Scholarly Articles

ICJ Ruling Based on Alleged CERD Violations by Russia Disappoints Many Ukrainians

August 21, 2024

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On January 31, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a landmark judgment in the Ukraine v. Russia case concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

*Protester at a rally calling for Crimea to remain a part of Ukraine. Courtesy of Spencer Platt and Getty Images.*

While the Court dismissed most of the allegations presented by Ukraine, it did investigate claims concerning the suppression of Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea. The Court’s ruling that Russia violated certain obligations under the CERD–regarding the educational rights of the Ukrainian-speaking community in Crimea–while limited, was still significant in demonstrating the importance of protecting minority rights and cultural identity.

The Court began by recalling that the current proceedings were instituted by Ukraine after events in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in early 2014. With the parties currently engaged in an armed conflict, the Court had limited the scope of its opinion under this treaty significantly, clarifying that it was not ruling on issues beyond the CERD claims. Evidence submitted by Ukraine spans as far back as 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Specifically, Ukraine alleges that Russia is engaged in a campaign of racial Discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea by depriving them of their political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights.

Ukraine instituted the case in 2017 to address events that occurred in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula. Claims under CERD included allegations of systematic discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainian communities in Crimea. Ukraine also asked for reparations for all victims of the erasure and discrimination. The Court ruled on eight specific CERD claims, but ultimately only found Russia in violation of one. The Cout found that Russia violated Articles 2(1)(a) and 5(e)(v) of the CERD because of the educational system it instituted in Crimea after 2014. The Court rejected all of Ukraine’s other claims under CERD.

These included claims of alleged physical violence directed toward these groups because of their political and ideological positions, racially motivated behavior by law enforcement toward members of these groups, and restrictions on media, cultural gatherings, heritage, and education. The one claim the Court found Russia in violation of related to protecting educational opportunities in Ukrainian. Specifically, the court found violations of Articles 2 and 5. It further explained that while declining to offer education in a minority language was not racial discrimination under CERD, the structural changes Russia implemented in schools to change the language of instruction made it unreasonably difficult for children to receive education in their primary language. The Court also found evidence of harassment against individuals choosing to pursue their education in Ukrainian. Thus, it found Russia in violation of these articles.

Since the reorientation of the Crimean education system to Russian, Ukrainian language instruction has fallen by 90%. Despite this, the Court did not find that Russia’s violation of the CERD articles was the sole cause of the decline, and left many hopeful human rights advocates disappointed by the outcome of the case. The ruling came during a myriad of other ICJ rulings based on Russia’s actions in Ukraine and raised questions about the retroactivity of these holdings and evidentiary questions when acts overlap under various human rights treaties. The Court did not provide legal guidance for many of the questions that these cases are raising.

Note: This case was decided in tandem with a ruling on the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT). This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

Just Security – Taking Stock of ICJ Decisions in the ‘Ukraine v. Russia’ Cases—And implications for South Africa’s case against Israel – 5 Feb. 2024

ICJ – 182 – Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 18 Oct. 2022

Relief Web – Mixed decisions by the International Court of Justice on Russia’s responsibility in crimes committed in Ukraine – 6 Feb. 2024

ICJ – Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 31 Jan. 2024

ICJ Ruling Only Finds in Favour of One Ukrainian Claim Against Russia’s Alleged ICSFT Violation

August 16, 2024

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On January 31, 2024, the ICJ delivered a landmark judgment in the Ukraine v. Russia case concerning the Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT). The Court investigated Russia’s alleged violation of five articles and found the nation only violated one. While the Court dismissed most of Ukraine’s allegations, it did investigate and find that Russia failed to fulfill its obligations under the ICSFT by not adequately investigating terrorism financing.

*Ukrainian servicemen who were wounded in battle waiting to leave a field hospital near Bakhmut in Eastern Ukraine. Courtesy of Evgeniy Maloletka and the Associated Press.*

The first case was filed in 2017 by Ukraine under the ICSFT. It claimed Russia’s support for Russian separatist groups in eastern Ukraine, including in-kind contributions of weapons and training, violated the ICSFT. As part of that claim, Ukraine also argued that Russia violated the ICSFT by failing to investigate, prosecute, and extradite perpetrators guilty of financing terrorism found in Russian territory. The Court rejected all of Ukraine’s other claims under the convention largely because of insufficient evidence. This sliver of a win seemed to do little as Ukraine lost on nearly every other claim of significance.

