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By: Darby Glass 

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Article Editor

Creteil, France – On September 17th of 2026, the teachers, parents and students of Antoine de Saint-Exupery High School went on strike. The protestors refused to open the school and blockaded the entrance to prevent anyone from entering. Their demonstration was in response to staff shortages and a lack of educational resources, that especially affect poorer, immigrant-dense neighborhoods like Creteil.

French students protesting outside of Henri-IV High School in Paris. Council on Foreign Relations, October 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of Reuters/Abdul Saboor. 

In a matter of weeks, the unrest spread nationwide. On October 17th, more than 500,000 French citizens showed up to protest the teacher shortages, crumbling infrastructure, and overcrowded classrooms found throughout the country. What began in a smaller French suburb spread to major cities such as Marseilles, Lyon, Lille, Toulouse and Paris.

Although the first demonstrators were only concerned with issues within France’s education system, the cause’s expansion picked up other protestors’ issues along the way. The students were joined by climate activists and other French citizens frustrated with the cost of living. Instead of focusing solely on issues of education, the purpose of the unrest evolved into a general concern of what future the French government is creating for the next generation of young adult citizens.

As the demonstrations grew, so did the actions taken by said protestors, with some taking advantage of the mass unrest. Larger protests turned riotous, protestors hurled glass bottles and fireworks at police officers, while others set fire to cars and boutique stores. 

The French police force responded in kind. During larger demonstrations riot police fired tear gas and volleys of stun grenades back into the crowds. Between September 28 and October 5, over six thousand people were arrested and another five thousand were detained-most under the age of 18. In reaction, both local and national authorities put in place both curfews and local bans on protests.

In a statement released on October 28, the United Nations Officer of the High Commissioner condemned the violence and mass arrests conducted by the French police force. Specifically, UN experts designate the excessive force as an inappropriate response by a state that is governed by the EU rule of law.

The students’ and teachers’ demands have yet to be met, and the demonstrations continue into November. French authorities have doubled down on their punishments of the demonstrators. On November 4, in an accelerated procedure, French senators backed the “Rioters Pay” bill. The bill would require protestors to pay up to $10,000 euros to pay for damages caused by the more violent demonstrations.

The French Government’s endorsement of police violence against the country’s protestors questions whether this administration is committed to upholding the French constitutional right to protest and its obligations as a member-state of the European Union.

For further information, please see: 

The Guardian – French pupils resume school blockades as country braces for more protests – 2 Nov 2026

NPR – France seethes again as youth-led protests sweep Europe – 31 Oct 2026 

CNN World – Hundreds of thousands march in largely peaceful protests across France – 5 Nov 2026

Council on Foreign Relations – What’s Behind the Protests and Riots in France, and What Comes Next – 28 Oct 2026

CNBC – French Senate backs ‘Rioters Pay’ bill that could make protesters pay $11,000 fines – 29 Oct 2026

United Nations – France: UN experts appalled by crackdown on student protests – 28 Oct 2026

Courthouse News Service – France passes controversial ‘Rioters Pay’ bill while students push for reforms – 28 Oct 2026

By: Julia Moreno

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations Associate Article Editor

A Ukrainian soldier flying a drone in the Donetsk region. New York Times, October 21, 2026. Photo courtesy of Reuters. 

For more than a week in mid-October 2026, Ukrainian officials reported that SpaceX’s Starshield, the military-grade counterpart to Starlink, had begun to disrupt drones flying above around 160 kilometers per hour. Sources from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and an adviser of Zelenskyy stated that SpaceX imposed the restrictions without prior warning and disrupted several missions. The speed range of these drones matter because Ukraine uses these interceptor drones to shoot down Russian attack drones. If the interceptor drones are unable to fly at around 160 km/h, they are an ineffective interceptor. 

After Zelenskyy reported speeds had been restored on October 24th, Elon Musk acknowledged that SpaceX had restricted Starlink in Ukraine. He said that Ukraine’s military had violated Starlink’s terms of service by using it for offensive drone strikes, and maintained that Starshield is a separate system controlled by the US government. Ukrainian officials dispute that claim, and administration officials have given conflicting accounts of their own role.

The reported Starshield cap tests whether a company’s responsibility to respect human rights, as set out in the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) on Business and Human Rights, extends to degrading a service on which a conflict-affected population’s defenses depend even where the company’s underlying concern is legitimate. 

