Human Rights Group Argues Forced Russian Adoption of Crimean Children Amounts to Enforced Disappearance

By: Carson Roberts

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

Strasbourg, France – Ten children, ages one to five at the time, have not been heard from since Russia took control of Crimea in 2014. On September 22, 2026, a Ukrainian human rights group asked the European Court of Human Rights to recognize that silence as an enforced disappearance.

Women with their children in prams walk as armed men, believed to be Russian servicemen, follow them outside an Ukrainian military base in Perevalnoye, near the Crimean city of Simferopol, March 14, 2014. Russia shipped more troops and armour into Crimea on Friday and repeated its threat to invade other parts of Ukraine, showing no sign of listening to Western pleas to back off from the worst confrontation since the Cold War. REUTERS/Vasily Fedosenko (UKRAINE - Tags: POLITICS MILITARY)

Women with children in strollers pass armed men believed to be Russian servicemen outside a Ukrainian military base near Simferopol, Crimea, in March 2014. Photo Courtesy of Vasily Fedosenko/Reuters.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) filed the application in January 2023 on behalf of the ten children. When Russia asserted jurisdiction over the peninsula in 2014, they were living in state childcare institutions and under the care of the Ukrainian state. According to UHHRU, more than 4,000 children in Crimea without parental care were automatically declared Russian citizens after the occupation began. Ukrainian authorities requested their return. Russia declined and instead opened adoption procedures. Profiles of these ten children later appeared on Russian adoption and foster placement databases, and information about some has since disappeared from public sources. The applicants say this may indicate that the children have been adopted.

The application relies on two provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights: Article 5, which guarantees the right to liberty and security, and Article 8, which protects private and family life. Under international law, enforced disappearance combines deprivation of liberty with a refusal to acknowledge a person’s fate or whereabouts. The applicants argue that the children were unlawfully detained and their whereabouts concealed, constituting an enforced disappearance under Article 5, and that the arbitrary change of their citizenship violated their rights under Article 8.

The Court held the public hearing at the applicants’ request. It will rule on admissibility and the merits later.

Represented by the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, the applicants argued that the conduct must be read cumulatively. They submitted that imposing Russian citizenship, combined with the ability to change a child’s name, date of birth, and place of birth, erased the children’s social identity as Ukrainians.

Several third parties intervened. International Partnership for Human Rights and the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health jointly submitted that the removal, adoption, and Russification of Ukrainian children are not isolated wartime incidents, but amount to “a deliberate state policy,” planned at the highest levels of the Russian government, codified in federal legislation, and administered by permanent federal institutions. The Government of Ukraine and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute also addressed the Court.

The Russian Government filed no observations and did not appear. The judges pressed the parties on the evidence showing that any of the children had in fact left Crimea or been placed with a family, and on why the application was lodged nine years after the events.

The International Criminal Court has charged similar conduct under a different theory. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of children, covering conduct dating back to at least February 24, 2022. Neither warrant has been executed, and the ICC has no power to make an arrest itself. By contrast, the case before the European Court of Human Rights requires no arrest and reaches back to 2014.

For further information, please see:

Agence Europe – ECHR Holds Hearing on Placement of 10 Ukrainian Children in Russian Adoption System in Crimea – 23 Sept. 2026

Al Jazeera – ECHR Hears How 10 Children Went Missing After Russia Annexed Crimea – 22 Sept. 2026

ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights – 1950

ECHR – Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union on behalf of ten Ukrainian children v. Russia, no. 6719/23 – 10 Jul. 2026

ICC – Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova – 17 Mar. 2023

IPHR – IPHR Addresses European Court of Human Rights on Russia’s Programme of Adoption and Russification of Ukrainian Children – 22 Sept. 2026

Mandatory Tanzanian Death Penalty Overturned

By Megan Bush

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

ARUSHA, Tanzania – On June 5, 2026, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights delivered its final judgment in the case of Masudi Said Selemani v. United Republic of Tanzania.  The court ruled that the imposition of a mandatory death sentence without judicial discretion violates due process. 

On July 15, 2010, the appellant killed his cousin, following false reports made by his cousin’s family to the village authorities that the appellant stole maize from a neighbor. Subsequently, on October 18, 2012, Selemani was arrested and arraigned. Selemani was later convicted on May 15, 2013 of murder. Due to the nature of his crime, Selemani was automatically sentenced to death by hanging. Selemani appealed to an appellate court, but the court dismissed his appeal on November 22, 2014.

