Europe

ICC Seeks to Prosecute a Military Mastermind

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Since March of 2023, the ICC has sought to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova. However, as Russia is not an ICC signatory, it is unlikely that Putin or Lvova-Belova will be extradited for trial soon. 

 
President Vladimir Putin delivers a statement at the Kremlin in Moscow on July 5, 2024. Courtesy of Alexander Nemenov and Agence France-Presse.
  

Both are allegedly responsible for war crimes related to unlawful deportation and transportation of population, specifically children, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine as far back as 2022 in violation of Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii). Incidents identified by the prosecutor’s office include deporting children removed from orphanages and child care homes. Many of these children were allegedly given up for adoption in the Russian Federation, and Russian law was changed via presidential decree to expedite citizenship. These acts demonstrate an intention to remove these children from their home country permanently, which violates the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moscow has denied the allegations and called the warrants outrageous.

Pre-Trial Chamber II considered, based on the Prosecution’s applications in February 2023, that there were reasonable grounds to that each suspect may bear responsibility for the unlawful deportation of population and the unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, particularly in prejudice of Ukrainian children. The Court had evidence of individual criminal responsibility for both under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and against Putin for failure to properly control civilian and military subordinates under Article 28(b). The warrants were considered in secret to protect the witnesses and investigation.

Prosecuting a military mastermind is no easy task and could undermine the Court; however, as the crimes addressed are allegedly ongoing, there is some hope that despite the unlikelihood of extradition, public awareness of the warrants may prevent further crimes. The Chamber considered this to be in the interest of justice and allowed the Registry to publicize the warrants’ existence, the suspect’s names, the warrants’ crimes, and the modes of liability the Chamber established.

The UN Commission of Inquiry of Ukraine found that Russian authorities took over 16,200 children out of Ukraine into Russia. The same Commission found evidence of rapes, torture, and killings, and has been investigating as far back as 2013 before the illegal annexation of Crimea. While the ICC can bring a prosecution against political leaders for waging an aggressive war, the Court seems to be focusing on civilian and children’s rights for now. Additionally, while the warrants recognize these acts as war crimes, commentators are making the case that the conduct also constitutes genocide and crimes against humanity. The decision to pursue these as war crimes may be an indication of evidence related to intent. With both the alleged crimes and evidence collection ongoing, the charges may be amended.

The Court has no power of enforcement instead relying on the 124 nations that are signatories to the Rome Statute to arrest those indicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity if they visit their territories. And yet, the Court issued the warrants. The decision to pursue charges against Putin sends a strong signal to low-level perpetrators that none are immune from prosecution and may serve as a deterrent. Plus, while Putin is not the first sitting head of state to be indicted, he is the first leader of a P5 country to be indicted. The ICC arrest warrants have impacted Putin internationally. He did not attend the BRICS summit in August 2023 in South Africa. Besides hindering potential international travel for Putin, the warrants make meeting with Putin less appealing. The stakes for engaging with Putin are becoming increasingly high for foreign governments. Combined with sanctions, the ICC warrants make it harder to ignore Russian actions in Ukraine and the brutality of its war. Even as many celebrate the ICC’s announcement, the Ukrainian government and like-minded partners continue to press for international support for the establishment of the tribunal to hold Russia accountable for the full breadth of crimes committed, specifically the crime of aggression.



This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

United States Institute of Peace – How the ICC’s Warrant for Putin Could Impact the Ukraine War – 23 March 2023

ICC – Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova – 17 March 2023

ICC – Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova – 17 March 2023

International Crisis Group – A New Court to Prosecute Russia’s Illegal War? – 29 March 2023

BBC News – What is a war crime and could Putin be prosecuted over Ukraine? – 20 July 2023

Foreign Affairs – Would Prosecuting Russia Prolong the War in Ukraine? – 12 July 2023



International Community Calls for a New Court to Prosecute the Crime of Aggression

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

Shortly after Russia launched its unlawful, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many began advocating for a new tribunal to prosecute Russian leadership for the crime of aggression. With 30 core states discussing the creation of a new adjudicative body, proponents are pushing for a way to address Russia’s breach of the international order and create deterrence in the future. 

 
A woman mourns at her son’s grave after he died fighting in the war on Ukrainian Independence Day in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Courtesy of Bram Janssen and Associated Press.
  

First recognized by the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, the crime of aggression, as defined by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits the use of force, barring narrow exceptions. It imposes criminal liability on those in violation. Largely dormant throughout the Cold War, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute sought to bring the crime under its jurisdiction but controversy at the time has left both the definition and activation apparently in limbo. Even with the additional Kampala amendments created in 2018 after the atrocities in Uganda, the grey zone remains. This has led many to call for a separate tribunal, akin to the one established at Nuremberg, to handle aggression cases stemming from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Beyond WWII, cases prosecuting aggression are scant. The UN Security Council set up courts to try the perpetrators of atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 90’s but with Russia as a permanent member, this is not a viable option. 

