Special Features

FACT SHEET: Principles for Middle East Peace

In his December 28, 2016 Remarks on Middle East Peace, Secretary of State John Kerry presented the Administration’s view on the broad consensus that has emerged regarding principles for a final status agreement that could meet the needs of both sides, reflecting the Secretary’s efforts and discussions with the parties and key stakeholders over the past four years.

These principles were offered not to prejudge or impose an outcome, but to provide a possible basis for serious negotiations when the parties are ready.

Principle 1. Provide for secure and recognized international borders between Israel and a viable and contiguous Palestine, negotiated based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed equivalent swaps.

Resolution 242, which has been enshrined in international law for 50 years, provides for the withdrawal of Israel from territories it occupied in 1967 in return for peace with its neighbors and secure and recognized borders. It has long been accepted by both sides, and it remains the basis for an agreement today.

The Arab League has previously agreed, following the Secretary’s engagement, that the reference in the Arab Peace Initiative to 1967 lines now includes the concept of land swaps, which the Palestinians have acknowledged. This is necessary to reflect practical realities on the ground, and mutually agreed equivalent swaps will ensure that the agreement is fair to both sides.

There is also broad recognition of Israel’s need to ensure that the borders are secure and defensible, and that the territory of Palestine is viable and contiguous. There is also a clear consensus that no changes by Israel to the 1967 lines will be recognized by the international community unless agreed to by both sides.

Principle 2. Fulfill the vision of the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of two states for two peoples, one Jewish and one Arab, with mutual recognition and full equal rights for all their respective citizens.

This has been the foundational principle of the two-state solution from the beginning: Creating a state for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian people, where each can achieve their national aspirations. Resolution 181 is incorporated into the foundational documents of both the Israelis and Palestinians. Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state has been the U.S. position for years, and many others have expressed that they are prepared to accept it as well, provided the need for a Palestinian state is also addressed.
There are some 1.7 million Arab citizens who call Israel their home and must now and always be able to live as equal citizens. That is why it is so important that in recognizing each other’s homeland – Israel for the Jewish people and Palestine for the Palestinian people – both sides reaffirm their commitment to upholding full equal rights for all of their respective citizens.

Principle 3. Provide for a just, agreed, fair, and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue, with international assistance, that includes compensation, options and assistance in finding permanent homes, acknowledgment of suffering, and other measures necessary for a comprehensive resolution consistent with two states for two peoples.

As part of a comprehensive resolution, the Palestinian refugees must be provided with compensation, their suffering must be acknowledged, and there will need to be options and assistance in finding permanent homes. The international community can provide significant support and assistance, including in raising money to help ensure the compensation and other needs of the refugees are met, and many have expressed a willingness to contribute to that effort. But there is a general recognition that the solution must be consistent with two states for two peoples, and cannot affect the fundamental character of Israel.

Principle 4. Provide an agreed resolution for Jerusalem as the internationally recognized capital of the two states, and protect and assure freedom of access to the holy sites consistent with the established status quo.

Jerusalem is the most sensitive issue for both sides, and the solution must meet the needs not only of the parties, but of all three monotheistic faiths. That is why the holy sites that are sacred to billions of people around the world must be protected and remain accessible, and the established status quo maintained. Most acknowledge that Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967. At the same time, there is broad recognition that there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.

Principle 5. Satisfy Israel’s security needs and bring a full end to the occupation, while ensuring that Israel can defend itself effectively and that Palestine can provide security for its people in a sovereign and non-militarized state.

Security is the fundamental issue for Israel. Everyone understands that no Israeli Government can ever accept an agreement that does not satisfy its security needs or risks creating an enduring security threat like Gaza in the West Bank. Israel must be able to defend itself effectively, including against terrorism and other regional threats. There is a real willingness by Egypt, Jordan, and others to work together with Israel on meeting key security challenges. The U.S. believes that those collective efforts, including close coordination on border security, intelligence-sharing, and joint operations, can play a critical role in securing the peace.
Fully ending the occupation is the fundamental issue for the Palestinians: They need to know that the military occupation will really end after an agreed transitional process, and that they can live in freedom and dignity in a sovereign state while providing security for their population even without a military of their own. This is widely accepted as well.