On August 19, 2019, Selemani filed an application to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights seeking for the court to set aside his death sentence and remove him from death row. The application was accepted.

African Court on Human and People’s Rights during the ruling of the case in Arusha, Tanzania on June 5, 2026. Photo courtesy of The East African.

During the hearings, Selemani argued that Tanzania violated his right to life under Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and his freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment under Article 5.

The court found the imposition of a mandatory death sentence without the allowance of judicial

discretion is a violation of due process. The mandatory death sentence also violates Article 4 because it arbitrarily deprives life. The court additionally found that Article 5 was violated due to Selemani’s prolonged detention on death row, dehumanizing conditions, and the execution method of hanging being implemented.

Due to its findings, the court ordered Tanzania to take all necessary measures to remove the mandatory death sentence provision quickly and to disallow the use of hanging as a method of execution. Additionally, the court directed Tanzania to vacate Selemani’s sentence, remove him from death row, and rehear his case through a procedure allowing judicial discretion. The court awarded Selemani 300,000 Tanzanian shillings in moral damages.

For further information, please see:

African Case Law Analyzer – Selemani v. Tanzania, No. 042/2019 June 2026

OAS – African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter)

The East African – “African Court Orders Tanzania to End Mandatory Death Penalty, Hanging” June 2026

ICC Rejects to Assess Legal Responsibility of Arms Dealers for Weapons Used in War Crimes

September 25, 2026

By: William Cody Hubbard

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor  

THE HAGUE, Netherlands — The International Criminal Court (ICC) has rejected a request to open an examination into the complicity of European arms dealers contributing to the Yemen conflict. 

Yemen’s Houthi followers on December 17, 2024, on the outskirts of Sana’a, Yemen. (Photo by Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images)

In 2019, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), along with other organizations such as Mwatana for Human Rights and Amnesty International, filed a formal communication submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC requesting an investigation to determine whether European corporate and government actors aided and abetted war crimes committed by Saudi Arabia in conjunction with the war in Yemen. 

The communication details 26 incidents of airstrikes conducted by the Saudi-UAE Coalition on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, a museum, and heritage sites which could amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute. 

According to the ECCHR, the Office of the Prosecutor did not provide any specific legal reasoning as to why it declined to open an investigation, coming to this conclusion almost seven years after the communication was submitted. 

The OTP is granted the ability to initiate investigations based on information received by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the ECCHR, and may do so if the OTP determines that the crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute. The ICC may then choose to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter. 

Because the OTP did not provide specific legal reasoning as to why it did not initiate a preliminary investigation, NGOs are left to speculate. The Arms Trade Litigation Monitor (ATLM) argues that there could be a hurdle in establishing a causal link between the conduct of the alleged accomplices of the war crimes and the crimes themselves, reasoning that ambiguity in the nature of arms dealing, such as end-user transfer dates, is a significant challenge to establishing criminal liability. 

An argument made in support of prosecution is that European arms dealers should be held criminally liable for war crimes, or crimes of aggression, under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which says that a person shall be held criminally liable for a crime if they aid, abet, or provide the means for the commission of the crime. 

Opponents of the OTP decision say that the lack of international accountability lets arms dealers continue to act with impunity. 

Similar cases had been filed in ICC member states such as in Italy; however, there is currently a lack of investigation happening in domestic jurisdictions in Europe regarding criminal liability for arms dealers’ involvement in war crimes. 

For further information, please see:  

European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights – ICC rejects request to open examination into complicity of Rheinmetall and other arms traders in Yemen conflict – 11 May 2026

European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights – Made in Europe, bombed in Yemen

Arms Trade Litigation Monitor – Arms in Yemen at the International Criminal Court

Human Rights Watch – Yemen: Coalition Bombs Homes in Capital – 21 Dec. 2015

Arms Trade Litigation Monitor – Individual Criminal Liability for Arms Exports under the ICC Statute: A Case Study of Arms Exports from Europe to Saudi-led Coalition Members Used in the War in Yemen – 18 Oct. 2019

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Developing Surveillance Technology in the United States Does Not Support Aiding and Abetting Claims for Abuses Committed Abroad

September 23, 2026

By: Conner Scholze

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

WASHINGTON, D.C., United States – Filing suit in 2011, practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious movement that started in China in the 1990s, alleged that an American technology company built the surveillance tools China used to find and detain them.

