Syria Watch
Syrian Network for Human Rights: Violations Report 25 June 2012
A video showing the Joret Ash-Shayah neighborhood of Homs. It has been completely destroyed due to attacks by the regime forces.
**WARNING: THE VIDEO BELOW CONTAINS GRAPHIC IMAGES**
After a shelling and raid campaign residents of Inkhel took to the streets in anger for the 15 victims killed. The regime’s army and security forces targeted the protestors, killing another 3 citizens.
Regime forces are placed all around towns in order to stifle the movement of citizens.
CASUALTY REPORT
70 confirmed casualties killed by the regime on Monday, 25 June 2012.
Hama: 17
Deir Ezzor: 11
Damascus and Rural Damascus: 11
Idleb: 9
Homs: 9
Daraa: 13
Latakia: 3
Al-Hasakah: 3
Aleppo: 3
90 confirmed casualties killed by the regime on Sunday, 24 June 2012.
Deir Ezzor: 28
Aleppo: 17
Idleb: 11
Daraa: 10
Homs: 10
Damascus and Rural Damascus: 9
Latakia: 5
102 confirmed casualties killed by the regime on Saturday, 23 June 2012.
Damascus and Rural Damascus: 27
Deir Ezzor 25
Homs: 19
Aleppo: 11
Hama: 9
Daraa: 8
Idelb: 2
Raqqa: 1
Syrian Revolution Digest – Sunday 24 June 2012
THE COMMENTARY IN THIS PIECE DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF IMPUNITY WATCH.
*WARNING VIDEOS MAY CONTAIN GRAPHIC IMAGES*
Paper-Tigers & Wimps!
Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State, Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III
Benjamin Franklin Room, Washington, DC, June 20, 2012
SECRETARY CLINTON: On Syria, so far they’ve taken Russia’s lead on Syria. But we’re working on that every single day as well.
MR. ROSE: Why did they do that? Why do they take Russia’s lead?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think both Russia and China have a very strong aversion to interference in internal affairs.
MR. ROSE: Sovereignty issue.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes.
SECRETARY BAKER: Yeah.
SECRETARY CLINTON: And so for the Russians, we – I was with President Obama in Mexico two days ago. We had a two-hour meeting with President Putin. They’re just – they don’t want anything to do with it. They find it quite threatening, and basically they reject it out of hand. So anything that smacks of interference for the Russians and for the Chinese, they presume against. There are other reasons, but that’s the principal objection that they make.
MR. ROSE: Would coming – both different countries and different points, but they somehow come together on these issues – Syria and with respect to Russia and the role they are playing.
SECRETARY BAKER: Yeah, yeah.
MR. ROSE: And the role that the United States is playing and the role that the region can play. What should we be doing and what is the risk of not doing?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I’ll answer that in just a minute. But first let me say if we’re going to have differences with Russia – and we do have some differences with Russia – it seems to me the most important difference we might have is with respect to Iran. And we don’t have that now, and that’s really important. And I don’t think we ought to create a problem with Russia vis-a-vis what we want to do in Iran about their nuclear ambitions as a result of something we might do in Syria. I just think the Iranian issue there is far more important really than how we resolve the Syrian issue.
How should we resolve the Syrian issue? I think we should continue to support a political transition in the government in Syria. But I don’t – but I think we ought to support it diplomatically, politically, and economically in every way that we can, but we should be very leery, extremely leery, about being drawn in to any kind of a military confrontation or exercise.
MR. ROSE: Does that include supplying them with arms?
SECRETARY BAKER: That – well, that’s a slippery slope. The fact of the matter is a lot of our allies are already supplying them with arms. Okay? It’s not something –
MR. ROSE: And our friends in the region.
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I say our allies in the region. Yeah, they’re doing it. And it’s not something we have to do. I look at Syria and I think why are we not calling for something that we – this is – it may not be the right comparison, but in 1989, when we came into office, the wars in Central America were the holy grail of the left, political left in this country, and the holy grail of the political right in this country. We said if we can take these wars out of domestic politics, we can cure the foreign policy problem, and we did.
How did we do it? We put it to both parties – Daniel Ortega, the hardline, authoritarian dictator, if you will, in Nicaragua, and to Violeta Chamorro, the opposition candidate. We said if you’ll hold an election and both agree to abide by the results, that’s the way we’ll get out of this conundrum. That’s what happened. And both of them did agree, finally, to abide by the results. Ortega lost. President Carter was very instrumental in getting him to leave office. Why don’t we try something like that in Syria, I mean, and say look, political transition is what we’re looking for. Everybody – even the Russians, I think – would have difficulty saying no, we’re not going to go for an election, particularly if you let Bashar run. Let him run. Make sure you have a lot of observers in there. Make sure they can’t fix the election. Why not try that?
