European Rights Watch

ICJ Genocide Convention Ruling is a Pyrrhic Victory for Ukraine

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – On 2 February 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a landmark decision for Ukraine’s case against Russia regarding genocide allegations. The ICJ rendered its decision on the preliminary objections concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). 32 States intervened.

 
Dead bodies are placed in a mass grave on the outskirts of Mariupol, Ukraine. People cannot bury their dead because of the heavy shelling by Russian forces. Courtesy of Evgeniy Maloletka and the Associated Press.
  

Ukraine employed an exceptional legal maneuver. Because there is no international court with jurisdiction over UN Charter violations or the crime of aggression, Ukraine used the dispute resolution provision in the CPPCG to bring Russia to court. To justify its invasion, Russia claimed Ukraine was committing genocide against the Russian ethnic minority in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine used Russia’s disinformation against it. Ukraine argued that this established a dispute under the CPPCG and called for Court resolution. While the Court ordered Russia to suspend its military operations in the region to begin its provisional measures and investigations, Russia unsurprisingly ignored the order. 

While these provisional measures seemed a big win for Ukraine in the early stages of the war, the mixed decision in February of this year has left many claiming the Court failed to deliver. The ICJ unanimously dismissed Russia’s procedural objections in its judgment, ruling that the Court can decide on the merits if Ukraine violated the CPPCG in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. Many human rights advocacy organizations highlighted how important the admissibility of reverse compliance claims is as Russia continues to spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and hate speech. The unanimous dismissal of Russia’s procedural objections in the genocide case was a victory for Ukraine’s legal battles. Still, many regret that the ICJ did not determine Russia’s false allegations of genocide to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to fall within the scope of the CPPCG. By sustaining Russia’s objection regarding subject-matter jurisdiction by a 12 to 4 vote, the Court raised significant concerns about applying the CPPCG in broad contexts.

Ukraine’s pyrrhic victory means that its conduct, not Russia’s has been the subject of the hearing. However, the Court has still been able to review Russia’s key justification for its military campaign. Anton Korynevych, Ukraine’s legal team leader told reporters, “It is important that the court will decide on the issue that Ukraine is not responsible for some mythical genocide, which the Russian Federation falsely alleged that Ukraine has committed.” 

Additionally, Russia’s violations of the Court’s provisional measures order might also give Ukraine some more room to maneuver. However, they must contend with a Court likely unwilling to rule on an issue in the borders of its jurisdictional boundaries, especially when its ruling will likely be ignored. A redundant declaration of illegality, while satisfying, may do little more than keep waning support mobilized. The nations condemning Russia’s acts would likely condemn regardless of the Court’s rulings, and Moscow has had no reservations ignoring the holdings.

This may pose additional challenges to the international community when addressing serious human rights violations. The Court is in the middle of a highly charged political, legal, and military confrontation with no police or military to back its decisions. The only formal mechanism for Court decision enforcement is referral to the Security Council. But when the state subject to the decision retains a permanent seat on the Council, the chance of an enforcement resolution is slim. The Court must be careful to preserve its legitimacy in light of its predicament. While there were no obviously negative consequences of the mixed decision, it has pushed Ukraine to focus even more intensely on evidence collection of human rights violations and crimes committed by Russian forces to increase the chances of future legal victories. 

 

This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

ICJ – 182 – Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 18 Oct. 2022

Just Security –  Taking Stock of ICJ Decisions in the ‘Ukraine v. Russia’ Cases—And implications for South Africa’s case against Israel – 5 Feb. 2024

ICJ – Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – 2 Feb. 2024

Relief Web – Mixed decisions by the International Court of Justice on Russia’s responsibility in crimes committed in Ukraine – 6 Feb. 2024

Associated Press – The UN’s top court says it has jurisdiction in part of Ukraine’s genocide case against Russia – 2 Feb. 2024



Russian Departure from the European Council and EUCHR Leaves Behind Questions About How to Handle Cases

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

STRASBOURG, France – After Russia’s departure from the European Court of Human Rights (EUCHR), questions about how to handle cases pending before the Court and the alleged dilution of standards that initially allowed Russia to join the Court remain. 

 
Kremlin forces in Russian-occupied Donetsk drive tanks during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade, marking the anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in WWII. Courtesy of Alexander Ermochenko and Reuters.
  

In 2002, the Court issued its first judgment against Russia to assist a Russian national conscripted to work on the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster after brutal radiation exposure. But by 2012, 22,358 complaints had been filed against Russia. With a backlog of more than 120,000 cases, the Court was already facing a docket crisis, only exacerbated by Russia’s expulsion. In 2022, 2,129 judgments and decisions and 17,450 applications were pending against Russia.