Surveillance cameras in operation in Shanghai, China in January of 2022. Photo Courtesy of Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News.

Under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act, plaintiffs, who are practitioners of the Falun Gong religious movement, contended that the Chinese Government persecuted them due to their religious beliefs. Specifically, these victims alleged that Cisco Systems, Inc., aided and abetted international law violations including torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, forced labor, detention, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, and forced disappearance. Through developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend Falun Gong practitioners, the plaintiffs believed that Cisco aided and abetted in violating international law. One plaintiff sought to go so far as to bring a claim against two Cisco executives individually for aiding and abetting torture. Defendant, Cisco, is an American multinational technology corporation that designs and manufactures internet networking devices and services for the communications and information technology industries.

Among the statutes involved, the Alien Tort Statute is a procedural tool that grants federal district courts jurisdiction over civil suits brought by foreign nationals “for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The Torture Victim Protection Act creates civil liability for anyone acting under color of law of any foreign nation who subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.

In June of 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved whether a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting exists under the ATS and under the Torture Victim Protection Act.

As Cisco would ultimately convince the Court, the Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional statute that does not create new private actions for violations of international norms because Congress is tasked with creating private rights. Cases involving the ATS inherently implicate the political branches.

In reaching its decision, the Court drew on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which established that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action. However, Sosa left open a narrow possibility that courts could recognize new causes of action under a two-part test guided by the international norm and judicial discretion. Sosa determined whether a Mexican national who was abducted and arbitrarily detained in Mexico could sue those involved in U.S. courts. On the issue of interpreting the Torture Victim Protection Act, the majority found that the statute’s silence on aiding and abetting created no liability for the two Cisco executives.

In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that under the Torture Victim Protection, subjecting an individual to torture ordinarily means the person “consciously and culpably participates in the torture so as to help make it succeed.”

As American companies continue to operate and sell abroad, the decision forecloses aiding and abetting liability under both statutes for U.S. corporations and their executives, redirecting foreign nationals seeking redress to Congress, the Executive, or other international actors.

For further information, please see:

Supreme Court of the United States – Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, No. 24-856 – 23 June 2026

Supreme Court of the United States – Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 – 29 June 2004

The Alien Tort Statute, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute – Feb. 2024

H.R. 2092 – Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Library of Congress – 25 Nov. 1991

Supreme Court – Alien Tort Statute Does Not Authorize Judicially Created Causes of Action, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP – 25 June 2026

French Cement Giant Lafarge Convicted of Financing Terrorism in Syria, a First for a French Multinational

By: Christina Bradic

Managing Editor of Impunity Watch News

PARIS, France — On Monday, April 13, 2026, the Paris Criminal Court (Tribunal correctionnel de Paris) convicted French cement giant Lafarge and eight individuals, including four of its former senior executives, of financing terrorism for paying jihadist groups, among them the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Al-Nusra Front, to keep a cement plant operating in northern Syria during the country’s civil war. Nearly a decade after Syrian former employees and two civil-society organizations first brought the case, the ruling marks the first time a French company has ever been found criminally responsible for financing a terrorist organization.

Former Lafarge CEO Bruno Lafont arrives at the Paris courthouse on the day of the verdict, April 13, 2026. Photo courtesy of Mustafa Yalcin/Anadolu via AFP/OCCRP.

The court fined the company €1.125 million ($1.32 million), the maximum penalty available, on the terrorism-financing charge, and imposed a joint customs fine of €4.57 million ($5.35 million) against Lafarge and four of the executives for violating international financial sanctions and a trade embargo. Former chief executive Bruno Lafont was sentenced to six years in prison, effective immediately, and the remaining individuals received prison terms reported to range from eighteen months to seven years. Among the eight individuals convicted alongside the company were two local security managers and two intermediaries, including the Syrian businessman Firas Tlass.