Further bolstering their demands, the Rome Statute has a major loophole: only parties to the Rome Statute fall under ICC jurisdiction. This means Russia, a non-party, cannot be tried by the Court currently. Additionally, domestic courts afford many members of The Russian Troika, including Putin, immunity. Coupled with the lack of precedent for prosecuting this crime generally, the ad hoc tribunal is becoming more compelling. 

Three major legal solutions have emerged. The first is a multilateral treaty between Ukraine and willing states, similar to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The second is a Ukraine-UN tribunal created via resolution. The last is a domestic-international hybrid chamber based in Ukraine. The first two circumvent the troika prosecution problem, and the deputy head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office has rejected the third option as unconstitutional. Many are opposed to a tribunal that would present the crime of aggression as something bilateral, between Ukraine and Russia alone, but much of this hinges on the level of international participation.

Because the crime of aggression carries a unique gravity, many are advocating for a clearly defined and replicable solution to serve a deterrent effect. In the meantime, many efforts to gather and preserve evidence of aggression are ongoing. EU member states have already agreed to support establishing a Centre for Prosecution in the Hague with American endorsement. This staggered approach has come with benefits already. As “the mother of all crimes”, whatever option the world chooses will likely become precedent in the future, further complicating the matter. As worries of selective justice and tribunal legitimacy continue, how to prosecute the crime of aggression is a legal question we may finally get an answer to; however, it will also be impossible to separate these two nations’ complex, centuries-long history without prosecution, definition, and resolution. As accountability efforts continue, Ukraine must determine which normative expectations it seeks to abide by and consider negotiating the Rome Statute and Kampala Amendments or developing a tribunal system prepared to adjudicate over the troika.

 

Note: This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

Just Security – Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine and Beyond: Seizing Opportunities, Confronting Challenges and Avoiding False Dilemmas – 2 April 2024

International Crisis Group – A New Court to Prosecute Russia’s Illegal War? – 29 March 2023



ICJ Holds Public Hearings Regarding Armenia’s Preliminary Objections to Court Jurisdiction

By: Sarah Sandoval 

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer 

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – From April 22-26, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) heard arguments on the preliminary objections raised by Armenia in the case of Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia). The delegation of Azerbaijan was led by HE Mr Elnur Mammadov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, while the delegation of Armenia was led by HE Mr Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters. 

 
Panel of judges at the International Court of Justice. | Photo courtesy of The Armenian Report.
  

The case stems from proceedings instituted by Azerbaijan in 2021, alleging that Armenia engaged in ethnic cleansing and discrimination against Azerbaijanis. Azerbaijan accused Armenia of violating Articles Two through Seven of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

In April of 2023, Armenia responded by raising preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the claims. As a result, the proceedings were suspended pending a review of the objections. The hearing pursuant to that review concluded on April 26, 2024. 

In its objections, Armenia claimed that Armenia did not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court for the full scope of Azerbaijan’s claims. Armenia attested that it only submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in regard to disputes arising under the CERD. Armenia stated that First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which Azerbaijan cited, ended before the CERD was in effect and is therefore outside of the scope of jurisdiction as well as inadmissible. Armenia also claimed that the alleged use of booby traps and landmines, as well as environmental harm, do not fall under racial discrimination and are therefore not subject to the CERD. The full written objections, as well as the transcripts of the hearings, can be found on the ICJ website. 

Azerbaijan asked the Court to dismiss the preliminary objections, either on the grounds that they are not valid objections or on the grounds that each should be decided on the merits. The Court will now deliberate on the objections raised by Armenia. The date of the decision will be announced at a later date. 

For further information, please see: 

ICJ – Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia) – Preliminary objections

ICJ – Conclusion of the public hearings held from Monday 22 to Friday 26 April 2024 – April 26, 2024

ICJ – Preliminary Objections of the Republic of Armenia – April 21, 2023

ICJ – The Republic of Azerbaijan institutes proceedings against the Republic of Armenia and requests the Court to indicate provisional measures – September 23, 2021

 

ECHR Finds Russia Violated Multiple Human Rights Following 2008 Conflict with Georgia

By: Johannah Brown

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer

STRASBOURG, France – On April 9, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered a judgment in the case of Georgia v. Russia (IV), where it unanimously found that Russia had committed multiple violations of human rights following its 2008 conflict between Georgia.  Specifically, Russia violated Article 2, 3, 5 § 1 and 8, Article 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

 
EU observers at the “administrative boundary line” between Georgia and South Ossetia. | Photo courtesy of Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times.
  

The conflict began in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia and began occupying the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  What followed is what is referred to as the “borderiszation” process, which restricted freedom of movement between the occupied territories and Georgia and resulted in numerous human rights abuses.

Russia erected physical barriers, installed surveillance equipment and deployed Russian border guards to the new administrative boundary line (ABL). The measures severely impacted the local Georgian population and people living near or trying to cross the administrative boundaries faced arrests, detentions, and sometimes even fatal incidents if found violating crossing rules. These barriers disrupted daily life, caused families to be separated, denied families access to their farmlands, and restricted children from accessing education in their Georgian language.