The war in Ukraine only raised the count, and ECHR began publishing interim verdicts. Many view these procedural changes as undermining the Court’s ability to handle cases in its jurisdiction. That said, the interim ruling was the first international court to prove Russia’s occupation in Donbas since 2014 and considered the evidence from the occupied territories, including the downing of flight MH17 and actions by the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) and members of the Russian military.

But now, after the Russian exit, many question how the Court can handle the previously pending cases without jurisdiction, and these uncertainties are only exacerbated by Russia’s departure from the Council of Europe as well. Critics claim Russia was a thorn in both by weakening democratic standards in exchange for only mild internal reform in Russia. 

These tensions have pervaded since Russia considered membership in 1994. And since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the relationship has been a sour one, with Russia refusing to pay dues. When Ukraine filed complaints against Russia’s acts, Russia did not listen to the ensuing Court orders. In 2022, after the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin did not listen to the Court order to stop hostilities. This situation deeply challenges the assumption that it is better to include rogue actors in international legal associations. Since Russia backed out, it is unclear if inclusion led to more harm or good, but it is clear that the Council and associated court were not successful in spreading liberal democracy to Russia as it had hoped.

Russia’s departure has not stopped the Council of Europe from acting on behalf of its victims in Ukraine and previously in Georgia. A key issue in these deliberations is identifying and defining conflict borders, which looks largely at where each state has control of its territory. Relying on past Georgian precedent, the ECHR did not have the jurisdiction to define borders because the “fog of war” prevented recognition of control during active hostilities. But earlier this year, the ECHR was able to rule that Russia controlled the DPR and LPR territories as of 2014 and assigned responsibility for the MH17 flight among other acts. Despite this ruling and revelation of the DPR and LPR alignment with Russia, the Kremlin continues to deny involvement. The ECHR ruling was certainly a political win for Ukraine, confirming the invasion began in 2014, not February 2022. It debunked Russian claims about independent separatist movements justifying the invasion. Russia’s objection to the ECHR’s subject matter jurisdiction over complaints concerning armed conflict was also rejected.

For now, the ECHR is considering issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The ECHR is considering any exceptional circumstances including jurisdiction ratione loci and jurisdiction ratione personae. The ECHR will consider occupation and annexation of another’s territory, whether unlawful or lawful and state agent’s authority over individuals in the territory. This is a win for Ukraine in that it legally declares when the war began, extending it to eight years earlier. The question that now remains is how to address violations that occurred after September 16, 2022, when Russia left the ECHR. It will remain responsible for acts carried out before that date, but no one is expecting compliance in the near future. If it seeks to return one day, a different question will emerge, but until then, the ECHR seems to be limited temporally by which violations it can examine. 

 

This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.



Court House News – One year after Russian expulsion from top European human rights body, Ukraine war rages on – 15 Sep. 2023

European Committee on Legal Co-operation – Supporting Ukraine in the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights   

Atlantic Council – ECHR ruling confirms Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2014 – 14 Feb. 2023

Gibson Dunn – Russia in the European Court of Human Rights – Recent Decisions May Impact Rights of Investors – 30 May 2023 

Just Security – Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine and Beyond: Seizing Opportunities, Confronting Challenges and Avoiding False Dilemmas – 2 April 2024



Ukraine Revamps Constitutional Court System Amid Corruption Charges to Prosecute Russian Aggressors

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

KYIV, Ukraine – The Constitutional Court, Ukraine’s highest legal power, was in crisis before Russia’s invasion in 2022. Now the country, in the middle of armed conflict, must remake its legal institutions if it wants to prosecute Russian aggressors captured in its territory. 

 
The inside of Ukraine’s Constitutional Court House. Photo courtesy of Ukrainian Constitutional Court House website.
  

From judges with conflicts of interest to alleged presidential interference, to backtracking corruption efforts, Ukraine must find a way to rectify its courts quickly. After a series of failed judicial reform bills, President Zelensky reconvened the Commission on Legal Reform. During the initial days of the Russian invasion, the Constitutional Court delayed major rulings, but now the Court seeks to prosecute individual Russians and perhaps even Russia as a whole for the crime of aggression. 

While negotiations on an ad hoc tribunal for the crime of aggression have garnered the majority of the media attention, Ukrainian prosecutors have forged ahead and begun domestic investigations while the international community determines the crime of aggression question. The Ukrainian criminal code prohibits the crime of aggression under Article 437. This includes “‘the planning, preparation, initiation and conduct’ of aggressive war, as well as ‘participation in conspiracy aimed at commission’ of such actions.” The Ukrainian code does not require the prosecuted individual to be in a position of leadership, unlike the Rome statute so even ordinary fighters and soldiers can be found guilty of aggressively waging war and the associated actus reus. 