The situation today is much different than when Ukraine first raised these complaints. This time around, Russia based its objection on the “clean hands” doctrine, which it raised in its Rejoinder on March 10th, 2023. Raising this objection at this late stage meant the Court viewed it as a defense on the merits. Several of the pieces of evidence submitted by Ukraine were already considered in the 2019 Judgement concerning the annexation of Ukraine

Aside from the acts Ukraine referred to by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) after 2019, Ukraine also referred to the acts of armed groups and individuals before 2019. Because the Court previously issued a judgment, the Court had tricky subject-matter jurisdiction questions to untangle, especially as the timeline of events became increasingly muddled. Ultimately, the Court determined there was jurisdiction under Article 24, paragraph 1, and entertained claims. This did limit the evidence and acts the Court could consider and narrowed the scope of the investigation significantly.

The Court did find that Russia violated its obligations under Article 9 of the treaty, related to the mandatory investigations of financing terrorism. An allegation alone is enough to invoke the investigation obligations since the treaty requires a low evidentiary threshold to investigate alleged terrorism financing. Because the Article had a low threshold, it was the only apparent “win” for Ukraine. Many regarded the proceedings as inadequately protecting the human rights regime. Many speculated that these lackluster decisions indicate that the Court is unwilling to intervene in politically charged situations, especially one rife with military confrontation. Some might wonder whether these lackluster decisions signal that the ICJ is having second thoughts about wading into highly politically charged situations. But the Court must work to preserve its legitimacy, especially concerning cases involving one of the Permanent Security Council members since referral to the Security Council is the only way to enforce an ICJ decision.

No one is contesting that Russia is in violation of international law in waging its war, but the variety of cases brought against Russia by Ukraine demonstrates the limits of international law. While nations can condemn Russia for the acts that they were found guilty of under the ICSFT, if the holding remains unenforceable, it is unlikely that anything will change on the ground. Because of this, it is unsurprising that the Court ruled how it did.

Note: this case was decided in tandem with a ruling on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

Just Security – Taking Stock of ICJ Decisions in the ‘Ukraine v. Russia’ Cases—And implications for South Africa’s case against Israel – 5 Feb. 2024

Relief Web – Mixed decisions by the International Court of Justice on Russia’s responsibility in crimes committed in Ukraine – 6 Feb. 2024

ICJ – 182 – Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 18 Oct. 2022

Library of Congress – International: International Court of Justice Issues Decision in Terrorism Financing and Racial Discrimination Case Involving Russia and Ukraine – 31 Jan. 2024

Russian Departure from the European Council and EUCHR Leaves Behind Questions About How to Handle Cases

August 14, 2024

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

STRASBOURG, France – After Russia’s departure from the European Court of Human Rights (EUCHR), questions about how to handle cases pending before the Court and the alleged dilution of standards that initially allowed Russia to join the Court remain.

Kremlin forces in Russian-occupied Donetsk drive tanks during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade, marking the anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in WWII. Courtesy of Alexander Ermochenko and Reuters.

In 2002, the Court issued its first judgment against Russia to assist a Russian national conscripted to work on the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster after brutal radiation exposure. But by 2012, 22,358 complaints had been filed against Russia. With a backlog of more than 120,000 cases, the Court was already facing a docket crisis, only exacerbated by Russia’s expulsion. In 2022, 2,129 judgments and decisions and 17,450 applications were pending against Russia.

The war in Ukraine only raised the count, and ECHR began publishing interim verdicts. Many view these procedural changes as undermining the Court’s ability to handle cases in its jurisdiction. That said, the interim ruling was the first international court to prove Russia’s occupation in Donbas since 2014 and considered the evidence from the occupied territories, including the downing of flight MH17 and actions by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) and members of the Russian military.

But now, after the Russian exit, many question how the Court can handle the previously pending cases without jurisdiction, and these uncertainties are only exacerbated by Russia’s departure from the Council of Europe as well. Critics claim Russia was a thorn in both by weakening democratic standards in exchange for only mild internal reform in Russia.

These tensions have pervaded since Russia considered membership in 1994. And since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the relationship has been a sour one, with Russia refusing to pay dues. When Ukraine filed complaints against Russia’s acts, Russia did not listen to the ensuing Court orders. In 2022, after the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin did not listen to the Court order to stop hostilities. This situation deeply challenges the assumption that it is better to include rogue actors in international legal associations. Since Russia backed out, it is unclear if inclusion led to more harm or good, but it is clear that the Council and associated court were not successful in spreading liberal democracy to Russia as it had hoped.