The Georgian government filed its application with the ECHR on August 22, 2018, ten years after the conflict began. The Georgian Government alleged that systematic harassment, unlawful arrests, and detention of its citizens led to widespread human rights abuses and violations of rights contrary to several Articles in the Convention of Human Rights.

The ECHR examined evidence, including victim lists, testimonies, forensic reports, and international observations and found a broader pattern of abuse that amounted to an administrative practice. In its decision, the Court noted that the complaints fell under an “administrative practice” of human rights violations, meaning a “repetition of acts incompatible with the Convention” that included an element of ‘official tolerance’ by the State.” The Court held that the Georgian Government had established beyond a reasonable doubt that these violations were officially tolerated by the Russian Government, taking note in its decision that the Russian Government had failed to participate in the proceedings and therefore there was no dispute of the facts.

With regards to Articles 2 and 3 the Court, pointed to evidence of the torture and extra-judicial killings of several residents trying to cross the border as well as the killing of seven pensioners trying to cross the ABL to collect their pension. In finding violations of Article 5, the Court pointed to evidence of at least 2,800 cases of arrest and detention for “illegally crossing.”

The ECHR’s decision comes one year after the Court ordered Russia to pay $134 Million to Georgia in compensation for the 2008 conflict. Georgian Minister of Justice Rati Bregadze commenting on the court’s decision, stated the ruling “underscored Georgia’s territorial integrity and the unlawfulness of the borderization process” and went on to say the ruling was “an important step toward the ultimate goal of achieving the complete de-occupation” of Georgia.

For further information, please see:

European Court of Human Rights – Judgment Georgia v. Russia (IV) – 9 Apr. 2024

European Court of Human Rights – Summary Judgment Georgia v. Russia – 9 Apr. 2024

Georgian Public Broadcaster – Justice Minister: On this symbolic day, Georgia takes another big step towards de-occupation – 9 Apr. 2024

Jurist – ECHR rules Russia violated Georgia citizens’ humans rights following 2008 conflict – 10 Apr. 2024

ECHR Rules that Coercive Methods Used to Recruit and Exploit “Web Models” Constituted Human Trafficking

By: Karla Lellis

Visiting Impunity Watch News Writer

STRASBOURG, France – On March 12, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in the case of Jasuitis And Šimaitis V. Lithuania, finding that coercing women to work as “web models” constituted as human trafficking. This decision highlights the importance of legal clarity and a victim-centred approach to dealing with such exploitation, aligning with Article 7(1) of the Convention.

 
A person’s hands held up facing the camera in a dark background. | Photo courtesy of Vecteezy.
  

The proliferation of internet technologies has profoundly transformed the dynamics of human trafficking. The UNODC’s 2020 Global Human Trafficking Report characterizes cyberspace as “digital hunting grounds” for traffickers, who exploit the expansive reach and anonymity of online platforms. Traffickers have skillfully leveraged digital tools to advertise deceptive job offers, promote exploitative services, and identify vulnerable individuals through social media. The rise of webcams and live streaming has further facilitated new forms of exploitation, as traffickers demonstrate a disturbing aptitude for using digital spaces to perpetuate their illicit activities.

This disturbing trend is exemplified in the Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania case, where young women were recruited through deceptive online advertisements to work as “web models.” The victims were coerced into performing sexual acts on camera, including nudity and using sex toys, facing threats and psychological manipulation. Police investigation revealed multiple cases of exploitation, with the perpetrators providing equipment and apartments, then demanding debt repayment while closely monitoring and pressuring the women to generate income through long, exploitative work hours. Vulnerable young women facing financial, or family difficulties were specifically targeted and subjected to these abusive practices, leading to legal action against the traffickers.

In their defense, the Jasuitis and Šimaitis applicants argued that their convictions for trafficking were unpredictable, thus violating Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 7 reflects the principle of nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law), which prohibits criminal sanctions for acts not clearly defined as offenses. The applicants claimed the national courts’ interpretation of trafficking laws was overly broad and lacked clarity, leading to uncertainty about the scope of liability. They argued this lack of foreseeability undermined their right to a fair trial and legal certainty under Article 7.

However, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously rejected this argument. The Court found the relevant criminal law provision, Article 147 § 1 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code, did not give rise to ambiguity, and the domestic courts’ interpretation was consistent and sufficiently precise. Crucially, the Court determined the applicants could foresee that their actions of deceiving victims and exploiting them for pornographic services would constitute a trafficking offense. The Court did not find the application of the law to be overly expansive or lacking in safeguards against arbitrary prosecution.

This ruling reinforces the ability of European states to effectively prosecute human trafficking, even as traffickers adapt their methods to the digital realm. As technology continues to transform the landscape of exploitation, robust legal frameworks and victim-centered approaches will be essential in combating this evolving menace.

For further information, please see:

ECHR – Jasuitis and Šimaitis V. Lithuania, App No. 28186/19 and 29092/19 – 12 Mar. 2024

ECHR, Guide on Article 7of the European Convention on Human Rights – No punishment without law:
the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty – 31 Aug. 2022

UNDOC, Global Report on Trafficking in Perso, U.N. Doc. Sales No. E.20.IV.3 – 2020