The UNGP, endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011, set a global standard to expected conduct for companies that exist independently of states’ own compliance. Companies should avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts and address them when they occur (Principle 13(a)), carry out ongoing due diligence to identify and mitigate actual and potential impacts (Principle 17), and seek ways to honor and respect internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements (Principles 23(b)). Principle 12 ties the responsibility to the International Bill of Human Rights, which includes the right to life under ICCPR Article 6. In conflict-affected settings, the Working Group on Business and Human Rights call for heightened due diligence. 

A no-notice throttle of systems that are the forefront of defense for Ukraine, amounts to contributing to adverse human rights impacts, and falls short of the due diligence the Principles expect, even if SpaceX’s concern about offensive use was genuine. 

SpaceX may respond that it had no duty to provide the service in the first place, but the UNGPs ask whether a company’s conduct contributes to the harm, not whether the service was owed. A company’s “activities” according to Principle 13’s commentary include both actions and omissions. Therefore, the question is how SpaceX changed a service Ukraine had come to depend on, not whether it was obligated to offer it. 

Principle 18 and its commentary expects impact assessment and consultation before major changes in operations, including policy changes. Additionally, even where a company has a genuine concern about how its service is being used, Principle 19’s commentary says to weigh factors. For example, comparing the severity of Ukraine’s alleged violation of terms and whether restrictions on Starshield would itself have adverse human rights consequences. 

Here, the reported facts suggest the problem was not SpaceX’s reason for acting, but how it acted: without notice, consultation, or a reasonable assessment of the effect of Ukraine’s defenses. The risk was also foreseeable: Musk himself said the Ukrainian front line would collapse immediately if Starlink were turned off. A company that understood the stakes and acted without notice or consultation is in direct conflict with Principles 18 and 19. 

The reported interference with Starlink and Starshield in Ukraine show how a company’s human rights responsibility governs how it restricts services during wartime, not whether it may. SpaceX may have had a genuine concern about offensive use, and the UNGPs do not ask a company to ignore those concerns. However, where the service has become part of the state’s defense, Principles 18 and 19 expect notice, consultation, and an assessment of the consequences before a company acts; the reported facts here suggest those steps were not followed. Musk’s own acknowledgement of Ukraine heavily relying on Starlink makes the risk hard to categorize as unforeseeable. The Principles are not binding law, and this situation shows how little formal accountability exists when a private company’s service is heavy intertwined within a state’s defense system. Until that gap is addressed, a company’s own process and procedures may be the main safeguard for those who depend on it. 

For further information, please see: 

Al Jazeera – Ukraine’s access to Starlink a decision for Elon Musk, Rubio says – 22 Oct 2026

CBS – Musk chose to restrict Ukraine’s access to SpaceX satellite network, sources says – 21 Oct 2026

CBS – Elon Musk’s Starlink and Starshield, and what they mean to Ukraine in the war against Russia – 26 Oct 2026

PBS – Musk says he was behind Starlink speed restriction after service in Ukraine is restored – 24 Oct  2026

United Nations Human Rights – Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

United Nations – Issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises : note / by the Secretary-General – 21 July 2020

United Nations Development Programme – Business, Human Rights and Conflict Affected Regions: Towards Heightened Action

United Nations Human Rights – The Corporate Responsibly to Respect Human Rights

https://papuanewguinea.un.org/en/download/4164/21260

By: Moises Ramirez Gomez
Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

WASHINGTON, D.C., United States – On September 18, 2026, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”) issued a report concluding that the United States is responsible for violating the rights of Tennessee death row prisoner Christa Pike, including her right to equality before the law under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Tennessee attempted to execute her by lethal injection, but the attempt failed. Afterward, the Tennessee Department of Correction stated that it followed every step of the state’s execution protocol, which does not allow for additional procedures.

Christa Pike appears in a Nashville court on April 12, 2012, in an earlier, separate case. 

Pike was sentenced to death after the 1995 killing of Colleen Slemmer, which she committed at age 18. In the year 2020, attorneys from Cornell Law School and the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee petitioned the Commission and requested precautionary measures, arguing that her trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence, that she had endured prolonged solitary confinement, and finally, that Tennessee’s execution methods violated her rights. Alongside this, they argued that, as the only woman on Tennessee’s death row, her isolation was a reflection of gender discrimination, because men on death row were housed together.