Russia’s departure has not stopped the Council of Europe from acting on behalf of its victims in Ukraine and previously in Georgia. A key issue in these deliberations is identifying and defining conflict borders, which looks largely at where each state has control of its territory. Relying on past Georgian precedent, the ECHR did not have the jurisdiction to define borders because the “fog of war” prevented recognition of control during active hostilities. But earlier this year, the ECHR was able to rule that Russia controlled the DPR and LPR territories as of 2014 and assigned responsibility for the MH17 flight among other acts. Despite this ruling and revelation of the DPR and LPR alignment with Russia, the Kremlin continues to deny involvement. The ECHR ruling was certainly a political win for Ukraine, confirming the invasion began in 2014, not February 2022. It debunked Russian claims about independent separatist movements justifying the invasion. Russia’s objection to the ECHR’s subject matter jurisdiction over complaints concerning armed conflict was also rejected.

For now, the ECHR is considering issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The ECHR is considering any exceptional circumstances including jurisdiction ratione loci and jurisdiction ratione personae. The ECHR will consider occupation and annexation of another’s territory, whether unlawful or lawful and state agent’s authority over individuals in the territory. This is a win for Ukraine in that it legally declares when the war began, extending it to eight years earlier. The question that now remains is how to address violations that occurred after September 16, 2022, when Russia left the ECHR. It will remain responsible for acts carried out before that date, but no one is expecting compliance in the near future. If it seeks to return one day, a different question will emerge, but until then, the ECHR seems to be limited temporally by which violations it can examine.

Court House News – One year after Russian expulsion from top European human rights body, Ukraine war rages on – 15 Sep. 2023

European Committee on Legal Co-operation – Supporting Ukraine in the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights

Atlantic Council – ECHR ruling confirms Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2014 – 14 Feb. 2023

Gibson Dunn – Russia in the European Court of Human Rights – Recent Decisions May Impact Rights of Investors – 30 May 2023

Just Security – Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine and Beyond: Seizing Opportunities, Confronting Challenges and Avoiding False Dilemmas – 2 April 2024

ICC Seeks to Prosecute a Military Mastermind

August 7, 2024

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Since March of 2023, the ICC has sought to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova. However, as Russia is not an ICC signatory, it is unlikely that Putin or Lvova-Belova will be extradited for trial soon.

*President Vladimir Putin delivers a statement at the Kremlin in Moscow on July 5, 2024. Courtesy of Alexander Nemenov and Agence France-Presse.*

Both are allegedly responsible for war crimes related to unlawful deportation and transportation of population, specifically children, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine as far back as 2022 in violation of Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii). Incidents identified by the prosecutor’s office include deporting children removed from orphanages and child care homes. Many of these children were allegedly given up for adoption in the Russian Federation, and Russian law was changed via presidential decree to expedite citizenship. These acts demonstrate an intention to remove these children from their home country permanently, which violates the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moscow has denied the allegations and called the warrants outrageous.

Pre-Trial Chamber II considered, based on the Prosecution’s applications in February 2023, that there were reasonable grounds to that each suspect may bear responsibility for the unlawful deportation of population and the unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, particularly in prejudice of Ukrainian children. The Court had evidence of individual criminal responsibility for both under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and against Putin for failure to properly control civilian and military subordinates under Article 28(b). The warrants were considered in secret to protect the witnesses and investigation.

Prosecuting a military mastermind is no easy task and could undermine the Court; however, as the crimes addressed are allegedly ongoing, there is some hope that despite the unlikelihood of extradition, public awareness of the warrants may prevent further crimes. The Chamber considered this to be in the interest of justice and allowed the Registry to publicize the warrants’ existence, the suspect’s names, the warrants’ crimes, and the modes of liability the Chamber established.

The UN Commission of Inquiry of Ukraine found that Russian authorities took over 16,200 children out of Ukraine into Russia. The same Commission found evidence of rapes, torture, and killings, and has been investigating as far back as 2013 before the illegal annexation of Crimea. While the ICC can bring a prosecution against political leaders for waging an aggressive war, the Court seems to be focusing on civilian and children’s rights for now. Additionally, while the warrants recognize these acts as war crimes, commentators are making the case that the conduct also constitutes genocide and crimes against humanity. The decision to pursue these as war crimes may be an indication of evidence related to intent. With both the alleged crimes and evidence collection ongoing, the charges may be amended.