MR. ROSE: Why not try that?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, actually, that is the path that we are trying. And I spoke with Kofi Annan again today. He is working on a political transition roadmap. We are somewhat disadvantaged by the fact that I think Assad still believes he can crush what he considers to be an illegitimate rebellion against his authority and characterizes everyone who opposes him as a terrorist who is supported by foreign interests. He’s not yet at the point where he understands his legitimacy is gone and he is on a downward slope.
The other problem we have is that the opposition has not yet congealed around a figure or even a group that can command the respect and attention internally within Syria as well as internationally. So what we’re doing is, number one, putting more economic pressure, because that is important, and the sanctions and trying to cut off the Syrian regime, and send a message to the Syrian business class, which so far has stuck with Assad.
We’re also working very hard to try to prop up and better organize the opposition. We’ve spent a lot of time on that. It still is a work in progress. We are also pushing hard on having Kofi Annan lay down a political transition roadmap and then getting a group of nations, that would include Russia, in a working group to try to sell that to both the Assad regime and to the opposition .
So, I mean, the path forward is exactly as Jim has described it. Getting the people and the interests on that path has been what we’ve been working on now for several months.
MR. ROSE: Who would be in that group other than the United States, Russia? Who else?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, you would have to have the Arab League because Kofi Annan is a joint envoy of both the UN and the Arab League. You would have to have the permanent members of the Security Council because that’s who he represents in his UN role. And you’d have to have the neighbors. You’ve got to have Turkey involved because of their long border and their very clear interests. But when I spoke with him today, he’s going to be making another proposal to the Russians, the Turks, and other interested groups to try to get them to agree on this roadmap and then a meeting, in effect to go public with it, so that we can increase the pressure not only on the Assad regime but on the opposition as well.
MR. ROSE: Is there a role for Iran?
SECRETARY CLINTON: At this point, it would be very difficult for Iran to be initially involved. I mean, I’m a big believer in talking to people when you can and trying to solve problems when you can. But right now, we’re focused on dealing with Iran and the nuclear portfolio. That has to be our focus. Iran’s always trying to get us to talk about anything else except their nuclear program.
And then we also have the added problem that Iran is not just supporting Assad, they are helping him to devise and execute the very plans that he is following to suppress, oppress the opposition.
SECRETARY BAKER: If you get the – you’re going to get the attention of the Russians and the Chinese, in my view, in the Security Council if you come with some sort of a proposal for a political transition that might involve an election, if you’re willing to say anybody and everybody can run. That means, of course, you got to make sure that the election is not fixed. But that would put a lot of pressure – the only reason I mention this, it seems to be that would put a lot of pressure on the Russians to support this idea.
With respect to Iran, I agree with the Secretary. This is not the place to involve them. However, I would think there might be a place for them in a group with respect to Afghanistan. They helped us when we first went in there. We talked to them. They were helpful.
Syrian Revolution Digest – Thursday 21 June 2012
THE COMMENTARY IN THIS PIECE DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF IMPUNITY WATCH.
*WARNING VIDEOS MAY CONTAIN GRAPHIC IMAGES*
Updates from the Road (3)!
As the world plays games of hide-and-seek and wait-and-see in regard to our “situation,” “worrying” and “tragic” as it is, the only thing we have is our resistance, our refusal to break even when faced with so much hypocrisy and indifference and with odds that so many would consider insurmountable. For the first time since the introduction of the term of “popular resistance” into our lives, it has finally become a true way of life for us.
The True Story of the Al-Qubeir Massacre: Witness Accounts
The UN video footage, once they were able to enter the village of Al-Qubeir and document the incident.
Location: Al-Qubeir Farm is located 20 KM west of Hama city and 2 KM south of Marzaf Village.
Description: Al-Qubeir Farm is a small community consisting of 25 houses, and its population is approximately 150 people
Date of incident : 06/06/2012
The witnesses:
1. Ahmad X (survivor) | age:45
2. X (survivor) | age: in her forties
3. witness code #12001 | Marzaf villager
4. witness code #12002 | Marzaf villager
Reporting of the Incident, Based on Interviews With the Witnesses:
On Wednesday June 6th 2012 at about 12:30 pm an armed group, consisting of 6 personnels who were wearing plainclothes and who carried Kalashnikovs weapons, attacked a checkpoint that belonged to the Syrian army. This was done to save a person arrested earlier the same day and detained, at the previously mentioned checkpoint. During the combat, a reinforcement from the Syrian army was sent, it was composed of 3 tanks, T72 type, some military armoured vehicles, and some military trucks, Zell type (Russian made). These full- armed reinforcement besieged the attacking group and clashed with them; leading to the deaths of all 6 men: (1)Mohammad Hassan Elwan, Hama- Greggis village; (2)Mahdi Ahmad Elwan, Hama-Greggis village; (3)Sari Ali Al-Hamdou, Hama-Greggis village; (4)Emad Ismail Elwan, Hama-Greggis village; (5)Mohammad Saleh Elwan, Hama-Greggis village; (6)Salah Jameel Elwan.
