Their efforts at local ethnic cleansing are already making Syria’s de facto partition more and more irremediable. Sectarian diversity is disappearing in many areas of the country, and this process of regional homogenization is drawing internal borders.

Yet formal partition is not necessarily a good solution. It could generate new conflicts, as seen when Sudan split and then the new country of South Sudan dissolved into civil war.

Therefore, the international community may need to work toward a Syrian agreement that lies somewhere between the Taif Accord, which imposed a kind of unity on Lebanon, and the Dayton Agreement, which imposed a difficult partition on Bosnia under intense foreign supervision. Syria’s various communities will accept living in a new, united Syrian Republic, but not the Syrian Arab Republic as it existed prewar.

A federal system would be the best political regime because the previous centralization cannot be reestablished, whatever the ruling group.

Fabrice Balanche, an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2, is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute.

Read the original article on The Washington Institute For Near East Policy. Copyright 2015. Follow The Washington Institute For Near East Policy on Twitter.

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