Principle 6. End the conflict and all outstanding claims, enabling normalized relations and enhanced regional security for all as envisaged by the Arab Peace Initiative.

It is essential for both sides that the final status agreement resolves all the outstanding issues and finally brings closure to this conflict, so they can move ahead to a new era of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. For Israel, this must also bring broader peace with its Arab neighbors. That is the fundamental promise of the Arab Peace Initiative, which key Arab leaders have affirmed.

(This article was originally published by the U.S. Department of State and can be found here.)

Magnitsky Campaign Releases Names of 28 Russian Officials Currently Involved in the Posthumous Cases Against Magnitsky for Inclusion on New International Sanctions Lists

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Distribution

27 December 2016 – Today, the Global Campaign for Justice for Sergei Magnitsky published a list of 28 Russian officials involved in current criminal cases against Sergei Magnitsky in spite of the fact that he was killed in police custody in 2009.

The list includes 28 officials from the Russian Interior Ministry, Prosecutor’s Office, FSB and the Investigative Committee.

The release of these new names coincides with the consideration or passage of Magnitsky sanctions legislation in the United States, Canada, the U.K., Estonia and at the EU.

The two Russian officials who had instigated the persecution of Sergei Magnitsky posthumously – Deputy General Prosecutor Victor Grin and Interior Ministry investigator Oleg Urzhumtsev – have already been sanctioned under the “Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act.”

The Russian officials listed below have rejected numerous complaints filed by Magnitsky’s mother, Natalia Magnitskaya.

Mrs Magnitskaya’s most recent complaint filed by her lawyer with the Russian authorities seeking to end the posthumous persecution of her son, said:

” It is currently known that the same criminal group [which stole US$230 million] perpetrated a number of similar crimes, and the amount of funds stolen from the budget is about US$800 million. S. Magnitsky was placed into custody on 24 November 2008 soon after he gave testimony implicating members of this criminal group. In a little less than a year, on 16 November 2009, he was found dead in the cell of the collection unit of Matrosskaya Tishina detention center. The location and nature of injuries on his body indisputably testify to the violent causes of the death of S.Magnitsky.

After S. Magnitsky was physically eliminated, investigator O. Urzhumtsev created a knowingly false version of the crime, as purportedly committed by S. Magnitsky himself, which was aimed to compromise the deceased and was monstrous in its cynicism and injustice.”

The Russian Interior Ministry refused Mrs Magnitskaya’s complaint against her son’s posthumous persecution on the ground that Mrs Magnitskaya did not have a procedural status to lodge this complaint, and said:

“The investigation sees no grounds to treat Mrs Magnitskaya as a person whose interests are affected by the criminal prosecution.”

The refusal of Mrs Magnitskaya’s complaint was prepared by Russian Interior Ministry investigator Ranchenkov pursuant to a criminal case about the laundered US$230 million proceeds of fraud – the crime uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky and in which he is being posthumously accused by the Russian authorities. This posthumous proceeding is currently overseen by deputy head of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department Krakovsky and deputy head of the Interior Ministry’s Directorate of Investigations of Organised Criminal Activity Shneiderman.

List of Officials Persecuting Sergei Magnitsky Posthumously – 2011-2016:

1. R. Filippov – investigator of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky under case No 678540

2. P. Tambovtsev – investigator of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky under case No 678540

3. A. Ranchenkov – investigator of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky under case No 678540

4. Y. Shinin – first deputy head of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department who sanctioned the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

5. M. Alexandrov – head of Directorate of Investigations of Organised Crime and Corruption of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department, deputy head of the Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department, and then deputy head of the General Prosecutor’s Office Directorate of the Oversight over Investigations of Especially Important Cases, overseeing cases against Sergei Magnitsky posthumously

6. A. Saribzhanov – deputy head of Directorate of Investigations of Organised Crime and Corruption of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department who refused complaint from Magnitsky’s mother against the posthumous persecution of her son

7. S. Shamin – head of 2nd section of Directorate of Investigations of Organised Crime and Corruption of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department who sanctioned posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