Afterwards, the tanks headed towards Al-Qubeir village along with the Zell trucks, six white buses, oil-colored armoured vehicles with the words “Riot Control” on the side of one, and other pick-up trucks carrying forces outfitted in the Syrian Armed Forces uniform. These troops all had personal weapons,most of the weapons displayed were Kalashnikovs and BKC machine guns.
The witnesses said that there were other civilian vehicles –2 pick-up Hyundai white tucks, other pick-up trucks, and small trucks (the natives call them Torteera or Torzena), these vehicles had civilians who accompanied the military forces. The people in them wore plainclothes and carried small weapons such as: sticks, knives, and daggers. Some of them carried pistols and Kalashnikovs
Between 1:40 and 1:50 pm, the previously mentioned armed forces besieged the village from three axis (The Northern Axis: Mezrav village direction; the Eastern axis: Al-Majdal direction; and the western axis: Al-Taweem village direction).
Once all of the forces took up positions, 4 shells were launched directly on the houses, without any earlier warning. Next, the heavy and medium guns were used to fire at random on the houses. After roughly 10 minutes, the tanks stormed into the village along with the security forces, wearing the alternative uniform that belongs to the Syrian Armed Forces, and the civilians, who wore plainclothes. They began shooting heavily. The sound of gun fire lasted intermittently inside the village for about an hour and a half, however the forces remained in the village until 7:30 PM.
According to one female survivor’s report, Feda Al-Yateam, the forces would get the people out of their houses and would shoot them directly. She added that the forces, wearing the plainclothes and carrying sticks, took her husband along with other civilians from the village. The villagers take were made to lay down on the ground and then were beaten on their heads with sticks, until those administering the beating knew the villagers were dead. After that the attackers burned the bodies, another witness, with the code #12001, said that he saw the army retreat from the village. Witness #12001 then dared to enter the village, so that he could administer aid to any survivors. Upon entering the village, he reported seeing a woman who had been shot in the chest with her right hand cut off at the wrist. Next to her there was a baby’s body, he had been stabbed in his chest with a sharp tool and enough force that his internal viscera had fallen out onto the ground.
Witness #12001 also added that he saw in front of another house three children’s bodies. All of them were behind a woman’s body. The four bodies were in sitting positions, and the scene displayed implied that the woman was trying to protect the children when they were all shot at point blank range.
Another survivor, a male, Ahmad Al-Yateam, said that he was hit repeatedly with sticks and shotguns on his head and his body. Some of his attackers wore the Syrian military uniform, and others wore plainclothes. Al-Yateam said that he was brutally beaten until he became unconscious.
Another witness, code #12002, said that before the military forces withdrew from the village, there were 6 ambulances that arrived and took some of the bodies. The witness said that the number of bodies taken was between 25-30, then the ambulances also withdrew from the village, accompanied by the forces.
Witness #12001 recalled that a bold green armoured vehicle, belonging to the Syrian Armed Forces, attached two bodies with a rope to the truck and dragged them on the ground while heading west to a place known locally as Aseela Road.
While the survivors and the locals claimed that there were over 100 people killed in this massacre, we managed to document 54 victim’s names. In addition to the 6 individuals killed in the clash at the checkpoint. The reason only 54 victims were documented is due to a variety of reasons. First, the bodies of some of the victims were completely disfigured or deformed, to the point that the locals couldn’t recognize it to identify. Second, there exists an incapacity to find some of the victims as their bodies are missing, or taken by the attacking force. Additionally, the Syrian government and military refused to make a comment on the Al-Qubeir incident, after failing to conduct a real and honest investigation.
Furthermore; the government and the security forces refused to let the international observers, who were stationed in Hama city, enter the area and document the incident. Those who attempted to enter the next morning, on June 7th, were stopped, and told to return to Hama city, at one of the many checkpoints surrounding the area where the massacre took place. The observers were thus prevented from heading into the village to gather accurate information.
The information contained in this report was provided by:
Syrian Network for Human Rights and Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies