Special Features

War Crimes Prosecution Watch: Volume 12, Issue 19 – November 27, 2017


FREDERICK K. COX
INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTER

Founder/Advisor
Michael P. Scharf

War Crimes Prosecution Watch

Volume 12 – Issue 19
November 27, 2017

Editor-in-Chief
James Prowse

Technical Editor-in-Chief
Samantha Smyth

Managing Editors
Rina Mwiti
Alexandra Mooney

War Crimes Prosecution Watch is a bi-weekly e-newsletter that compiles official documents and articles from major news sources detailing and analyzing salient issues pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes throughout the world. To subscribe, please email warcrimeswatch@pilpg.org and type “subscribe” in the subject line.

Opinions expressed in the articles herein represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily those of the War Crimes Prosecution Watch staff, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law or Public International Law & Policy Group.

Contents

AFRICA

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

Sudan & South Sudan

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Burundi

WEST AFRICA

Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)

Lake Chad Region — Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon

Mali

EAST AFRICA

Uganda

Kenya

Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda)

Somalia

NORTH AFRICA

Libya

EUROPE

Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, War Crimes Chamber

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Domestic Prosecutions In The Former Yugoslavia

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

Iraq

Syria

Yemen

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal

War Crimes Investigations in Burma

Israel and Palestine

North Korea

Afghanistan

AMERICAS

North & Central America

South America

TOPICS

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Terrorism

Piracy

Gender-Based Violence

Commentary and Perspectives


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Opinio Juris: Reflections on the Mladić Verdict – A High-Point for the ICTY’s Legacy and Perhaps Hope for Victims of Other Conflicts

by Jennifer Trahan

[Jennifer Trahan is an Associate Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University.]

As Jens Ohlin has written, a highly awaited verdict came out Wednesday, November 22, sentencing Ratko Mladic, former commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), to life in prison for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed from 1992-1995.

The verdict was not unexpected given Mladić’s lengthy trial, and that his involvement as commander of the troops who committed the Srebrenica massacre was recorded on well–known news footage.  Wire intercepts of his communications were until recently hanging on display on the walls of the Potočari memorial near Srebrenica, in the former battery factory that had also housed UN peacekeepers.

This high-level verdict is an extremely significant one for the ICTY.  Mladić was convicted of:

  • genocide and persecution, extermination, murder, and the inhumane act of forcible transfer in the area of Srebrenica in 1995;
  • persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and inhumane act of forcible transfer in municipalities throughout Bosnia;
  • murder, terror and unlawful attacks on civilians in Sarajevo; and
  • hostage-taking of UN personnel.

The only count of which he was acquitted was the “greater genocide” theory—genocide in additional municipalities in Bosnia in 1992.  The verdict is subject to appeal, as is the sentence.

These were extremely brutal crimes with large numbers of victims—over 8,300 alone in and around Srebrenica, over 13,000 in Sarajevo, after a multi-year campaign of sniping and shelling its citizens.  The ICTY’s proceedings were extensive, thorough, (and lengthy).  Trial commenced in May 2012, and according to the ICTY, there were 530 trial days, 592 witnesses, and nearly 10,000 exhibits introduced into evidence.

While the verdict is coming late in the day no doubt for some victims and their families (for example, 22 years after the Srebrenica massacre), this is not entirely the ICTY’s fault.  Mladić spent nearly 16 years on the run, and was only captured and sent to The Hague in 2011.

Well-done trials of international tribunals also take time, particularly when so many victims and so many crimes are involved.  Funder states often complain about the high costs of international trials, but these costs pale in comparison to peacekeeping expenditures that might have been required had high-level perpetrators not been indicted and apprehended.  And, if one measures the number of crime scenes involved or number of victims whose crimes were adjudicated, then costs seem not nearly as high.  States’ representatives and tribunal critics who make these cost arguments should reflect:  would they really like to argue to remaining family members that justice for their loved ones is not worth it?

Victims may or may not feel some “closure” at this verdict.  Complete closure is of course impossible, as no one can restore their loved ones.  But hopefully surviving victims and family members of those who did not survive will take some measure of solace from the verdict.

As Marko Milanovic has written, denial of crimes and partial denial of crimes is still a pervasive problem among certain communities in the former Yugoslavia (particularly in Repŭblika Srpska and Serbia), and today’s verdict is not anticipated to change that.  Yet, establishing the facts, hearing witness testimonies, and introducing documentary evidence is extremely significant in its own right, and helps create a solid record that makes denial harder, and perhaps will make it gradually less and less plausible.

Finally, the Mladić verdict can also give us hope for future prosecutions—that justice is sometimes delayed, but remains possible and one needs to remember this.  For years (when I was a junior attorney at Human Rights Watch) there was only an “arrest Mladić and Karadžić campaign,” and we had no idea if these two fugitives from justice would ever be apprehended.  It took years of concerted pressure and economic leverage from the US and the EU, but the arrests did occur, and the trials did occur.  So, as we look on as mass crimes continue today in other countries (such as Syria and Myanmar), and the geopolitical roadblocks to seeing any kind of comprehensive justice solutions, we should remember this long trajectory that the ICTY’s work took, and the need to stay the course.