8. A. Ryabtsev – head of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Main Department of Economic Security and Combating Corruption(Department “K”), involved in the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and exoneration of those involved in Magnitsky’s death

9. D. Mityaev – official of the Russian Interior Ministry’s MainDepartment of Economic Security and Combating Corruption(Department “K”), involved in the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and exoneration of those involved in Magnitsky’s death

10. A. Krakovsky – deputy head of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky seven years after his death in custody

11. S. Shneiderman – deputy head of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky seven years after his death in custody

12. S. Murashev – deputy head of second section of the Directorate of the Russian Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky seven years after his death in custody

13. V. Yudin – head of the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office Directorate of Oversight over Investigations of Especially Important Cases, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

14. V. Ignashin – deputy head of the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office Directorate of Oversight over Investigations of Especially Important Cases, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

15. S. Bochkarev – prosecutor of the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office Directorate of Oversight over Investigations of Especially Important Cases, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

16. A. Kulikov – prosecutor of the second section of the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office Directorate of Oversight over Investigations of Especially Important Cases, responsible for the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

17. D. Stroitelev – head of section of the FSB’s Directorate K (Financial Counterintelligence) involved in the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and refusal of complaint from Magnitsky’s mother

18. V. Komarov – officer of the FSB’s Directorate K (Financial Counterintelligence) involved in the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

19. A. Pogrebnyak – officer of the FSB’s Directorate K (Financial Counterintelligence) involved in the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky

20. E. Golubev – investigator of the Russian Investigations Committee who exonerated tax officials from liability for the US$230 million theft and posthumously persecuted Sergei Magnitsky in spite of complaints from Magnitsky’s mother

21. V. Alyshev – deputy head of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Russian Investigations Committee who exonerated from liability Interior Ministry officials who persecuted Sergei Magnitsky

22. A. Iskantsev – acting head of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Russian Investigations Committee who exonerated from liability Interior Ministry officials who persecuted Sergei Magnitsky

23. S. Olkhovnikov – deputy head of the second investigative section of the first investigative department for Central District of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Russian Investigations Committee overseeing the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and the exoneration of officials implicated by Magnitsky in the US$230 million theft

24. S. Kiryukhin – head of the second investigative section of the first investigative department of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Russian Investigations Committee overseeing the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and the exoneration of officials implicated by Magnitsky in the US$230 million theft

25. L. Kolobkova – deputy head of the first investigative department of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Russian Investigations Committee overseeing the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and the exoneration of officials implicated by Magnitsky in the US$230 million theft

26. A. Prokopets – acting head of the first investigative department of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Russian Investigations Committee overseeing the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and the exoneration of officials implicated by Magnitsky in the US$230 million theft

27. R. Erdniev – deputy head of the Directorate of Procedural Oversight over Investigations of Especially Important Cases in Federal Districts of the Russian Investigations Committee overseeing the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and the exoneration of officials implicated by Magnitsky in the US$230 million theft

28. Y. Tyutyunnik – acting head of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigations Committee overseeing the posthumous persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and the exoneration of officials implicated by Magnitsky in the US$230 million theft.

For further information please contact:

Global Justice for Sergei Magnitsky

+44 207 440 1777

info@lawandorderinrussia.org

www.lawandorderinrussia.org

www.billbrowder.com

twitter.com/Billbrowder

 
Extract from Mrs Magnitskaya’s Complaint against her son’s posthumous persecution

Below is an extract from the complaint filed with the Russian Interior Ministry by Mrs Magnitskaya’s lawyer against her son’s posthumous persecution:

“The investigation of this criminal case affects the constitutional rights of Mrs Magnitskaya and her deceased son.

Since the end of 2007 and in 2008 Sergei Magnitsky took active part in exposing the criminal group responsible for the theft of 5.4 billion roubles [US$230 million] from the state budget under the disguise of a tax refund.

Today, the investigation has numerous proofs that the theft had been committed by the criminal group which comprised heads of Moscow Tax Inspectorates No 25 and 28 E.Khimina and O.Stepanova and their subordinates; owner and employees of Universal Savings Bank; previously convicted Markelov, Kurochkin and Khlebnikov; officials from the Moscow Interior Ministry’s Tax Crime Department who assisted them, and others.