The Commission found violations of Pike’s rights to life, liberty and personal security, equality before the law, health and well-being, a fair trial, protection from arbitrary arrest, and due process. As a result, it recommended reparation, review and commutation of her sentence, her removal from solitary confinement, and reforms to ensure adequate counsel is given in capital cases. The Commission also noted that the American Declaration does not prohibit the death penalty in itself, but concluded that executing Pike after proceedings that violated her rights would be a serious violation of her rights to life and due process. The United States had objected earlier in the proceeding, telling the Commission in 2020 that Pike had not exhausted domestic remedies and that the jury considered her mental health as a mitigating factor.

Because the United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, Pike’s case was assessed by the Commission under the Declaration rather than by the Inter-American Court. The Commission first sent its findings to the United States on October 15, 2025. Here, they asked for information on compliance within one month. According to Diplomacy and Law, a legal commentary site, the findings do not change Pike’s Tennessee sentence, nor do they act as a stay in Tennessee courts. Alongside this, the same commentary points that Report 197/26, the Commissions published decision on the Pike’s case, does not say whether Tennessee can attempt a second execution. 

Considering this analysis, whether international law limits a second execution attempt is unresolved. Report 197/26 does not address a repeat attempt, and there is no applicable treaty provision or Inter-American decision it reviewed that bars one outright. On October 1, the UN human rights chief and nine UN experts urged Tennessee not to pursue another attempt. The governor has halted the remaining 2026 executions, and has additionally ordered an independent review. The state says the Tennessee Supreme will decide whether to set a new date. 

In conclusion, Pike’s case leaves two questions open: what effect the Commission’s findings will have in Tennessee, and whether a second lethal injection attempt is permitted. 

For further information, please see:

Diplomacy and Law – Can Tennessee Execute Christa Pike Again? What International Law Says – 7 Oct. 2026

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – IACHR Publishes Merits Report on Death Penalty and Detention Conditions of Christa Pike In the United States – 24 Sept. 2026 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – IACHR Urges the United States to Refrain from Applying the Death Penalty Against Christa Pike, Beneficiary of Precautionary Measures – 18 Sept. 2026

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – Reports No. 197/26, Case 14.754, Christa Pike – 18 Sept. 2026

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – Resolution 95/2020, Precautionary Measure No. 1080-20 – 11 Dec. 2020

By: Abigail Wilcher

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Senior Article Editor

United States President Donald Trump, Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen alongside Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen after signing the updated 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement, courtesy of the White House.

New York, New York – September 22, 2026, the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Government of Greenland published an agreement amending and supplementing the original April 27, 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement (“Agreement”). The 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement is a bilateral treaty signed by the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark on April 27, 1951, under the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, granting the United States military rights in Greenland during and after the Cold War. The 2026 Agreement preserves that foundational architecture while adapting it to an increasingly contested Arctic, where intensified military activity and strategic competition have elevated regional security concerns.

Under Article IV of the 2026 Agreement, the United States may modernize and expand operations at Pituffik Space Base and establish additional defense areas at Narsaruaq and Mestersvig. Additional installations may be proposed, subject to consultation and mutual agreement among the United States, Denmark, and Greenland (“Parties”). However, if negotiations do not yield agreement within 90 days, the issue must be escalated through successive diplomatic channels. These provisions enable expanded U.S. capabilities while withholding any unilateral authority to create new defense areas absent consensus. Article VI further enhances operational access by authorizing the movement of military aircraft, vessels, and personnel throughout Greenland, including its territorial waters. The Agreement also contemplates expanded defense capabilities associated with the proposed Golden Dome missile defense system. At the same time, all military activities must accord due respect to Greenlandic society, including traditional hunting, fishing, and cultural practices.

Pituffik Space Base pictured in northern Greenland on October 4, 2023, courtesy of Getty Images.

Beyond operational matters, the Agreement incorporates significant national security safeguards. Article IX generally prohibits non-NATO states from establishing military installations or maintaining a persistent military presence in Greenland without the Parties’ agreement. Article X similarly constrainscertain foreign investments involving critical infrastructure, natural resources, and other sensitive sectors where national security or public order may be implicated.

Article XI addresses the Agreement’s durability and Greenland’s constitutional trajectory. It provides that the Agreement has no expiration date and may be amended only by mutual consent. Should Greenland exercise a right to independence, Denmark and Greenland must ensure that the newly independent state remains within NATO and assumes the existing defense obligations. This provision foregrounds complex issues at the intersection of national self-determination and treaty commitments that extend beyond the territory’s present constitutional status.