International Center for Transitional Justice: In Focus – Challenging Impunity in Haiti

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ICTJ | Justice, Truth, Dignity
ICTJ InFocus
November 2017

In Focus ›
Can the UN’s New Mission in Haiti Work with Activists to Challenge Impunity?
Last month, the United Nations established a new mission in Haiti, focused on strengthening rule of law institutions and human rights reporting. Can it work with activists to challenge impunity? We sat down with Isabelle Clérié, a Haitian civil society organizer, to talk about the mission, what it can accomplish, and how the past is understood in the country.
Read More ›

Publications ›

Other News
ICTJ Course Examines the Place for Justice in Peace Negotiations
From Syria to Colombia and beyond, how do societies navigate the pursuit of justice in peace processes? That question animated ICTJ’s annual Intensive Course on Transitional Justice and Peace Processes, which this month gathered 31 participants from nearly 20 countries in Barcelona to discuss the place of justice in negotiations to end conflict. Go behind-the-scenes with our instructors and participants.
Read More ›
Amid Ethnic Cleansing in Myanmar, Where Does Transitional Justice Stand?
During the past month, over 400,000 members of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim community have been driven from their homes as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign led by the military. What lies at the root of the current violence, how is it connected to political transition, and does transitional justice have a role to play? ICTJ’s Anna Myriam Roccatello answers those questions and more.
Read More ›

Upcoming Events ›
December 07 – 09, 2017
Present Past: Time, Memory, and the Negotiation of Historical Justice ›
Location: Columbia University, New York City

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Quartz: Robert Mugabe is reportedly under house arrest as situation in Zimbabwe looks increasingly like a coup

Harare, Zimbabawe

Zimbabwe’s longtime leader president Robert Mugabe is reportedly under house arrest after soldiers took over the state broadcaster on Nov. 15 in a move that has all the classic hallmarks of a coup, although the army insists it’s not one.

There is a strong military presence on the streets of Harare and Zimbabwe’s parliament and the president’s offices have also been cordoned off. Universities deferred exams and asked students to stay home.

No one has heard from Mugabe or his wife Grace Mugabe since tanks were spotted rolling into Harare on Nov. 14. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (livestream) reported that the first couple is under house arrest. The country’s finance minister Ignatius Chombo and several ministers loyal to Grace Mugabe’s faction have been detained, according to Reuters.

Zimbabweans woke up on Wednesday morning local time to discover that leaders of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces had taken control of the state broadcaster with a promise to restore order to the country, but insisted that it was not a military coup.

Around 1am local time, major general Sibusiso Moyo on behalf of the ZDF, came on air in camouflage fatigues, announcing that president Robert Mugabe and his family are “safe and sound” with their security “guaranteed.”

“We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice,” said Moyo.

“As soon as we have accomplished our mission we expect that the situation will return to normalcy.”

Image uploaded from iOS
Major general Sibusiso Moyo on ZBC. (screen shot)

But in a message to the international community, Moyo said: “We wish to make it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover of government. What the Zimbabwe Defence Forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country which if not addressed may result in violent conflict.”

The takeover of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation in Harare comes after around 48 hours of unease in the country, after the ZDF’s top officer, general Constantine Chiwenga challenged president Mugabe’s treatment of former war veterans from the country’s independence struggle and, significantly, the sacking of vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Chiwenga was called treasonous by Mugabe’s Zanu PF party.

On Tuesday, army tanks and trucks rolled into the capital city Harare heightening tension in a country that has never experienced political intervention from its armed forces since independence in 1980. After hours of uncertainty about the reasons for show of military force in the city, soldiers eventually took control the broadcaster.

Moyo’s Wednesday statement seemed determined to ensure that the country, which has been ruled by president Mugabe for all the 37 years since independence, would not descend into chaos. He called on war veterans, traditional leaders and other security services to play a “positive role in ensuring peace, stability and unity” in the country.

But he also warned, “Let it be clear that we intend to address the human security threats in our country, therefore any provocation will be met with an appropriate response.”

After the announcement, the TV stations have returned to showing videos of martial music.

Lynsey Chutel reported from Johannesburg. Additional reporting by Yinka Adegoke in New York City.

War Crimes Prosecution Watch: Volume 12, Issue 18 – November 12, 2017


FREDERICK K. COX
INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTER

Founder/Advisor
Michael P. Scharf

War Crimes Prosecution Watch

Volume 12 – Issue 18
November 12, 2017

Editor-in-Chief
James Prowse

Technical Editor-in-Chief
Samantha Smyth

Managing Editors
Rina Mwiti
Alexandra Mooney

War Crimes Prosecution Watch is a bi-weekly e-newsletter that compiles official documents and articles from major news sources detailing and analyzing salient issues pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes throughout the world. To subscribe, please email warcrimeswatch@pilpg.org and type “subscribe” in the subject line.

Opinions expressed in the articles herein represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily those of the War Crimes Prosecution Watch staff, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law or Public International Law & Policy Group.

Contents

AFRICA

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

Sudan & South Sudan

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Burundi

WEST AFRICA

Lake Chad Region — Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon

Mali

EAST AFRICA

Uganda

Kenya

Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda)

Somalia

NORTH AFRICA

Libya

EUROPE

Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, War Crimes Chamber

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Domestic Prosecutions In The Former Yugoslavia

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

Iraq

Syria

Yemen

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal

War Crimes Investigations in Burma

Israel and Palestine

AMERICAS

North & Central America

South America

TOPICS

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Terrorism

Piracy

Gender-Based Violence

Commentary and Perspectives

WORTH READING


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups “warcrimeswatch – War Crimes Prosecution Watch” group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to warcrimeswatch+unsubscribe@case.edu.