Furthermore, it is currently known that the same criminal group perpetrated a number of similar crimes, and the amount of funds stolen from the budget is about US$800 million. The theft of 5.4 billion roubles was not the first and not the last in the list of their crimes. Having unlimited financial resources at their disposal and having secured protection at the high administrative level, they have organised persecution against those who disrupted and exposed their criminal activity.

S. Magnitsky was placed into custody on 24 November 2008 soon after he gave testimony implicating members of this criminal group. In a little less than a year, on 16 November 2009, he was found dead in the cell of the collection unit of Matrosskaya Tishina detention center. The location and nature of injuries on his body indisputably testify to the violent causes of the death of S.Magnitsky.

After S. Magnitsky was physically eliminated, investigator O. Urzhumtsev created a knowingly false version of the crime, as purportedly committed by S. Magnitsky himself, which was aimed to compromise the deceased and was monstrous in its cynicism and injustice.

The decree to commence a criminal case, investigator O.Urzhumtsev included data about alleged complicity of S. Magnitsky in the 5.4 billion roubles theft, which in fact S.Magnitsky had uncovered.”

The complaint from Mrs Magnitskaya’s lawyer further says that the conclusion on complicity of S. Magnitsky in the wrong-doing is a knowing lie and slander, contrary to the article 8 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code which stipulates that no one can be recognised as guilty in committing the offence in the absence of a court judgment.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Atrocity Alert: Syria, South Sudan, Burma/Myanmar and Nigeria

Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting and updating situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.

Syria

Following a three-week pause in airstrikes on opposition-held Eastern Aleppo, the Syrian government renewed their bombardment on 15 November. As of 20 November the World Health Organization reported that the 250,000 Syrians still trapped inside the city are entirely without access to emergency medical care following airstrikes on the few remaining hospitals. Local health authorities have also reported civilians suffering symptoms of chlorine exposure following a suspected 22 November chemical attack by government helicopters. Non-state armed groups have also continued shelling residential areas of western Aleppo, including a direct hit on a school on 20 November, killing eight children. In his briefing to the UN Security Council on 21 November, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O’Brien called for an end to all attacks on civilians and an immediate lifting of the siege by Syrian government forces. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, in the 60 days since the cessation of hostilities collapsed, 834 civilians have been killed in East Aleppo. In light of the failure by the Security Council to uphold its responsibility to protect the long-suffering people of Syria, the UN General Assembly should immediately take up the issue.

South Sudan

On 17 November the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, briefed the UN Security Council on his recent visit to South Sudan, warning that there is a “strong risk of violence escalating along ethnic lines, with the potential for genocide.” Special Adviser Dieng called upon the Council to request that the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) monitor, investigate and report on all incidents of hate speech and urged Council members to impose an arms embargo, noting the devastating impact of the proliferation of arms. During the meeting the Permanent Representative of the United States, Samantha Power, announced her delegation’s intention to put forward a resolution for an arms embargo on South Sudan. The draft resolution should be adopted without delay.

Burma/Myanmar

Burma/Myanmar’s army continues to undertake violent “clearance operations” in ethnic Rohingya areas of Arakan/Rakhine state following the 9 October attacks on border posts. According to Human Rights Watch, during these operations security forces have razed more than 1,250 homes in five Rohingya villages, with more than 820 destroyed since 10 November. On 18 November the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, criticized the government for placing the region on “lockdown” for six weeks and for its “blanket denial” of human rights violations, urging an immediate investigation into reports of torture, sexual violence and summary executions. An estimated 30,000 people have been displaced from Arakan/Rakhine state since 9 October and emergency humanitarian access remains suspended for an estimated 160,000 people. The UN Refugee Agency has appealed for neighboring countries to allow safe passage to civilians fleeing violence amidst reports that Bangladesh has closed its border to Rohingya asylum seekers.

Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin

Despite a Nigerian government offensive against Boko Haram, over the past two weeks the extremist group has reportedly escalated its attacks. Employing scorched earth tactics, Boko Haram has razed nine villages in Borno state. The town of Chibok, where hundreds of schoolgirls were kidnapped in April 2014, is currently under siege by Boko Haram. The group also carried out multiple suicide attacks in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, on 18 November, and perpetrated three attacks in northern Cameroon on 21 and 22 November, including an attempted suicide bombing of a camp for displaced civilians.