The Court has no power of enforcement instead relying on the 124 nations that are signatories to the Rome Statute to arrest those indicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity if they visit their territories. And yet, the Court issued the warrants. The decision to pursue charges against Putin sends a strong signal to low-level perpetrators that none are immune from prosecution and may serve as a deterrent. Plus, while Putin is not the first sitting head of state to be indicted, he is the first leader of a P5 country to be indicted. The ICC arrest warrants have impacted Putin internationally. He did not attend the BRICS summit in August 2023 in South Africa. Besides hindering potential international travel for Putin, the warrants make meeting with Putin less appealing. The stakes for engaging with Putin are becoming increasingly high for foreign governments. Combined with sanctions, the ICC warrants make it harder to ignore Russian actions in Ukraine and the brutality of its war. Even as many celebrate the ICC’s announcement, the Ukrainian government and like-minded partners continue to press for international support for the establishment of the tribunal to hold Russia accountable for the full breadth of crimes committed, specifically the crime of aggression.

United States Institute of Peace – How the ICC’s Warrant for Putin Could Impact the Ukraine War – 23 March 2023

ICC – Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova – 17 March 2023

ICC – Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova – 17 March 2023

International Crisis Group – A New Court to Prosecute Russia’s Illegal War? – 29 March 2023

BBC News – What is a war crime and could Putin be prosecuted over Ukraine? – 20 July 2023

Foreign Affairs – Would Prosecuting Russia Prolong the War in Ukraine? – 12 July 2023

International Community Calls for a New Court to Prosecute the Crime of Aggression

August 2, 2024

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

Shortly after Russia launched its unlawful, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many began advocating for a new tribunal to prosecute Russian leadership for the crime of aggression. With 30 core states discussing the creation of a new adjudicative body, proponents are pushing for a way to address Russia’s breach of the international order and create deterrence in the future.

A woman mourns at her son’s grave after he died fighting in the war on Ukrainian Independence Day in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Courtesy of Bram Janssen and Associated Press.

First recognized by the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, the crime of aggression, as defined by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits the use of force, barring narrow exceptions. It imposes criminal liability on those in violation. Largely dormant throughout the Cold War, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute sought to bring the crime under its jurisdiction but controversy at the time has left both the definition and activation apparently in limbo. Even with the additional Kampala amendments created in 2018 after the atrocities in Uganda, the grey zone remains. This has led many to call for a separate tribunal, akin to the one established at Nuremberg, to handle aggression cases stemming from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Beyond WWII, cases prosecuting aggression are scant. The UN Security Council set up courts to try the perpetrators of atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 90’s but with Russia as a permanent member, this is not a viable option.

Further bolstering their demands, the Rome Statute has a major loophole: only parties to the Rome Statute fall under ICC jurisdiction. This means Russia, a non-party, cannot be tried by the Court currently. Additionally, domestic courts afford many members of The Russian Troika, including Putin, immunity. Coupled with the lack of precedent for prosecuting this crime generally, the ad hoc tribunal is becoming more compelling.

Three major legal solutions have emerged. The first is a multilateral treaty between Ukraine and willing states, similar to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The second is a Ukraine-UN tribunal created via resolution. The last is a domestic-international hybrid chamber based in Ukraine. The first two circumvent the troika prosecution problem, and the deputy head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office has rejected the third option as unconstitutional. Many are opposed to a tribunal that would present the crime of aggression as something bilateral, between Ukraine and Russia alone, but much of this hinges on the level of international participation.

Because the crime of aggression carries a unique gravity, many are advocating for a clearly defined and replicable solution to serve a deterrent effect. In the meantime, many efforts to gather and preserve evidence of aggression are ongoing. EU member states have already agreed to support establishing a Centre for Prosecution in the Hague with American endorsement. This staggered approach has come with benefits already. As “the mother of all crimes”, whatever option the world chooses will likely become precedent in the future, further complicating the matter. As worries of selective justice and tribunal legitimacy continue, how to prosecute the crime of aggression is a legal question we may finally get an answer to; however, it will also be impossible to separate these two nations’ complex, centuries-long history without prosecution, definition, and resolution. As accountability efforts continue, Ukraine must determine which normative expectations it seeks to abide by and consider negotiating the Rome Statute and Kampala Amendments or developing a tribunal system prepared to adjudicate over the troika.

Note: This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

Just Security – Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine and Beyond: Seizing Opportunities, Confronting Challenges and Avoiding False Dilemmas – 2 April 2024

International Crisis Group – A New Court to Prosecute Russia’s Illegal War? – 29 March 2023