Uncategorized

September 23, 2026

By: Conner Scholze

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

WASHINGTON, D.C., United States – Filing suit in 2011, practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious movement that started in China in the 1990s, alleged that an American technology company built the surveillance tools China used to find and detain them.

Surveillance cameras in operation in Shanghai, China in January of 2022. Photo Courtesy of Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News.

Under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim Protection Act, plaintiffs, who are practitioners of the Falun Gong religious movement, contended that the Chinese Government persecuted them due to their religious beliefs. Specifically, these victims alleged that Cisco Systems, Inc., aided and abetted international law violations including torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, forced labor, detention, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, and forced disappearance. Through developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend Falun Gong practitioners, the plaintiffs believed that Cisco aided and abetted in violating international law. One plaintiff sought to go so far as to bring a claim against two Cisco executives individually for aiding and abetting torture. Defendant, Cisco, is an American multinational technology corporation that designs and manufactures internet networking devices and services for the communications and information technology industries.

Among the statutes involved, the Alien Tort Statute is a procedural tool that grants federal district courts jurisdiction over civil suits brought by foreign nationals “for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The Torture Victim Protection Act creates civil liability for anyone acting under color of law of any foreign nation who subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.

In June of 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved whether a judicially implied private right of action for aiding and abetting exists under the ATS and under the Torture Victim Protection Act.

As Cisco would ultimately convince the Court, the Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional statute that does not create new private actions for violations of international norms because Congress is tasked with creating private rights. Cases involving the ATS inherently implicate the political branches.

In reaching its decision, the Court drew on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which established that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action. However, Sosa left open a narrow possibility that courts could recognize new causes of action under a two-part test guided by the international norm and judicial discretion. Sosa determined whether a Mexican national who was abducted and arbitrarily detained in Mexico could sue those involved in U.S. courts. On the issue of interpreting the Torture Victim Protection Act, the majority found that the statute’s silence on aiding and abetting created no liability for the two Cisco executives.

In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that under the Torture Victim Protection, subjecting an individual to torture ordinarily means the person “consciously and culpably participates in the torture so as to help make it succeed.”

As American companies continue to operate and sell abroad, the decision forecloses aiding and abetting liability under both statutes for U.S. corporations and their executives, redirecting foreign nationals seeking redress to Congress, the Executive, or other international actors.

For further information, please see:

Supreme Court of the United States – Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, No. 24-856 – 23 June 2026

Supreme Court of the United States – Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 – 29 June 2004

The Alien Tort Statute, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute – Feb. 2024

H.R. 2092 – Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Library of Congress – 25 Nov. 1991

Supreme Court – Alien Tort Statute Does Not Authorize Judicially Created Causes of Action, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP – 25 June 2026

By Kamryn Page

Associate Editor Journal of Global Rights and Organizations

On March 30th, the Israeli Knesset approved legislation that significantly expanded the use of the death penalty, marking a major shift in Israeli criminal law and raising concerns about compliance with international human rights standards. The development comes in the wake of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) July 2024 Advisory Opinion, which found Israel in violation of international legal obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

The newly approved law introduces capital punishment as the default sentence for individuals convicted of intentional killings classified as terrorism in the West Bank. While Israeli law has historically permitted the death penalty in limited circumstances such as genocide, it has not been applied since 1962, and the new framework allows military courts to impose death sentences by a simple majority absent a prosecutorial request requirement, and mandates execution within 90 days with no possibility of commutation or pardon. 

Critics of the new framework argue that it disproportionately targets Palestinian because Israeli settlers in the West Bank are excluded from its application, despite the framework not explicitly targeting a specific nationality or ethnicity. Within Israel, civilian courts may also impose the death penalty for intentional killings deemed to threaten the existence of the state. Human rights organizations argue that the law introduces discriminatory practices and weakens due process protections such as limited access to legal counsel and reduced oversight mechanisms. 

The ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion provides a critical legal context for evaluating the law’s implications, where the Court emphasized that states must ensure equal protection under the law and uphold fundamental rights, including the right to life. 

Human rights advocates argue that the new death penalty law contravenes both these principles, as well as obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 6 of the ICCPR restricts the use of capital punishment to the “most serious crimes” and requires stringent fair trial guarantees.  

Moreover, the European Union has reiterated its long-standing position that the death penalty is incompatible with human dignity and has called for measures in response to Israel’s actions.  

The broader significance of the legislation lies in its potential to deepen concerns about systemic discrimination and accountability. In expanding capital punishment within a contested legal and territorial framework, the law may further strain compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.  

Furthermore, as international scrutiny intensifies following the ICJ’s findings, the implementation and legal challenges to this legislation will likely remain a focal point in ongoing debates over justice and impunity in the region. 

For More Information:  

Council of the European Union – Israel: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the approval of the Death Penalty Bill by the Israeli Parliament – March 31, 2026

Death Penalty Information Center – Israel Passes Mandatory Death Penalty for Palestinians Convicted of Terrorism, Flouting International Law and Drawing Widespread Condemnation – April 2, 2026

Human Rights Watch – Adoption of death penalty law by the Israeli Knesset requires urgent EU measures – April 2, 2026

Reuters – Israel passes death penalty law for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks – March 30, 2026

United Nations – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – 1967

 

By: Eric Boutros
Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

A proposed “Finalissima” match between Argentina and Spain, envisioned as a high-profile soccer contest between continental champions, ultimately failed to materialize amid governance constraints, security concerns, and unresolved institutional accountability. While framed as a logistical and scheduling issue, the collapse of the fixture reflects deeper structural questions about how authority is exercised and reviewed in international sport.

The Finalissima, originally scheduled for March 27, 2026, in Qatar, and jointly organized by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL), and coordinated with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), represents more than a sporting event. These organizations operate as transnational regulators, establishing binding rules governing player release, competition structure, and international scheduling. Although formally private associations, they exercise authority resembling that of public regulatory bodies: their decisions shape labor conditions, commercial markets, and access to international competition on a global scale.

This quasi-public role has increasingly drawn scrutiny in international legal discourse, particularly when decisions affect the rights and interests of athletes and affiliated stakeholders. In this regard, the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland is instructive. There, the Court recognized that the regulatory framework of international sport, though formally private, can have significant implications for individual rights, particularly when affected parties are effectively bound to centralized dispute-resolution mechanisms. The decision reflects a broader acknowledgment that sports governing bodies, by virtue of their structural dominance, operate within a space that implicates principles traditionally associated with public law.

Initial support for the fixture centered on its commercial appeal and symbolic significance. A match between Argentina and Spain promised substantial global engagement and reinforced ongoing cooperation between European and South American football institutions. However, even before external risks emerged, the proposal encountered structural resistance. FIFA’s international match calendar strictly limits available windows, while clubs retain contractual control over player participation. These overlapping constraints reflect a system in which authority is distributed among multiple actors, each with veto power, yet no single entity capable of unilaterally resolving conflicts.

Geopolitical instability ultimately proved decisive. The match was under consideration for Qatar, placing it within a region affected by escalating conflict in the Middle East. As security conditions deteriorated, governing bodies were forced to assess whether proceeding would expose players, staff, and spectators to foreseeable risks. The decision to cancel the fixture can therefore be understood as a form of institutional risk mitigation, consistent with broader expectations that entities exercising regulatory authority take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm.

At the same time, the failure to relocate the match underscores the limitations of the current governance structure. UEFA, CONMEBOL, and FIFA each possess partial authority over scheduling, venue selection, and competition approval, yet none exercises comprehensive control. This fragmentation creates gaps in accountability, where collective decision-making can obscure responsibility. When outcomes result from the interaction of multiple institutions, it becomes difficult to identify a single actor responsible for either the failure to proceed or the inability to find alternatives.

The diffusion of authority is further compounded by the absence of meaningful avenues for review. The cancellation of the Finalissima was not subject to judicial scrutiny, nor was there a clear forum for affected stakeholders, such as players, clubs, or commercial partners, to challenge the decision. As highlighted in Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, the governance structures of international sport often rely on internal or specialized dispute mechanisms that may limit access to independent judicial oversight. In circumstances such as this, where no formal dispute resolution process is triggered, the accountability gap becomes even more pronounced.

The collapse of the proposed Finalissima, therefore, illustrates a broader structural concern: governing bodies exercise regulatory power with transnational impact, yet remain only partially constrained by legal mechanisms designed to ensure transparency, reviewability, and responsibility. While the decision not to proceed may have been justified by legitimate safety concerns, the process by which that decision was reached, and the absence of oversight, raise important questions about governance in a system that increasingly resembles public administration in all but name.

Going forward, this episode highlights the need to reconsider how authority is structured and reviewed in global soccer. As international soccer competitions grow in scale and significance, the institutions that govern them may face increasing pressure to adopt more transparent procedures, clearer lines of responsibility, and mechanisms for independent review. Without such reforms, similar disputes may continue to expose the tension between private governance and public accountability on the global stage.

 

For more information:

Sam Marsden, Spain vs. Argentina Finalissima cancelled due to Middle East conflict, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2026)

Spain v Argentina Finalissima match in Qatar cancelled amid conflict, Al Jazeera (Mar. 15, 2026)

Messi, Yamal and the Finalissima that never was, The Athletic (New York Times) (Mar. 17, 2026)

Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, App. Nos. 40575/10 & 67474/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 2, 2018)

By: Abigail Wilcher

Journal of Global Rights and Organizations, Associate Articles Editor

Strasbourg, France – Osman Kaval (Mr. Kaval), a prominent businessman and human rights advocate, remains unlawfully detained despite two rulings from the European Court of Human Rights declaring his detention arbitrary and politically motivated.

Mr. Kaval is well-known for his involvement in numerous civil society initiatives. Mr. Kaval was arrested in Istanbul in 2017 and placed in pre-trial detention one month after his arrest. Mr. Kaval faced criminal charges related to his alleged participation in the mass protests in the 2013 Gezi protests and the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. Mr. Kaval is serving an aggravated life sentence in Marmara Prison for attempting to overthrow the government. Currently, Mr. Kaval is serving an aggravated life sentence in Marmara Prison, along with other high-profile prisoners, for attempting to overthrow the government.

After unsuccessful attempts to challenge the proceedings in domestic courts, Mr. Kaval appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In 2019, the Court determined that his detention was arbitrary and politically driven, finding that he was detained for exercising fundamental human rights. Further, the Court found that Turkish authorities aimed to silence him. However, despite this judgment and a subsequent European Court of Human Rights decision in 2022 regarding Turkey’s failure to implement the 2019 ruling, Mr. Kaval was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Mr. Kavala has since filed a second application to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging violations of rights under numerous Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. Specifically, Mr Kavala argues that his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair hearing), 7 (no punishment without law), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association, taken together with Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) have been violated as a result of the continuing arbitrary and politically motivated deprivation of his liberty which breached the terms of the ECtHR’s 2019 judgment.

The European Court of Human Rights will hold a Grand Chamber Hearing to review Mr. Kaval’s continued detention following the Court’s 2019 decision ordering his immediate release. The proceedings will address whether Turkey’s refusal to comply with that judgment, as well as Turkey’s later imposition of a life sentence in 2022, constitutes ongoing violations of Mr. Kaval’s rights. Mr. Kaval’s continued imprisonment illustrates the broader systemic failures in Turkey’s legal system by using excessive and prolonged detention. Furthermore, Osman Kaval’s imprisonment has become a defining test of whether the European Court of Human Rights’ judgements carry meaningful authority when member states fail to comply with its orders.

 

For more information:

Türkiye – Statement by the Spokesperson on ECtHR ruling against Türkiye in the Kavala Case (Nov. 7, 2022)  

Kavala v Türkiye (Third Party Intervention)  

ECHR – Case of Kavala v. Türkiye (No. 2): a Six-Week Deadline is Set for Submitting Requests for Third-Party Intervention (Dec. 12, 2025)  

Türkiye: Osman Kavala Marks 7 Years Behind Bars Wrongly Detained Rights Defender Awaits New European Court Ruling (Nov. 1, 2024)   

Jailed Since 2017, Kavala says Turkish Government Made an Example of Him to Intimidate Activists (Feb. 25, 2026)