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Xinjiang: China’s Anti-Terrorism Campaign Is Linked to Its Persecution of Uighurs

By Christine Khamis

Impunity Watch Special Features Editor

For years, unrest in China’s Xinjiang region has led to the injury and deaths of hundreds of people. Muslim people in the region, predominantly the Uighurs, have experienced persecution under the Chinese government, which claims that such actions are part of its growing campaign against terrorism.

For years, there has been violence between Chinese security forces and the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region. (Photo courtesy of BBC)
For years, there has been violence between Chinese security forces and the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region. (Photo courtesy of BBC)

Previously, Xinjiang was a short-lived independent state named East Turkestan, before China asserted control over the region in 1949. Xinjiang was historically not considered part of China before that point.

The ethnic majority in Xinjiang is made up by the Han Chinese. About 10 million Uighurs also live in Xinjiang, and make up nearly half of the population in the region. Many Uighurs live in southern Xinjiang, which is the poorest area in the region.

Xinjiang is rich in natural resources like oil, coal, and natural gas, and because of those resources, the Chinese government has provided incentives to Chinese citizens in order to facilitate their moving and settling there. Due to these incentives, many Han Chinese have migrated to the Xinjiang region. The presence of the Han Chinese in the region has grown exponentially in recent years, with an increase from the Han making up 6.7% of the population in the region to over 40% of the population in 2008. That migration is yet another factor impacting the presence of conflict in Xinjiang.

China’s government states that the violence in the area is due to the mobilization of Islamic separatist and militant groups and that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur Muslim separatist group, is the primary instigator of tension in the region.

ETIM is an al-Qaeda affiliated militant group and is concentrated in nearby states Afghanistan and Pakistan. The group has fought for some time to establish an independent state for the Uighurs. China blames ETIM for over two hundred terrorism-related attacks thatoccurred from 1990-2001, according to the Council of Foreign Relations, a United States based independent think tank.

While ETIM was officially considered an active terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda by both the United States and China in 2002, some experts on the region have questioned how active the group has remained in Xinjiang. Prior to recent years, the violence in the region appeared be directed toward local governments in response to their treatment of the Uighurs.

Rather than ETIM, human rights groups believe it is truly Beijing’s treatment of the Uighurs fueling the ongoing conflict in Xinjiang. According to their view, it is the Chinese government’s crackdown on the Uighurs, including its blaming of the Uighurs for fueling terrorist uprisings in the region and its curtailment of the Uighurs’ religious and cultural practices, that has contributed to that unrest.

Uighurs in Xinjiang. (Photo courtesy of the Telegraph)
Uighurs in Xinjiang. (Photo courtesy of the Telegraph)

Nicholas Bequelin, East Asia director for Amnesty International has referred to the unrest as “homegrown self-radicalization that is made worse by repressive policies and an attempt to hollow out Uighur culture and religious practices.”

The Chinese Communist Party has an agenda against what it perceives as “three evils” of extremism, separatism, and terrorism. According to the 2015 annual report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the Communist Party’s campaign against the said evils has “manifested in a heavy-handed security apparatus and led to the adoption of a repressive approach to Islam in Xinjiang”.

Human rights groups state that China overstates the threat of Uighur separatists to justify its restrictions on the Uighurs. Some experts also state that the Chinese government may also be overstating the extent of ETIM’s growth in the region.

China’s repression of the Uighurs has heightened since 2009, as anti-terrorism efforts have become increasingly important to the Chinese government. As that repression heightens, conflict in the region also appears to have increased significantly.

In 2009, there were ethnic riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, which caused thousands of injuries and hundreds of deaths. Since 2013, there have also been attacks on a coal mine, a mosque, a market, train station, and in Tiananmen Square, all of which the Chinese government linked to Uighur militants.

Following a set of attacks in Urumqi that killed 43 people in 2014, Chinese officials began a “strike hard special operation” against terrorist forces in the country. The Chinese government has noted that that the operation facilitated the elimination of 200 terrorist groups and the execution of least 49 people.

Also in 2015, Chinese authorities hunted down alleged perpetrators of the coal mine attack in Xinjiang. Security forces killed 28 suspects in the process, women and children among them.

Following the Urumqi riots in 2009, Chinese authorities began to take measures to curb the perceived threat of terrorism in Xinjiang, such as building fences throughout the regions and closing off entire neighborhoods for security inspections. Uighurs are often required to display identification before entering their neighborhoods, while Han Chinese living in the same neighborhoods do not have to adhere to the same requirement.

Heavy security in the Xinjiang region. (Photo courtesy of BBC)
Heavy security in the Xinjiang region. (Photo courtesy of BBC)

Authorities in Xinjiang maintain security checkpoints to check the ID cards and cellphones of citizens, primarily those of Uighurs. Cellphones are of particular interest to officials because they may contain apps or other software contributing to jihadist causes or allowing owners to communicate with individuals outside of China.

Uighurs are also disallowed from certain religious practices, including the covering of the head and face and accessing religious centers. Fasting during Ramadan is also strictly governed.

Many Uighurs are also discouraged from traveling, especially abroad, and some are even denied travel documents. Even those who are ultimately able to obtain travel documents go through an arduous process in order to be approved for those documents. In June 2016, the Chinese government determined that people in Yili, in Xinjiang’s north-western region, would need to present DNA or other biological evidence when applying for travel documents.

Human rights advocates that have worked to eradicate conflict in Xinjiang face repression by the Chinese government as well. One such advocate, economist and Uighur supporter Ilham Tohti, was sentenced to life imprisonment for alleged separatism after he called for reconciliation between the Chinese and Uighurs. This year, two years after his imprisonment commenced, Mr. Tohti was announced as the winner of the Martin Ennals award for human rights defenders. The Martin Ennals Foundation described Mr. Tohti’s work as that which fostered dialogue and understanding between the Han and Uighur populations in Xinjiang, but China’s foreign ministry stated that the activist’s case has nothing to do with human rights and is based purely on his separatist activities.

Ilham Tohti, a Uigher and advocate for mending relations between the Chinese and Uighurs, was imprisoned in 2014. (Photo courtesy of the Guardian)

Additionally, members of the media, both foreign and national, have experienced persecution for their portrayal of the Uighur plight. It is difficult for foreign press to infiltrate Xinjiang to deliver news coverage of ongoing events, so coverage is limited. Officials in the region often do not respond to requests for interviews, and the aforementioned security checkpoints keep journalists from reaching specific parts of the region.

In December 2015, a French journalist was expelled from the country for an article that criticized Beijing’s policies in the Xinjiang region and its treatment of the Uighurs. The journalist, Ursula Gauthier, published a story indicating that China could be using the Paris attacks to justify its crackdowns in Xinjiang. Ms. Gauthier’s expulsion was the first foreign journalist to be expelled from China since 2012.

Even those who work for state-run media are not safe from punishment for what the government perceives as criticism of its policies regarding the Uighurs. In November 2015, the editor of newspaper Xinjiang Daily, was expelled from the state’s official Communist Party and subjected to legal review for his improper discussion of clashes in the Xinjiang region.

China’s crackdown on the Uighurs may in turn have driven some Uighurs to join terrorist organizations. When news sources began to report that Uighurs were fighting alongside affiliates of al-Qaeda in 2015, it became clear that some Uighurs were vulnerable to al-Qaeda and Islamic State recruitment techniques.

Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have pointedly highlighted the Uighurs’ treatment by the Chinese in Xinjiang. In December 2015, Islamic State’s foreign media division, Al Hayat Media Center, released a recording of a chant in Chinese which called for Muslims to rise up and fight for the Islamic State. It was unclear whether the chant designated China as a target, but China was previously identified by Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a state in which the rights of Muslims are seized.

Additionally, Islamic State group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi denounced China’s treatment of the Uighurs and other Muslims earlier this year and spoke of an Islamic state reaching from Morocco to Xinjiang.

A report released in July 2016 by the New America Foundation, a non-partisan think tank, indicated that 114 Uighurs from Xinjiang had been recruited by the Islamic State. The report, which was based on leaked registration documents of Islamic State recruits, stated that policies enacted in the region could be a “push factor driving people to leave the country and look elsewhere for a sense of ‘belonging’.”

Earlier this year, a suicide bombing at the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan was carried out by Zoir Khalilov, an ethnic Uighur who reportedly was an ETIM member. The GKNB, the State Committees of National Security for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, reported that Uighur terrorist groups committed the attack and that Nusra Front, a splinter group of al-Qaeda in Syria, financed the attack.

The bombing was the first time a Chinese embassy has ever been attacked by a terrorist organization. Several other individuals were detained or arrested in connection with the attack.

China has increased its anti-terrorism efforts targeted at the Uighurs by joining efforts with other states. For example, in 2015, Thailand deported a group of 100 Uighurs who were attempting to reach Turkey and other nations that could offer refuge. The Chinese government claimed that the deportees were militants who intended to join the jihadist movement in Syria. Thailand’s deportation sparked protests in front of a Chinese embassy and an honorary consulate in the country.

In August 2016, China instituted an anti-terrorism alliance with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, all whom border with the Xinjiang region. China and Tajikistan held anti-terrorism drills in October, with over 400 troops participating.

China’s President, Xi Jinping, visited Saudi Arabia in 2016 to discuss expanding security cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In October 2016, China and Saudi Arabia held joint anti-terrorism drills in southwest China, with about 50 individuals participating.

Anti-terrorism forces in China. (Photo courtesy of Time)
Anti-terrorism forces in China. (Photo courtesy of Time)

At the 2016 G20 Summit in September, President Jinping and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey pledged to strengthen ties in order to fight terrorism. Turkey and China previously had discord between them regarding China’s treatment of the Uighurs, who ethnically identify as Turkish. Some Muslim political groups in Turkey have denounced China’s treatment of the Uighurs, and at one point, Turkish protesters marched on the Chinese embassy and consulate in Turkey to fight that treatment. Jinping and Erdogan’s pledge to increase ties between their states seems to have overshadowed that discord at least for the time being.

President Xi Jinping of China and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, meeting at the G20 Summit. (Photo courtesy of International Business Times)
President Xi Jinping of China and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, meeting at the G20 Summit. (Photo courtesy of International Business Times)

China’s relations with Western nations regarding its anti-terrorism campaign and treatment of the Uighurs have not been as fruitful. Many critics of China’s treatment of the Uighurs and its anti-terrorism campaign point to China’s lack of transparency.

In June of this year in its annual anti-terrorism report, the U.S. State Department questioned China on its anti-terror campaign in Xinjiang, citing its lack of transparency and its effect on anti-terrorism cooperative efforts. China responded with a statement citing the need for the United States to respect China’s fight against militants in the region.

In November 2015, China’s state-run media also came out with a series of articles criticizing western nations for their failure to support China in its fight against Uighur militants in Xinjiang, stating that those nations refused to treat the Uighurs’ actions as acts of terrorism.

 

For more information, please see: 

Al Jazeera – China, Saudi Arabia Hold Joint “Anti-Terror” Drills – 27 October 2016

Associated Press – Rising Uighur Militancy Changes Security Landscape for China – 9 September 2016

Associated Press via San Diego Union-Tribune – AP EXPLAINS: How Uighur Militants are Affecting China – 9 September 2016

The Atlantic – The Limits of Chinese Isolationism – 17 October 2016

BBC –Chinese Police Require DNA for Passports in Xinjiang – 7 June 2016

BBC – China Xinjiang Daily Editor Sacked After “Anti-Terror Criticism” – 2 November 2015

CNBC – As China Fights Uighurs in Xinjiang, Complaints Rise Over West’s View – 25 November 2015

The Diplomat – China’s Nightmare: Xinjiang Jihadists Go Global – 17 August 2016

The Economist – Xinjiang: The Race Card – 3 September 2016

The Epoch Times – CHINA SECURITY: China Uses Paris Attacks to Promote Persecution of Uyghurs – 24 November 2015

The Financial Times – Syria-based Uighur Militants Linked to Chinese Embassy Bombing – 7 September 2016

