European Rights Watch

ECHR Rules Cyprus Violated the Rights of Syrian Refugees to Claim Asylum

By: Anjali Basdeo 

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer 

STRASBOURG, FRANCE- On October 8, 2024, in the case of M.A and Z.R v. Cyprus, the ECHR ruled that the Cypriot government violated the rights of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in Cyprus.  

 
Photo of refugees on a Cypriot Marine Police boat after being rescued from their own sunken boat off the southeastern coast of Cyprus. Photo courtesy of Petros Karadjias.
 

M.A. and Z.R. are Syrian nationals who fled their home, Idlib, Syria, in January of 2016 for their own safety and to escape civil war. They ended up in Lebanon where they stayed in camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While at these camps, they allege that there was no access to healthcare or employment opportunities, and they were not entitled to their basic rights. Fearing that they might be sent back to Syria, seeing as Lebanon was sending Syrians back home after the Beirut explosion of 2020, they decided to seek asylum in Cyprus.   

To obtain asylum in Cyprus, M.A. and Z.R. paid smugglers $2,500 each. They had set sail in early September of 2020 on a boat with 30 other refugees. When arriving at the territorial waters of Cyprus, their boat was intercepted by the Cypriot coastguard. They were told that they could not continue their journey, even after M.A. and Z.R. explained their situation. On September 8, after 2 days of being stranded at sea under the control of the Cypriot Marine Police, they were forced onto another boat and sent back to Lebanon where the Lebanese police questioned and detained them before letting them go. As of today, M.A. and Z.R. still live in Lebanon under the UNHCR.  

M.A. and Z.R. brought this suit against the Cypriot court, claiming that their refusal of asylum procedure and forcible departure back to Lebanon violated Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No.4, and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  

The Cypriot government, on the other hand, argued that they returned M.A. and Z.R. back to Lebanon on the basis of a bilateral agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon, which provided for readmission of individuals who entered Cyprus unlawfully. The Cypriot Government contended Lebanon is a safe third country because they (1) have a good relationship with Lebanon and (2) because of the UNHCR and the presence of other UN bodies there to help refugees.  

ECHR RULING 

The ECHR ruled in favor of M.A. and Z.R., stating that the Cypriot government violated Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol No.4, and Article 13 of the Convention by refusing them asylum and forcibly sending them back to Lebanon without reviewing their claims and circumstances. 

Violation Under Article 3 

Article 3 of the Convention conveys that no person shall be subjected to degrading or inhumane treatments. The court stated that it cannot overlook the fact that M.A. and Z.R. were stranded at sea for two days under Cypriot authority just to be forcibly sent back to Lebanon without even having their asylum claims investigated.  

The Court also stated that Cypriot officials should have known of the various shortcomings of the Lebanese asylum system and weighed the consequences of sending M.A. and Z.R. back. There is no evidence that the Cypriot officials assessed the ineffective asylum process or the living conditions of the asylum seekers there before sending them back. Cyprus officials knew or should have known of these conditions, yet they forced M.A. and Z.R. back to persecution without looking into their situation.  

The Cypriot government also argued that they thought Lebanon was a safe third country because of their bilateral agreement with each other and the presence of UN bodies. In response, the Court reiterated that countries should not rely on others for their own refugee obligations. 

Hence, under Article 3, the court ruled that Cyprus failed their refugee obligations and to follow the proper procedures for assessing asylum claims before sending M.A. and Z.R. back to Lebanon.  

Violation Under Article 4 of Protocol No.4 

Article 4 under Protocol No.4 prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens. Exceptions to this article only happen where this collective expulsion is done reasonably after proper examinations of the aliens in the group as individuals. Here, the Cypriot government did not investigate any claims of any of the refugees on the boat and still expelled them back to Lebanon.  

The Court says that the purpose of this article is to prevent States from removing foreign nationals without first examining their circumstances. Here, the Court rules that Cyprus forcibly returning M.A. and Z.R. to Lebanon without investigating their circumstances and asylum claims falls under the definition of collective expulsion and they are thus in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No.4 under the Convention.   

Violation Under Article 13 

Article 13 expresses the right to an effective remedy. In the case present, the Cypriot authorities deprived M.A. and Z.R. of an effective remedy by not examining their claims and forcibly deporting them back to Lebanon. This article was read in conjunction with Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.  

The ECHR has ruled on behalf of Syrian refugees and hold Cyprus liable for not following proper refugee procedure in examining the asylum claims of M.A. and Z.R. and forcibly sending them back to conditions that they were trying to escape.   

There are many stories of Syrian refugees similar to M.A. and Z.R., where they have been refused of asylum procedures by Cypriot authorities and were forced back to Lebanon to face persecution and risk being sent back to Syria. This ruling can change the landscape of refugee rights and bring awareness to the inhumane treatments that the Cypriot government imposes on Syrian refugees seeking asylum.  

 

For further information, please see:  

ECHR- Case of M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus – 8 Oct. 2024 

ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights – 1 Aug. 2021 

Human Rights Watch – Lebanon/Cyprus: Refugees Pulled Back, Expelled, Then Forced Back to Syria – 4 Sept. 2024 

 

Russia Violates Freedom of Expression in Recent ECHR Case

By: Neha Chhablani

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer

 

STRASBOURG, France – On October 15th, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held that Russia violated the right to Freedom of Expression in the case of Gadzhiyev and Gostev v. Russia. The case concerned two applicants who were dismissed from their jobs after criticizing workplace practices without permission. The ECHR’s ruling challenged Russia’s strict prohibition on public statements issued by State employees.   

While the ECHR ruled on Mr. Gadzhiyev and Mr. Gostev’s cases together, their individual claims were slightly different. Mr. Gadzhiyev served as a police colonel for the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior since 1978. In 2013, after his previous attempts to raise awareness about corruption within regional police forces failed, Mr. Gadzhiyev arranged a meeting with the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs. In anticipation of this meeting, he gave four interviews with media outlets in which he claimed the presence of corruption. On March 1st, 2013, the Minister of the Interior of Dagestan opened an investigation and found that Mr. Gadzhiyev failed to get permission from the Public Relations Department for interviews. Ultimately, he was dismissed from his post because he failed to seek this approval and spoke out negatively against a government agency, which was a violation of domestic law. All national courts ruled against or dismissed Mr. Gadzhiyev’s case on the grounds that he criticized a government agency without concrete facts to support his claims.

 
Photograph of Moscow Metro. Photo Courtesy of David Burdeny.
 

Mr. Gostev was an employee of the Moscow Metro since 1992 and, in 2014, became chairman of the Metro Workers’ trade union. After a series of technical accidents, the trade union organized protests to draw attention to the safety conditions of the metro service. After further issues, Mr. Gostev gave two interviews with media outlets, during which he commented on the safety deficiencies of the metro system. The Moscow Metro Authority issued a reprimand to Mr. Gostev, as all employees were required to publish material through the metro press service and not engage with the press directly. After his second interview was published, the Authority fired Mr. Gostev. National courts rejected Mr. Gostev’s application, stating that he had been informed of the proper procedures for communicating with the press but chose to ignore them. They found that his dismissal was not an infringement of freedom of expression, only a restriction on his exercise of this right.

            Due to their similarity, the ECHR considered Mr. Gostev and Mr. Gadzhiyev’s case at the same time. The court determined that the purpose of their statements was to safeguard the public and they had no malintent. Although the domestic courts ruled a lack of evidence, numerous police officers corroborated Mr. Gadzhiyev’s claims, demonstrating their validity. Furthermore, while domestic courts claimed Mr. Gostev’s statements could have harmed Moscow Metro, they failed to show any evidence of harm.

            Ultimately, the ECHR ruled that the severity of punishment was disproportionate to the crime, given the relevance and legitimacy of Mr. Gostev and Mr. Gadzhiyev’s statements. They ruled that strict enforcement of Russian law prohibiting or discouraging any negative statements made to the public could deter employees, union representatives, and whistleblowers from voicing legitimate concerns.

            While the court held that Russia was to pay 9,950 and 10,500 euros to Mr. Gadzhiyev and Mr. Gostev, respectively, the ruling implied a broader disagreement with Russian law and its application regarding the prohibition of public statements against the State. Ultimately, the ECHR suggests Russia should evaluate the presence of democratic procedures within the State when claiming that interference with freedom of expression is unnecessary in a democratic society.

 

For further information, please see:

European Court of Human Rights – CASE OF GADZHIYEV AND GOSTEV v.

RUSSIA – (15 Oct. 2024)

European Court of Human Rights – European Convention on Human Rights – (20 Oct. 2024)

European Court of Human Rights – Gadzhiyev and Gostev v. Russia Press Release – (15 Oct. 2024)

 

ECHR Holds Turkey Violated Seven Individuals’ Right to Freedom of Expression

By: Sarah Peck

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer

 

STRASBOURG, France On October 8, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in four separate cases that Turkey had violated Article 10 of the European Convention for Human Rights, the right to freedom of expression.  According to the ECHR, the Turkish government wrongfully imposed on seven individuals suspended sentences of imprisonment and lengthy probations for comments each had made criticizing the governing bodies of Turkey, including the President and Prime Minister at the time.

 
Photo of a crowd with a Turkish flag on a street. Photo courtesy of Emir Bozkurt.
 

The Convictions

Bayram Yorulmaz, Abuzer Serdar Özlü, Binali Erdoğan, Mihriban Şorli, Tugay Kurnaz, Saide İnaç, and Jinda Açıkgöz were all convicted by Turkish courts of offenses under the Turkish Criminal Code as a result of either verbal or written criticisms of the Turkish Government or its officials. The convictions included:

Bayram Yorulmaz: A public official at the Adana courthouse in Turkey charged with the offense of insulting a public official.

Abuzer Serdar Özlü: A Turkish national convicted of public denigration of the Turkish Nation, the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and the judicial bodies of the state for nine publications he had made on his Twitter account in March and April 2016.

Binali Erdoğan: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic via a Facebook post.

Mihriban Şorli: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic via comments she made verbally during an altercation with police officers.

Tugay Kurnaz: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic and overtly insulting a public official via Facebook and Twitter.

Saide İnaç: A German national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic by sharing an article via Facebook post, which stated that the President of the Republic had provoked attacks on the Kurds and caused their massacre.

Jinda Açıkgöz: A Turkish national convicted of insulting the President of the Republic via Facebook posts.

 

The Criticisms

The individuals’ criticisms varied in severity. Some examples include:

Mr. Yorulmaz: “They sneeringly give each other as gifts the paintings of the people they condemned to death… What is this? Effrontery? Insolence? Perversion?”

Mr. Özlü: “You suspended the Constitution and cancelled out the police and the judiciary because of the bribes this man distributed to your Ministers!”

Mr. Erdoğan: “You and your damned presidency, that’s enough!”

Ms. Şorli: “You [your] dishonourable Tayyip (şerefsiz) can’t do anything to me, Tayyip’s soldiers killed my brother in the mountains, I’m going to retaliate.”

 

The Sentences

For each of the convictions, the Turkish Government handed down the following sentences:

Individual

Imprisonment

Probation

Bayram Yorulmaz

Eleven months and twelve days, suspended

Five years

Abuzer Serdar Özlü

Five months, suspended

Five years

Binali Erdoğan

Held for one month in pre-trial detention and sentenced to ten months, suspended

Five years

Mihriban Şorli

Ten months, suspended

Five years

Tugay Kurnaz

One year, two months and seventeen days, suspended

Five years

Saide İnaç

One year, five months and fifteen days, suspended

Five years

Jinda Açıkgöz

One year, two months and seventeen days, suspended

Five years

 

The ECHR’s Ruling

In each of the cases, the Turkish Government argued that the suspension of the prison sentence meant that the individuals had not suffered any obligations or restrictions, and therefore did not have victim status. However, the ECHR determined that despite the suspension of the imprisonment, the criminal convictions amounted to an interference with their exercise of the right to freedom of expression  as the sentences may have had  a deterrent effect. The ECHR further noted that the Turkish national authorities failed to weigh the interests at stake in accordance with the criteria in Turkey’s case law and the interferences were not shown to have been necessary in a democratic society.

Citing Durukan and Birol v. Türkiye, the ECHR explained that Article 231 of Turkey’s Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the suspension of pronouncement of judgments entailing convictions, did not offer the required protection against arbitrary infringement by the public authorities of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention for Human Rights.

The ECHR found that the Government of Turkey had violated the right to freedom of expression in each case and ordered Turkey to pay following penalties:

Individual

Non-Pecuniary Damages

Costs & Expenses

Bayram Yorulmaz

2,216 euros (EUR)

EUR 1,500

Abuzer Serdar Özlü

EUR 2,600

EUR 1,000

Binali Erdoğan

EUR 5,000

N/A

Mihriban Şorli

EUR 2,600

N/A

Tugay Kurnaz

EUR 2,600

N/A

Saide İnaç

EUR 2,600

N/A

Jinda Açıkgöz

EUR 2,600

EUR 1,000

 

For further information, please see:

ECHR – Case of Açikgöz v. Türkiye – 8 Oct. 2024

ECHR – Case of Durukan and Birol v. Türkiye – 3 Oct. 2023

ECHR – Case of Erdoğan and Others v. Türkiye – 8 Oct. 2024

ECHR – Case of Özlü v. Türkiye – 8 Oct. 2024

ECHR – Case of Yorulmaz v. Türkiye – 8 Oct. 2024

 

 

 

ECHR Rules Spain Violated Right to Privacy and Freedom of Religion

By: Neha Chhablani

Impunity Watch News Staff Writer

 

STRASBOURG, France – On September 17, 2024, in the case of Pindo Mulla v. Spain, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Spain had violated the right to privacy and religious freedom of Ms. Rosa Edelmira Pindo Mulla, a Jehovah’s witness, by administering blood transfusions against her will. The ruling marks another victory for individual autonomy and religious freedom in healthcare, reaffirming the ECHR’s commitment to self-determination.

 
Photograph of the Pindo Mulla v. Spain judgement delivery. Photo Courtesy of the European Court of Human Rights.
 

Ms. Rosa Edelmira Pindo Mulla, an Ecuadorian national living in Spain, firmly opposes blood transfusions due to her religious beliefs. Following a series of medical evaluations between May and July 2017, she was advised to undergo surgery to remove a myoma. In preparation for the procedure, she issued two legal documents—an advance directive and a lasting power of attorney—refusing blood transfusions under any circumstance.

On June 6, 2018, Ms. Pindo Mulla was admitted to the hospital due to severe internal bleeding. She reiterated her refusal of a blood transfusion and was transferred to a specialized hospital in Madrid that could provide alternative treatments. However, multiple miscommunications during this transfer—including incomplete sharing of her advance directive, unclear information about treatment preferences, and a failure to consult with her or her family—resulted in a duty judge authorizing blood transfusions without knowledge of her legal documents or religious beliefs. The doctors administered three life-saving blood transfusions while Ms. Pindo Mulla was unaware and unable to give informed consent. 

Ms. Pindo Mulla pursued her case through each level of the Spanish judiciary before appealing to the ECHR. Both the local judge and the provincial court concluded that the absence of her advance directive and insufficient evidence of her refusal justified the transfusion. When the case reached Spain’s Constitutional Court, she argued that medical professionals violated her rights to legal protection, physical integrity, and freedom of religion, under Articles 24, 15, and 16 respectively of the Spanish Constitution. Ultimately, her appeal was deemed inadmissible as it did not meet the “special constitutional significance” threshold under Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

On March 13, 2020, Ms. Pindo Mulla brought her case to the ECHR, claiming that Spain violated Article 8 (right to respect for private life) and 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Spain relinquished jurisdiction to the ECHR on July 4, 2023, and the Grand Chamber hearing took place on January 10, 2024.

The court scrutinized the medical professionals’ decision-making process and evaluated whether they had shown sufficient respect for Ms. Pindo Mulla’s autonomy. Based on its investigation, the court determined that the doctors’ shortcomings in providing incomplete information and failing to confirm consent prevented her from exercising self-determination and autonomy. The court ruled that Spain had violated Article 8 in light of Article 9 and ordered the government to pay Ms. Pindo Mulla 12,000 Euros in non-pecuniary damage and 14,000 Euros for her legal costs and treatment expenses.

In this case, the ECHR had to carefully weigh the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR and the right to religious freedom. While medical professionals justified their actions as necessary to preserve life, the court held that when a patient refuses treatment freely, autonomously, explicitly, and without ambiguity—as Ms. Pindo Mulla had done—the right to autonomy supersedes the right to life. By ruling in her favor, the ECHR reaffirmed the primacy of self-determination in healthcare and strengthened the legal protections of religious minorities in medical jurisprudence.

 

For further information, please see:

ECHR – Case of Pindo Mulla v. Spain – 17 Sept. 2024

ECHR – Grand Chamber Judgment Pindo Mulla v. Spain – 17 Sept. 2024

ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights – 29 Sept. 2024

Human Rights Without Frontiers – EUROPEAN COURT: Ruling about forced blood transfusion of a Jehovah’s Witness – 17 Sept. 2024

Tribunal Constitucional de España – The Spanish Constitution – 29 Sept. 2024

ICJ Genocide Convention Ruling is a Pyrrhic Victory for Ukraine

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On 2 February 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a landmark decision for Ukraine’s case against Russia regarding genocide allegations. The ICJ rendered its decision on the preliminary objections concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). 32 States intervened.

 
Dead bodies are placed in a mass grave on the outskirts of Mariupol, Ukraine. People cannot bury their dead because of the heavy shelling by Russian forces. Courtesy of Evgeniy Maloletka and the Associated Press.
 

Ukraine employed an exceptional legal maneuver. Because there is no international court with jurisdiction over UN Charter violations or the crime of aggression, Ukraine used the dispute resolution provision in the CPPCG to bring Russia to court. To justify its invasion, Russia claimed Ukraine was committing genocide against the Russian ethnic minority in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine used Russia’s disinformation against it. Ukraine argued that this established a dispute under the CPPCG and called for Court resolution. While the Court ordered Russia to suspend its military operations in the region to begin its provisional measures and investigations, Russia unsurprisingly ignored the order. 

While these provisional measures seemed a big win for Ukraine in the early stages of the war, the mixed decision in February of this year has left many claiming the Court failed to deliver. The ICJ unanimously dismissed Russia’s procedural objections in its judgment, ruling that the Court can decide on the merits if Ukraine violated the CPPCG in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. Many human rights advocacy organizations highlighted how important the admissibility of reverse compliance claims is as Russia continues to spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and hate speech. The unanimous dismissal of Russia’s procedural objections in the genocide case was a victory for Ukraine’s legal battles. Still, many regret that the ICJ did not determine Russia’s false allegations of genocide to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to fall within the scope of the CPPCG. By sustaining Russia’s objection regarding subject-matter jurisdiction by a 12 to 4 vote, the Court raised significant concerns about applying the CPPCG in broad contexts.

Ukraine’s pyrrhic victory means that its conduct, not Russia’s has been the subject of the hearing. However, the Court has still been able to review Russia’s key justification for its military campaign. Anton Korynevych, Ukraine’s legal team leader told reporters, “It is important that the court will decide on the issue that Ukraine is not responsible for some mythical genocide, which the Russian Federation falsely alleged that Ukraine has committed.” 

Additionally, Russia’s violations of the Court’s provisional measures order might also give Ukraine some more room to maneuver. However, they must contend with a Court likely unwilling to rule on an issue in the borders of its jurisdictional boundaries, especially when its ruling will likely be ignored. A redundant declaration of illegality, while satisfying, may do little more than keep waning support mobilized. The nations condemning Russia’s acts would likely condemn regardless of the Court’s rulings, and Moscow has had no reservations ignoring the holdings.

This may pose additional challenges to the international community when addressing serious human rights violations. The Court is in the middle of a highly charged political, legal, and military confrontation with no police or military to back its decisions. The only formal mechanism for Court decision enforcement is referral to the Security Council. But when the state subject to the decision retains a permanent seat on the Council, the chance of an enforcement resolution is slim. The Court must be careful to preserve its legitimacy in light of its predicament. While there were no obviously negative consequences of the mixed decision, it has pushed Ukraine to focus even more intensely on evidence collection of human rights violations and crimes committed by Russian forces to increase the chances of future legal victories. 

 

This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

ICJ – 182 – Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 18 Oct. 2022

Just Security –  Taking Stock of ICJ Decisions in the ‘Ukraine v. Russia’ Cases—And implications for South Africa’s case against Israel – 5 Feb. 2024

ICJ – Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 2 Feb. 2024

Relief Web – Mixed decisions by the International Court of Justice on Russia’s responsibility in crimes committed in Ukraine – 6 Feb. 2024

Associated Press – The UN’s top court says it has jurisdiction in part of Ukraine’s genocide case against Russia – 2 Feb. 2024