According to evidence presented during the six-week trial, which opened in November 2025, Lafarge funneled roughly €5.5 million to armed groups operating around its facility between 2013 and 2014 in order to keep the plant running and to protect its commercial interests amid the escalating conflict. Investigators found that the money moved through monthly “security payments” and through purchases of raw materials from intermediaries linked to the armed groups, and they argued that some of these funds helped finance the network behind the 2015 terror attacks in France.
The plant at the center of the case was Lafarge’s roughly $680 million facility at Jalabiyeh, in northern Syria. As the war intensified, the company evacuated its foreign staff in 2012 but left its Syrian employees behind to keep the site operational—a decision that, according to former workers, exposed them to checkpoints, threats, and daily danger. In a statement issued through the plaintiffs, former employees said the company knew what they were enduring but “chose to risk the lives of its employees for profit.”


A ruling described as “historic” on two counts


The organizations behind the case were quick to frame the verdict as a watershed for corporate accountability. Sherpa, the French anti-corruption NGO that filed the original criminal complaint in 2016 together with the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and eleven former Syrian employees, called the decision “historic and highly symbolic.”


Anna Kiefer, a Litigation and Advocacy Officer at Sherpa, said the judgment was the first instance of a French multinational being convicted of financing terrorism, crediting the years-long judicial investigation and the journalists who first exposed the company’s conduct. She said Sherpa hoped the ruling would send a strong signal to companies operating in conflict zones that they can be held accountable in court for crimes connected to their conduct abroad.
Observers and the plaintiffs have pointed to two distinct reasons the decision breaks new ground. First, it is the first time a French company has been convicted of financing a terrorist organization—a charge previously untested against a corporation in the French courts. Second, no terrorism-financing case examined by French courts had ever involved sums of this magnitude. Sherpa and ECCHR argued that the precedent has implications well beyond the cement industry: a French parent company, they said, can no longer shelter behind a foreign subsidiary to escape responsibility for what is done in its name overseas.


A decade-long road through the French courts


The proceedings trace back to a complaint filed in November 2016, in which the former Syrian employees, Sherpa, and ECCHR accused Lafarge of making arrangements with ISIS and other armed groups to sustain its operations. The case wound through years of judicial wrangling. In 2021, France’s highest court, the Cour de cassation, examined the matter, addressing both the earlier dismissal of crimes-against-humanity charges and the standing of the two NGOs to act as civil parties. The Investigating Chamber later confirmed charges against Lafarge for financing a terrorist organization, endangering the lives of its employees, and violating an embargo, while setting aside the complicity-in-crimes-against-humanity charge.


In October 2024, investigating judges ordered Lafarge and four former executives to stand trial for financing a terrorist organization and breaching the embargo, with four additional individuals also referred for trial. The trial itself ran before the Paris Criminal Court from November into December 2025, with prosecutors ultimately asking the court to convict all defendants.


Notably, the matter is not fully closed. Lafarge remains under separate investigation for complicity in crimes against humanity—a charge that the plaintiffs stress goes further than terrorism financing, because it concerns participation in some of the gravest crimes under international law. Sherpa and ECCHR have said they will continue to press for that strand of the case to be brought before a court, and have underscored that, despite the conviction, the former Syrian employees are still awaiting compensation.


An echo of the U.S. prosecution


The French verdict follows a parallel reckoning in the United States. In 2022, Lafarge pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court to conspiring to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations over its Syrian operations and agreed to pay a fine of approximately $778 million—at the time, the first occasion on which a corporation had faced that particular charge. Holcim, the Swiss group that merged with Lafarge in 2015, has maintained that it had no knowledge of the Syrian dealings when the merger took place.


Taken together with the U.S. case, the Paris ruling adds to a slowly emerging body of law holding that multinational corporations can be criminally answerable for the financial relationships they cultivate in war zones. For the former employees who testified—many of whom waited the better part of a decade for a verdict—the judgment is a partial vindication, even as the fight for crimes-against-humanity accountability and for reparations continues.

 

For further information, please see:

Sherpa — Lafarge convicted of financing terrorism in Syria — 13 Apr. 2026
ECCHR — Lafarge convicted of financing terrorism in Syria: A historic ruling in the fight for corporate accountability — 13 Apr. 2026
OCCRP — French Cement Giant Convicted of Financing Terrorism — 13 Apr. 2026
The National — Lafarge found guilty of financing terrorism in Syria and breaching sanctions — 14 Apr. 2026
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre — Lafarge lawsuit (re complicity in crimes against humanity & financing of terrorism in Syria)