The Guardian – Ilham Tohti, Uighur Imprisoned for Life by China, Wins Major Human Rights Prize – 11 October 2016

The Guardian – China Expels French Journalist Who Questioned Treatment of Uighurs – 26 December 2015

International Business Times – China’s Jinping Meets Turkey’s Erdogan; Both Countries Pledge to Step up Counter Terrorism Cooperation – 3 September 2016

The New York Times – Xinjiang Seethes Under Chinese Crackdown – 2 January 2016

The New York Times – ISIS Extends Recruitment Efforts to China With New Chant – 8 December 2015

Reuters – China, Turkey Pledge to Deepen Counter-Terrorism Cooperation – 3 September 2016

TIME – Five Ways China Has Become More Repressive Under President Xi Jinping – 6 October 2016

TIME – China Will Have to Get Used to Being a Terrorist Target – 31 August 2016

TIME – Uighur Extremists Joining Isis Poses a Security and Economic Headache for China’s Xi Jinping – 21 July 2016

UNPO – EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy Recognizes Persistent Threats to Minorities – 26 September 2016

UNPO – East Turkestan: Daily Harassment and Physical Segregation of Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang Region – 24 August 2016

UNPO – East Turkestan: U.S. Criticizes Chinese Anti-Terror Campaign – 6 June 2016

War on the Rocks – Counterterrorism or Repression? China Takes on Uighur Militants – 18 April 2016

 

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Atrocity Alert: South Sudan, Burma/Myanmar and Iraq

Atrocity Alert is a weekly publication by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect highlighting and updating situations where populations are at risk of, or are enduring, mass atrocity crimes.

South Sudan

The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, visited South Sudan from 7 to 11 November to meet with government officials, and religious and community leaders amidst ongoing reports of targeted ethnic violence throughout the country. Since widespread fighting broke out between the army and rebel soldiers in Juba between 7 and 11 July this year, there has been growing ethnic polarization, with increasing use of hate speech in the media, as well as targeted killings and rapes. Following visits to Juba and Yei, Special Adviser Dieng released a statement emphasizing that, “the signs are all there for the spread of this ethnic hatred and targeting of civilians that could evolve into a genocide, if something is not done to stop it now.” The UN, African Union and Inter-governmental Authority on Development must urgently engage with the government of South Sudan to ensure immediate action is taken to end violence, prevent further fracturing of South Sudanese society, and protect populations from atrocity crimes, regardless of their ethnic or political affiliation. The UN Security Council should impose a long overdue arms embargo to halt the flow of weapons to South Sudan and into the hands of those who target and kill civilians.

Burma/Myanmar

The situation in Burma/Myanmar continues to deteriorate following the start of a joint army-police operation in Arakan/Rakhine state on 10 October. Violence between the army and the Rohingya population – a distinct Muslim ethnic minority group – has escalated while humanitarian assistance for more than 150,000 people remains suspended. On 12 and 13 November the army responded to an attack that killed two soldiers by deploying helicopter gunships to several Rohingya villages, resulting in the death of more than 30 people. There are reports of the widespread destruction of Rohingya buildings and mosques in army-led “clearance operations” as well as ethnically-motivated attacks on Rohingya civilians, including allegations of rape and sexual assault of women and young girls. Under existing discriminatory laws in Burma/Myanmar, the Rohingya minority have been systematically disenfranchised and marginalized.

Iraq

On 14 November Human Rights Watch released a report detailing a pattern of unlawful demolition of buildings, homes, and entire villages within Kirkuk and Nineveh governorates between September 2014 and May 2016 by Kurdistan Regional Government security forces and Peshmerga fighters in areas where they have defeated the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The report follows the 11 November announcement by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of alleged revenge killings and home demolitions in Kirkuk by civilians and members of the Iraqi security forces since the start of the Mosul offensive on 17 October. While the offensive has revealed further atrocities perpetrated by ISIL, forces combatting the group must ensure their own actions consistently comply with international humanitarian and human rights standards. As the military campaign to liberate Mosul from ISIL continues, it is essential that all parties take effective measures to ensure the protection of civilians and uphold their obligations under international law.

Human Rights Watch Photo

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