The amended Agreement updates a Cold War–era framework for a contemporary Arctic security environment defined by strategic competition, heightened maritime and air activity, and the salience of space and cyber domains. By clarifying NATO’s role, codifying access and mobility, and enabling modernization and expansion of Defense Areas, the Agreement positions Greenland as a critical node in allied early warning, space, and North Atlantic defense architectures. For Greenland, provisions emphasizing “maximum respect,” local sourcing preferences, and structured consultation seek to align defense imperatives with societal, environmental, and economic considerations, acknowledging self- governance and the aspiration that benefits flow to local communities. The restrictions on non-NATO military presence and the investment-screening mechanism establish a firmer perimeter against strategic influence via basing or critical-sector investments, reflecting broader transatlantic security-screening trends. Finally, the Agreement’s permanent nature and its independence-contingency clause aim to preserve continuity in defense obligations across potential constitutional outcomes, thereby mitigating uncertainty for long-term basing, interoperability, and allied planning. Ultimately, the amended 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement modernizes a Cold War defense framework for today’s Arctic, expanding allied flexibility while embedding consultation and economic-security guardrails likely to shape Greenland’s strategic future.

For further information, please see:

The Avalon Project – Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark – 27 April 1951.

The White House – Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Together with the Government of Greenland – 22 Sept. 2026.

gettyimages – Thule Air Base Stock Photos – 2023.

The White House – United Nations General Assembly 2026 – September 22, 2026 – 2026.

Monica Rodriguez Santana

Impunity Watch Staff Writer 

An exterior view of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, March 31, 2021. Photo Courtesy of Reuters and Piroschka van de Wouw.

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Russia has requested the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security to extradite International Criminal Court (ICC) president and Japanese national, Tomoko Akane, among eight other ICC officials. 

The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on October 8, 2026, that it had sent a request to the Dutch government for the extradition of the nine ICC officials following their conviction in absentia in a Moscow City Court in December 2025. The named officials include the court’s current president Tomoko Akane, first vice-president Rosario Salvatore Aitala, second vice-president Reine Alapini-Gansou, and judges Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, and Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez. The remaining three individuals named no longer sit on the court, including former president Piotr Hofmański, former judge Bartram Schmitt, and former ICC prosecutor Karim Khan. 

The Russian Court found all nine individuals guilty of knowingly bringing an innocent person to face criminal liability, unlawful detention, and an attack on persons enjoying international protection. The named officials received prison sentences ranging from three and a half years to fifteen years. 

This move from Russian authorities comes as retaliation for the ICC’s warrants issued in 2023 against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the presidential commissioner for children’s rights, for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. The ICC has held them responsible for the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia. 

According to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, the 2023 warrants issued by ICC officials violated international law and were issued without any evidence. 

Russia has cited its 2016 presidential order withdrawing its intention to become a party to the Rome Statute as the grounds for not recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Rome Statute is the international treaty that founded the ICC in 2002, to which neither Russia nor the United States are parties. 

This action coincides with the United States’s sanctions on ICC officials, including president Akane, as a result of the U.S. campaign launched in July 2026 to “dismantle the threat posed by the International Criminal Court to U.S. sovereignty.” The ICC authorized an investigation in 2020 into alleged crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, as well as targeting the U.S. and Israel in its investigation into the conflict in the Gaza Strip. 

This conflict creates a point of contention for Japan as it navigates continued support for the ICC while its closest ally, the United States, works to dismantle the institution. Japanese spokesman Masanao Ozaki stated that the Japanese government plans to “respond appropriately, including by making further representations to Russia” and “maintaining communication with the ICC and other states parties.”

Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, during a recent parliamentary session, stated, “We have consistently supported the ICC in accordance with our efforts to uphold the rule of law, and we will continue to do so.” 

For further information, please see: 

Anadolu Ajansı – Russia seeks extradition of 9 ICC officials convicted in absentia – 9 Oct. 2026

ICC – Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Mediazona – Performative mail. Russia requests the extradition of current and former ICC judges sentenced in absentia over the Putin warrant – 8 Oct. 2026

NHK World Japan – Russia requests handover of nine ICC officials – 8 Oct. 2026

The Japan Times – Japan calls Russia’s request to extradite ICC head Akane regrettable – 9 Oct. 2026

ua.news – Russia is demanding that the Netherlands extradite the ICC officials who issued an arrest warrant for Putin – 8 Oct. 2026