The first conviction of the crime of aggression in the Ukrainian courts happened in May 2022, when 21-year-old Russian tank commander, Vadim Shishimarin was jailed for life after shooting an unarmed civilian, 62-year-old Oleksandr Shelipov, a few days after the invasion began. By July 2022, Ukraine’s prosecutor-general, Iryna Venediktova, and her office were investigating more than 21,000 war crimes and crimes of aggression allegedly committed by Russian forces. By March 2023, at least 26 war crimes suspects had been convicted by Ukrainian courts.

Before Russia’s invasion, national courts rarely saw aggression cases. Now, prosecutors are beginning to align Article 437 of the Ukrainian criminal codes to a more narrow scope, similar to the Rome statute. In the past, legislative attempts to bring Article 437 up the Rome standard failed. These prosecutions offer an interesting case study, as they show legal advocates conforming the code to international standards when the legislation and courts themselves have deprioritized doing so. Even with the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (OPG) sending guidance on standardized prisoner of war (POW) immunity, prosecutors seemed to be conforming to international humanitarian norms on combatant immunity fairly seamlessly.

Despite its corruption crisis, in February of this year, the Court issued a decision on an Article 437 case. It clarified who could be found guilty of the crime of aggression, further aligning Ukraine with international standards, rather than the criminal code’s broad definition. When the decision was released, 99 criminal aggression cases were registered, including cases against typical defendants, like military commanders, foreign intelligence service workers, and high-level state officials, but also including 30 “instigators of war” such as Russian singers and university rectors. While many–if not most–of these will take place in absentia, whether the Court can successfully rule on an atypical defendant’s crime of aggression poses an interesting challenge for the Court.

Additionally, Ukraine’s domestic prosecutors have an important opportunity to set a precedent for how the crime of aggression could be handled at national levels. This could set customary international law norms in an area that has seen little activity in the past century, which could be key to protecting the right to life. It is interesting to note that the list of potential defendants does not include notable suspects in aggression cases like President Putin himself and other members of the Troika. The Court seems committed, at least right now, to preserving the immunity of the Troika before its courts. It seems generally accepted that these personal immunities cannot be surpassed at a national level and will need some kind of extraordinary judicial response. 

 

This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

Cites:

BBC News – What is a war crime and could Putin be prosecuted over Ukraine? – 20 July 2023

Confronting Challenges and Avoiding False Dilemmas – 2 April 2024

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute- Ukraine’s Constitutional Court Crisis, Explained

Just Security –  Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine and Beyond: Seizing Opportunities, 



ICC Seeks to Prosecute a Military Mastermind

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

THE HAGUE, Netherlands – Since March of 2023, the ICC has sought to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova. However, as Russia is not an ICC signatory, it is unlikely that Putin or Lvova-Belova will be extradited for trial soon. 

 
President Vladimir Putin delivers a statement at the Kremlin in Moscow on July 5, 2024. Courtesy of Alexander Nemenov and Agence France-Presse.
  

Both are allegedly responsible for war crimes related to unlawful deportation and transportation of population, specifically children, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine as far back as 2022 in violation of Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii). Incidents identified by the prosecutor’s office include deporting children removed from orphanages and child care homes. Many of these children were allegedly given up for adoption in the Russian Federation, and Russian law was changed via presidential decree to expedite citizenship. These acts demonstrate an intention to remove these children from their home country permanently, which violates the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moscow has denied the allegations and called the warrants outrageous.

Pre-Trial Chamber II considered, based on the Prosecution’s applications in February 2023, that there were reasonable grounds to that each suspect may bear responsibility for the unlawful deportation of population and the unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, particularly in prejudice of Ukrainian children. The Court had evidence of individual criminal responsibility for both under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and against Putin for failure to properly control civilian and military subordinates under Article 28(b). The warrants were considered in secret to protect the witnesses and investigation.

Prosecuting a military mastermind is no easy task and could undermine the Court; however, as the crimes addressed are allegedly ongoing, there is some hope that despite the unlikelihood of extradition, public awareness of the warrants may prevent further crimes. The Chamber considered this to be in the interest of justice and allowed the Registry to publicize the warrants’ existence, the suspect’s names, the warrants’ crimes, and the modes of liability the Chamber established.

The UN Commission of Inquiry of Ukraine found that Russian authorities took over 16,200 children out of Ukraine into Russia. The same Commission found evidence of rapes, torture, and killings, and has been investigating as far back as 2013 before the illegal annexation of Crimea. While the ICC can bring a prosecution against political leaders for waging an aggressive war, the Court seems to be focusing on civilian and children’s rights for now. Additionally, while the warrants recognize these acts as war crimes, commentators are making the case that the conduct also constitutes genocide and crimes against humanity. The decision to pursue these as war crimes may be an indication of evidence related to intent. With both the alleged crimes and evidence collection ongoing, the charges may be amended.

The Court has no power of enforcement instead relying on the 124 nations that are signatories to the Rome Statute to arrest those indicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity if they visit their territories. And yet, the Court issued the warrants. The decision to pursue charges against Putin sends a strong signal to low-level perpetrators that none are immune from prosecution and may serve as a deterrent. Plus, while Putin is not the first sitting head of state to be indicted, he is the first leader of a P5 country to be indicted. The ICC arrest warrants have impacted Putin internationally. He did not attend the BRICS summit in August 2023 in South Africa. Besides hindering potential international travel for Putin, the warrants make meeting with Putin less appealing. The stakes for engaging with Putin are becoming increasingly high for foreign governments. Combined with sanctions, the ICC warrants make it harder to ignore Russian actions in Ukraine and the brutality of its war. Even as many celebrate the ICC’s announcement, the Ukrainian government and like-minded partners continue to press for international support for the establishment of the tribunal to hold Russia accountable for the full breadth of crimes committed, specifically the crime of aggression.



This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

United States Institute of Peace – How the ICC’s Warrant for Putin Could Impact the Ukraine War – 23 March 2023

ICC – Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova – 17 March 2023

ICC – Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova – 17 March 2023

International Crisis Group – A New Court to Prosecute Russia’s Illegal War? – 29 March 2023

BBC News – What is a war crime and could Putin be prosecuted over Ukraine? – 20 July 2023

Foreign Affairs – Would Prosecuting Russia Prolong the War in Ukraine? – 12 July 2023



International Community Calls for a New Court to Prosecute the Crime of Aggression

Zoé Tkaczyk

Impunity Watch News Guest Writer

 

Shortly after Russia launched its unlawful, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many began advocating for a new tribunal to prosecute Russian leadership for the crime of aggression. With 30 core states discussing the creation of a new adjudicative body, proponents are pushing for a way to address Russia’s breach of the international order and create deterrence in the future. 

 
A woman mourns at her son’s grave after he died fighting in the war on Ukrainian Independence Day in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Courtesy of Bram Janssen and Associated Press.
  

First recognized by the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, the crime of aggression, as defined by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits the use of force, barring narrow exceptions. It imposes criminal liability on those in violation. Largely dormant throughout the Cold War, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute sought to bring the crime under its jurisdiction but controversy at the time has left both the definition and activation apparently in limbo. Even with the additional Kampala amendments created in 2018 after the atrocities in Uganda, the grey zone remains. This has led many to call for a separate tribunal, akin to the one established at Nuremberg, to handle aggression cases stemming from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Beyond WWII, cases prosecuting aggression are scant. The UN Security Council set up courts to try the perpetrators of atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 90’s but with Russia as a permanent member, this is not a viable option. 

Further bolstering their demands, the Rome Statute has a major loophole: only parties to the Rome Statute fall under ICC jurisdiction. This means Russia, a non-party, cannot be tried by the Court currently. Additionally, domestic courts afford many members of The Russian Troika, including Putin, immunity. Coupled with the lack of precedent for prosecuting this crime generally, the ad hoc tribunal is becoming more compelling. 

Three major legal solutions have emerged. The first is a multilateral treaty between Ukraine and willing states, similar to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The second is a Ukraine-UN tribunal created via resolution. The last is a domestic-international hybrid chamber based in Ukraine. The first two circumvent the troika prosecution problem, and the deputy head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office has rejected the third option as unconstitutional. Many are opposed to a tribunal that would present the crime of aggression as something bilateral, between Ukraine and Russia alone, but much of this hinges on the level of international participation.

Because the crime of aggression carries a unique gravity, many are advocating for a clearly defined and replicable solution to serve a deterrent effect. In the meantime, many efforts to gather and preserve evidence of aggression are ongoing. EU member states have already agreed to support establishing a Centre for Prosecution in the Hague with American endorsement. This staggered approach has come with benefits already. As “the mother of all crimes”, whatever option the world chooses will likely become precedent in the future, further complicating the matter. As worries of selective justice and tribunal legitimacy continue, how to prosecute the crime of aggression is a legal question we may finally get an answer to; however, it will also be impossible to separate these two nations’ complex, centuries-long history without prosecution, definition, and resolution. As accountability efforts continue, Ukraine must determine which normative expectations it seeks to abide by and consider negotiating the Rome Statute and Kampala Amendments or developing a tribunal system prepared to adjudicate over the troika.

 

Note: This article is one of a seven-part series exploring the Russo-Ukrainian War. Zoé Tkaczyk is a J.D./MAIR candidate (May 2025) at the Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. This article series was inspired by sessions from the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab Fellowship: Postwar: Europe, Ukraine and the Future of European Order. Special thanks to Cora True-Frost and Alexa Connaughton for their guidance, feedback, and edits.

 

Just Security – Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine and Beyond: Seizing Opportunities, Confronting Challenges and Avoiding False Dilemmas – 2 April 2024

International Crisis Group – A New Court to Prosecute Russia’s Illegal War? – 29 March 2023